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Abstract 
This landscape report describes the state of play of the European Union’s policies and activities in security 
and defence and the EU-funded research aimed at supporting them, with an exclusive focus on intentional 
harm. It is organised around several thematic building blocks under the umbrella of the three core priorities 
defined in the European agenda on security.  
The report reviews the current main risks and threats but also those that may emerge within the next 5 
years, the policy and operational means developed to combat them, the main active stakeholders and the EU 
legislation in force. In this context, a short history of EU research on security and defence is presented, 
followed by an inventory of relevant research and development projects funded under the Horizon 2020 
framework programme during the period 2014-2018. The specific contributions of the Joint Research Centre 
to security research are also highlighted. Finally, future avenues for security and defence research and 
development are discussed.  
Please note that the executive summary of this landscape report has been published simultaneously as a 
companion document. 
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Executive summary 
The aim of this report is to provide in a single document a large landscape review of the security and defence 
research and development in the European Union. For this purpose, it dedicates a substantive part of its 
content to set the scene, i.e., understanding the security threats currently observed and expected to arise in 
the next years, listing the policy initiatives and strategies for combating them, presenting the main 
stakeholders and the relevant legislation in the field. This part is organised around several thematic ‘building 
blocks’ − border control; critical infrastructure protection; public space protection; critical supplies security; 
cybersecurity; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive threats; hybrid threats; 
combating radicalisation to terrorism; fighting against terrorism financing; space; and defence − under the 
umbrella of the three core priorities defined in the European agenda on security: terrorism, organised crime 
and cybercrime.  
The picture is completed by presenting the history and evolution of the security and defence research and 
development funding of the European Union. In this context, all the R&D projects funded under the Horizon 
2020 framework programme during the period 2014-2018 were analysed in order to identify those related 
to security and defence, allocate them to the various building blocks and priorities mentioned above. A basic 
statistical analysis gives information about the number of projects, funding programme, country participation 
and dual-use potential. The latter is considered from the perspective of Horizon 2020 projects with civil 
applications which could also be used in the defence sector. The specific contributions of the Joint Research 
Centre to security and defence research are also highlighted.  
The analysis of the 349 security and defence Horizon 2020 R&D projects shows that almost half of them are 
related to cybersecurity. There are also a significant number of projects that are multi-thematic, i.e. related to 
two or more building blocks (21%) or to two or more priorities (11%). The analysis also illustrates that the 
specific Horizon 2020 programme dedicated to security is not the only funding source for projects displaying 
security component as 41% of them are funded by other Horizon 2020 programmes. Regarding the 
involvement of the EU Member States, all of them are contributors (as participant or coordinator) of one 
project at least, but five of them stand out – the UK, Spain, Italy, Germany and France – accounting for 56% 
of the total EU contributors. Considering the legal status of the contributors, private-for-profit companies 
represent a very high share, 48% of the total. They are also predominant among the coordinators of projects. 
However, private for-profit companies are much less involved in projects related to combating radicalisation, 
while public bodies’ contribution is particularly low in the area of cybersecurity. The analysis shows further 
that the overwhelming majority (approx. 90%) of the considered research projects have potential dual-use 
applications, i.e. their output with civil application could also be used in the defence sector. 
Finally, future avenues for security and defence research and development are discussed by building block, 
with the discussion being complemented by more specific foresight insights gathered from a topical horizon‐
scanning exercise carried out at the Joint Research Centre. Its results hint on the relative importance of “life 
sciences” for the future and the attention that need to be put on the growing role of manipulations of the 
living, which raises all kinds of concern, also in terms of security.  
This landscape report is meant to be the base for an online living document, which could be updated with 
new data (e.g. relevant legislation, analysis of R&D projects or results of foresight exercises) when 
appropriate. A potential avenue for future development would be the analysis of EU funded R&D projects in 
terms of achieved output and impact on society at large (e.g. innovation, policy development, knowledge 
transfer and dissemination, etc.), once the H2020 framework programme will be completed. Another 
dimension of future deeper analysis is the dual-use potential of such projects. This latter analysis is on the 
way of being undertaken by the editorial team of this report and should be available early 2020.  
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1 Introduction 
Living in peace and security was a founding principle for establishing in the 1950s the first nucleus of what 
would eventually become the European Union. This is indeed a condition for any society to develop, for the 
sake of all its members. Therefore, security has also been a major focus of the 2014-2019 European 
Commission from the very beginning of its mandate. Furthermore, the dramatic series of terrorist attacks 
that hit several European countries from 2015 onwards have increased the challenges faced by the EU (and 
the whole world) in this area, making security issues a top priority. In addition, recent development in world 
geopolitics and the growing overlap between civilian and military operations have increased the EU’s 
strategic interest in defence. The primary areas of this interest lie in the development of a defence industry 
for growth and cost saving, the establishment of territorial defence, the exploitation of military capacity for 
civil protection and security, and ensuring that the EU maintains its role as a global actor. Above all, the goal 
remains to protect and defend EU citizens, EU values and the EU way of life, based on ethics, integrity, 
freedom and respect for human rights. 
By March 2019, 28 legislative initiatives related to security had been presented, of which 19 had been 
agreed by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, while 9 were still on the table for 
the agreement of both institutions (1).  
It comes out that the 2019-2024 European Commission will immediately face the security and defence file. 
The main new challenges include, in particular, a stronger call for a Commission role in defence, owing to the 
evolution of security threats inside and around Europe; the effect of globalisation, which has deepened 
interconnections between Europe and the rest of the world; and dependence on complex, interdependent 
infrastructures. Further drivers are the blurring of the distinction between internal and external security, the 
shifting geopolitical landscape and technological developments that have introduced benefits but also new 
risks and dependencies. As a consequence, the security and defence reality is constantly evolving, potentially 
confronted to conventional, non–conventional and irregular warfare, cyberthreats and fake news; that has 
resulted in a shift of emphasis from targeted security to ensuring the resilience of structures, processes and 
citizens.  
To support these major trends and priorities, research on security and defence is much needed, and it has 
consequently gained in importance under EU research schemes. Parts of the Horizon 2020 (H2020) 
framework programme for research and innovation are dedicated to security research (and it was part of the 
previous seventh framework programme for research and innovation (FP7), while defence research has 
mainly been undertaken so far by national actors, with some limited collaboration between EU Member 
States. The EU has, however, not been left behind in this regard. In particular, in its report A New Deal For 
European Defence (2), the European Commission focused specifically on dual-use research and in particular 
the maximisation of synergies between the civil research included in H2020 and the defence research 
activities coordinated by the European Defence Agency (EDA). 
Objective and content 
In this context, the main objective of this report is to provide information about the current situation with 
regard to EU-funded research aimed at supporting EU security and defence policymaking, focusing 
exclusively on man-made risks and threats intended to harm individuals and societies at large. 
For this purpose, a multi-step approach has been followed. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive overview of 
the security and defence situation in the EU. This overview is organised around several thematic building 
blocks (namely border control; critical infrastructure protection; public space protection; critical supplies 
security; cybersecurity; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive threats (CBRN-E); 
hybrid threats; combating radicalisation to terrorism; fighting against terrorism financing; space; and 
defence), under the umbrella of the three core priorities defined in the European agenda on security: 
terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime. 
For each building block, the chapter includes (i) a review of the main current risks and threats; (ii) a 
description of the scene in the EU (and beyond where relevant) in terms of policy spheres and 
practical/operational implementation; (iii) a prospective review of the risks and threats expected to emerge 
                                           
(1)  22 (15 agreed + 7 pending) under the Security Union initiative, 6 (4 agreed + 2 pending) under other Commission initiatives having 
security components; see European Commission Communication COM(2019) 145 final, and European Agenda on Security – 
Factsheet Delivering on the Security Union (20 March 2019) available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-security/fact-sheets_en; consulted on 10 April 2019. 
(2)  European Commission, Commission report, A New Deal for European Defence (COM(2014) 387 final), Brussels, 24.6.2014. 
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within the next 5 years; (iv) a description of main EU and international actors active in a particular field, and 
their responsibilities and capacities; and (v) a list of EU legislation in force and of other reference documents 
at EU and international levels. 
Chapter 3 starts with a short history of EU research on security and defence, before reviewing the recent and 
current research projects funded through the H2020 framework programme. An inventory of relevant 
projects covering the period 2014-2018 has been carried out, allowing a statistical analysis to be performed, 
looking at, for example, the distribution of the projects by building block, core priority, H2020 research 
programme and country involved. As a consequence of the growing overlap between civil and defence 
domains, the dual-use nature of projects has also been examined. This chapter also describes the specific 
contributions of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) to the various building blocks. All in all, this study constitutes 
the first analysis of this type performed on EU security and defence research projects (3).  
Finally, in Chapter 4, future avenues for security and defence research and development (R & D) in the EU are 
discussed, by building block and based on the above information. This chapter benefits from foresight 
perspectives gathered from a horizon-scanning exercise on security and defence carried out at the JRC.  
Please note that this report need not be read from cover to cover. In fact, it has been designed to allow 
thematic reading (by building block), which may better satisfy the reader’s interest. 
Expected impact 
The authors hope that the report will support the work of the new European Commission (2019-2024) and 
the EU policy makers in the domain of security and defence. Its holistic approach should help in identifying 
the main issues, the gaps and uncovered fields, the links between threats, and areas that have dual-use 
potential, as well as providing insights into expected developments in the next 5 years and beyond. The 
ultimate goal and the expected impact of the report are that it will help to shape future EU R & D in security 
and defence. 
 
                                           
(3)  An impact analysis of these research projects (e.g. looking at their impact on EU policymaking) has not been carried out for the 
sake of this landscape study, as it will be possible to estimate their impact with any degree of certainty only once the H2020 
framework programme and its funded projects are over.  
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2 The security and defence situation in the European Union 
This chapter provides an overview of the security and defence situation in the EU, including (i) a review of 
main risks and threats currently existing, (ii) a description of the EU scene (and beyond when relevant) in 
terms of policy spheres and practical/operational implementations, (iii) a prospective review of the risks and 
threats suspected to emerge within the next five years, (iv) a description of main EU and international actors 
active in a particular field, their responsibilities and capacities, and (v) a list of EU policies in force and other 
reference documents, both at EU and international levels. To ease the presentation of information, this 
overview is organised around several thematic building blocks − border control; critical infrastructure 
protection; public space protection; critical supplies security; cybersecurity; CBRN-E; hybrid threats; combating 
radicalisation to terrorism; fighting against terrorism financing; space; and defence. 
2.1 Border control 
2.1.1 What is border control? 
Within the EU, border control is defined as the activities carried out at the EU’s external borders in accordance 
with and for the purposes of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (the Schengen Borders Code) (4), exclusively in 
response to an intention to cross or the act of crossing that border, regardless of any other consideration, 
consisting of border checks and border surveillance. 
Border control is a very broad and complex area, with many stakeholders interacting on its three main 
dimensions: land, air and sea. 
Moreover, recent developments have introduced a fourth dimension: the cyber-border. Concerns stemming 
from the convergence of border and cybersecurity threats are nothing new to those involved in both 
disciplines. Criminals and foreign actors have been exploiting computers and cyber methods to circumvent 
physical border security for decades. Today, nearly every crime or security threat that once required some 
physical nexus with the nation’s traditional borders (land, air and sea) is being committed, or at least 
facilitated, by some cyber component. In many ways, vulnerabilities in cybersecurity render some aspects of 
traditional border security irrelevant or, at the very least, much less effective (Osborn, 2017). 
Recent major events, such as the 2015 crisis in migration to Europe, make border control an increasingly 
essential element in the security domain, as well as in the general public perception of EU citizens of the 
performance of the EU as a whole. 
Two political developments that are of particular relevance to border control are the European agenda on 
migration and the European agenda on security. 
The European agenda on migration (5) includes the following initiatives: 
— a revised proposal for an entry–exit system (6) to facilitate and reinforce border check procedures for 
non-EU nationals; 
— the proposed reform of the Common European Asylum System, including the Dublin regulation, the 
European Union Agency for Asylum, the asylum procedures regulation, the qualification regulation, the 
reception conditions directive and the EU resettlement framework; 
— a proposal to adapt and reinforce the European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database (Eurodac) system, with a 
view to facilitating returns and helping tackle irregular migration; 
— a proposal for a targeted modification to the Schengen Borders Code to make checks on EU citizens 
against all relevant databases mandatory; 
— the implementation of the EU action plan against migrant smuggling (2015-2020); 
— an EU action plan on return; 
                                           
(4)  Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing 
the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1-52. 
(5)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘A European agenda on migration’ (COM(2015) 240 final), Brussels, 13.5.2015. 
(6)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Proposal for a regulation establishing an entry/exit System (EES) to register 
entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the 
European Union and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes and amending Regulation (EC) 
No 767/2008 and Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011’ (COM(2016) 194 final), Brussels, 6.4.16. 
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— a detailed ‘Back to Schengen’ roadmap. 
The key aspects of the European agenda on security include (7): 
— a proposal for the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) to strengthen security 
checks on visa-free travellers (8), with the ETIAS Central Unit envisaged as part of the European Border 
and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), and the implementation of the system, once adopted, requiring close 
interagency cooperation, particularly between the European Union Agency for the Operational 
Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA), Frontex 
and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol); 
— the establishment of the High-Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability, with the 
participation of Frontex, Europol, eu-LISA and other EU agencies; 
— the adoption of the EU passenger name records (PNR) directive (9) and the EU PNR implementation plan; 
— proposals to revise the Schengen Information System (SIS) (10), aiming to enhance the ability of the 
system to fight terrorism and cross-border crime, improve border and migration management and 
ensure an effective information exchange between Member States. 
2.1.2 A political priority of the European Commission 
Border control is very high on the EU’s political agenda. In the European Commission’s political guidelines 
issued in 2014 (11), border control is an intrinsic component of at least two priorities: 
1. An area of justice and fundamental rights based on mutual trust. The document states, 
‘Combating cross-border crime and terrorism is a common European responsibility. We need to crack 
down on organised crime, such as human trafficking, smuggling and cybercrime. We must tackle 
corruption; and we must fight terrorism and counter radicalisation — all the while guaranteeing 
fundamental rights and values, including procedural rights and the protection of personal data.’ 
2. Towards a new policy on migration. The document mentions the common asylum policy and a 
new migration policy but also the need to secure Europe’s borders. This entails a need to step up the 
operational capacities of Frontex. 
President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address 2017 acknowledged the progress made in these 
areas: ‘We are now protecting Europe’s external borders more effectively. Over 1 700 officers from the new 
European Border and Coast Guard are now helping Member States’ 100 000 national border guards patrol in 
places like Greece, Italy, Bulgaria and Spain. … We have managed to stem irregular flows of migrants, which 
were a cause of great anxiety for many. … In doing so, we have drastically reduced the loss of life in the 
Mediterranean’ (12). 
At the same time, the speech also emphasised the need to better counter cross-border terrorist threats and 
further strengthen the external borders, by opening the Schengen area to Romania and Bulgaria. 
                                           
(7)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘The European agenda on security’ (COM(2015) 185 final), Strasbourg, 
28.4.2015. 
(8)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Proposal for a Regulation establishing a European Travel Information and 
Authorisation System (ETIAS) and amending Regulations (EU) No 515/2014, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2016/794 and (EU)2016/1624’ 
(COM(2016) 731 final), Brussels, 16.11.2016. 
(9)  Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of passenger name record 
(PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, 
p. 132-149. 
(10)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of border checks, amending Regulation 
(EU) No 515/2014 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006’ (COM(2016) 882 final), Brussels, 21.12.2016. 
(11)  European Commission, A New Start for Europe: My agenda for jobs, growth, fairness and democratic change, 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-political-guidelines-speech_en.pdf). 
(12)  European Commission, ‘President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address 2017’ (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm). 
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2.1.3 The possible evolution of border control within the next 5 to 10 years 
The Commission’s proposal for the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021-2027 was released in 
May 2018 (13). The document confirms that the strengthening of the external borders remains a high priority 
for the European Commission. It states: ‘the effective protection of our external borders is a prerequisite for 
ensuring a safe area for the free movement of persons and goods within the Union. This includes the proper 
management of flows of persons and goods and safeguarding the integrity of the customs union. A new 
integrated Border Management Fund will provide vital and reinforced support to Member States in the shared 
responsibility of securing the common external borders of the Union. The Fund will cover border 
management, visas and customs control equipment. It will help ensure equivalence in the performance of 
customs controls at the external borders. This will be achieved by addressing the current imbalances between 
Member States due to geographical, capacity and resource differences. This will not only strengthen customs 
controls but also facilitate legitimate trade, contributing to a secure and efficient customs union’ (14). 
These efforts need to be complemented by a strong and fully operational European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency (Frontex) at the core of a fully integrated EU border management system. The Commission proposes 
to create a standing corps of around 10 000 border guards by the end of the financial period. It will also 
provide financial support and training for national border guards in Member States. This will enable the 
stepping up of operational capacity, the reinforcement of existing tools and the development of EU-wide 
information systems for borders, migration management and security (15). 
The proposal is for the EU budget for the management of external borders, migration and refugee flows to 
be significantly reinforced, totalling nearly EUR 33 billion, compared with EUR 12.4 billion for the period 
2014-2020. 
2.1.4 Stakeholders 
2.1.4.1 European Union stakeholders 
European Commission Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs 
The Directorate-General (DG) for Migration and Home Affairs is in charge of the policy area known as 
migration and home affairs. It works to develop a balanced and comprehensive EU migration policy, based on 
solidarity and responsibility, which — in line with the Europe 2020 strategy — will make an important 
contribution to the EU’s economic development and performance in the longer term. Its aim is to create an 
EU-wide set of rules for legal migration while taking into account the interconnection between migration and 
integration. It also aims to address irregular migration and trafficking in human beings. At the same time, it 
works to set up a Common European Asylum System, based on solidarity and respect for fundamental rights, 
to ensure effective protection for the people who need it. 
DG Migration and Home Affairs helps build a safer Europe by fighting terrorism and organised crime, by 
promoting police cooperation and by preparing to respond swiftly to emerging crises. The DG’s actions in 
these areas include stricter rules against illicit trafficking of firearms and on trafficking in human beings, as 
well as revision of legislation on combating child sexual abuse, sexual exploitation and child pornography. The 
fight against terrorism and the internal security strategy, strictly linked to the broader European security 
strategy, will continue to be cornerstones of its efforts to make Europe more secure by strengthening 
cooperation on law enforcement, border management, civil protection and disaster management. 
In all these areas, DG Migration and Home Affairs promotes dialogue and cooperation with non-EU countries 
so that we can work in partnership and jointly tackle common challenges. Its external action contributes to 
the strengthening of the EU’s position as a reliable, active and pragmatic global player. 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/index_en 
                                           
(13)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘A modern budget for a union that protects, empowers and defends: The 
multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027’ (COM(2018) 321 final), Brussels, 2.5.2018. 
(14)  European Commission communication COM(2018) 321 final.  
(15)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and 
repealing Council Joint Action No 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Regulation (EU) No 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council’ (COM(2018) 631 final), Brussels, 12.9.2018. 
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European Commission Directorate-General Joint Research Centre 
As the European Commission’s science and knowledge service, the JRC supports EU policies with independent 
scientific evidence throughout the whole policy cycle. 
Since January 2014, the JRC has supported DG Migration and Home Affairs in its policies regarding border 
control, in particular in the development of the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) (16) and in 
analysing innovative solutions for border surveillance. More details are presented in Section 3.4. 
Since 2010, under a series of administrative arrangements with the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs 
and Fisheries, the JRC (through its Transport and Border Security Unit) has collaborated with other relevant 
DGs and agencies to support the design and implementation of the Common Information Sharing 
Environment (CISE) for maritime surveillance, which is one of the pillars of the European Union maritime 
security strategy (EUMSS) for the global maritime domain, and hence a crucial part of blue border 
surveillance. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/joint-research-centre_en 
European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) 
The mission of Frontex is to promote, coordinate and develop European border management in line with the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the concept of integrated border management. 
To help identify migratory patterns as well as trends in cross-border criminal activities, Frontex analyses data 
related to the situation at and beyond the EU’s external borders. It monitors the situation at the borders and 
helps border authorities to share information with EU Member States. The agency also carries out 
vulnerability assessments to evaluate the capacity and readiness of each Member State to face challenges at 
its external borders, including migratory pressure. 
Frontex coordinates and organises joint operations and rapid border interventions to assist Member States at 
the external borders, including in humanitarian emergencies and for rescue at sea. The agency deploys 
European Border and Coast Guard teams, including a pool of at least 1 500 border guards and other relevant 
staff, in rapid interventions. The members of this pool must be provided by Member States upon request by 
the agency. It also deploys vessels, aircraft, vehicles and other technical equipment provided by Member 
States in its operations. In addition, Frontex may carry out operations on the territory of non-EU countries 
neighbouring at least one Member State, where there is migratory pressure at a non-EU country’s border. 
Frontex supports Member States with screening, debriefing, identification and fingerprinting of migrants. 
Officers deployed by the agency refer and provide initial information to people who need, or wish to apply 
for, international protection, cooperating with the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and national 
authorities. National authorities, not Frontex, decide who is entitled to international protection. The agency 
also assists Member States with forced returns of people who have exhausted all legal avenues to legitimise 
their stay within the EU. This help includes obtaining travel documents for returnees by working closely with 
the consular authorities of the relevant non-EU countries. 
Frontex focuses on preventing smuggling, human trafficking and terrorism as well as many other cross-
border crimes. It shares any relevant intelligence gathered during its operations with relevant national 
authorities and Europol. The agency is a centre of expertise in the area of border control. It develops training 
curricula and specialised courses in a variety of areas to guarantee the highest levels of professional 
knowledge among border guards across Europe. It also supports search and rescue operations that arise 
during border surveillance operations at sea. 
https://frontex.europa.eu/ 
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) 
EMSA is one of the EU’s decentralised agencies. Based in Lisbon, the Agency provides technical assistance 
and support to the European Commission and EU Member States in the development and implementation of 
EU legislation on maritime safety, pollution by ships and maritime security. It has also been given operational 
tasks in the field of oil pollution response, vessel monitoring and long-range identification and tracking of 
vessels. 
http://www.emsa.europa.eu/ 
                                           
(16)  Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European 
Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 11-26. 
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European Asylum Support Office 
EASO is the EU agency that supports the implementation of a Common European Asylum System by applying 
a bottom-up approach. The aim is to ensure that individual asylum cases are dealt with in a consistent way 
by all Member States. 
EASO provides different kinds of support, including, in particular, supporting and stimulating the common 
quality of the asylum process, tailored assistance, emergency support for Member States subject to particular 
pressures, sharing and merging information and data, and support to non-EU countries. 
https://www.easo.europa.eu/ 
European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice 
eu-LISA was established to provide a long-term solution for the operational management of large-scale IT 
systems, which are essential instruments in the implementation of the asylum, border management and 
migration policies of the EU. 
The agency currently manages Eurodac, the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) and the 
Visa Information System (VIS). 
https://www.eulisa.europa.eu/ 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) 
Europol is the EU’s law enforcement agency. Its main goal is to achieve a safer Europe, supporting the EU 
Member States in their fight against terrorism, cybercrime and other serious and organised forms of crime. It 
also works with many non-EU partner states and international organisations. Some of the services provided 
by Europol are listed below. 
— Operational coordination and support. The Operational Centre (running 24/7) is the hub for the 
exchange of data among Europol, EU Member States and third parties on criminal activity.  
— Information exchange. There are three systems in place for information exchange: (i) the Secure 
Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) is a platform that meets the communication needs of 
EU law enforcement; (ii) the Europol Information System is Europol’s central criminal information and 
intelligence database, covering all of Europol’s mandated crime areas, including terrorism; and (iii) the 
Europol Platform for Experts is a collaborative web platform for specialists in a variety of law 
enforcement areas that facilitates the sharing of best practices, documentation, knowledge and non-
personal data on crime. 
— Strategic analysis. Europol does this to help decision-makers identify priorities in the fight against 
organised crime and terrorism. Once this has been done, law enforcement officers can tailor their 
operational work nationally, regionally and locally. 
— Intelligence analysis 
● Cyber intelligence involves collecting, processing and analysing information on cybercrime (from 
a wide array of public, private and open sources).  
● Cyber community engagement — the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) develops and maintains 
partnerships to support the response of EU Member States to cybercrime. It carries out research 
on internet governance to pinpoint significant vulnerabilities that organised crime groups can 
exploit. 
— Forensics. Europol provides forensic support to law enforcement agencies across the EU, in relation to 
crimes that include euro counterfeiting, illicit drug production, payment card fraud and cybercrime. 
— Training and capacity building. EC3 supports EU Member States’ law enforcement authorities through 
capacity building and training, links available EU funding with law enforcement partners and acts as a 
central host for hi-tech services to support national investigations. 
— Joint investigation teams. These are investigative teams set up for a fixed period and specific 
purpose, based on an agreement between law enforcement authorities in EU Member States (non-EU 
countries may participate with the agreement of all other participants). 
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— Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce. The taskforce’s objective is to drive intelligence-led, coordinated 
action against key cybercrime threats and targets by facilitating the joint identification, prioritisation, 
preparation and initiation of cross-border investigations and operations by its partners. 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/ 
European External Action Service (EEAS) 
The EEAS is the EU’s diplomatic service. It helps the EU’s foreign affairs chief — the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) — to 
implement the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP). 
A key aspect of the EEAS’s activities is its ability to work closely with the foreign and defence ministries of 
the EU Member States and with EU institutions. It also has a strong working relationship with the United 
Nations and other international organisations. 
Following the Treaty of Lisbon, the EEAS is responsible for the running of EU delegations and offices around 
the world. The 139 delegations play a vital role in representing the EU and its citizens around the globe and 
in building networks and partnerships. Their main role is to represent the EU in the country where they are 
based and to promote the values and interests of the EU. 
https://eeas.europa.eu 
2.1.4.2 International stakeholders 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
On 8 July 2016, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission, 
together with the Secretary General of NATO, signed a joint declaration in Warsaw with a view to giving new 
impetus and new substance to the EU–NATO strategic partnership (17). 
One of the seven specific areas where cooperation is to be enhanced is operational cooperation, including at 
sea and on migration. 
2.1.5 Legislation and reference documents 
— Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger 
data, OJ L 261, 6.8.2004, p. 24-27. 
— Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on 
the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), OJ 
L 381, 28.12.2006, p. 4-23. 
— Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 concerning 
the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas 
(VIS Regulation), OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 60-81. 
— Regulation (EC) No 810/2009, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), OJ L 243, 15.9.2009, p. 1-58. 
— Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the 
establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation 
(EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States 
by a third-country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data 
by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational 
management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice, OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, 
p. 1-30. 
— Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 
establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 11-26. 
                                           
(17) EEAS, ‘EU–NATO cooperation — factsheets’ (https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/28286/eu-nato-
cooperation-factsheet_en). 
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— Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
establishing, as part of the Internal Security Fund, the instrument for financial support for external 
borders and visa and repealing Decision No 574/2007/EC, OJ L 150, 20.5.2014, p. 143-167. 
— Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational 
cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 93-107. 
— Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union 
Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L  77, 
23.3.2016, p. 1-52. 
— Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the use of 
passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist offences and serious crime, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 132-149. 
— Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the 
European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, OJ L  251, 16.9.2016, 
p. 1-76. 
— Regulation (EU) 2016/1625 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 establishing a European Maritime Safety Agency, OJ L 251, 
16.9.2016, p. 77-79. 
— Regulation (EU) 2016/1626 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 
amending Regulation (EC) No 768/2005 establishing a Community Fisheries Control Agency, OJ L 251, 
16.9.2016, p. 80-82. 
— Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on the revision of the European Union maritime 
security strategy (EUMSS) Action Plan (10494/18), Brussels, 26 June 2018. 
2.2 Critical infrastructure protection 
2.2.1 What is a critical infrastructure? 
Although there is no single definition of what a critical infrastructure is, all definitions underline the 
detrimental effects that the disruption or destruction of such a critical infrastructure would have on society. 
Several examples of definitions from around the world illustrate this (18). For instance, in the United States of 
America, the Patriot Act of 2001 defines critical infrastructure as those ‘systems and assets, whether 
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets 
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or 
any combination of those matters’ (19). In Canada, critical infrastructure refers to ‘processes, systems, 
facilities, technologies, networks, assets and services essential to the health, safety, security or economic 
well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of government. Critical infrastructure can be stand-
alone or interconnected and interdependent within and across provinces, territories and national borders. 
Disruptions of critical infrastructure could result in catastrophic loss of life, adverse economic effects and 
significant harm to public confidence’ (20). In Switzerland, ‘critical infrastructure protection aims to ensure the 
supply of crucial goods and services, such as energy, transport and healthcare. Critical infrastructures include 
not just buildings and facilities, but also supply systems and services in the broadest sense. Serious 
disruptions, for example, a nationwide power cut, can have far-reaching consequences for the population and 
cause considerable damage to the economy’ (21). 
                                           
(18)  For a complete list of definitions, see CIPedia, an online glossary of multinational definitions related to critical infrastructure 
protection (http://www.cipedia.eu). 
(19)  US 107th Congress, Public Law 56, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001. 
(20)  Public Safety Canada, ‘Critical infrastructure’ (https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/crtcl-nfrstrctr/index-en.aspx). 
(21)  Swiss Federal Office for Civil Protection, ‘Critical infrastructures’ (https://www.babs.admin.ch/en/aufgabenbabs/ski/kritisch.html). 
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In the EU, a Green Paper adopted in 2005 on a European programme for critical infrastructure protection 
(EPCIP) (22) understood it as ‘the ability to prepare for, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from 
critical infrastructure disruptions or destruction’. In this document, critical infrastructures include ‘those 
physical resources, services, and information technology facilities, networks and infrastructure assets which, 
if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic well-being 
of citizens or the effective functioning of governments’. It also defines European critical infrastructure (ECI) 
as that which upon disruption or destruction would have a significant impact on at least two Member States. 
A total of 11 sectors with 37 subsectors were identified as critical infrastructure sectors: energy, information 
and communication technology (ICT), water, food, health, finance, public and legal order and safety, civil 
administration, transport, chemical and nuclear industry, and space and research. 
One year later, a Commission communication (23) set out the principles, processes and instruments proposed 
to implement EPCIP. 
Then, in 2008, a Council directive on ECI (24) was adopted to implement EPCIP. This directive applies, however, 
only to the energy and transport sectors, further divided into three energy subsectors (electricity, oil and gas) 
and five transport subsectors (road, rail, air, inland waterways, and ocean and short sea shipping and 
ports) (25). 
In 2016, another directive fostered increased security levels in networks and information systems (26). The 
directive attempts to establish a culture of security across sectors that are vital for the economy and society 
and, moreover, rely heavily on ICT, such as energy, transport, water, banking, financial market infrastructures, 
healthcare and digital infrastructure. Businesses in these sectors that are identified by the Member States as 
operators of essential services have to take appropriate security measures and notify serious incidents to the 
relevant national authority. 
2.2.2 Threats to critical infrastructures 
Reducing the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures and increasing their resilience (27) to threats is one of 
the major objectives of the EU. In particular, adequate protection must be ensured and detrimental effects of 
disruption and destruction on society and people must be contained as far as possible. 
Threats to critical infrastructures are multiple and can be caused intentionally or unintentionally. Critical 
infrastructures can be damaged, disrupted or destroyed by deliberate acts of terrorism, criminal activity, 
computer hacking, malicious behaviour, negligence, accidents and natural disasters.  
It must, however, be underlined that besides these deliberate or accidental disruptions, there are other 
factors that reinforce overall critical infrastructure-related risks. Examples of such factors are (Setola et al., 
2016): (1) a reduction in state/public control as a result of liberalisation and privatisation of infrastructures; 
(2) increased use of information and telecommunication technologies to support, monitor and control critical 
infrastructure functionalities; (3) the idea on the part of the population that services can and will be available 
24/7, meaning that acceptance of critical infrastructure failure has become very low, thus making protection 
a higher priority than it was in the 1980s; (4) urbanisation, which pushes the utilisation of ageing 
infrastructures to the limit; (5) the increasing interwovenness, (supply) chaining and dependencies of 
infrastructural services; and (6) the increasing understanding on the part of various adversaries of society 
that a successful attack may create societal havoc.  
                                           
(22)  European Commission, ‘Green Paper on a European programme for critical infrastructure protection’ (COM(2005) 576 final), 
Brussels, 17.11.2005. 
(23)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection’ (COM(2006) 786 
final), Brussels, 12.12.2006. 
(24)  Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and 
the assessment of the need to improve their protection, OJ L 345, 23.12.2008, p. 75-82.  
(25)  See Annex 1 for details. A comprehensive review of recent literature on infrastructure and related issues further categorises critical 
infrastructures into physical and social infrastructures (Kumari and Sharma, 2017). Note that in the present study most social 
infrastructures (e.g. shopping centres, healthcare facilities) are considered public spaces and therefore tackled in the relevant 
chapter.  
(26)  Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common 
level of security of network and information systems across the Union, OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1-30. 
(27)  There is no single definition of what ‘resilience’ means, but that proposed by Nan et al. (2016) applies well to critical 
infrastructures: ‘the ability of a system to resist the effects of disruptive forces and to reduce performance deviations’. See also, 
for example, Ouyang et al. (2012), Francis and Bekera (2014) and Setola et al. (2016). The UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction 
defines ‘resilience’ as the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, 
transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and 
restoration of its essential basic structures and functions through risk management (https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology). 
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Several of these aggravating factors, such as 1 and 4, are clearly dependent on political choices. Factor 5 is 
also to be noted. Critical infrastructures nowadays have a high degree of dependency and interdependency, 
on the one hand resulting in positive effects for society as a whole but on the other hand adding more 
complexity and hence more vulnerability to critical infrastructures and increased related risk. A lack of 
understanding of critical infrastructure dependencies, often non-intuitive or non-obvious, has been found to 
be highly problematic for the management of recent incidents (28). Dependencies obviously constitute a major 
issue that has to be taken into consideration to a greater extent in critical infrastructure protection  (Luiijf et 
al., 2010; van Eeten et al., 2011; Setola et al., 2016; Setola and Theocharidou, 2016). 
2.2.3 The European Union scene and beyond 
EPCIP (29) provides the framework for activities needed to improve the protection of critical infrastructures in 
the EU, throughout its Member States.  
Practically, Directive 2008/114/EC ‘establishes a procedure for the identification and designation of European 
critical infrastructures, and a common approach to the assessment of the need to improve the protection of 
such infrastructures in order to contribute to the protection of people’ (Article 1). It also retains an ‘all-
hazards approach while countering threats from terrorism as a priority’, meaning that ‘man-made, 
technological threats and natural disasters should be taken into account in the critical infrastructure 
protection process, but the threat of terrorism should be given priority’. The key points of this directive are 
outlined below. 
Identification and designation of ECI 
— Each EU Member State identifies potential ECI, using cross-cutting criteria (e.g. possible casualties, 
economic effects and effect on people) and sectoral criteria specific to the type of ECI. Regular reviews 
must be carried out. 
— Each EU Member State cooperates with other Member States with regard to potential ECI located on 
their territory. 
— The directive applies only to the energy and transport sectors. In time, other sectors may be added. 
Operator security plans 
— Each EU Member State is to ensure that an operator security plan is in place for each ECI. 
— This plan is to identify the critical assets of the ECI, as well as the existing security solutions for 
protecting them. 
In addition, each EU Member State must ensure that a security liaison officer is designated for each ECI; the 
Member States also have to do specific and regular reporting to the Commission. 
Following a comprehensive review (30) of this directive, in 2013 the Commission adopted a new approach to 
EPCIP (31). It aims to build common tools and a common approach in the EU to critical infrastructure 
protection and resilience, taking better account of interdependencies between critical infrastructures, 
industries and state actors. This revised EPCIP takes a more pragmatic approach to the implementation of 
elements of risk assessment and risk management, focusing on case studies of European infrastructures (the 
Eurocontrol air traffic management system, the Galileo satellite system, the electricity transmission grid and 
the gas transmission network). 
Within this policy context, the Commission has introduced a number of initiatives, in particular the European 
Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (ERNCIP), the Critical Infrastructure Preparedness and 
Resilience Research Network (CIPRNet) and the Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN). 
They are discussed below in Sections 2.2.5 and 2.2.6. 
                                           
(28) See Annex 2 for several examples of critical infrastructure disruption. 
(29) European Commission Green Paper COM(2005) 576 final; European Commission communication COM(2006) 786 final. 
(30) European Commission, Commission staff working document, ‘Review of the European programme for critical infrastructure 
protection (EPCIP)’ (SWD(2012) 190 final), Brussels, 22.6.2012. 
(31) European Commission, Commission staff working document, ‘A new approach to the European programme for critical infrastructure 
protection: making European critical infrastructures more secure’ (SWD(2013) 318 final), Brussels, 28.8.2013. 
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2.2.4 Possible evolution within the next 5 years 
The landscape of critical infrastructure protection is rapidly evolving. What started back in the first decade of 
2000 as an effort to ensure the protection of critical infrastructures assets has radically changed. Nowadays, 
the scientific community and critical infrastructure stakeholders are discussing the topics of resilience, 
interdependencies and a systems approach in order to improve the protection and resilience of critical 
infrastructures. It is expected that in the years to come discussion will be more about systems of critical 
infrastructures, even systems of systems, and how their interaction results in emerging behaviour that 
cannot be considered the sum of the performance of each interconnected infrastructure.  
Another trend that is expected in the years to come is a shift in focus from protection to resilience. This 
reflects an increase in the number of threats and their complexity, such that threats cannot always be 
predicted and incorporated in a pure risk management approach. In this regard, it will be necessary to 
continue to develop resilience measures and to integrate them with existing and future security measures. As 
an example we mention the paradigm of hybrid threats, that is, complex attack vectors incorporating several 
methods: bolstering resilience is considered the main answer to this type of threat.  
The paradigm of resilience is tightly linked to discussions about services and in particular continuity of critical 
services. The interconnectedness of critical infrastructures and the blurred boundaries between 
infrastructures have shifted attention to the services that infrastructures provide to citizens. This approach is 
increasingly being adopted by experts in the field and it is also reflected in the research work that is currently 
in full swing in Europe and elsewhere. The focus on services is also reflected in Directive (EU) 2016/1148. 
The pervasiveness of ICT in all infrastructures has also created a new reality frequently referred to using the 
word ‘smart’. Increasingly, the discussion is about ‘smart grids’, ‘smart homes’, etc., with the word ‘smart’ 
used to indicate that traditional infrastructures are nowadays integrated in such a pervasive manner with ICT 
that their nature has been completely altered. The internet of things (IoT) is driving changes in this area.  
This digitalisation has led to more efficient infrastructures that provide better and more personalised services 
to citizens. At the same time, it has opened the door for new threats and vulnerabilities, with significant 
potential for cascade effects. Recent events have shown that these smart infrastructures may be less 
resilient than we believe. It is therefore natural that we will see in the near future a strong debate on the 
resilience versus efficiency issue. The two can be combined, but we need to break new ground in terms of the 
available knowledge. The aeronautical industry provides excellent examples of best practice in terms of how 
a system (air traffic management, aircraft, etc.) can be very efficient as well as resilient. To achieve this 
balance, better regulation, more research and better training of personnel may be required.  
Furthermore, an area in which significant improvement is expected is training and education of stakeholders 
involved in critical infrastructure security and resilience. There is a common perception that the human factor 
is extremely important in the security chain. This is also related to the issue of insider threat, which seems to 
be a recurring problem for critical infrastructure stakeholders.  
Cloud computing already has a strong footprint in the domain of critical infrastructures. Modern critical 
infrastructures are producing an enormous amount of data and cloud solutions seem attractive. However, 
there is fierce debate about the security of cloud datasets and the risk of their being compromised. Cloud 
solutions available on the market claim to be extremely resilient; however, the main concern is the trust that 
needs to be built between operators and cloud services providers. In certain cases, this trust has been 
established and even classified datasets are stored in the cloud. 
The large amount of available data may be helpful in supporting decision making; however, advanced 
computational algorithms are required in order to harness this power. Artificial intelligence (AI) is an area that 
is expected to grow in the near future, to support decision making during a crisis but also to optimise critical 
infrastructure services during normal operations.  
Finally, most critical infrastructures are expected in the long run to have some level of autonomy linked to AI. 
The sector that is expected to be revolutionised is transport. Autonomous cars are close to entering into 
production; they will change completely the way we move and travel, and the capacity of the existing network 
is expected to increase. Consequently, the management of transport infrastructure is going to change as a 
result of autonomous vehicles. 
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2.2.5 Stakeholders 
2.2.5.1 European Union stakeholders 
European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection  
The mission of ERNCIP is to foster the emergence of innovative, qualified, efficient and competitive security 
solutions, through networking of EU experimental capabilities. It aims to link laboratories and facilities in 
order to carry out critical infrastructure-related security experiments and test new technology. It also 
contributes to improving the conditions for EU-wide certification and standardisation of security solutions.  
The ERNCIP Office, run by JRC, is responsible for the management, coordination and administration of the 
ERNCIP project, under the supervision of Member State representatives and the Commission. 
ERNCIP publishes annually a handbook to assist in the dissemination of the results of the network’s activities. 
The latest edition was released in May 2018 (Gattinesi, 2018). 
https://erncip-project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
Critical Infrastructure Preparedness and Resilience Research Network 
CIPRNet was funded as an FP7 security project, which started in March 2013 and finished in March 2017. 
CIPRNet created and maintains CIPedia, an online glossary of multinational definitions related to critical 
infrastructure protection. In addition, CIPRNet offered critical infrastructure protection training activities in the 
form of lectures and masterclasses.  
To continue the work achieved within the project, 2E!SAC was founded as a European non-profit association 
under German law focusing on critical infrastructure protection and resilience activities throughout Europe. 
Members are from EU Member States and associated states. The ultimate goal of 2E!SAC is the foundation 
by 2020 of a distributed European infrastructure simulation and analysis centre.  
www.ciprnet.eu 
Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network 
The setting up of CIWIN (32) was one of the measures proposed in Commission communication 
COM(2006) 786 on EPCIP to facilitate the implementation of the programme. It has been operational since 
January 2013. 
The network has two functions. First, it is an electronic forum for the exchange of information on critical 
infrastructure protection. Second, it is a rapid alert system for the delivery of early warnings from Member 
States to the Commission in relation to acute risks and threats to all. All Member States have signed a 
memorandum of understanding providing that they will contribute to the operation of this network.  
DG Migration and Home Affairs coordinates all activities related to CIWIN.  
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/critical_infrastructure_warning_information_network_en 
Thematic Network on Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection 
This network is made up of European owners and operators of energy infrastructures in the electricity, gas 
and oil sectors. It allows them to exchange information on threat assessment, risk management, 
cybersecurity and other related topics.  
The network is an initiative of the Directorate-General for Energy. 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure  
European Commission Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs 
DG Migration and Home Affairs manages policies that aim to ensure that all activities necessary and 
beneficial to the economic, cultural and social growth of the EU can develop in a stable, lawful and secure 
environment. It aims to develop a balanced and comprehensive EU migration policy, based on solidarity and 
                                           
(32)  European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on a Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN)’ 
(COM(2008) 676 final), Brussels, 27.10.2008. 
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responsibility, building a safer Europe by fighting terrorism and organised crime, by promoting police 
cooperation and by preparing to respond swiftly to emerging crises. 
DG Migration and Home Affairs is in charge of managing two dedicated EU funds: the Asylum, Migration and 
Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Internal Security Fund (ISF). The latter provides support for police 
cooperation, crime prevention and the fight against serious cross-border crime, including terrorism and 
violent extremism, as well as for crisis management and the protection of ECI (European Commission, 
2016a). 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/critical-infrastructure_en 
European Commission Directorate-General for Energy 
This DG is responsible for the EU’s energy policy, with the aim of ensuring secure, sustainable and 
competitively priced energy for Europe. 
In this context, DG Energy is engaged in the protection of the EU’s critical energy infrastructure from 
disruption and damage. 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure  
European Commission Directorate‑General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) 
DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs is the Commission department responsible for EU 
policy on the single market, industry, entrepreneurship and small businesses. 
It is one of the Commission’s actors engaged in building resilience by addressing potential strategic and 
critical sectors such as cybersecurity, critical infrastructures (energy, transport, space), the financial system, 
and public health (European Commission, 2016b). 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/internal-market-industry-entrepreneurship-and-
smes_en#responsibilities  
European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development 
This DG is responsible for EU policy on development and delivering international aid. It is in charge of 
international development cooperation, and it adapts to the evolving needs of partner countries, working 
closely with DG Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations and other Commission services. 
In the DG’s strategic plan 2016-2020, specific objective 12 is as follows: ‘Under the broader coverage of the 
legal bases of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and the Instrument for Nuclear Safety 
Cooperation (INSC), [DG International Cooperation and Development] will address nuclear safety issues 
(EURATOM based) as well as specific global, trans-regional and emerging security threats, including among 
others chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risks, terrorism and protection of critical 
infrastructure in third countries (TFEU based)’ (European Commission, 2016c). 
The IcSP addresses specific global and trans-regional threats to peace, international security and stability. It 
has three components: two implemented by the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (activities linked to 
crisis management and peace building) and a third implemented by DG International Cooperation and 
Development (activities associated with global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats). This last 
component covers counterterrorism, CBRN risk mitigation, the fight against organised crime, protection of 
critical infrastructures, climate change and security. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/international-cooperation-and-development_en#responsibilities 
European Commission Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport  
DG Mobility and Transport is responsible for EU policy in this area. It is engaged in aviation, maritime and 
land transport security. Among other tasks, and faced with the persistent threat of terrorism, it aims to 
reduce the vulnerability of public spaces related to transport infrastructures and to ensure a coordinated 
response in the event of a security incident on land, especially relating to rail travel (European Commission, 
2016d). 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/topics/transport_en 
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European Commission Directorate‑General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 
DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries is responsible for EU policy on maritime affairs and fisheries. The action 
plan of the EUMSS for the global maritime domain, adopted in June 2014, is organised around five areas, the 
fourth being ‘Risk management, protection of critical infrastructures and crisis response’; Section 4.3 covers 
assessing the resilience of maritime transport infrastructure to man-made and natural disasters and climate 
change (Council of the European Union, 2014a). 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/maritime-affairs-and-fisheries_en 
European Commission Directorate‑General Joint Research Centre 
The JRC is the European Commission’s science and knowledge service. It has solid research and policy 
support experience, developed in house, as well as broad networks with academia, industry, Member States 
and local authorities.  
For more detailed information, see Section 3.4. 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research-topic/critical-infrastructure-protection 
European Defence Agency 
The EDA was established under a joint action of the Council of Ministers on 12 July 2004, ‘to support the 
Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis 
management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy as it stands now and develops in the 
future’ (33). 
In October 2015, the EDA and the Commission jointly launched the Consultation Forum for Sustainable 
Energy in the Defence and Security Sector. Protection of critical energy infrastructures (PCEI) was identified 
as one of the areas to be examined and a PCEI expert group was set up. The work of the expert group is led 
by the ministries of defence of Cyprus and Greece, supported by their respective national academic 
communities and research centres. DG Energy and the JRC, as well as the NATO Energy Security Centre of 
Excellence (CoE), also support the work of the PCEI expert group, which explores options for protecting 
defence-related critical energy infrastructures from existing and emerging risks and threats, including hybrid 
and asymmetrical warfare, climate change and natural hazards (EDA, 2017a,b). 
https://www.eda.europa.eu 
European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) 
ENISA is a centre of expertise for cybersecurity in Europe. Since it was set up in 2004, it has actively 
contributed to a high level of network and information security (NIS) within the EU, to the development of a 
culture of NIS in society and to raising awareness of NIS, thus contributing to the proper functioning of the 
internal market. ENISA assists EU Member States in implementing relevant EU legislation and works to 
improve the resilience of Europe’s critical information infrastructure and networks. Objective 1.1 of the ENISA 
programming document 2018-2020 relates to improving expertise related to critical information 
infrastructure (ENISA, 2017). 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/ 
European Global Navigation Satellite Systems Agency (GSA) 
The GSA’s core mission is to ensure that EU citizens get the most out of Europe’s satellite navigation 
programmes, ensuring that European services and operations are thoroughly secure, safe and accessible. The 
GSA is positioning the Galileo Open Service as the answer to the demand for more and better 
synchronisation, on which many critical infrastructures, the telecom sector and financial services rely. The 5th 
issue of the GNSS Market Report states that the European global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) bring 
resilience to critical infrastructure. In particular, Galileo provides clear benefits to critical infrastructure 
operators thanks to its increasingly robust defences against spoofing and an increased number of satellites 
facilitating integrity monitoring and ensuring improved availability. GNSS are also used to monitor critical 
infrastructure and the natural environment to prevent major disaster and promptly intervene in case of 
emergency (GSA, 2017). 
https://www.gsa.europa.eu/ 
                                           
(33)  EDA, ‘Mission’ (https://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/Missionandfunctions). 
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European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) 
According to its mission statement, ‘the EU Satellite Centre supports the decision making and actions of the 
European Union in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in particular Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP), including European Union crisis management missions and operations, by providing 
products and services resulting from the exploitation of relevant space assets and collateral data, including 
satellite imagery and aerial imagery, and related services’ (34). SatCen provides fast and reliable analyses of 
satellite data to meet current security challenges. In the field of critical infrastructure, it has been 
participating in studies on vulnerability assessment (i.e. evaluation of the likelihood of occurrence for various 
identified threats) based on spatially enabled data.  
https://www.satcen.europa.eu/ 
2.2.5.2 International stakeholders 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
Significant research activity in the domain of defence-related critical infrastructures has been fostered by 
NATO’s seven baseline requirements for resilience. NATO is currently working on supporting its member 
countries in identifying critical infrastructure dependencies and providing the tools to improve their resilience. 
Considering that military operations rely on critical infrastructures that are in principle operated by the 
private sector, it is not surprising that there are significant efforts to enhance civil-military collaboration. 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_161675.htm?selectedLocale=en 
2.2.6 Legislation and reference documents 
— European Commission, ‘Green Paper on a European programme for critical infrastructure protection’ 
(COM(2005) 576 final), Brussels, 17 November 2005. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘European programme for critical infrastructure 
protection’ (COM(2006) 786 final), Brussels, 12 December 2006. 
— European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on a Critical Infrastructure Warning Information 
Network (CIWIN)’ (COM(2008) 676 final), Brussels, 27 October 2008. 
— Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European 
critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection, OJ L 345, 
23.12.2008, p. 75-82. 
— European Commission, Commission staff working document, ‘Review of the European programme for 
critical infrastructure protection (EPCIP), SWD(2012) 190 final, Brussels, 22 June 2012. 
— European Commission, Commission staff working document, ‘A new approach to the European 
programme for critical infrastructure protection: making European critical infrastructures more secure’ 
(SWD(2013) 318 final), Brussels, 28 August 2013. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘The European agenda on security’ (COM(2015) 185 
final), Strasbourg, 28 April 2015. 
— European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, joint 
communication, ‘Joint framework on countering hybrid threats: a European Union response’ 
(JOIN(2016) 18 final), Brussels, 6 April 2016. 
— European Commission Communication, ‘Delivering on the European agenda on security to fight against 
terrorism and pave the way towards an effective and genuine security union’ (COM(2016) 230 final), 
Brussels, 20 April 2016. 
— Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning 
measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union, OJ 
L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1-30. 
                                           
(34)  SatCen, ‘Mission, users and partners’ (https://www.satcen.europa.eu/who-we-are/our-mission); see also Council Decision 
2014/401/CFSP of 26 June 2014 on the European Union Satellite Centre and repealing Joint Action 2001/555/CFSP on the 
establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre, OJ L 188, 27.6.2014, p. 73-84. 
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— European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, joint 
communication, ‘Resilience, deterrence and defence: building strong cybersecurity for the EU’ 
(JOIN(2017) 450 final), Brussels, 13 September 2017. 
— European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joint 
Communication JOIN(2018) 16 final, Increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to address hybrid 
threats, Brussels, 13 June 2018. 
2.3 Public spaces protection 
2.3.1 What are soft targets / public spaces? 
There are two expressions used in this context: ‘soft targets’ and ‘public spaces’. Although they are used to 
describe very similar things, the former is used more in relation to defence, while the latter is mainly used in 
a purely civilian context. Several English dictionaries define ‘soft target’. For instance, according to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, it is ‘A person or thing that is relatively unprotected or vulnerable, especially to military or 
terrorist attack’ (35), whereas in the Cambridge Dictionary a ‘soft target’ is defined as ‘Something that is easy 
to attack or get an advantage from’ (36). Collins Dictionary defines it as ‘A thing or a person that is easy to 
criticize or make an attack upon’ (37), and according to the online Free Dictionary ‘soft target’ is ‘A military 
term referring to unarmoured/undefended non-military target’ (38). 
Therefore, the phrases ‘soft target’ and ‘public space’ can refer, by definition, to a great variety of entities in 
terms of nature or type and size, from a single person to a city, the unifying characteristic — their softness — 
lying in the fact that they are in normal circumstances (relatively) unprotected or undefended, making them 
highly vulnerable to criminals or terrorists. Security practitioners and specialists tend for their part to use the 
term in the plural, ‘soft targets’, referring to places and areas that the general public, or certain parts of it, 
can access freely, combining a (high) concentration of people and a low degree of security against assault, 
thus making them relatively easy targets for terrorists. And this is clearly the definition of ‘public spaces’. In 
this sense, they are usually opposed to ‘hard targets’, which are, on the contrary, highly secured premises and 
areas (e.g. military zones, some government and official buildings, and certain specific industrial 
infrastructures). In this report, we will use the expression ‘public spaces’, since this is the wording most 
commonly used in the EU. 
Because of their open nature, a high concentration of people and the inherent low degree of security against 
assault, public spaces are also vulnerable to low-cost methods of attack. A ramming vehicle, home-made 
bomb or toy drone carrying explosives, to give but a few grim examples, are all cheap means by which not 
only to cause a number of fatalities but also to instil panic and fear, injuring European life, values and 
institutions at their very core. 
Collective public spaces are numerous as shown by the following (non-exhaustive) list: 
— places of study — schools, universities, libraries; 
— public administration offices and public services; 
— religious sites and places of worship; 
— shopping centres and other commercial facilities;  
— cultural venues — cinemas, theatres, concert halls, museums, galleries; 
— bars, clubs, nightclubs, restaurants and hotels; 
— hospitals and healthcare facilities; 
— sporting arenas, sporting events and stadiums;  
— railway stations, bus stations, ferry terminals and airports; 
— parks, squares, beaches, tourist sites and places of interest;  
                                           
(35)  https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/soft_target 
(36)  https://dictionary.cambridge.org/fr/dictionnaire/anglais/soft-target 
(37)  https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/soft-target 
(38)  https://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/soft+target 
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— fairs and marketplaces; 
— parades, demonstrations, public meetings, pilgrimages and festivals; 
— important transport sites. 
2.3.2 Protecting public spaces 
The increased number of attacks on public spaces since the beginning of 2000 and in particular during the 
past decade (see Table 1) demonstrates the need to increase security in public places. As stated by Kalvach 
et al. (2016), ’placing the soft targets [public spaces] in focus alongside the hard targets reflects an 
innovative attitude towards security management. We pay greater attention to the attackers’ point of view 
and study the likelihood of an attack rather than its impact and social consequences’. This leads to 
‘[providing] security to subjects which would traditionally not have been entitled to protection — commercial 
facilities, community events, private individuals etc.’. 
However, public spaces are so numerous and different — despite their common intrinsic vulnerability due to 
their (more or less) open nature and public character — that it is almost impossible to provide security for all 
of them. 
Indeed, as stated by John Cohen, a former counterterrorism coordinator for the US Department of Homeland 
Security, ‘They are places that are difficult to harden because that would undermine the very reason they 
exist’ (Keneally and Madden, 2017). He made this point after the mass shooting that killed 58 people and 
injured 851 others at an outdoor concert in Las Vegas in October 2017. He argued that eliminating the 
public’s vulnerability in public spaces isn’t necessarily possible, noting that officials tend to encourage people 
to go about their lives as normal after an attack. 
This attitude is understandable, as it aims to counter the fear and anxiety that terrorists try to instil in people 
when carrying out their devastating acts, in addition to directly causing casualties and physical damage. 
Despite the difficulties, many actions can be undertaken to reduce as much as possible the vulnerabilities of 
these public spaces, to detect threats at an earlier stage and to increase resilience at all levels. 
2.3.3 The European Union scene and beyond 
In the EU, which has been heavily impacted by terrorist attacks in recent years, the protection of public 
spaces has been high on the agenda, reflecting the great complexity of the task (in particular because of the 
heterogeneity of the potential targets, which range from fully open spaces to areas with some form of 
protection) and the many challenges that it poses for law enforcement, public health authorities and civil 
protection authorities, not only technically but also in finding the right balance between protection and 
people’s individual and collective fundamental rights (39). According to the Council conclusions on the 
development of a renewed EU internal security strategy, ‘respecting fundamental rights in planning and 
implementing internal security policies and action has to be seen as a means of ensuring proportionality, and 
as a tool for gaining citizens’ trust and participation’ (40). 
The recent comprehensive assessment of EU security policy underlined the need to engage in ‘a 
comprehensive approach to support soft target protection which could include aspects such as a risk 
assessment methodology, insider threats and vetting procedures, detection capacity, raising public awareness 
and training citizens, engaging with private stakeholders and harnessing new technology, in particular on 
detection and security by design’ (41). 
Therefore, and although there is no EU legal instrument dealing with public space protection — a domain that 
falls primarily within Member States’ responsibilities — the Commission has been active in the field. The EU 
action plan to support the protection of public spaces (42), issued in October 2017, outlines all the actions to 
be taken by the Commission. It highlights in particular new funding schemes, the fostering of exchange of 
best practices and public-private cooperation. 
                                           
(39)  Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on development of a renewed European Union internal security strategy, 
Brussels, 4 December 2014; European Commission communication COM(2015) 185 final. 
(40)  Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on development of a renewed European Union internal security strategy (2014). 
(41)  European Commission, Commission staff working document, ‘Comprehensive assessment of EU security policy’ (SWD(2017) 278 
final), Brussels, 26.7.2017. 
(42)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Action plan to support the protection of public spaces’ (COM(2017) 612 final), 
Brussels, 18.10.2017.  
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The Commission also created a forum to enhance cooperation and coordination between Member States, the 
EU Policy Group on Public Space Protection. A first EU workshop on public space protection, gathering experts 
from various disciplines, took place on 6-7 February 2017; a number of policy strands and actions were 
agreed among Member States. The Practitioners’ Forum was also set up to facilitate exchange of information 
and expertise and the sharing of best practices on operational action to protect soft targets. It is intended 
mainly for Member State law enforcement practitioners and law enforcement networks. This has been 
complemented further by a newly established High Risk Security Network, which aims to bring together 
representatives of specialised law enforcement units responsible for the protection of high-risk public spaces. 
Through this network, a cross-border exercise, supported by the Commission and involving special 
intervention forces from the Belgian and Dutch police, took place on 29 June 2017, to test different 
approaches to soft target protection. the exercise consisted of a simulation of synchronised attacks on 
schools, aiming to measure preparedness and crisis management functions in case of simultaneous attacks 
in neighbouring countries (43).  
The EU Policy Group on Public Space Protection has also steered the work through a second stream, which 
has led to the creation of the Operators’ Forum, which aims to engage with private operators and other 
relevant security stakeholders from the private sector (e.g. shopping malls, concert halls, car rental 
companies, etc.). The idea is to create a common awareness of current security challenges and encourage 
public-private security partnerships to improve protection. 
One important aspect of the EU’s work to protect public spaces is providing support to local authorities. City 
centres are very vulnerable owing to the large numbers of people gathering there. In March 2018, the EU 
mayors’ conference organised by the Commission and the Committee of the Regions demonstrated the 
importance of sharing experiences among local authorities (44). The JRC also organised in June 2018 a 
technical workshop on protecting city centres against terrorist attacks, to foster the exchange of practical 
information among urban planners and local security authorities (Karlos and Larcher, 2018). This work will be 
continued under the EU urban agenda, with a new partnership on security in public spaces. 
Several funding schemes have also been adapted to reflect the increased need to protect public spaces. The 
Urban Innovative Fund aims to provide urban areas throughout Europe with resources to test new and 
unproven solutions to address urban challenges. The 2018 call included a budget for urban security (45). The 
Internal Security Fund — Police promotes the implementation of the internal security strategy and law 
enforcement cooperation (46). The new call seeks proposals in the field of public space protection, similar to 
the security projects carried out under H2020 (47).  
There are many other relevant initiatives at EU level and beyond, the international level being of prime 
importance in relation, for instance, to air transport infrastructures. One example is the EU aviation security 
framework, which has been developed over the years and is being constantly monitored, revised and 
reinforced in an attempt to stay ahead of the threat (48).  
With regard to the transport sector as a target (49), whereas air transport is now significantly better protected, 
rail transport remains at high risk of attacks because of its open nature. On 15 June 2017, the Commission, 
with the Member States, launched a common railway risk assessment and is working on further measures to 
improve passenger railway security. The Commission has also been working on a best practice security 
guidance toolkit for the commercial road transport sector, which was published in January 2018. It provides 
operational guidance to help European truck drivers, haulage companies and other stakeholders to address 
cargo theft, stowaway entry to trucks and possible threats from terrorism. It also updates and upgrades 
                                           
(43)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Ninth progress report towards an effective and genuine security union’ 
(COM(2017) 407 final), Brussels, 26.7.2017; European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Tenth progress report towards an 
effective and genuine security union’ (COM(2017) 466 final), Brussels, 7.9.2017. 
(44)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Thirteenth progress report towards an effective and genuine security union’ 
(COM(2018) 46 final), Brussels, 24.1.2018. 
(45)  https://www.uia-initiative.eu/en/call-proposals/4th-call-proposals  
(46)  http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/desktop/en/opportunities/isfp/topics/isfp-2018-ag-ct-protect.html 
(47)  http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/desktop/en/opportunities/h2020/topics/su-infra02-2019.html 
(48)  The framework was built on efforts in collaboration with the United Nations: Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation security, OJ L 355, 
30.12.2002, p. 1-21; Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 on common 
rules in the field of civil aviation security and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002, OJ L 97, 9.4.2008, p. 72-84; and subsequent 
revisions. The EU remains exposed to vulnerabilities in non-EU countries, in particular those facing a high level of terrorism threat 
and with lower aviation security standards. 
(49)  This sector presents the particularity that means of transport can also be used to conduct attacks (as in vehicle ramming). 
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contemporary good security practices that are rapidly becoming outdated amid constantly evolving threats, 
emerging technologies and regulatory changes (50).  
Maritime transport security is also under the scrutiny of the Commission, in particular to increase protection 
for maritime transport infrastructures (ports and port facilities) and ships (for container and passenger 
transport) (51). 
More of these initiatives are described in Sections 2.3.5 and 2.3.6. They all contribute to supporting Member 
States at national, regional and local levels in their efforts to increase the protection of public spaces against 
future terrorist attacks and to increase overall resilience. 
2.3.4 Possible evolution within the next 5 years 
Attacks on public spaces could be of a terrorist nature, linked to a demonstration of ideological conviction, the 
result of emotional instability not linked to an ideology or a recurring pattern, or part of a more complex 
attack scenario (e.g. an element of hybrid warfare). By definition, the spectrum of public space vulnerability is 
broad and the methods of attack are diverse.  
Relatively simple, low-cost methods such as vehicle ramming or shooting a firearm at a crowded space have 
been used to create casualties, fear and damage, and there is no reason to believe that such methods will 
not be used again in the future. As terrorist organisations are continually trying to innovate in terms of their 
techniques and modi operandi, more sophisticated assault techniques can be expected, such as the use of 
drones (sometimes referred to as ‘unmanned aerial systems’ or ‘unmanned aerial vehicles’ (UAVs)) carrying 
explosives or other harmful substances or weapons; drones have already been employed by Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 
All transport systems are still a focus for terrorist groups. This concerns in particular air traffic, even though 
access to these systems is heavily controlled; the attractiveness of a successful attack remains high. In 
addition, rail transport is notably vulnerable. Access to transport hubs such as stations is very difficult to 
control, and therefore it is difficult to minimise the risk. Furthermore, the tracks themselves represent a 
critical target for operations such as derailing.  
Risk analysis must also consider other potential methods of attack, which may presently appear highly 
improbable but which are becoming cheaper and more accessible through new technologies and thus more 
realisable. 
Table 1: Non-exhaustive list of assaults against various types of public spaces in Europe in recent years, indicating the 
modus operandi (MO)  
Schools 
— Žďár nad Sázavou, Czechia, 2014; 1 fatality; MO: hostages, knife attack  
— Toulouse, France, 2012; Jewish school; 4 fatalities and 1 injured; MO: shooting 
Religious sites and places of worship 
— Copenhagen, Denmark, 2015; outside a synagogue; 1 fatality and 2 injured; MO: shooting 
— Brussels, Belgium, 2014; Jewish museum; 4 fatalities; MO: shooting  
— Paris, France, 2015; kosher supermarket; 4 fatalities; MO: shooting, hostages  
— Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray, France, 2017; church; 1 fatality and 1 injured; MO: knife attack, hostages 
Transport 
— Belgium–France, 2015; Thalys train attack; 4 injured; MO: shooting 
                                           
(50)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Eleventh progress report towards an effective and genuine security union’ 
(COM(2017) 608 final), Brussels, 18.10.2017; European Commission communication COM(2018) 46 final. 
(51)  Council of the European Union (2014a). 
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— Brussels, Belgium, 2016; Zaventem airport terminal; 16 fatalities and 100 injured; MO: suicide bombing  
— Brussels, Belgium, 2016; metro station; 16 fatalities and more than 200 injured; MO: suicide bombing 
— Würzburg, Germany, 2016; train attack; 5 injured; MO: attack with hatchet and knife 
Cultural and sports venues/events 
— Paris, France, 2015; football match; 1 fatality; MO: suicide bombing  
— Paris, France, 2015; concert hall; 129 fatalities and 354 injured; MO: shooting 
— Copenhagen, Denmark, 2015; cultural centre; 1 fatality and 3 injured; MO: shooting 
Shopping centres and restaurants 
— Paris, France, 2015; restaurant terraces; 39 fatalities and 32 injured; MO: shooting from a car 
— Copenhagen, Denmark, 2015; 1 fatality; MO: shooting  
— Carcassonne and Trèbes, France, 2018; car and supermarket; 4 fatalities and 15 injured; MO: shooting, 
hostages 
City centres 
— Dijon, France, 2014; city centre; 13 injured; MO: car driving into a crowd 
— Nice, France, 2016; Promenade des Anglais; 86 fatalities and 458 injured; MO: truck driving into a crowd 
— Berlin, Germany, 2016; Christmas market; 12 fatalities and 56 injured; MO: truck driving into a crowd 
— Stockholm, Sweden, 2017; city centre; 5 fatalities and 14 injured; MO: van driving into a crowd 
— Manchester, United Kingdom, 2017; Manchester Arena foyer; 22 fatalities and 512 injured; MO: suicide 
bombing 
— Barcelona, Spain, 2017; city centre; 15 fatalities and 180 injured; MO: car driving into a crowd 
— Cambrils, Spain, 2017; city centre; 1 fatality and several injured; MO: car driving into a crowd 
— Paris, France, 2017; Avenue des Champs-Élysées; 1 fatality and 3 injured; MO: shooting 
— London, United Kingdom, 2017; Westminster area; 5 fatalities and 44 injured; MO: car driving into a 
crowd, knife attack 
Others 
— Paris, France, 2015; headquarters of the newspaper Charlie Hebdo; 12 fatalities and 12 injured; MO: 
shooting 
Note: Not all attacks listed are necessarily only terrorism-related. 
Source: Authors. 
2.3.5 Stakeholders 
2.3.5.1 European Union stakeholders 
EU Policy Group on Public Space Protection 
The EU Policy Group on Public Space Protection was launched in February 2017. As described in the action 
plan to support the protection of public spaces (52), its aim is to improve cooperation and coordination 
between Member States, to bring together national policymakers and to collect, exchange and disseminate 
best practices. The group will advise the Commission on actions on the protection of public spaces and will 
steer the work through two streams: the Practitioners’ Forum and the Operators’ Forum.  
                                           
(52)  European Commission communication COM(2017) 612 final. 
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The former connects law enforcement practitioners and networks to enable them to exchange expert 
knowledge on the protection of public spaces. The Operators’ Forum involves private entities operating public 
spaces, such as shopping malls or concert halls, and other relevant private stakeholders, with the aim of 
improving security awareness and encouraging public-private security partnerships to improve protection. The 
first meeting of the Operators’ Forum took place in December 2017, and focused on information exchange 
and guidance on detection, as well as on the testing of new technology and security solutions (53). 
European Commission Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs 
DG Migration and Home Affairs manages policies that aim to ensure that all activities necessary and 
beneficial to the economic, cultural and social growth of the EU can develop in a stable, lawful and secure 
environment. It aims to develop a balanced and comprehensive EU migration policy, based on solidarity and 
responsibility, building a safer Europe by fighting terrorism and organised crime, by promoting police 
cooperation and by preparing to respond swiftly to emerging crises. As stated in its 2018 management plan, 
DG Migration and Home Affairs supports the implementation of the action plan on protecting public spaces 
(European Commission, 2018). 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/index_en 
European Commission Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport  
DG Mobility and Transport is responsible for EU policy in this area. It is engaged in aviation, maritime and 
land transport security. Among other tasks, and faced with the persistent threat of terrorism, it aims to 
reduce the vulnerability of public spaces related to transport infrastructures and to ensure a coordinated 
response in the event of a security incident on land, especially relating to rail travel (European Commission, 
2016d). 
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/security_en 
EU Airport Police Network (Airpol) 
Airpol is an operational network of airport-related law enforcement agencies. Its mission is to enhance the 
overall security of EU airports and the civil aviation domain by optimising the effectiveness and efficiency of 
airport- and aviation-related law enforcement and border guard activities, and by contributing to a more 
harmonised approach to enforcement in this area. In May 2014, the Commission and Airpol developed a 
manual on soft target protection at EU airports (54). 
https://www.airpoleuropa.eu/ 
European Network of Railway Police Forces (Railpol) 
Railpol is an international network of organisations responsible for policing the railways in EU Member States. 
The aim is to enhance and intensify international railway police cooperation in Europe, to prevent threats and 
to guarantee the effectiveness of measures against cross-border crime. It operates through working groups 
on various subjects, including public order and counterterrorism. The main goals of these groups are to 
exchange best practices and share information, draw up recommendations, analyse reports and organise joint 
international days of action (55). 
https://www.railpol.eu/site/home 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) 
Europol is the EU’s law enforcement agency, and its mission is to support EU Member States in preventing 
and combating all forms of serious international organised crime and terrorism. Its European Counter 
Terrorism Centre (ECTC) is an operations centre and hub of expertise in the fight against terrorism, focusing 
on, for example, providing operational support for investigations to EU Member States, international 
cooperation among counterterrorism authorities and tackling foreign fighters. 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/ 
                                           
(53)  European Commission, ‘Security union: Commission follows up on terrorist radicalisation’ 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_381). 
(54)  European Commission, ‘Implementation of the European agenda on security: questions and answers’ 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_16_2594). 
(55)  Railpol annual review 2017. 
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European Commission Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy 
DG Regional and Urban Policy manages policies aimed at reducing disparities in development between the 
various EU regions. As part of its activities, it contributes to the Commission priority of migration, mainly 
through measures financed under the European Regional Development Fund, such as Urban Innovative 
Actions. The aim of these actions is to create a space in which cities throughout Europe feel free to 
experiment with potential solutions to the challenges they face (European Commission, 2016e). 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/regional-and-urban-policy_en 
European Committee of the Regions 
The Committee of the Regions is the EU’s assembly of regional and local representatives. Together with the 
European Commission, the committee organised a conference in Brussels on 8 March 2018, which brought 
together mayors from a large number of European cities, including those cities that had been hit by terrorist 
attacks, in order to facilitate an exchange on the protection of public spaces, draw lessons from recent 
attacks and identify best practices emerging in cities across the Union (56). The Committee of the Regions has 
drafted recommendations for an action plan to support the protection of public spaces, drawn up by the 
Commission (57). 
https://cor.europa.eu/en 
European Commission Directorate-General Joint Research Centre 
The JRC is the European Commission’s science and knowledge service. It has solid research and policy 
support experience, developed in house, as well as broad networks with academia, industry, Member States 
and city authorities. 
The JRC provides scientifically based evidence supporting the policies in the field of public space protection of 
DG Migration and Home Affairs, EEAS (through the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre), DG Mobility and 
Transport and DG Regional and Urban Policy. It is actively involved in the implementation of the action plan 
on protecting public spaces. For more detailed information, see Section 3.4. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/joint-research-centre_en 
2.3.6 Legislation and reference documents 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Action plan to enhance preparedness against 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks’ (COM(2017) 610 final), Brussels, 18 October 
2017. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Action plan to support the protection of public 
spaces’ (COM(2017) 612 final), Brussels, 18 October 2017. 
2.4 Critical supplies security 
2.4.1 What are critical supplies? 
Critical supplies can be defined as those supplies vital to the support of operations that, owing to various 
causes, are or are expected to be in short supply (58). 
In this report, the notion is applied to non-fuel/non-food raw materials as well as to energy fuel supply. There 
is growing concern within the EU and beyond regarding the increasing use and high supply risk of a number 
of raw materials and fuels, putting the EU economy at risk of supply shortages. Securing non-energy and 
energy supply chains is therefore a key priority for the EU’s economic and social life. 
More generally, the question of availability and access to natural resources is at stake. In a recent study, the 
World Economic Forum states: ‘The availability of natural resources, particularly food, water, energy and 
minerals, is an important issue but also a highly contested one, mostly because of the many different 
                                           
(56)  European Commission communication COM(2018) 46 final. 
(57)  European Committee of the Regions, ‘Tackling terrorism: local leaders welcome EU plans to invest in cities to protect communities’ 
(http://cor.europa.eu/en/news/Pages/Tackling-terrorism-local-leaders-welcome-EU-plans-to-invest-in-cities-to-protect-
communities0308-2981.aspx). 
(58)  https://www.thefreedictionary.com/critical+supplies+and+materiel 
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perspectives and opinions held by both experts and the general public’ (World Economic Forum, 2014, p. 3). 
The report proposes a new paradigm that ‘shows that while the world has sufficient global stocks of natural 
resources to meet most of society’s demands, the flow of resource distribution is increasingly threatened by 
highly uncertain “above ground” factors. Similarly local crises risk having disproportionate global effects on 
resources, due to the high level of interconnections among resources and the factors influencing their 
availability. This, in turn, indicates a need for heightened care in addressing social and environmental 
considerations’ (World Economic Forum, 2014, p. 5). 
This explains the global context in which the situation described hereafter with regard to the security of raw 
materials and fuel supplies in the EU is embedded. 
2.4.2 Securing the supply of raw materials and fuels in the European Union 
Raw materials (including non-fuel and non-food ones) and energy fuels will be considered successively in 
subsection.  
2.4.2.1 Non-fuel and non-food raw materials 
The European raw materials initiative and the notion of critical raw material 
Non-fuel and non-food materials such as metals, minerals and forest-based materials have become 
increasingly important to the EU’s economy, as they constitute crucial inputs into a wide range of high-value 
goods and applications in a number of industrial sectors, such as automotives, aerospace, steel, electronics 
and renewable energy, to name only a few. 
However, because of an increased global competition for access to a sustainable supply of many of these 
raw materials, the EU may end up sometimes in a severe situation because of its low level of self-sufficiency 
and high level of consumption of products that are rich in various raw materials. The severity is expressed as 
supply risk, reflecting the risk of a disruption in the EU supply of the materials. Weak links in critical supply 
chains may further threaten the transition towards clean technologies and also have a negative impact on 
defence capabilities, health services, food production and distribution systems and transport systems. 
Considering complete and shifting supply chains is therefore essential when assessing the security of supply 
of raw materials. 
As a consequence, the European Commission adopted in 2008 the European raw materials initiative (59), as 
part of which it proposed a number of measures aimed at: 
— securing a fair and sustainable supply of raw materials from international markets; 
— fostering sustainable supply within the EU; 
— boosting resource efficiency and promoting recycling. 
One of the main actions under the initiative was the introduction of the concept of a critical raw material in 
which the methodology for assessing criticality is based on economic importance and supply risk. This 
resulted in an initial list of 14 critical non-energy raw materials (60). The list was accompanied by the 
following information, illustrating the concept of critical raw materials: ‘The 14 raw materials listed are 
critical because the risks of supply shortage and their impacts on the economy are higher compared with 
most of the other raw materials. Their high supply risk is mainly due to the fact that a high share of the 
worldwide production mainly comes from a handful of countries: China, Russia, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Brazil (niobium and tantalum). This concentration of production is in many cases compounded by 
low substitutability and low recycling rates.’ 
The original list was to be updated at least every 3 years; therefore, two revised lists have been published, in 
2014, with 20 critical raw materials (61), and in 2017, with 27 critical raw materials (62). 
                                           
(59)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘The raw materials initiative — meeting our critical needs for growth and jobs 
in Europe’ (COM(2008) 699 final), Brussels, 4.11.2008. 
(60)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Tackling the challenges in commodity markets and on raw materials’ 
(COM(2011) 25 final), Brussels, 2.2.2011. 
(61)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Review of the list of critical raw materials for the EU and the implementation 
of the raw materials initiative’ (COM(2014) 297 final), Brussels, 26.5.2014; this followed European Commission, Commission report, 
Implementation of the Raw Materials Initiative (COM(2013) 442 final), Brussels, 24.6.2013. 
(62)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘2017 list of critical raw materials for the EU’ (COM(2017) 490 final), Brussels, 
13.9.2017; European Commission (2017a). 
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The list contributes to implementing EU industrial policy, aiming in particular to 
(European Commission, 2017a): 
— strengthen the competitiveness of EU industry in line with the renewed industrial strategy for Europe (63); 
— stimulate the production of critical raw materials by enhancing new mining and recycling activities in the 
EU; 
— foster efficient use and recycling of critical raw materials; 
— increase awareness of potential raw material supply risks and related opportunities among EU countries, 
companies and investors; 
— provide support to innovation on raw material supply under the H2020 research and innovation 
programme;  
— support the negotiation of trade agreements, challenge trade distortion measures, develop research and 
innovation actions and implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable 
Development Goals. 
Other EU actions related to the raw material initiative 
Several other policies contributing to the implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy relate to the supply of 
raw materials needed for EU industry (64), including the following. 
— The European innovation partnership (EIP) on raw materials, targeting non-energy, non-agricultural raw 
materials, supports innovation and jobs by creating a multistakeholder platform to guide EU policy in this 
area (65). In several documents released by the EIP, specific actions and orientations are mentioned. 
● The Commission will, within the framework of the EU Raw Materials Strategy, identify 
bottlenecks and supply risks linked to the materials that are necessary for the development of 
key capabilities ... Future EU research programmes could also be used to mitigate supply risks, 
including substitution of critical raw materials, building on the work in the area of Key Enabling 
Technologies (KETs) (66). 
● The Commission has developed the concept of ‘hybrid standards’ for dual-use products to 
support security-related research. In implementing the Communication on cybersecurity, the 
Commission, in cooperation with Member States and industry, is developing a European 
certification framework and exploring a voluntary labelling framework for the security of ICT 
products, products that are dependent on the supply of around 16 EU-declared critical raw 
materials. 
— The eco-innovation action plan, which is part of the Innovation Union flagship initiative, focuses on 
specific bottlenecks, challenges and opportunities for achieving environmental objectives through 
innovation (67). 
— The EU action plan for the circular economy, as part of the circular economy package (68) under the 
responsibility of the Commission’s Secretariat-General, was adopted at the end of 2015 to support the 
circular economy in each step of the whole value chain, from production to consumption, repair and 
manufacturing, waste management and secondary raw materials that are fed back into the economy (69). 
                                           
(63)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Investing in a smart, innovative and sustainable industry: a renewed EU 
industrial policy strategy’ (COM(2017) 479 final), Brussels, 13.9.2017. 
(64)  See, for example, European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Roadmap to a resource efficient Europe’ (COM(2011) 571 
final), Brussels, 20.9.211; European Commission, Commission communication, ‘For a European industrial renaissance’ 
(COM(2014) 14 final), Brussels, 22.1.2014. 
(65)  European Commission, ‘European innovation partnership (EIP) on raw materials’ (https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/eip-
raw-materials/). 
(66)  According to the European Commission, “KETs are a group of six technologies: micro and nanoelectronics, nanotechnology, 
industrial biotechnology, advanced materials, photonics, and advanced manufacturing technologies. They have applications in 
multiple industries and help tackle societal challenges”; https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/policy/key-enabling-technologies_en; 
consulted on 19 September 2018.  
(67)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Innovation for a sustainable future — the eco-innovation action plan (Eco-AP)’ 
(COM(2011) 899 final), Brussels, 15.12.2011. 
(68)  European Commission, ‘Circular economy’ (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/circular-economy/index_en.htm). 
(69)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Closing the loop — an EU action plan for the circular economy’ 
(COM(2015) 614 final), Brussels, 2.12.2015. 
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However, it is very important to be aware that sustainable raw material usage and recycling cannot cover 
current and future EU needs for such materials, and that securing the primary raw material supply from 
outside the EU will also be necessary. The Commission’s circular economy principles — new technological 
solutions and business models with more sustainable production, consumption and waste management 
— should also be applied to the defence sector, in which resource efficiency and security of supplies are 
increasingly important. 
2.4.2.2 Energy fuels  
The EU currently imports 54 % of its energy fuels (90 % of its crude oil, 69 % of its natural gas, 42 % of its 
coal and other solid fuels, and 40 % of its uranium and other nuclear fuels), with this sector accounting for 
more than 20 % of total EU imports (70).  
The energy mix is also shifting notably, moving towards more renewable sources, leading to the use of, for 
instance, more wind turbines, solar panels and ocean energy. These new technologies and plants (e.g. 
photovoltaic farms) rely on various raw materials to function, largely imported from non-EU countries, which 
implies, as for the ‘old technologies’, the need to have secure access to these materials.  
The supply of fuels to the EU, which is of vital importance, is exposed to various types of risks, externally and 
internally, ranging from problems and disruptions in exporting countries to terrorist attacks and hybrid 
threats, not forgetting extreme weather events. Therefore, to increase the security of energy supply and the 
resilience of the EU’s energy system, an EU energy security strategy was launched in 2014 (71), addressing 
long-term challenges to the security of supplies through five main issues, which are described below in a 
quotation from the DG Energy website (72): 
— increasing energy efficiency, focusing on buildings and industry (accounting for 40 % and 25 % of total 
energy consumption respectively in the EU); 
— reducing EU energy dependency on third countries and also diversifying supplier countries and routes; 
— completing the internal energy market and building missing infrastructure links to respond quickly to 
supply disruptions and redirect energy across the EU to where it is needed; 
— speaking with one EU voice in external energy policy, ensuring also that Member States inform the 
European Commission early on planned agreements with third countries that may affect the EU’s 
security of supply; 
— strengthening emergency and solidarity mechanisms and protecting critical infrastructure. 
The main energy sectors are all covered by legislation or proposed legislation aimed at securing fuel supplies: 
the security of gas supply regulation (73) (one quarter of all the energy used in the EU is natural gas, and 
many EU countries import nearly all their supplies), the minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum 
products directive (74) (Member States are required to maintain oil stocks equal to at least 90 days of their 
average daily consumption) and the Commission proposal for a new regulation on electricity risk-
preparedness (75) (to prevent and manage electricity blackouts).  
These precautionary actions are of the greatest importance, as any disruption in fuel supply or 
malfunctioning of the fuel supply chain would affect all sectors of society, and in particular the defence 
capabilities of the EU and its Member States. 
                                           
(70)  European Commission, ‘Energy security’ (https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/imports-and-secure-supplies). 
(71)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘European energy security strategy’ (COM(2014) 330 final), Brussels, 
28.5.2014. 
(72)  European Commission, ‘Energy security strategy’ (https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/energy-
security-strategy). 
(73)  Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard 
the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010, OJ L 280, 28.10.2017, p. 1-56. 
(74)  Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of 
crude oil and/or petroleum products, OJ L 265, 9.10.2009, p. 9-23. 
(75)  European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on risk-preparedness in the electricity 
sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC’ (COM(2016) 862 final), Brussels, 27.10.2008. 
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2.4.2.3 The case of the defence sector 
Defence is a sector that is highly sensitive to the availability of non-fuel and fuel raw materials and therefore 
requires the highest possible level of supply security. Consequently, the European defence action plan  (76) of 
2016 contains a full section on strengthening security of supply, forming the first of the three pillars of the 
action plan (‘Reinforcing the single market for defence’). 
According to this section, ‘The Commission will, within the framework of the EU Raw Materials Strategy, 
identify bottlenecks and supply risks linked to the materials that are necessary for the development of key 
capabilities building on the findings of a recent study [Pavel and Tzimas, 2016]. Future EU research 
programmes could also be used to mitigate supply risks, including substitution of critical raw materials, 
building on the work in the area of Key Enabling Technologies (KETs).’ 
Several dual-use technologies — namely advanced batteries and fuel cells, unmanned systems, robotics and 
3D printing technology — have been thoroughly examined and assessed in view of demand for materials and 
security of supply issues (77). Europe’s dependence on the supply of raw materials is extremely high. Europe 
produces around 3 % of the raw materials required for these technologies, whereas China dominates global 
production, supplying one third of all the raw materials needed for the technologies in question. Other key 
suppliers are South Africa, Russia, Brazil, Australia and Chile. With regard to the supply of critical raw 
materials, Europe provides only 1 % of them. The major supplier is China, with an almost 40 % share, 
followed by South Africa and Russia (Figure 1). The main raw material risks across batteries, fuel cells, 
robotics and drones relate to supplies of cobalt, natural graphite and silicon metal, for which the major 
suppliers are the Democratic Republic of Congo and China. Vanadium and magnesium are also high risk, 
given their use in several dual-use technologies. 
Figure 1: Key suppliers of critical raw materials (CRMs) for advanced Lithium-ion batteries, fuel cells, robotics, drones 
and 3D printing 
 
Source: JRC internal report to DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (2019). 
2.4.2.4 The trade and diplomacy perspective 
Raw materials play a significant role in EU trade policy, which must ensure that global markets operate in a 
free and transparent way. Many non-EU countries, however, apply measures such as export taxes, import 
duties or price-fixing to raw materials, which distorts markets and could be detrimental to the EU’s 
manufacturing industries. Consequently, the EU’s implements its trade strategy along three lines: 
1. defining the ‘rules of the game’ through bilateral and multilateral negotiations; 
                                           
(76)  European Commission communication COM(2016) 950 final. 
(77)  JRC internal report to DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, Materials dependencies for dual-use technologies 
relevant for Europe’s defence sector (2019). 
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2. enforcing the rules and tackling market barriers when required; 
3. promoting debate on raw materials, both in bilateral and in multilateral settings. 
As part of its raw materials strategy, the EU pursues raw materials diplomacy and is engaged in a number of 
bilateral and multilateral dialogues and strategic partnerships. So far, the EU has developed relations with 
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Greenland, Japan, Mexico, Peru, the United States, Uruguay, 
the EuroMed countries and the African Union (78). 
There is also an EU energy diplomacy strategy in place (79), involving close cooperation between the EEAS and 
the European Commission, and resulting from the Commission communication on a resilient energy union 
(February 2015), the European Council conclusions recognising the importance of the external dimension of 
the Energy Union (March 2015) and the Foreign Affairs Council adopting Council conclusions on EU energy 
diplomacy, which include an EU energy diplomacy action plan (July 2015) (80).  
2.4.3 Possible evolution within the next 5 years 
The following trends are anticipated:  
— serious threats are not expected in the next 5 years;  
— price increases and imbalances between supply and demand for some metals are possible; 
— a new rare earths crisis is improbable in the short term; 
— mitigation measures (e.g. increasing efficiency, substitution and recycling) will continue to be developed; 
— attention should be paid to supplies of critical materials, in particular those associated with high and 
increasing demand, such as cobalt, lithium (in batteries), rare earths (in wind turbines and electric 
vehicles), composite materials, etc. 
2.4.4 Stakeholders 
2.4.4.1 European Union stakeholders 
European Commission Directorate‑General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and 
SMEs  
DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs is responsible for EU policy on the single market, 
industry, entrepreneurship and small businesses. 
One of its many tasks is ensuring a secure, sustainable and affordable supply of raw materials (European 
Commission, 2016b). DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs is in particular responsible for 
the EIP on raw materials and for the European Rare Earth Competency Network. 
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/raw-materials_en 
European Commission Directorate-General for Energy 
DG Energy is responsible for developing a resilient energy union with a forward-looking climate policy, in 
order to ensure affordable, secure and sustainable energy for businesses and households alike. 
One of its objectives is to contribute to the security of energy supply, based on solidarity and trust (European 
Commission, 2016f).  
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/imports-and-secure-supplies 
European Commission Directorate-General for Environment 
This DG is responsible for EU policy on the environment. It proposes and implements policies that ensure a 
high level of environmental protection and preserve the quality of life of EU citizens. 
                                           
(78)  European Commission, ‘Raw materials diplomacy’ (https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/raw-materials/specific-interest/international-
aspects_en). 
(79)  EEAS, ‘EU energy diplomacy’ (https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/energy-diplomacy/406/eu-energy-diplomacy_en). 
(80)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘A framework strategy for a resilient energy union with a forward-looking 
climate change policy’ (COM(2015) 80 final), Brussels, 25.2.2015; Council of the European Union, Council conclusions EUCO 11/15, 
Brussels, 20.3.2015; Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on energy diplomacy (10995/15), Brussels, 20.7.2015.  
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It is responsible for the implementation of the circular economy action plan (European Commission, 2016g) 
(specific objective 1 includes ensuring that the EU economy is resource-efficient, green and competitive). 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/circular-economy/index_en.htm 
European Commission Directorate-General for Trade 
This DG is responsible for EU policy on trade with countries beyond the EU’s borders. This includes raw 
materials (European Commission, 2016h). 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/goods-and-services/raw-materials/ 
European Commission Directorate-General Joint Research Centre 
The JRC is the European Commission’s science and knowledge service. It has solid research and policy 
support experience, developed in house, as well as broad networks with academia, industry, Member States 
and city authorities.  
For more information about research in the area of critical supplies, see Section 3.4. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/joint-research-centre_en 
European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) 
The EIT is an independent EU body. It aims to enhance Europe’s ability to innovate by nurturing 
entrepreneurial talent and supporting new ideas. 
EIT RawMaterials was designated an EIT Innovation Community by the EIT Governing Board on 9 December 
2014. 
https://eit.europa.eu/eit-community/eit-raw-materials and https://eitrawmaterials.eu/ 
European Defence Agency 
The EDA was established under a joint action of the Council of Ministers on 12 July 2004, ‘to support the 
Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis 
management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy as it stands now and develops in the 
future’. 
The EDA works to ensure an adequate level of confidence in security of supply across Europe, including long-
term assurance of sources of key technologies and willingness of partner governments to facilitate supply. 
The EDA’s work is based on a pragmatic step-by-step approach, reaching a common understanding on and 
taking into account the different aspects of security of supply. 
In addition, its energy and environment programme aims, among its objectives, to ‘reduce [the dependency of 
European military forces] on imported fossil fuels, improve energy efficiency, integrate new energy 
technologies into military capabilities and to understand the cultural and management issues that exist 
within the military that restrict overall sustainability and resilience’. 
https://www.eda.europa.eu and https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/energy-and-
environment-programme  
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) 
The EU agency ACER was created as part of the third energy package to further progress the completion of 
the internal energy market both for electricity and for natural gas. 
ACER contributes to achieving the EU’s energy policy objectives, including an efficient energy infrastructure 
guaranteeing the free movement of energy across borders and the transportation of new energy sources, 
thus enhancing security of supply for EU businesses and consumers. 
https://www.acer.europa.eu/en/The_agency/Pages/default.aspx 
Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) 
The Euratom Supply Agency was established by the Art 52 of the Euratom Treaty to ensure a regular and 
equitable supply of nuclear fuels to EU users in line with the objectives of Art 2(d). ESA also implements the 
EU common supply policy for nuclear materials and monitors transactions involving services in the nuclear 
fuel cycle (conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication).  
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The remit of the agency was strengthened in 2008 by the Council Decision, establishing ESA's statutes which 
entrusted the agency with the creation of a nuclear market observatory. 
https://ec.europa.eu/euratom/index.html 
2.4.4.2 International stakeholders 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
The European Commission supports the work of the OECD on raw materials. This work concentrates on the 
raw materials trade, tackling export restrictions, promoting best practices in raw material policies and due 
diligence for responsible supply chains. The OECD provides economic analysis of trade in the sector and a 
forum for multilateral discussions. 
http://www.oecd.org/tad/benefitlib/export-restrictions-raw-materials.htm 
United Nations 
Among the 17 Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted by 
the UN in 2015 in order ‘to promote prosperity while protecting the planet’, Goal 12 aims at ‘ensuring 
sustainable consumption and production patterns. Sustainable consumption and production is about 
promoting resource and energy efficiency, sustainable infrastructure, and providing access to basic services, 
green and decent jobs and a better quality of life for all.’ This goal is further specified in a series of 11 
targets, such as ‘Implement the 10-year framework of programmes on sustainable consumption and 
production, all countries taking action, with developed countries taking the lead, taking into account the 
development and capabilities of developing countries’ and ‘By 2030, achieve the sustainable management 
and efficient use of natural resources’. 
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-consumption-production/ 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Regarding energy security, NATO performs regular consultations among allies and partner countries, shares 
intelligence sharing and expands links with relevant international organisations, such as the International 
Energy Agency and the EU. NATO also organises the North Atlantic Council’s annual seminars on global 
energy developments, as well as the Energy Security Strategic Awareness Course, which has taken place 
annually since 2015. NATO supports national authorities in enhancing their resilience to energy supply 
disruptions that could affect national and collective defence. 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49208.htm 
2.4.5 Legislation and reference documents 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘The raw materials initiative — meeting our critical 
needs for growth and jobs in Europe’ (COM(2008) 699 final), Brussels, 4 November 2008. 
— Council of Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to 
maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products, OJ L 265, 9.10.2009, p. 9-23. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Tackling the challenges in commodity markets and 
on raw materials’ (COM(2011) 25 final), Brussels, 2 February 2011. 
— European Commission, Commission report, Implementation of the raw materials initiative 
(COM(2013) 442 final), Brussels, 24 June 2013. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Review of the list of critical raw materials for the 
EU and the implementation of the raw materials initiative’ COM(2014) 297 final, Brussels, 26 May 2014. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘European energy security strategy’ (COM(2014) 330 
final), Brussels, 28 May 2014. 
— European Commission, Commission staff working document, ‘In-depth study of European energy security’ 
(SWD(2014) 330 final), accompanying COM(2014) 330 final, Brussels, 2 July 2014. 
— European Commission, Report on Critical Raw Materials for the EU: Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on Defining Critical Raw Materials, May 2014. 
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— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘A framework strategy for a resilient energy union 
with a forward-looking climate change policy’ (COM(2015) 80 final), Brussels, 25 February 2015. 
— Council of the European Union, Council conclusions EUCO 11/15, Brussels, 20 March 2015. 
— Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on energy diplomacy (10995/15), Brussels, 20 July 
2015. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘European defence action plan’ (COM(2016) 950 
final), Brussels, 30 November 2016. 
— European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on risk-
preparedness in the electricity sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC’ (COM(2016) 862 final), 
Brussels, 30 November 2016. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘2017 list of critical raw materials for the EU’ 
(COM(2017) 490 final), Brussels, 13 September 2017. 
— Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 
concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) 
No 994/2010, Strasbourg, OJ L 280, 28.10.2017, p. 1-56. 
2.5 Cybersecurity 
2.5.1 What are cyber-threats? 
Terrorist groups and some political or ideological extremist groups have found in the internet an effective 
way to promote, plan, support and execute acts of terrorism or hate crimes with the help of hacktivists or 
transnational criminal organisations.  
From a defence perspective, an increasing number of nations have found ways of using the internet as a 
multifaceted weapon. The boundaries of conflicts become uncertain; attack scenarios are never declared, 
making difficult to identify who is performing the attack, hence, making even harder to take the proper 
defence countermeasures. Cybersecurity concerns almost everyone, from individuals to business 
communities and states, while issues committing the states to counter political, ideological extremist groups 
and state-sponsored hackers are predominantly cyber defence related. 
The ongoing technological evolution has led to a new form of conflict targeting critical societal functions, 
government digital services, and economic and financial development. Strategically, targeted actions in 
cyberspace could be designed either to inflict physical damage or to provoke emotional and psychological 
effects, inducing fear or mistrust in society as a result of service disruptions or by taking control of digital 
data information systems and networks.  
The internet, the web, computer systems, mobile devices, all kinds of data and social networking — in a single 
word cyberspace — is the battlefield for approximately four billion global internet users, half of the world 
population. In addition, a large part of this environment, the deep web, needs to be investigated. 
According to International Standard ISO/IEC 27032:2012 (81):  
— cybersecurity is defined as ‘preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information in the 
cyberspace’;  
— cyberspace is the ‘complex environment resulting from the interaction of people, software and services 
on the Internet by means of technology devices and networks connected to it, which do not exist in any 
physical form’. 
Cyberattacks on public and private infrastructure are currently considered an aspect of the hybrid threats 
that the EU will have to face and challenge (see Section 2.7). Cyberspace is the specific context for the 
analysis of the various potential threats as a result of which a strategic shift is taking place from 
cybersecurity activities to cyberdefence-related actions. Although a clear definition of the concept is lacking 
(Dewar, 2017), the notion of ‘active cyberdefence’ is increasingly being used by relevant actors. Researcher 
Robert S. Dewar of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy defines it as ‘a concept predicated upon deploying 
tools to not only identify and stop cyber incidents as they are occurring, but also taking offensive measures 
                                           
(81)  International Organisation for Standardisation, ‘ISO/IEC 27032:2012’ (https://www.iso.org/standard/44375.html). 
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to minimize attackers’ capabilities. This can be achieved through a variety of technical solutions such as 
deploying decoys or hacking the attackers’ own networks to neutralize their efforts’ (Dewar, 2017). 
Therefore, the intention in this section is to avoid referring simply and directly to cybersecurity as such, 
addressing more specifically cyberdefence, which relates closely to the topic of hybrid threats. A new hybrid 
model of cybersecurity defence and response is rapidly emerging and possible cyberattacks against EU 
public/private infrastructure data and systems have established the need for a different approach in the use 
of IT assets and networks. This is currently being effected through a series of actions and negotiations both 
at EU and at international levels, including the engagement of scientists for the development of responsible 
and innovative counterattack measures.   
2.5.2 How do ‘state hackers’ or ‘hacktivists’ operate? 
Hackers are systems and computer security experts able to break into computer networks to steal, change, 
destroy information or tamper with digital devices. Hacktivists are hackers who are politically or socially 
motivated and intend to strategically jeopardise vital societal services and systems. The frequency of 
cyberattacks against local, national and foreign governments and their critical infrastructures continues to 
grow; these results could provoke physical damage leading to conventional hostilities. Attacks could affect or 
shut down power grids, cause oil pipelines to explode, contaminate water supplies, cause the collision of 
aeroplanes or disrupt military or intelligence satellites. Not only systems or structures but also data and 
information are very attractive to nation state hackers, and not merely for financial gain. As recently reported 
(Brattberg and Maurer, 2018), extracted or stolen data have been used to influence voting in some elections.  
2.5.3 Reform of cybersecurity in the European Union 
Cybersecurity is an essential element of the EU digital single market strategy (82). The EU has introduced a 
set of legislative measures, a public-private partnership, a certification scheme and a cybersecurity 
competence network, as well as reinforcing the role of the EU cybersecurity agency. Developing a 
cyberdefence policy and capabilities under the CSDP is part of the EU’s cybersecurity plan to protect the open 
internet and online freedom and opportunity. 
2.5.3.1 Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union 
Since 2013, with the adoption of an EU cybersecurity strategy (83) setting out the vision, roles, responsibilities 
and required actions in the domain of cybersecurity, the EU has proposed many initiatives and measures that 
focus on and/or include cybersecurity, privacy and cybercrime aspects. In the context of developing a 
cyberdefence policy, the HR/VP has called for a focus on: 
— assessing operational EU cyberdefence requirements; 
— developing the EU cyberdefence policy framework; 
— improving cyberdefence training and exercise opportunities for the military; 
— promoting dialogue and coordination between civilian and military actors in the EU; 
— ensuring dialogue with international partners, including NATO. 
The strategy specifies roles and responsibilities both at national and EU levels for three key pillars — NIS, law 
enforcement and defence — involving dialogue on policy with international partners , such as the Council of 
Europe, the OECD, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), NATO and the UN. 
In addition, the strategy states that the forthcoming arrangements for the implementation of the Solidarity 
Clause (Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) should take into 
consideration the risk of cyberattack against a Member State. 
                                           
(82)  European Commission, ‘Digital single market’ (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en). 
(83)  European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, joint communication, 
‘Cybersecurity strategy of the European Union: an open, safe and secure cyberspace’ (JOIN (2013) 1 final), Brussels, 7.2.2013. 
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2.5.3.2 Strengthening Europe’s cyber-resilience system and fostering a competitive and 
innovative cybersecurity industry 
This communication (84) aims to strengthen Europe’s cyber-resilience system and foster a competitive and 
innovative cybersecurity industry in Europe, so that Europe is prepared to face a possible large-scale cyber-
crisis that could affect critical information systems in several Member States simultaneously. For this 
purpose, cyber-aspects should be integrated into existing crisis management mechanisms, and information 
sharing and cooperation among Member States should be effective. 
Cooperation is envisaged in the directive on security of network and information systems, the NIS 
directive (85), of 2016, for example through the Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) network 
(which promotes effective operational cooperation on specific cybersecurity incidents and sharing of 
information about risks) and the Cooperation Group (which supports strategic cooperation and exchange of 
information related to cyber-incidents among Member States). To reinforce further the implementation of the 
directive, the Commission proposed additional measures in a communication of 2017 (86). 
To address intersectoral interdependencies and key public network infrastructure resilience, the Commission 
recommended various actions in its communication. These included facilitating cooperation among sectoral 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (87) and CSIRTs, studying the strategic/systemic risk resulting from 
cyber-incidents in highly interdependent sectors, setting up trusted channels for voluntary reporting on cyber-
theft of trade secrets and promoting the embedding of cybersecurity measures in European sectoral policies. 
To stimulate the competitiveness and innovation of Europe’s cybersecurity industry, the Commission signed 
with industry a contractual public-private partnership on cybersecurity in July 2016 (88), launched H2020 calls 
for proposals related to the cybersecurity partnership and ensured coordination of the cybersecurity 
partnership through relevant sectoral strategies, H2020 instruments and sectoral public-private partnerships. 
2.5.3.3 Resilience, deterrence and defence 
To better protect Europe against cyberattacks, the Commission and the HR/VP proposed in September 2017 a 
wide-ranging set of measures to build strong cybersecurity in the EU. 
The joint communication (89) describes a package of measures building on existing instruments and 
presenting new initiatives to further improve EU cyber-resilience and response in three key areas: 
1. building EU resilience to cyberattacks and stepping up the EU’s cybersecurity capacity; 
2. creating an effective criminal law response; 
3. strengthening global stability through international cooperation. 
As part of the package of measures, the Commission presented a proposal for a regulation (90), referred to as 
the Cybersecurity Act, to deal with cyberattacks and to build strong cybersecurity in the EU. The act reinforces 
the mandate of ENISA, to enable it to better support Member States in tackling cybersecurity threats and 
attacks, and it also establishes an EU framework for cybersecurity certification, boosting the cybersecurity of 
online services and consumer devices. 
                                           
(84)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Strengthening Europe’s cyber resilience system and fostering a competitive 
and innovative cybersecurity industry’ (COM(2016) 410 final), Brussels, 5.7.2016. 
(85)  Directive (EU) 2016/1148. 
(86)  European Commission, Commission communication ‘Making the most of NIS — towards the effective implementation of Directive 
(EU) 2016/1148 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union’ 
(COM(2017) 476 final/2), Brussels, 4.10.2017. 
(87)  These centres are non-profit organisations that provide a central resource for gathering information on cyber-threats as well as 
allowing two-way sharing of information between the private and the public sector; see ENISA, ‘Information Sharing and Analysis 
Centers (ISACs)’ (https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies/information-sharing). 
(88)  European Commission, ‘Commission signs agreement with cybersecurity industry to increase measures to address cyber threats’ 
(https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/commission-signs-agreement-cybersecurity-industry-increase-measures-
address-cyber-threats). 
(89)  European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, joint communication, 
‘Resilience, deterrence and defence: building strong cybersecurity for the EU’ (JOIN(2017) 450 final), Brussels, 13.9.2017. 
(90)  European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union on ENISA, 
the “EU Cybersecurity Agency”, and repealing Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on Information and Communication Technology 
cybersecurity certification (“Cybersecurity Act”)’ (COM(2017) 477 final/2), Brussels, 4.10.2017. 
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More generally, to complete the EU digital single market, the package also includes:  
— the swift implementation of the NIS directive; 
— a cybersecurity certification scheme (91); 
— the establishment of a blueprint for how to respond to large-scale cyberattacks; 
— the launch of a European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre, with a 
network of similar centres at Member State level (92); 
— a more effective criminal law response to cybercrime through a new directive to fight fraud and 
counterfeiting of non-cash payments. 
With regard to cyberdefence, the framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber-activities 
(the ‘Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox’) (93) sets out the measures under the CFSP, including restrictive measures, 
that can be used to strengthen the EU’s response to activities that harm its political, security and economic 
interests. Implementation work on the framework is currently ongoing with Member States and will be taken 
forward taking into account the blueprint (94) for responding to large-scale cyber-incidents. More particularly, 
the EU aims to drive high-end skills development among civilian and military professionals by providing 
solutions to help with national efforts and by setting up a cyberdefence training and education platform. 
The EU cybersecurity strategy also identifies developing cyberdefence policy and capabilities related to the 
framework of the CSDP as one of its objectives, and it outlines a list of actions envisaged to increase 
collaboration between the EDA and the Member States. 
2.5.3.4 The European Union cyberdefence policy framework 
The Council of the European Union conclusions on common security and defence policy of November and 
December 2013 (95) called for the development of an EU cyberdefence policy framework, on the basis of a 
proposal by the HR/VP, in cooperation with the European Commission and the EDA. 
The Council conclusions (96) related to the joint communication of September 2017 recognised the need for a 
renewed emphasis on the implementation of the 2014 EU cyberdefence policy framework (Council of the 
European Union, 2014b) and to update it to further integrate cybersecurity and defence into the CSDP and 
into the wider security and defence agenda. Furthermore, they stressed the need to step up cooperation on 
cyberdefence and to take full advantage of the proposed defence initiatives to accelerate the development of 
adequate cyber-capabilities in Europe. 
The cyberdefence policy framework called for increased civil-military cooperation and synergies with wider 
EU cyber policies, relevant EU institutions and agencies, and the private sector. Since its adoption, a number 
of objectives have been implemented and a list of priorities established. In December 2017, the Council 
published a report on the implementation of the cyberdefence policy framework (Council of the European 
Union, 2017a).    
                                           
(91)  European Commission, ‘The EU cybersecurity certification framework’ (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/eu-
cybersecurity-certification-framework). 
(92)  This has been further implemented by the adoption of European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of the European Union establishing the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research 
Competence Centre and the Network of National Coordination Centres’ (COM(2018) 630 final), Brussels, 12.9.2018. 
(93)  Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on a framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities 
(‘Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox’) (9916/17), Brussels, 7.6.2017. 
(94)  European Commission, Commission recommendation on coordinated response to large scale cybersecurity incidents and crises 
(C(2017) 6100 final), Brussels, 13 September 2017 
(95)  Council of the European Union, Council conclusions partly on common security and defence policy (EUCO 217/13), Brussels, 
20.12.2013; Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on common security and defence policy (15992/13), Brussels, 
25.11.2013. 
(96)  Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on the joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council: 
Resilience, deterrence and defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU (14435/17), Brussels, 20.11.2017. 
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Table 2: Timeline of implementation of the EU cyberdefence policy framework 
Date Document reference Document description 
March 2013 N/A Cyberdefence capability requirements statement 
19 December 2013 EUCO 217/13 Council of the European Union conclusions  
7 February 2013 JOIN(2013) 1 final EU cybersecurity strategy 2013 
18 November 2014 15532/2/14 REV 2 Council conclusions on CSDP  
18 November 2014 15585/14 EU cyberdefence policy framework 
18 May 2015  8971/15 Council conclusions on CSDP  
26 June 2015 10347/15 First report on the implementation of the cyberdefence policy 
framework  
10 November 2015 13801/15 Second report on the implementation of the cyberdefence policy 
framework  
February 2016 NA Technical arrangement between the Computer Emergency Response 
Team of the EU and the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability 
1 June 2016 9701/16 Third report on the implementation of the cyberdefence policy 
framework  
8 July 2016 NA Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the 
President of the European Commission and the Secretary-General of 
NATO 
22 November 2016 EEAS(2016) 1597 EU concept for cyberdefence for EU-led military operations 
25 November 2016 14904/16 Fourth report on the implementation of the cyberdefence policy 
framework  
7 June 2017 9916/17 Council conclusions on a framework for a joint EU diplomatic response 
to malicious cyber activities (‘Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox’) 
12 June 2017 EEAS(2017) 773 Concept for integrating cybersecurity into the planning and conduct of 
civilian CSDP missions 
13 September 2017 JOIN(2017) 450 final Joint communication, ‘Resilience, deterrence and defence: building 
strong cybersecurity for the EU’ 
9 October 2017 13007/17 Implementing guidelines for the framework on a joint EU diplomatic 
response to malicious cyber activities 
13 November 2017 14190/17 Council conclusions on security and defence in the context of the EU 
global strategy 
20 November 2017 14435/17 Council conclusions on the joint communication on resilience, 
deterrence and defence  
6 December 2017 
5 December 2017 
14802/17 
15283/16 
Council conclusions on the implementation of the EU–NATO joint 
declaration  
19 December 2017 15870/17 Annual report on the implementation of the cyberdefence policy 
framework  
Source: Authors. 
To mention some examples, the EDA launched in 2017 a cooperative mechanism to encourage national 
cyberdefence exercises and training, involving 11 Member States. More broadly, the EU’s defence ministers 
took part in EU Cybrid 2017, a table-top exercise on strategic-level responses to cyberattacks against EU 
missions. The purpose of the exercise, under the Estonian Presidency, was to raise awareness of the impact 
of cyberattacks on EU military structures and to provide training on the coordination of crisis response 
measures. Many cyber aspects have been included in EU and NATO exercise scenarios with the intention of 
enhancing cyberdefence cooperation. The EU and NATO have also agreed on exchanging information and 
sharing best practices between their respective emergency response teams, the Computer Emergency 
Response Team of the European Union (CERT-EU) and NATO’s Computer Incident Response Capability.  
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2.5.3.5 The general data protection regulation and the directive on security of network and 
information systems 
With the full entry into force of the NIS directive, a higher common level of security of network and 
information systems will be achieved within the EU, enhancing cybersecurity capabilities at national level and 
further cooperation on risk management, baseline security measures and incident reporting obligations for 
critical infrastructure operators of essential services and digital service providers. These measures, together 
with the general data protection regulation (97), will contribute to the legal basis that is indispensable in 
providing stability and improved security to the digital single market while ensuring fundamental freedoms 
and privacy protection. Furthermore, under the umbrella of the NIS, the legislator is starting to inject in 
sectorial policy cybersecurity elements, to implement a cybersecurity by design approach also in the policies. 
The Commission has just published a report with key findings on how the EU cybersecurity rules under the 
NIS Directive are implemented in the crucial energy sector, in particular in electricity, gas and oil areas  (98). 
Other examples are related to the last policies in the sectors of transport, border management and radio 
equipment. 
2.5.4 Possible evolution within the next 5 years 
With full digitalisation, the vulnerability of our society to cyberattacks will certainly increase. Cybersecurity 
will increasingly become a matter of national security and as a direct consequence it is reasonable to expect 
cyber-conflicts to escalate in terms of frequency and magnitude, targeting not only traditional critical 
infrastructures but also other layers of digital society. Military forces as well as diplomacy will be required to 
enforce national security in a completely new, non-military dimension.  
State-sponsored attacks may lead to the deployment of cyber-capabilities in a military context, although the 
attribution of a cyber-threat still remains very difficult. Research and innovation are needed to protect 
national interests from cyberattacks. 
As cyberspace has been declared by the Council of the European Union to be a military domain — the fifth 
domain of operations, alongside land, sea, air and space — strategic autonomy in information technology is 
becoming increasingly important for civil and military infrastructures. Just as the battlefield is expanding in 
cyberspace, countermeasures in support of societal vital interests will have to be further developed. The 
deployment of AI techniques is expected to be a game-changer for next-generation cyberdefence.  
The dual use component in ICT and cybersecurity will be key for preventing and reacting to these emerging 
cyber-risks. Increased civil-military cooperation should take place and new research on cyberdefence carried 
out, starting with an assessment of the incremental effect of combining the two dimensions. Needs in 
relation to developing a common approach should be identified, available tools and capabilities fully 
exploited, and common curricula and guidelines developed.  
2.5.5 Stakeholders 
2.5.5.1 European Union stakeholders 
European Commission Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology 
(Connect) 
Connect is responsible for managing the digital agenda. The DG’s efforts in cybersecurity are mainly 
channelled through the NIS directive and specific actions under the digital single market agenda (e.g. the 
contractual public-private partnership on cybersecurity, accompanying measures on security certification and 
labelling of ICT products and security, the NIS directive and the general data protection regulation). The 
European Commission, through Connect, and the HR/VP have proposed a wide range of specific measures 
that will further strengthen the EU’s cybersecurity structures and capabilities through more cooperation.  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/communications-networks-content-and-technology_en 
                                           
(97)  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1-88. 
(98)  NIS Cooperation Group (2019). 
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European Commission Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs  
DG Migration and Home Affairs manages policies that aim to ensure that all activities necessary and 
beneficial to the economic, cultural and social growth of the EU can develop in a stable, lawful and secure 
environment. It aims in particular to build a safer Europe by fighting terrorism and organised crime, by 
promoting police cooperation and by preparing to respond swiftly to emerging crises. Promoting cybersecurity 
and fighting against cybercrime in the EU is one of its most important tasks (European Commission, 2016a).  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/migration-and-home-affairs_en#responsibilities 
European Commission Directorate-General for Energy 
DG Energy focuses on creating a competitive internal energy market to lower prices, develop renewable 
energy sources, and reduce energy dependence and energy consumption. Like other Commission services in 
charge of industrial or service sectors, DG Energy is responsible for specific actions addressing security, and 
by extension cybersecurity. For instance, in 2017 it organised, together with Connect, a high-level round table 
on the main challenges for cybersecurity in the energy system. The DG continued its work with expert groups, 
including stakeholder consultations to analyse vulnerabilities and cyber-risks in the energy system (European 
Commission, 2017b). For this purpose, a Smart Grids task force was set up in 2009 to advise on issues 
related to smart grid deployment and development. It consists of five expert groups which focus on specific 
areas. Their work shape EU smart grid policies and the policy framework. In April 2019, the Commission has 
adopted a Recommendation (99) that provides guidance on how to address the specific challenges of the 
energy sector on cybersecurity. It identifies the main actions required to preserve cybersecurity and be 
prepared to possible cyberattacks in the energy sector, taking into account the characteristics of the sector 
such as the real-time requirements, the risk of cascading effects, and the combination of legacy systems 
with new technologies. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/energy_en#responsibilities 
European Commission Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport 
The aim of the Commission in terms of transport is to promote, through DG Mobility and Transport, a mobility 
that is efficient, safe, secure and environmentally friendly and to create the conditions for a competitive 
industry generating growth and jobs. One of the general objectives of the DG is to support the development 
and deployment of intelligent transport systems and the digitalisation of transport, as contributions to the 
emergence of a connected digital single market. This requires, in particular, that it address cybersecurity 
issues (European Commission, 2016d). 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/mobility-and-transport_en#responsibilities 
European Commission Directorate-General Joint Research Centre 
The JRC is the European Commission’s science and knowledge service. It has solid research and policy 
support experience, developed in house, as well as broad networks with academia, industry, Member States 
and city authorities. The JRC is very active in the field of research and policy support for cybersecurity. See 
Section 3.4 for more details. 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research-topic/cybersecurity 
European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) 
This agency, set up in 2004, works closely with the Member States and private sector to deliver advice and 
solutions. This includes, among other activities, the pan-European cybersecurity exercises, the development of 
national cybersecurity strategies, and CSIRT cooperation and capacity building, as well as studies on the 
cyberthreat landscape, secure cloud adoption, data protection issues, privacy-enhancing technologies, and 
privacy issues relating to emerging technologies, electronic identification and trust services. ENISA also 
supports the development and implementation of the EU’s policy on matters related to the security of 
network and information systems. 
In May 2018, the agency signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a cooperation framework 
between their organisation with the EDA, EC3 and CERT-EU. The framework aims to leverage synergies 
between the four organisations, promoting cooperation on cybersecurity and cyberdefence, and it is a 
                                           
(99)  European Commission, Commission Recommendation (EU) 2019/553 on cybersecurity in the energy sector (notified under 
document C(2019) 2400), Brussels, 3 April 2019.  
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testament to the trusted partnership that exists between these EU agencies. It focuses on five areas of 
cooperation: exchange of information, education and training, cyber-exercises, technical cooperation, and 
strategic and administrative matters (100). 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/ 
Computer Emergency Response Team of the European Union 
CERT-EU, established in September 2012, is the permanent computer emergency response centre for all EU 
institutions, agencies and bodies. It is made up of IT security experts from the main EU institutions (the 
European Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions, and the 
Economic and Social Committee). It cooperates closely with CERTs in the Member States and beyond as well 
as with specialised IT security companies. Its mission is to support the EU institutions to help them protect 
themselves against intentional and malicious attacks that would hamper the integrity of their IT assets and 
harm the interests of the EU. The scope of CERT-EU’s activities covers prevention, detection, response and 
recovery. 
https://cert.europa.eu/cert/plainedition/en/cert_about.html 
The European Network of Law Enforcement Technology Services (Enlets) 
Enlets was established as a subgroup of the Law Enforcement Working Party of the Council of the European 
Union in 2008 during the French Presidency of the Council. The main goals of this subgroup are to strengthen 
police activities and cooperation and to promote the use of modern technologies in the process of exchanging 
information, knowledge or experiences. Within Enlets, the Mobile Identification Interoperability Group is a 
subgroup aimed at bringing together examples of good practice and advice for Member States in relation to 
developing and using mobile identification devices for police and immigration services. 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/projects/HOME_2012_ISEC_FP_C2_4000003994_en 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) 
The EDPS is the EU’s independent data protection authority; it ensures that EU institutions and bodies respect 
people’s right to privacy when processing their personal data. In particular, the EDPS (i) supervises the EU 
administration’s processing of personal data to ensure compliance with privacy rules, (ii) advises EU 
institutions on all aspects of personal data processing and related policies and legislation, (iii) handles 
complaints and conducts inquiries, (iv) works with the national authorities of EU Member States to ensure 
consistency in data protection and (v) monitors new technologies that might have an impact on data 
protection. 
https://edps.europa.eu/edps-homepage_en 
European External Action Service 
The EEAS is the EU’s diplomatic service. A key aspect of the work of the EEAS is its ability to work closely with 
the foreign and defence ministries of the EU Member States and with EU institutions. It also has a strong 
working relationship with the UN and other international organisations. It helps the HR/VP to implement the 
EU’s CFSP.  
The EEAS, together with DG Migration and Home Affairs and DG Connect, implements the CSDP. They also co-
authored the 2013 EU cybersecurity strategy (101). 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en 
                                           
(100)  EDA, ‘Four EU cybersecurity organisations enhance cooperation’ (https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-
news/2018/05/23/four-eu-cybersecurity-organisations-enhance-cooperation). 
(101)   See JOIN (2013) 1 final. 
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European Defence Agency 
The EDA is an intergovernmental agency of the Council of the European Union, to which it reports and from 
which it receives guidelines. The Agency has three main missions: (1) supporting the development of defence 
capabilities and military cooperation among the EU Member States, (2) stimulating defence research and 
technology and strengthening the European defence industry and (3) acting as a military interface for EU 
policies. 
One of the domains in which the EDA is active is cyber- and hybrid warfare. This work comprises several 
projects on topics such as: cyberdefence, communications and information systems and hybrid warfare. 
https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/cyber-defence 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) 
Europol is the EU’s law enforcement agency; it supports the EU Member States in their fight against 
terrorism, cybercrime, and other serious and organised forms of crime. It also works with many non-EU 
partner states and international organisations. 
The European Union Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) was set up by the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the 
EU and is built upon Europol’s Check-the-Web service. Its main role is to anticipate and pre-empt terrorist 
abuse of online tools, as well as to play a proactive advisory role in relation to EU Member States and the 
private sector in this regard. 
The EUIRU is a key unit of Europol’s ECTC and focuses on: 
— supporting the competent EU authorities by providing strategic and operational analysis; 
— flagging terrorist and violent extremist online content and sharing it with relevant partners; 
— detecting and requesting the removal of internet content used by smuggling networks to attract 
migrants and refugees; 
— swiftly carrying out and supporting the referral process, in close cooperation with the industry. 
Besides the support provided to the EU Member States, EU IRU cooperates closely with third-party partners 
within the framework of the EU Internet Forum. In this context and with the European Commission’s support, 
EU IRU has engaged with online service companies to promote self-regulation activities by the online 
industry. The EU Internet Forum is a platform launched by the European Commission on 3 December 2015, 
bringing together EU interior ministers, a number of internet companies, Europol and the EU Counter-
Terrorism Coordinator. The aim of the forum has been to address, in a coordinated manner, the phenomenon 
of the spread of terrorist and violent extremist propaganda to a large proportion of the global online 
population. 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc 
The European Cybercrime Centre 
EC3 was set up by Europol in 2013 to strengthen law enforcement responses to cybercrime in the EU. EC3 
contributes to the fight against cybercrime through a three-pillar approach: forensics, strategy and 
operations. It has been involved in high-profile operations and on-the-spot operational support deployments 
resulting in many arrests, and has analysed huge numbers of files, the vast majority of which have proven to 
be malicious. 
EC3 produces annually the Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment, which reports the key findings and 
emerging threats and developments in cybercrime. 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-cybercrime-centre-ec3 
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2.5.5.2 International stakeholders 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
On 8 July 2016, a joint declaration on an EU–NATO partnership was signed by the President of the European 
Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary-General of NATO. It identifies seven 
areas of cooperation, one of which is cybersecurity and defence coordination in the context of missions and 
operations, exercises, and education and training. NATO and EU cyber-incident response teams regularly 
exchange policy updates and best practices on cyberdefence. 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm  
Within NATO, the Cooperative Cyber Defence CoE is a multinational and interdisciplinary hub of cyberdefence 
expertise. The Tallinn-based international military organisation focuses on technology, strategy, operations 
and law. NATO CoE are nationally or multinationally funded institutions that train and educate leaders and 
specialists from NATO member and partner countries, assist in doctrine development, identify lessons 
learned, improve interoperability and capabilities, and test and validate concepts through experimentation. 
https://ccdcoe.org/ 
United Nations International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
Based on the guidance of the World Summit on the Information Society, held in two phases in Geneva (2003) 
and Tunis (2005), and the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, the role of ITU is to build confidence and security 
in the use of ICT. At the summit, heads of state and world leaders entrusted ITU to be the facilitator of Action 
Line C5, ‘Building confidence and security in the use of ICTs’, in response to which ITU launched, in 2007, the 
Global Cybersecurity Agenda as a framework for international cooperation in this area. 
https://www.itu.int/en 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) 
ETSI, a European standards organisation set up in 1988, produces globally applicable standards for ICT, 
including fixed, mobile, radio, converged, broadcast and internet technologies. One of the ETSI technical 
committee deals with cybersecurity (TC Cyber), looking at standardisation of cybersecurity internationally and 
providing a centre of relevant expertise for other ETSI committees. TC Cyber focuses on the security of 
infrastructures, devices, services and protocols, as well as on security assurance tools and techniques. The 
committee works with stakeholders to develop appropriate standards to increase privacy and security for 
organisations and citizens across Europe. It offers security advice and guidance to users, manufacturers, and 
network and infrastructure operators. The standards it produces are freely available online. 
https://www.etsi.org/committee/1393-cyber 
2.5.6 Legislation and reference documents 
— European Parliament Resolution 2013/2606(RSP) on a cybersecurity strategy of the European Union: an 
open, safe and secure cyberspace, Strasbourg, 12 September 2013. 
— Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on 
electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing 
Directive 1999/93/EC (eIDAS), OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 73-114. 
— Council of the European Union, EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework (15585/14), Brussels, 18 November 
2014. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘The European agenda on security’ (COM(2015) 185 
final), Strasbourg, 28 April 2015. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘A digital single market strategy for Europe’ 
(COM(2015) 192 final), Brussels, 6 May 2015. 
— European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, joint 
communication, ‘Joint framework on countering hybrid threats: a European Union response’ 
(JOIN(2016) 18 final), Brussels, 6 April 2016. 
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— European Commission, Commission communication COM(2016) 230 final, ‘Delivering on the European 
agenda on security to fight against terrorism and pave the way towards an effective and genuine 
security union’, Brussels, 20 April 2016. 
— Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, 
p. 1-88. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Strengthening Europe’s cyber resilience system and 
fostering a competitive and innovative cybersecurity industry’ (COM(2016) 410 final), Brussels, 5 July 
2016. 
— European Commission, Commission decision on the signing of a contractual arrangement on a public-
private partnership for cybersecurity industrial research and innovation between the European Union, 
represented by the Commission, and the stakeholder organisation (C(2016) 4400 final), Brussels, 5 July 
2016. 
— European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, joint 
staff working document, ‘EU operational protocol for countering hybrid threats: “EU Playbook” ’ 
(SWD(2016) 227 final), Brussels, 5 July 2016. 
— Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning 
measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (the 
NIS directive), OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1-30. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Space strategy for Europe’ (COM(2016) 705 final), 
Brussels, 26 October 2016. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘European defence action plan’ (COM(2016) 950 
final), Brussels, 30 November 2016. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Mid-term review on the implementation of the 
digital single market strategy: a connected digital single market for all’ (COM(2017) 228 final), Brussels, 
10 May 2017. 
— Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on a framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to 
malicious cyber activities (‘Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox’) (9916/17), Brussels, 7 June 2017. 
— European Commission, ‘Reflection paper on the future of European defence’ (COM(2017) 315 final), 
Brussels, 7 June 2017. 
— EEAS, Integrating cyber security in the planning and conduct of civilian CSDP missions (Document ST 
10548 2017 INIT), 21 June 2017. 
— European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, joint 
report, The implementation of the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats — A European Union 
response (JOIN(2017) 30 final), Brussels, 19 July 2017. 
— European Commission, Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1584 on coordinated response to large-
scale cybersecurity incidents and crises, Brussels, 13 September 2017. 
— European Commission, Commission Recommendation (EU) 2019/553 on cybersecurity in the energy 
sector (notified under document C(2019) 2400), Brussels, 3 April 2019. 
2.6 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive threats 
2.6.1 What are chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive 
hazardous materials? 
CBRN-E hazardous materials pose a major threat against which the EU must be prepared. Some chemicals, in 
particular toxic industrial materials, can cause burns and blisters, prevent breathing or attack the central 
nervous system. The biological agents in question are highly pathogenic bacteria and viruses or toxins 
affecting human health in a variety of ways. Ionising radiation arises from nuclear materials or other sources 
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of radiation, particularly from hospitals or industries, and can damage tissues and organs. The use of 
explosives in busy places is unfortunately well known. These materials are very dangerous and may hurt 
many people. CBRN-E events can happen accidentally, for example the sudden outbreak of an epidemic or 
the occurrence of an industrial catastrophe involving CBRN-E materials (e.g. the notorious incidents at 
Chernobyl or Fukushima, the explosion of the AZF factory in Toulouse, the leak of toxic sludge in Hungary), 
but there are increasing concerns about criminal use of CBRN-E materials.  
When used on purpose, CBRN-E materials can become weapons of mass destruction. CBRN-E materials may 
lead to mass casualties, have long-term effects and create an extremely hazardous environment. The use of 
CBRN-E weapons is not new but has evolved over time. In the 18th century, the distribution of smallpox 
infected blankets deliberately contaminated the Native American population (Ranlet, 2000; see also Carus 
(2017) for an overview of biological warfare throughout history). Nuclear weapons have been used twice, as 
we all remember. Chemical weapons made their terrible appearance during the First World War and their use 
has recurred regularly since; we have all seen the horrific photographs from the Vietnam War or of the 
Halabja massacre in Iraq. Chemical weapons are still being used repeatedly today in Syria, in spite of an 
international ban. Chemical or radiological agents can also be used by clandestine criminals to kill targeted 
persons, as illustrated recently by the Novichok attack on Sergei and Julia Skripal in the United Kingdom and 
the assassination of the half-brother of the North Korean leader with a highly toxic chemical weapon in Kuala 
Lumpur in 2017. 
CBRN-E incidents are frightening threats faced by our society. Owing to modern technology, the production of 
hazardous substances is easier now than it was a few years ago and thus the probability of an incident has 
of course increased. CBRN-E incidents may result from a disaster, but they may also be caused by non-state 
actors, that is, terrorists. Industrial and agricultural toxic chemicals can be purchased relatively cheaply and 
easily in most parts of the world. Illicit transfers have considerably increased, in parallel with the 
intensification of international commercial exchanges. 
2.6.2 The European Union scene 
To secure CBRN-E materials within the EU, the European Commission presented in 2009 a 
communication (102) on strengthening CBRN security in the Union, including an EU CBRN action plan (2009-
2015) with 124 actions to complement national measures on prevention, detection, preparedness and 
response to CBRN incidents. Communications on new EU approaches to the detection and mitigation of CBRN-
E risks followed in 2014 and 2017 (103) with the aims of ensuring that unauthorised access to CBRN-E 
materials becomes ever more difficult and of developing better capacities to detect those materials and 
respond quickly and efficiently to CBRN-E events. 
Threats to population health can emerge from multiple sources, including emerging or current pathogens but 
also chemical or radiological and nuclear events. In 2013, the EU adopted new legislation on cross-border 
threats to health (104), to improve preparedness across the EU and strengthen capacity to coordinate 
responses to health emergencies. 
To limit the general public’s ability to manufacture illicit explosives, a regulation was adopted harmonising 
rules concerning the availability, introduction, possession and use of substances or mixtures that could be 
misused and ensuring appropriate reporting on suspicious transactions throughout the supply chain (105). 
To prevent the dissemination of CBRN-E materials outside the EU, the European Commission controls the 
export, transit and brokering of dual-use items (goods, software and technology that can be used for both 
civilian and military applications) with the aim of contributing to international peace and security and 
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The EU export controls (106) reflect commitments 
                                           
(102)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Strengthening chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security in the 
European Union — an EU CBRN action plan’ (COM(2009) 273 final), Brussels, 24.6.2009. 
(103)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘New EU approach to the detection and mitigation of CBRN-E risks’ 
(COM(2014) 247 final), Brussels, 5.5.2014; European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Action plan to enhance 
preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks’ (COM(2017) 610 final), Brussels, 18.10.2017. 
(104)  Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on serious cross-border threats to 
health and repealing Decision No 2119/98/EC, OJ L 293, 5.11.2013, p. 1-15. 
(105)  Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2013 on the marketing and use of 
explosives precursors, OJ L 39, 9.2.2013, p. 1-11. 
(106)  Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering 
and transit of dual-use items, OJ L 134, 29.5.2009, p. 1-269 (recast in 2017). 
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agreed upon in key multilateral export control regimes such as the Australia Group, the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. 
Dual-use items may be traded freely within the EU, except for some particularly sensitive items the transfer 
of which within the EU remains subject to prior authorisation. The directive of 2009 (107) specifies the terms 
and conditions for transfers of defence-related products and provides a list of defence-related products that 
are subject to authorisation and licensing procedures. Items listed on the Common Military List of the 
European Union (108) include chemical or biological toxic agents, riot control agents, radioactive materials, and 
related equipment, components and materials. 
Finally, the CBRN CoE initiative (109), funded by the IcSP (2014-2020) (110), focusing particularly on crisis 
preparedness and response outside the EU, aims to mitigate risks related to CBRN-E materials. The causes of 
CBRN-E incidents can be natural, accidental or intentional, but it is in particular the intentional or malevolent 
use of those materials for terrorist attacks that is of increasing concern to the EU. 
The EU needs to position itself to stay ahead of an ever-evolving CBRN-E threat. An obvious first line of 
defence is to prevent as far as possible access to CBRN-E materials, securing correctly chemical and nuclear 
plants, pharmaceutical laboratories, agro-chemical storage spaces and other dangerous facilities in the EU 
but also outside it, in neighbouring countries, and preventing the potential introduction of dangerous 
ingredients and equipment into the EU. Limited access should be accompanied by appropriate vetting of on-
site workers. Similarly, stricter control of trade in dual-use products should be properly enforced. 
Preparedness is also an important component of the answer, and a precise chain of command needs to be in 
place in case of a CBRN-E incident; there also needs to be sufficient availability of skilled people with the 
necessary equipment. A common vision between countries is essential, since CBRN-E incidents extend across 
borders. 
2.6.3 International agreements 
The Chemical Weapons Convention (111), which entered into force in 1997, aims to eliminate chemical 
weapons of mass destruction by prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, 
transfer or use of chemical weapons by states parties. States parties must take the necessary steps to 
enforce that prohibition within their jurisdiction. The convention also regulates the destruction of chemical 
weapons and shut-down of production facilities. The development and production of several substances (and 
precursors) are subject to limits and inspections. In case of doubt about states’ compliance (Article IX) and 
where assistance and protection are needed (Article X), including emergency protection against chemical 
weapons and riot control agents, an investigation procedure is conducted following the Verification Annex, 
Part XI. Implementation is monitored by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. 
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC or BWC) (112) entered into force in March 1975; it 
prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of microbial and biological agents 
and toxins — unless for peaceful purposes — and of weapons, equipment and means of delivery of such 
agents for hostile purposes. According to the BTWC, the parties shall prohibit any actor from such activities; 
however, the exchange of equipment and information for the peaceful use of such agents must be supported. 
Surveillance and detection of infectious diseases in case of danger should be coordinated by 
intergovernmental organisations (e.g. the World Health Organization (WHO)). The BTWC has a peer complaint 
reporting system to enable complaints to the UN Security Council in case of a suspected breach, and there is 
also an investigation mechanism. The Implementation Support Unit, housed within the UN Office for 
Disarmament, receives information on national legislation, matches requests for assistance from the states 
and links national contact points.  
                                           
(107)  Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers 
of defence-related products within the Community, OJ L 146, 10.6.2009, p. 1-36. 
(108)  Council of the European Union, Common Military List of the European Union adopted by the Council on 9 February 2015 (equipment 
covered by Council common position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology 
and equipment), OJ C 129, 21 April 2015. 
(109)  European Commission, ‘EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence (CoE)’ 
(http://www.cbrn-coe.eu/). 
(110)  European Commission, ‘Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI)’ 
(http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/documents/140311_icsp_reg_230_2014_en.pdf). 
(111)  Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, ‘Chemical Weapons Convention’ (https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-
convention).  
(112) UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Biological weapons: the Biological Weapons Convention’ 
(https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/). 
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In response to the exponential increase in international travel and trade, and the emergence and re-
emergence of international diseases and other health risks, 194 countries across the globe have agreed to 
implement the International Health Regulations (WHO, 2007). Members of WHO must report disease 
outbreaks. The aim of the regulations is to provide a public health response to emergencies. 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (113) was opened for signature in 1968 and entered 
into force in 1970, and since that time 191 parties, including the five nuclear-weapon states, have joined. The 
objectives are to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology and to further the goal of 
achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and 
Nuclear Facilities (114) regulates the physical protection regime for nuclear material (use, storage and 
transport) and nuclear facilities both used for peaceful purposes. The countries that have signed the 
convention must set up an adequate protection regime for material and facilities, including the capacity to 
locate and recover missing or stolen material and to protect against sabotage. 
According to the International Civil Aviation Organisation Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for 
the Purpose of Detection (115), signed in 1991 and which entered into force in June 1998, each state party 
must prohibit and prevent the manufacture in its territory of unmarked plastic explosives. Plastic explosives 
are to be marked by introducing during the manufacturing process any one of four agreed detection agents 
(listed in the technical annex). Each state party must prohibit and prevent the movement into or out of its 
territory of unmarked explosives and exercise strict and effective control over the possession of any existing 
stocks of unmarked explosives. Stocks of plastic explosives not held by authorities performing military and 
police functions are to be destroyed, marked or rendered permanently ineffective. 
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of 2004 (UN Security Council, 2004) addresses the non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and requires all UN Member States to impede the development, acquisition, 
manufacture, possession, transport, transfer or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and means of 
delivery by non-state actors. States must take active measures to establish domestic controls, develop 
effective border controls and combat illicit trafficking. States have to establish effective national export and 
trans-shipment controls over such items. A 1540 Committee has been established to supervise the 
implementation of the resolution. 
2.6.4 Possible evolution within the next 5 years 
There is a potential risk that terrorist groups or non-state actors will use CBRN-E materials in future attacks 
in Europe, with a higher probability for chemical or biological weapons. The security of such material is 
therefore a crucial issue, and thefts and losses occur on hundreds of occasions each year.  
Dual-use products such as pesticides can also be accessed through chemical stockpiles in unstable countries. 
Toxic chemicals are the perfect weapon for our fake-news world, where responsibility is often in doubt and 
provenance hard to pinpoint. In addition, the advent of molecular biology techniques has allowed easier 
manipulation of bacteria and viruses, providing the means to create antibiotic- or antiviral-resistant 
pathogens or to synthesise pathogenic organisms without having to source the organisms themselves.  
Last but not least, drones could be used for the dispersal of such material. Small drones are cheap, easy to 
buy and operate, and can provide distance and anonymity to their operators. Drones have proliferated on a 
massive scale and improvements in battery technology give them greater power, lift and endurance, while 
fast chips and sensors allow automatic stability and easy operation. 
Terrorist incidents cause a higher level of psychopathology than those occasioned by natural disasters, but it 
would be even worse if CBRN-E materials were involved in an attack. 
                                           
(113) UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’ 
(https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/). 
(114) IAEA, ‘Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material’ 
(https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/conventions/convention-physical-protection-nuclear-material). 
(115) International Civil Aviation Organisation, ‘Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purposes of Detection’ 
(https://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/MEX_EN.pdf). 
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2.6.5 Stakeholders 
2.6.5.1 European Union stakeholders 
European Commission Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs  
The EU agenda on security (116) aims to strengthen the tools that the EU provides to national law 
enforcement authorities to fight terrorism and cross-border crime. In particular, DG Migration and Home 
Affairs is responsible for the EU CBRN action plan and related activities. In order to assist the Commission in 
its tasks, a CBRN Advisory Group, created in 2010, brings together the CBRN security coordinators of all the 
Member States. 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/securing-dangerous-material_en 
European Commission Directorate-General for Trade 
DG Trade is in charge of Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, which governs the EU’s export control regime. It 
contains a common EU list of dual-use items and a ‘catch-all clause’ for non-listed items in connection with a 
weapons of mass destruction programme (including CBRN items). This regulation calls for an annual report 
on the activities of the Dual-Use Coordination Group. Through the CBRN CoE initiative, a programme has been 
set up to enhance outreach to partner countries on export control of dual-use items (the EU-P2P export 
control programme; the website is run by the JRC) (117). 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/import-and-export-rules/export-from-eu/dual-use-controls/ 
European Commission Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety  
Public health emergencies at EU level are managed under the legislation on cross-border threats to health 
from 2013 (118), which provides for a comprehensive and coordinated approach to preparedness, early 
warning, risk assessment and crisis response. The Early Warning and Response System is a tool managed by 
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (with restricted access) to monitor public health 
threats in the EU in order to ensure a rapid and effective response to health events (including emergencies). 
The Health Security Committee is a body responsible for the coordination of health security measures in the 
EU, including CBRN-related measures (119). 
https://ec.europa.eu/health/preparedness_response/risk_management/hsc_en 
European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development  
DG International Cooperation and Development supports the implementation of the EU CBRN CoE initiative, a 
worldwide programme involving 61 partner countries financed under the EU’s IcSP. The DG also implements 
the EU-P2P export control programme described above. 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/tags/centres-excellence-cbrn_en 
European Commission Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid 
Operations (ECHO) 
Under the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism (120), the EU offers assistance to respond to major emergencies 
and to enhance preventive and preparedness measures for all kinds of emergencies, including CBRN 
disasters. Within the framework of the mechanism, there are 17 training modules dedicated to civil 
protection workers; one focuses on CBRN detection and sampling, and another is dedicated to search and 
rescue in CBRN conditions. ECHO also organises regular trans-border exercises, including on CBRN incidents. 
https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/mechanism_en 
                                           
(116)  European Commission communication COM(2015) 185 final. 
(117)  European Commission, ‘EU P2P (partner to partner) export controls programme’ (https://export-control.jrc.ec.europa.eu/). 
(118)  Decision No 1082/2013/EU. 
(119)  European Commission, Commission staff working document, ‘Health security in the European Union and internationally’ 
(SEC(2009) 1622 final), Brussels, 23.11.2009. 
(120)  Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on a Union civil protection 
mechanism, Brussels, OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 924-947. 
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European Commission Directorate-General Joint Research Centre 
The JRC is the European Commission’s science and knowledge service. It has solid research and policy 
support experience, developed in house, as well as broad networks with academia, industry, Member States 
and city authorities. The JRC has been active for many years in the vast area of CBRN-E threats. Details are 
presented in Section 3.4. 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research-topic/chemical-biological-radiological-and-nuclear-hazards 
European Defence Agency 
The EDA was created in 2004; all the Member States except Denmark participate. The agency aims to 
improve the EU’s defence capabilities through cooperative projects and programmes. The European 
Framework Cooperation for Security and Defence involves cooperation between the EDA and the European 
Commission on CBRN research, with a joint investment programme having been established in 2010. The 
investment programme launched 2 calls for projects in 2012 and 2013, with 14 projects selected and a 
budget of EUR 12 million (12 projects were still running in 2016, according to the EDA website, consulted on 
16 January 2019). Research topics include the remote detection of chemical threats, point detection of 
biological threats, handling mixed CBRN samples, modelling and simulation of CBRN architectures, 
decontamination management and sensor networking for CBRN. 
https://www.eda.europa.eu/ 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) 
Europol supports law enforcement authorities in their crime-fighting activities to achieve a safer Europe for 
all citizens. The main current threats include cybercrime and trafficking in human beings. Europol manages 
the EU Bomb Data System for sharing technical information and intelligence on explosives and CBRN (with 
two different multilingual databases). The European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network (EEODN) is a 
Europol platform for experts established in 2008 to fight against terrorism. Through this platform, Europol 
enhances and develops knowledge in the field of (CBRN-E) security, by facilitating the sharing of best 
practices among EU experts (Europol, 2018a). Explosive ordnance disposal and CBRN experts meet twice a 
year to discuss and explore existing threats from the illicit use of explosives and CBRN agents. The EEODN is 
also intended to improve civil-military cooperation between competent authorities in the field of explosives 
and CBRN. 
Since 2013, these activities have been incorporated in the training portfolio of the European Union Agency for 
Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL). 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/ and https://www.cepol.europa.eu/ 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
This EU agency, established in 2005, aims to strengthen Europe’s defences against infectious diseases and 
develops, with Member States, disease surveillance and early warning systems. At CBRN level, it ensures 
cross-sectoral bio-risk awareness and mitigation training, produces a handbook on the threat posed by 
bioterrorism, and raises awareness and disseminates best practices as regards ‘do it yourself’ biology. 
https://ecdc.europa.eu/en/home 
European Food Safety Authority 
This EU agency ensures the safety of the EU food chain by providing scientific advice to risk managers, by 
communicating with the public about risks and by cooperating with Member States and other parties to 
deliver a coherent, trusted food safety system in the EU. In the event of an incident of malevolent food 
poisoning, the European Food Safety Authority would have to assess the related risks. 
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/ 
European Biosafety Association (EBSA) 
The not-for-profit organisation EBSA, founded in 1996, establishes and communicates best biosafety and 
biosecurity practices among its members and encourages dialogue and discussions on developing issues. 
EBSA has several focal points, one of which deals with BTWC/CBRN matters. 
http://ebsaweb.eu/focal-points 
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2.6.5.2 International stakeholders 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
The IAEA is an independent intergovernmental, science- and technology-based organisation, within the UN, 
and serves as the global focal point for nuclear cooperation. The IAEA: 
— assists Member States in using nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes (including the 
generation of electricity), and facilitates the transfer of technology and knowledge in a sustainable 
manner to developing member states; 
— develops nuclear safety standards and promotes the achievement and maintenance of high levels of 
safety in applications of nuclear energy, as well as the protection of human health and the environment 
against ionising radiation; 
— verifies, through its inspection system, that states comply with their commitments under the Treaty on 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other non-proliferation agreements to use nuclear material 
and facilities only for peaceful purposes. 
Border Monitoring Working Group 
This working group was established in 2005 by IAEA, the European Union and the United States to promote 
co-operation between its members and serve as a forum for discussion and exchange of information on 
plans and programs to be implemented by the members in cooperation with the recipient countries to combat 
the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material that is out of regulatory control. 
https://www.iaea.org/ 
International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) 
This international organisation, established in 1956, enables police around the world to work together 
(currently it has 194 member states). It provides expertise and capabilities through three main programmes: 
counterterrorism, cybercrime, and organised and emerging crime. One of the ‘crime areas’ identified by the 
organisation is CBRN-E and the prevention of CBRN-E terrorism thanks to (i) sharing information and 
intelligence analysis, (ii) capacity building and training, and (iii) operational and investigative support. 
Activities include data analysis, training workshops, table-top exercises, international conferences and on-the-
ground operations. 
https://www.interpol.int/ 
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute 
The UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (1968) aims to implement improved policies and 
actions in the field of crime prevention and control: 
— to advance understanding of crime-related problems; 
— to foster just and efficient criminal justice systems; 
— to support respect for international instruments and other standards; 
— to facilitate international law enforcement cooperation and judicial assistance. 
The institute, through its CBRN risk mitigation and security governance programme, supports the 
development of an integrated CBRN approach through which all stakeholders, while operating autonomously, 
can establish common goals, identify and manage resources to achieve them, and clearly allocate 
responsibilities and tasks. 
http://www.unicri.it 
The Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction 
The Global Partnership, established in 2002, is an international initiative (currently with 31 active members) 
that contributes to international security through specific cooperation projects to:  
— secure and destroy dangerous CBRN materials;  
— protect vulnerable physical infrastructure;  
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— strengthen global networks, supporting international initiatives such as the Nuclear Security Summit and 
the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA); 
— build partner capacity to meet the international obligations set out in UN Security Council Resolution 
1540 against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (UN Security Council, 2004).  
The Global Partnership is committed to preventing CBRN terrorism and proliferation. 
https://www.gpwmd.com/cbrnwg 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
The OSCE takes an inclusive approach to security that includes politico-military, economic, environmental and 
human aspects. It addresses a wide range of security-related concerns, arms control, human rights, 
confidence- and security-building measures, national minorities, democratisation, policing strategies, 
counterterrorism, and economic and environmental activities. The 57 participating states enjoy equal status; 
decisions are taken by consensus on a politically but not legally binding basis. Most OSCE field operations are 
deployed in south-eastern Europe, the south Caucasus and central Asia. Within the CBRN field, the OSCE is 
active in counterterrorism and border control. 
https://www.osce.org/ 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NATO is an intergovernmental military alliance between 29 North American and European countries, under a 
treaty signed in 1949. NATO is a system of collective defence whereby its member states agree to mutual 
defence in response to an attack by any external party. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
their delivery systems are among the current threats. 
The NATO Joint CBRN Defence Task Force consists of a CBRN Joint Assessment Team and a CBRN Defence 
Battalion. This battalion is trained and equipped to deal with CBRN events not only in armed conflicts but also 
in crisis situations such as natural disasters and industrial accidents. Guidelines and Minimum Standards for 
CBRN First Responders have been produced by NATO’s Civil Protection Group, supporting the planning and 
implementation of responses to CBRN incidents. 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49156.htm 
World Health Organization 
WHO, a United Nations agency, is a coordinating authority on international health with the following 
objectives (among others):  
— monitoring the health situation; 
— setting norms and standards and promoting their implementation; 
— providing technical support and building sustainable institutional capacity; 
— working with countries to respond to crisis and health emergencies. 
WHO wishes to establish an integrated global alert and response system for epidemics and other public 
health emergencies. It supports its Member States in the implementation of national capacities for epidemic 
preparedness and response in the context of the International Health Regulations of 2005 (WHO, 2007), 
including laboratory capacities and early warning alert and response systems. 
After the Ebola crisis in west Africa in 2014, WHO, together with the GHSA, developed the Joint External 
Evaluation tool as part of the International Health Regulations monitoring and evaluation framework. This 
tool is used to assess a country’s capacity to prevent, detect and respond to public health threats, be they 
naturally occurring, deliberately caused or accidental. It has a section dedicated to biosafety and biosecurity, 
and another on chemical and radiological emergencies. A WHO manual on laboratory biosafety also provides 
guidelines. In addition, guidance documents on public health response to biological and chemical weapons 
and on laboratory biosecurity have been published. All the documents mentioned are available at the web 
address below. 
https://www.who.int/home 
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Global Health Security Agenda 
The GHSA, launched in 2014, is a partnership of nations, international organisations and non-governmental 
stakeholders to help build countries’ capacity to create a world safe and secure from infectious disease 
threats and elevate global health security as a national and global priority. GHSA pursues a multilateral and 
multisectoral approach (criminal threats are included). It contributed to the development of the Joint External 
Evaluation tool described above. 
https://www.ghsagenda.org/about 
Global Health Security Initiative 
The Global Health Security Initiative, launched in 2001, is an informal, international partnership to strengthen 
health preparedness and response globally to threats of biological, chemical or radionuclear terrorism and 
pandemic influenza. WHO serves as an expert adviser to the initiative. 
http://www.ghsi.ca/english/index.asp 
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) 
The World Organisation for Animal Health, established in 1924 as the Office International des Épizooties, is 
responsible for improving animal health worldwide, with 182 member countries, and is a reference 
organisation for the World Trade Organization. Each member country reports animal diseases detected on its 
territory. The OIE disseminates the information to other countries, which can take the necessary preventive 
actions. This information provision also covers diseases transmissible to humans and intentional introduction 
of pathogens; the OIE takes very seriously the threat posed by accidental or deliberate release of animal 
pathogens (breaches of biosecurity). It should be noted that several OIE biosecurity programmes combating 
zoonoses such as avian influenza and Rift Valley fever and the spread of antibiotic resistance in developing 
countries are funded by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN (121). 
http://www.oie.int/ 
International Federation of Biosafety Associations (IFBA) 
The IFBA, a not-for-profit non-governmental organisation (NGO) of biosafety associations from all over the 
world, has the mission of ensuring ‘safe and secure work with biological materials’. Among its priorities, the 
development of innovative approaches to achieving affordable biosafety and biosecurity capacities 
appropriate to regions with limited resources is crucial. The IFBA is a GHSA partner, supporting the 
development of national biosafety and biosecurity strategies and guidelines, and certifying the competency 
of biosafety professionals handling infectious disease agents. 
https://www.internationalbiosafety.org/ 
International regimes for the control of export of strategic goods 
Various groups are listed hereafter. 
— The Australia Group combats the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons 
(https://australiagroup.net/en/). 
— The Missile Technology Control Regime regulates matters such as the export of missile components and 
components for unmanned aerial vehicles (http://mtcr.info/). 
— The Nuclear Suppliers Group concludes agreements to prevent proliferation of nuclear goods and 
technologies (http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/). 
— The Wassenaar Arrangement includes agreements on export controls for military and dual-use goods 
(https://www.wassenaar.org/). 
— The Zangger Committee ensures that countries interpret the nuclear export control policies under the 
Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the same manner (http://zanggercommittee.org/). 
                                           
(121)  Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations ‘Transboundary animal diseases’ 
(http://www.fao.org/emergencies/emergency-types/transboundary-animal-diseases/en/). 
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Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) 
This Global Initiative is a voluntary international partnership of 89 nations and six international organizations 
that are committed to strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. 
http://www.gicnt.org/ 
2.6.6 Legislation and reference documents 
EU legislation 
— The Euratom Treaty coordinates research on atomic energy, establishes a common market for nuclear 
equipment and materials, and sets out safety and health regulations. It operates an effective regional 
nuclear safeguards system, encompassing nuclear material accountancy, verification through on-site 
inspections, regular reporting, and technical and scientific support to EU Member States, in close 
partnership with the IAEA. It participates in the fight against the illicit trafficking of nuclear and 
radiological materials. 
— Council of the European Union Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community 
regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items, OJ L 134, 29.5.2009, 
p. 1-269 (recast in 2017). 
— Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms 
and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community, OJ L 146, 10.6.2009, p. 1-
36. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Strengthening chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear security in the European Union — an EU CBRN action plan’ (COM(2009) 273 final), Brussels, 
24 June 2009. 
— Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on 
serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 2119/98/EC, OJ L 293, 5.11.2013, p. 1-
15.  
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘New EU approach to the detection and mitigation of 
CBRN-E risks’ (COM(2014) 247 final), Brussels, 5 May 2014. 
— Council of the European Union, Common Military List of the European Union adopted by the Council on 
9 February 2015 (equipment covered by Council common position 2008/944/CFSP defining common 
rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment), OJ C 129, 21 April 2015. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Action plan to enhance preparedness against 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks’ (COM(2017) 610 final), Brussels, 18 October 
2017. 
International treaties related to CBRN-E issues 
— Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, London, Moscow and Washington DC, 1 July 1968. 
— Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of Biological and Toxic 
Weapons and on their Destruction, London, Moscow and Washington DC, 10 April 1972. 
— Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Vienna and New York, 3 March 1980. 
— Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Montreal, 1 March 1991. 
— Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on their Destruction, Paris, 13 January 1993. 
— Resolution 1540 of the UN Security Council, 28 April 2004. 
— International Health Regulations (2005), Geneva, 2007. 
For further details on legislation and stakeholders related to CBRN-E issues, Eurojust publishes a report 
dedicated to the topic, which is periodically updated (Eurojust, 2017). 
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2.7 Hybrid threats 
2.7.1 What are hybrid threats? 
The EU, the Member States and non-EU countries are increasingly exposed to hostile actions that are 
generically called ‘hybrid threats’. These aim not only to produce direct damage to and exploit the 
vulnerabilities of their adversaries or opponents but also to destabilise societies, regions or states and create 
ambiguity to hinder decision making. Territorial integrity and political sovereignty may also be at stake. 
Although the concept of a hybrid threat is not quite new (122), there is no single definition of what hybrid 
threats are. There is, however, general agreement in stating that these threats involve combinations of 
conventional and unconventional tools and tactics to destabilise the adversary. As the word implies, ‘hybrid’ 
means ‘of a nature that is the product of multiple sources (or ways of acting towards a definite objective)’; 
therefore, hybrid threats involve a mix of different approaches — conventional and unconventional, military 
and non-military, overt and covert — and actors — state entities and non-state groups — gathered to 
threaten or attack chosen targets. Depending on the levels of intensity of the threat and the motivation of 
the actors involved, it is possible to further distinguish between a hybrid threat, a hybrid conflict and hybrid 
warfare, with the last two being specific categories in which some hybrid tactics are used by a state to 
achieve its strategic ends (Hoffmann, 2014; European Parliament, 2015a). 
At the EU level, a formal definition of hybrid threats is found in a joint communication of the European 
Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 2016: ‘the 
concept [of hybrid threats] aims to capture the mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and 
unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a 
coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the 
threshold of formally declared warfare.’ (123). In a later joint communication of the European Parliament, the 
European Council and the Council, of 2018, reference is made to ‘hybrid campaigns’, a term that further 
highlights their multidimensional and complex nature (124). 
Not all present-day threats can be described as hybrid. The notion of composite origin is paramount here. To 
give an example, a terrorist group that mainly plants bombs does not qualify as a hybrid threat. However, the 
combination of such bombing with, for instance, disinformation campaigns or criminal activities would 
transform a mono-threat into a hybrid one. Similarly, cybercrime and human trafficking, for instance, are not 
hybrid by their very nature, but they may easily become hybrid threats through association with other attack 
modes (Andersson and Tardy, 2015). To put it another way, hybrid threats constitute a synthesis of attack 
scenarios long regarded as isolated. 
It is also important be aware that a hybrid threat does not necessarily include force of arms. It can appear 
without the use of physical force, but it has to include a combination of non-violent practices to be 
considered a hybrid threat (Dengg and Schurian, 2006). 
2.7.2 How do hybrid attackers operate? 
The rhizomatic structure of hybrid threats is also reflected in the variety of modus operandi used by hybrid 
aggressors, which societies and their authorities must cope with in reacting to such threats (e.g. through 
preventive and preparedness actions). This then brings greater levels of complexity than in single threats. 
Thorough descriptions of such action modes have been published (see, for example, Giannopoulos et al., 
2018) and will be summarised hereafter. Three main ‘blocks’ of a given entity such as a state or a region are 
often targeted during hybrid attacks — the infrastructures (critical infrastructures but also public spaces), the 
media and communication systems (through manipulation, disinformation campaigns, etc.) — thus taking 
advantage of potential societal vulnerabilities. 
Infrastructures, in particular for energy, transport, space, defence and communications, are obvious and 
attractive targets for hybrid attacks aimed at degrading their availability and reliability, in order to induce 
social frustration, fear and vulnerability. As an illustration, we might mention the now exemplary cyberattacks 
                                           
(122)  Andersson and Tardy (2015) state correctly that ‘warfare itself has never been “pure” ’. It is also true that modern technology 
capacities and dependencies facilitate and multiply the potency and devastating impacts of hybrid threats. 
(123)  European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, joint communication, ‘Joint 
framework on countering hybrid threats: a European Union response’ (JOIN(2016) 18 final), Brussels, 16.4.2016. 
(124)  European Parliament, European Council and Council joint communication, ‘Increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to 
address hybrid threats’ (JOIN(2018) 16 final), Brussels, 13.6.2018. 
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against Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure, which temporarily disrupted electricity supply to over 225 000 
consumers in December 2015, demonstrating the capability of the adversary to strongly impact one of the 
country’s core infrastructures (Styczinski et al., 2016). Another example of such attacks, again against 
Ukraine, is the part of the Russian invasion of Crimea that involved local military action (conducted by special 
operations forces) supported by disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks: the occupation of the 
Simferopol internet exchange point, followed by the disruption of cable connections to the mainland, secured 
Russian information dominance in the peninsula, which was combined with informational and psychological 
warfare targeting Ukraine and the EU (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2018). 
As can be seen from the previous examples, media manipulation, propaganda and disinformation campaigns 
through social media or other means are an indispensable part of hybrid threats. The new information age 
provides opportunities in this regard that were considered simply impossible some years ago. The rapid 
proliferation of smartphones and all their technical capabilities — such as saving and sending videos and 
photographs or information — enable the worldwide provision of information — real or fake — by any user 
with scarcely any delay. Disinformation, regardless of the entity engaging in the activity, is aggressive 
marketing of information in support of political objectives and, as part of a hybrid threat, serves to steer 
people’s thinking in the direction desired by the attacker. Recent examples are numerous (see, for example, 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2018; Treverton et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, hybrid threats will always try to take advantage of societal weaknesses and vulnerabilities that 
may exist structurally or temporarily within their intended targets. These vulnerabilities can be the outcome 
of very different situations or developments, such as historical memory, legislation, old practices, 
geostrategic factors, a high degree of polarisation of society, technological disadvantages or ideological 
differences. In some situations, adversaries will identify these vulnerabilities and exploit them to create 
ambiguity and confusion and instil fear among citizens and authorities in the targeted countries. This is, for 
instance, what Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, sometimes referred to as ISIS or Daesh) did with EU 
citizens and governments, pushing them to take more hostile attitudes towards refugees, ultimately 
strengthening the image of the EU as an anti-Muslim society, to its discredit, promoting, in the end, 
radicalisation of people who would later support the deployment of targeted terrorist attacks. 
Recently, and in order to provide further clarity on this topic, the JRC and the Centre of Excellence for 
Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) have jointly developed a conceptual framework (Giannopoulos et al., 
2019) that aims to characterise hybrid threats and foster a better understanding among the various 
stakeholders. This framework is based on five pillars providing answers to (1) who might be behind hybrid 
activity, (2) the means that can be used (tools), (3) the areas that can be targeted and affected (domains), 
(4) the evolution timeline and (5) the objectives of hybrid activities. A hybrid actor might be a state actor or a 
non-state actor (e.g. a terrorist organisation, a transnational criminal organisation or a private military 
organisation) or a proxy acting on behalf of another hybrid actor. 
The hybrid threat is an overarching concept that incorporates different types of activity and an escalation 
process with a number of phases. The phases are priming, destabilisation and coercion. Activities in the 
phases can sometimes overlap. While there is always escalation potential, this does not mean that all hybrid 
campaigns will escalate to the coercion phase. On the contrary, an actor may perform persistent priming for 
long periods of time. The activities observed in the different phases are interference, influence, 
operations/campaign and warfare. Interference and influence usually belong to the priming phase; influence 
and operations/campaigns are features of the destabilisation phase; and the coercion phase may include 
hybrid operations/campaigns and warfare. 
As mentioned above, hybrid attackers select a number of tools to affect one or more of a country’s domains. 
Thirteen domains have been identified, coupled with a (non-exhaustive) list of tools that can be used to 
affect these domains. An adversary selects tools to achieve strategic objectives. These form a hybrid toolbox, 
which may vary depending on the adversary (state actor, non-state actor or proxy). Each tool targets one or 
multiple domains or the interface between them. Tools can exploit the vulnerability of a domain or domains 
or take advantage of an opportunity. The objective can be achieved either by the direct effect of the tool on 
the domain or through the resulting cascade effects. Such tools might be technological ones (e.g. 
cyberattacks) but they might also relate to the media, propaganda, etc. 
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2.7.3 Countering hybrid threats in the European Union 
Finding the right responses to counter hybrid threats requires the establishment of an array of strategies and 
tools, because of the variety of channels that need to be followed simultaneously. Responses must also take 
into consideration the interconnected nature of the challenges (e.g. ethnic conflict, terrorism, migration and 
weak institutions), the multiplicity of actors (e.g. regular and irregular forces, criminal groups) and the 
diversity of conventional and unconventional means used (e.g. military, diplomatic, technological) (European 
Parliament, 2015a). 
Countering hybrid threats also means countering ambiguity, confusion and fear deliberately created by 
adversaries in the targeted entity in order to hinder or block democratic decision making and enable them to 
perform their malicious acts. As correctly indicated by the title of a recent NATO report called Hybrid Threats: 
Overcoming ambiguity, building resilience (NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence, 2017), ensuring 
resilience at every level of societies and states must be at the core of strategies to be adopted and 
implemented by democratic nations and alliances of nations. 
This is the path followed by the European Commission and the HR/VP, who adopted in 2016 a joint 
framework to counter hybrid threats and foster the resilience of the EU, its Member States and partner 
countries while increasing cooperation with NATO on countering these threats. This framework, through the 
actions it proposes, envisages work along four lines (125): 
1. raising awareness by establishing dedicated mechanisms for the exchange of information between 
Member States and by coordinating EU actions to deliver strategic communication; 
2. building resilience by addressing potential strategic and critical sectors such as cybersecurity, critical 
infrastructures, protection of the financial system and protection of public health, and supporting 
efforts to counter violent extremism and radicalisation; 
3. preventing threats, responding to crisis and recovering by defining effective procedures to follow, but 
also by examining the applicability and practical implications of the Solidarity Clause (Article  222 of 
the TFEU) and the mutual defence clause (Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union), in the 
event that a wide-ranging and serious hybrid attack occurs; 
4. stepping up cooperation between the EU and NATO as well as other partner organisations, in a joint 
effort to counter hybrid threats, while respecting the principles of inclusiveness and the autonomy of 
each organisation’s decision-making process. 
As far as the EU is concerned, countering hybrid threats is largely a matter of Member State competence; 
Member States must develop integrated national responses, including threat analysis, self-assessment of 
vulnerabilities and a comprehensive security approach. However, the joint framework adopted 2 years ago 
aims to help EU Member States and their partners to counter hybrid threats and increase their resilience 
when facing them by combining European and national instruments in a more effective way than in the past. 
The first report on the implementation of the joint framework was issued in July 2017 (126) and updated 
1 year later (127); it puts a strong emphasis in particular on the CBRN-E aspects of hybrid threats. 
On the whole, an integrated international response, including joint EU and NATO efforts, is much needed to 
support the assessment of threats and vulnerabilities as well as coordinated action. Efforts in this regard are 
described further in Section 2.7.5. 
2.7.4 Possible evolution of hybrid threats within the next 5 years 
Hybrid threats are not expected to diminish; on the contrary, they are expected to increase in number and 
complexity. This trend can be attributed to the fact that adversaries are becoming more technologically 
advanced and experienced in conducting such threats. In addition, the enablers of hybrid threats (mainly 
technological means such as cyberattacks, but also disinformation and propaganda) are accessible by state 
                                           
(125)  For details, see European Commission and High Representative joint communication JOIN(2016) 18 final. 
(126)  European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, joint report, The 
implementation of the joint framework on countering hybrid threats — A European Union response (JOIN(2017) 30 final), Brussels, 
19.7.2017. 
(127)  European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, joint report, The 
implementation of the joint framework on countering hybrid threats from July 2017 to June 2018 (JOIN(2018) 14 final), Brussels, 
13.6.2018. 
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and non-state actors. To a certain extent, hybrid threats enable relatively small terrorist groups and/or poor 
countries to be more effective than their resources would ever have allowed them to be in the past. 
The evolution of hybrid threats will be closely linked to how societal weakness manifests itself in European 
countries. Hybrid threats are more effective in countries that face severe societal challenges. The capability 
of EU Member States to address such issues will define to a large extent their vulnerability against hybrid 
threats. Issues related to emerging technologies and trends, such as digitalisation, will certainly determine 
new channels of attack and affect how Member States perceive and respond to hybrid threats. 
It is also expected that the ways in which countries respond to hybrid threats will change dramatically. The 
comprehensiveness and multidisciplinary nature of hybrid threats will require countries to change how they 
address national security. It will be necessary to revise strategies related to collaboration between 
authorities, collection of data, data fusion and analytics to create a holistic approach to security. In this way, 
hybrid threats will be a catalyst for updating and modernising modus operandi in the security domain.  
2.7.5 Stakeholders 
2.7.5.1 European Union stakeholders 
European Commission Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and 
SMEs  
The mission of DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs is to develop a deeper and fairer 
internal market and help European enterprises, in particular start-ups and SMEs, and manufacturing and 
services industries to be globally competitive, innovative and sustainable, and to create more jobs, growth 
and value for all. The DG is a major contributor to two of the Commission’s priorities: (1) a new boost for 
jobs, growth and investment and (2) a deeper and fairer internal market with a strengthened industrial base. 
DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs also significantly contributes to other two of the 
Commission’s priorities: (3) a connected digital single market and (4) a resilient energy union with a forward-
looking climate change policy. According to its strategic plan 2016-2020, the DG is working together with the 
EEAS to counter hybrid threats. The Commission aims to build resilience to potential hybrid threats and 
increase cooperation with international partners on the issue (European Commission, 2016b). 
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/index_en 
European Commission Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs 
DG Migration and Home Affairs manages policies that aim to ensure that all activities necessary and 
beneficial to the economic, cultural and social growth of the EU can develop in a stable, lawful and secure 
environment. It aims to develop a balanced and comprehensive EU migration policy, based on solidarity and 
responsibility, building a safer Europe by fighting terrorism and organised crime, by promoting police 
cooperation and by preparing to respond swiftly to emerging crises.  
DG Migration and Home Affairs, together with the JRC, develops tools and vulnerability indicators to address 
hybrid threats to critical infrastructures (Giannopoulos et al., 2018). 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/index_en 
European Commission Directorate-General Joint Research Centre 
The JRC is the European Commission’s science and knowledge service. It has solid research and policy 
support experience, developed in house, as well as broad networks with academia, industry, Member States 
and city authorities. 
The JRC, thanks to its anticipatory thinking and its broad expertise in various fields related to hybrid threats, 
was among the first DGs to conduct work in this area. See Section 3.4 for more details. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/joint-research-centre_en 
European External Action Service 
The EEAS is the EU’s diplomatic service, which works closely with the foreign and defence ministries of the EU 
Member States and with EU institutions. It also has a strong working relationship with the UN and other 
international organisations. It helps the HR/VP to implement the EU’s CFSP. 
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https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/security-defence-crisis-response/47517/implementing-global-strategy-eu-
delivers-security-and-defence_en 
The EU Hybrid Fusion Cell was established in 2016, within the existing EU Intelligence and Situation Centre, 
aiming to provide all-source analysis on hybrid threats. As envisaged in the joint framework on countering 
hybrid threats (128), it receives, analyses and shares classified and open-source information specifically 
relating to indicators and warnings concerning hybrid threats; the information comes from various 
stakeholders within the EEAS, the Commission (and the EU agencies) and Member States. In liaison with 
similar bodies at EU and national levels, the Fusion Cell deals with external aspects of hybrid threats 
affecting the EU and its neighbourhood, rapidly analysing relevant incidents and informing the EU’s strategic 
decision-making processes, including by providing inputs into the security risk assessments carried out at EU 
level. Member States are expected to establish national contact points connected to the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell 
(EEAS, 2018).  
Communication task forces for the EU’s eastern and southern neighbourhoods have been established to 
counter widespread disinformation campaigns and systematic diffusion of fake news. The guidelines issued 
on the basis of the Council conclusions of March 2015 provided a mandate for establishing the EEAS East 
StratCom Task Force. In 2017, the EEAS decided to set up two forces, the EEAS StratCom Western Balkans 
Task Force and the EEAS StratCom South Task Force (129).  
The East StratCom Task Force develops communication products and campaigns focused on better explaining 
EU policies in the Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). 
It supports EU efforts to strengthen the media environment in the Eastern Partnership region, in collaboration 
with other EU actors. The task force reports on and analyses disinformation trends, explains and corrects 
disinformation narratives, and raises awareness of disinformation. It works with the EU institutions, EU 
delegations in the Eastern Partnership countries, Member States and a wide range of other partners, both 
governmental and non-governmental, within the EU, in the eastern neighbourhood, and beyond. This 
international cooperation aims to share best practices in strategic communications and provide access to 
objective information, as well as ensuring support for independent media in the region (130). 
European Defence Agency 
The EDA is an intergovernmental agency of the Council of the European Union, to which it reports and from 
which it receives guidelines. It has three main missions: (1) supporting the development of defence 
capabilities and military cooperation among the EU Member States, (2) stimulating defence research and 
technology and strengthening the European defence industry and (3) acting as a military interface to EU 
policies. 
One of the domains in which the EDA is active is cyber- and hybrid warfare. This work comprises several 
projects on topics such as cyberdefence, radiofrequency sensor technologies, information, optronics, 
governmental satellite communications, communications and information systems, persistent surveillance 
long-term analysis and hybrid warfare. 
In 2016, the EDA organised the Hybrid Threats Table Top Exercise, with the participation of DG Internal 
Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, DG Energy, DG Mobility and Transport, DG Migration and Home 
Affairs, ECHO, the EEAS, CERT-EU, ENISA and Europol, as well as observers from NATO. The objective of the 
exercise was to identify and analyse the implications of hybrid threats for European military capability 
development (131). 
The EDA is currently managing the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security 
Sector (132), a European Commission initiative aimed at bringing together specialists from the defence and 
energy sectors to share data and best practices on, for example, energy efficiency, renewable energy, and the 
protection and resilience of critical infrastructures for defence energy. In October 2017, the final report on 
                                           
(128)  European Commission and High Representative joint communication JOIN(2016) 18 final. 
(129)  Estonian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, ‘Estonian Foreign Minister Sven Mikser: EU must strengthen strategic 
communication capability’ (https://www.eu2017.ee/news/press-releases/estonian-foreign-minister-sven-mikser-eu-must-
strengthen-strategic). 
(130)  EEAS, ‘Questions and answers about the East StratCom Task Force’ (https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
Homepage/2116/questions-and-answers-about-east-stratcom-task-force_en). 
(131)  EDA, ‘Countering hybrid threats: EDA hosts first table top exercise’ (https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-
news/2016/03/11/countering-hybrid-threats-eda-hosts-first-table-top-exercise). 
(132)  EDA, ‘Consultation forum for sustainable energy in the defence and security sector (CF SEDSS)’ 
(https://www.eda.europa.eu/european-defence-energy-network). 
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the first phase was released (EDA, 2017b) and the second phase was launched. This project has received 
funding from the H2020 research and innovation programme and the agreement is between the Executive 
Agency for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises and the EDA, with support from the JRC. 
https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) 
Europol is the EU’s law enforcement agency. It supports the EU Member States in their fight against 
terrorism, cybercrime and other serious and organised forms of crime. It also works with many non-EU 
partner states and international organisations. 
The EU IRU was set up by the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the EU and is built upon Europol’s Check-
the-Web service. Its main role is to anticipate and pre-empt terrorist abuse of online tools, as well as to play 
a proactive advisory role in relation to EU Member States and the private sector in this regard. 
A key unit of Europol’s ECTC, EU IRU focuses on: 
— supporting the competent EU authorities by providing strategic and operational analysis; 
— flagging terrorist and violent extremist online content and sharing it with relevant partners; 
— detecting and requesting the removal of internet content used by smuggling networks to attract 
migrants and refugees; 
— swiftly carrying out and supporting the referral process, in close cooperation with the industry. 
The EU IRU’s tactical approach to referrals is targeted. The procedure aims to focus on propaganda linked to 
a high-profile event (e.g. the Paris attacks, the Brussels attack, the Magnanville murder) and relayed by high-
profile accounts. The primary objective is to be effective during the ‘viral’ phase of the propaganda. The 
secondary objective is to gather information to better understand the tactics and modi operandi of the main 
online propagandists, in order to improve the disruption mechanism. 
In addition to providing support to the EU Member States, EU IRU cooperates with third-party partners within 
the framework of the EU Internet Forum. In this context and with the European Commission’s support, EU IRU 
has engaged with online service companies to promote self-regulation activities by the online industry (133).  
https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol  
2.7.5.2 International stakeholders 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NATO’s Joint Intelligence and Security Division, Hybrid Analysis Branch, was established in July 2017. Its 
mandate is to analyse the full spectrum of hybrid actions, drawing from military and civilian, classified and 
open sources (134).  
In addition, two CoE contribute to NATO’s efforts to counter hybrid threats: the Strategic Communications CoE 
in Riga, Latvia, and the Cooperative Cyber Defence CoE in Tallinn, Estonia. Both organisations are 
international research centres that are nationally or multinationally funded and staffed. They work alongside 
and contribute knowledge and expertise to the alliance, but they are not NATO bodies. 
On 8 July 2016, a joint declaration on EU–NATO partnership was signed by the President of the European 
Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary-General of NATO (135). It identifies 
seven areas of cooperation: countering hybrid threats; operational cooperation, including at sea and on 
migration, cybersecurity and defence; defence capabilities; defence industry and research; exercises; and 
supporting eastern and southern partners’ capacity-building efforts. In total, 74 specific actions are under 
implementation in the 7 areas; 20 of them centre on countering hybrid threats. Interaction between the EU 
Hybrid Fusion Cell and the NATO Hybrid Analysis Branch is an important element of EU–NATO cooperation on 
hybrid threats.  
                                           
(133)  Europol, ‘Europol Internet Referral Unit one year on’ (https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-internet-referral-unit-
one-year). 
(134)  NATO, ‘Adapting NATO intelligence in support of “one NATO” ’ (https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/Also-in-2017/adapting-nato-
intelligence-in-support-of-one-nato-security-military-terrorism/EN/index.htm). 
(135)  EEAS, ‘EU–NATO cooperation — factsheets’ (https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/28286/eu-nato-
cooperation-factsheet_en). 
 60 
 
An EU operational protocol, the EU Playbook, has been developed; it outlines practical arrangements for 
coordination, intelligence collation, analysis and cooperation with partner organisations, including NATO (136). 
It was tested in the 2017 Parallel and Coordinated Exercise and further tested in the 2018 exercise. 
https://www.nato.int/ 
European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats 
Hybrid CoE was established in 2017 to serve as a hub of expertise supporting the participating countries’ 
individual and collective efforts to enhance their civil-military capabilities, resilience and preparedness to 
counter hybrid threats with a special focus on European security. Participation in the centre is open to EU 
Member States and NATO allies. Currently, the participants are Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. The 
aim of Hybrid CoE is to provide a single location dedicated to furthering a common understanding of hybrid 
threats at a strategic level and promoting the development of comprehensive, whole-of-government 
responses at national levels and of coordinated responses at EU and NATO levels. In addressing these issues, 
the functions of Hybrid CoE include the following: 
— to encourage strategic-level dialogue and consultation between and among participants, the EU and 
NATO; 
— to conduct research and analysis into hybrid threats and methods to counter them; 
— to develop doctrine, conduct training and arrange exercises aimed at enhancing the participants’ 
individual capabilities, as well as interoperability between and among participants, the EU and NATO to 
counter hybrid threats; 
— to engage with and invite dialogue with governmental and non-governmental experts from a wide range 
of professional sectors and disciplines;  
— to involve, or cooperate with, communities of interest, focusing on specific activities that may constitute 
hybrid threats, on methodologies for understanding these activities and on ways to adjust organisations 
to better address threats effectively. 
https://www.hybridcoe.fi 
2.7.6 Legislation and reference documents 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘The European agenda on security’ (COM(2015) 185 
final), Strasbourg, 28 April 2015. 
— European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, joint 
communication, ‘Joint framework on countering hybrid threats: a European Union response’ 
(JOIN(2016) 18 final), Brussels, 6 April 2016. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Delivering on the European agenda on security to 
fight against terrorism and pave the way towards an effective and genuine security union 
(COM(2016) 230 final), Brussels, 20 April 2016. 
— European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, joint 
staff working document, ‘EU operational protocol for countering hybrid threats: “EU Playbook” ’ 
(SWD(2016) 227 final), Brussels, 5 July 2016. 
— European Commission, ‘Reflection paper on the future of European defence’ (COM(2017) 315 final), 
Brussels, 7 June 2017. 
— European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, joint 
report, The implementation of the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats — A European Union 
response (JOIN(2017) 30 final), Brussels, 19 July 2017. 
— European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, joint 
report, The implementation of the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats from July 2017 to June 
2018 (JOIN(2018) 14 final), Brussels, 13 June 2018. 
                                           
(136)  European Commission and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, joint staff working document, ‘EU 
operational protocol for countering hybrid threats: “EU Playbook” ’ (SWD(2016) 227 final), Brussels, 5.7.2016. 
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— European Parliament, European Council and Council, joint communication, ‘Increasing resilience and 
bolstering capabilities to address hybrid threats’ (JOIN(2018) 16 final), Brussels, 13 June 2018. 
2.8 Combating radicalisation to terrorism 
2.8.1 The European Union’s rationale for focusing on eradicating terrorism at its 
source — the why and what 
The EU has suffered many deaths resulting from terrorist attacks in the past two decades: Madrid (2004), 
London (2005), Paris (2015), Brussels (2016), Nice (2016), Berlin (2016), London (2017), Barcelona (2017) 
and Strasbourg (2018). This has strengthened the need to address radicalisation leading potentially to violent 
extremism and terrorism. The eradication of terrorism starts at the source; therefore, a priority of the EU 
internal security strategy in action (Council of the European Union, 2015) is combating radicalisation and 
recruitment to terrorism.  
Radicalisation is a process whereby an individual’s or group’s thoughts and beliefs (ideological , religious or 
political) deviate from what society accepts as norms. In other words, it is a process whereby people shift 
towards extremism (137). Academic models depict radicalisation as a gradual, complex, dynamic and 
multifaceted evolution of interconnected and recurring factors over a period of time.  
This shifting process of interior and personal change can trigger actions geared towards ideological, political 
or social change and, in most cases, these are peaceful and do not necessarily result in serious harm. Only a 
few of those who are radicalised turn to terrorism. However, in exceptional circumstances, when the shift in 
behaviour leads to an explicit decision to use fear, terror or violence to achieve change, the result is violent 
extremism (138). Terrorism is a type of violent extremism, like xenophobia or other forms of discrimination (UN 
Security Council, 2015). 
Recruitment, radicalisation and incitement to terrorism can be visualised as points along a continuum. 
Radicalisation can be interpreted as the indoctrination process of transforming potential recruits or recruits 
into individuals determined to act with violence. The radicalisation process often involves use of propaganda, 
whether communicated in person or over the internet, over time. The length of time and the effectiveness of 
the propaganda and other persuasive means employed depend on individual circumstances and relationships 
(UNODC, 2016). 
Recent observations made by the Radicalisation Awareness Network (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 
2017) show that violent extremist groups can grow out of religious extremism or left wing, right wing, 
anarchist, nationalist or separatist ideologies. Furthermore, violent extremists can be part of hierarchical 
organisations, members of smaller cells and or ‘lone wolves’. Consequently, terrorist or violent extremist 
actions are challenging for the authorities to detect and predict, making traditional law enforcement 
techniques alone insufficient to deal with these evolving trends, particularly in relation to tackling the root 
causes of the problem. A wider, systemic and participatory multistakeholder approach is needed to enable the 
timely identification of causes, pathways and interconnections for effective management. 
The EU has prioritised the need to govern terrorism pre-emptively by investing in and implementing a 
counterterrorism strategy with a robust but flexible design (see Section 2.8.3). 
2.8.2 How do terrorists recruit and operate? 
Radicalisation and recruitment of new members of terrorist groups are now most commonly carried out using 
the internet and social media. It seems to be the case that people who are hooked by online means to a 
terrorist cause have been explicitly targeted (Alarid, 2016). These radicalised people are not necessarily 
religious; for example, Muslims radicalised online are not necessarily devout and are demographically varied, 
ranging from poorly to highly educated, with no common factor in terms of country of origin, gender, age or 
financial status. Their vulnerability seems sometimes to lie in the fact that they feel there is something 
missing from their lives, while they are also living in a climate of inequality and political frustration (Alarid, 
2016).  
                                           
(137)  The word ‘extremism’ is, however, to be used with great caution as mentioned by Neumann (2017, p. 16), who states that ‘the 
meaning of extremism depends on what is seen as “mainstream” in any given society, section of society, or period of time. 
Different political, cultural and historical contexts produce different notions of extremism.’ 
(138)  Australian Government, ‘Living safe together: building community resilience to violent extremism — resources’ 
(https://www.livingsafetogether.gov.au/information/Pages/resources.aspx). 
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Drivers of violent extremism are complex, multifaceted and interconnected, and are particular to the 
structural environment in which radicalisation and possibly violent extremism can start to burgeon (UNDP, 
2016; Miller and Selig Chauhan, 2017). Examples of drivers could be severe alienation, perceived injustice or 
humiliation reinforced by social marginalisation, xenophobia and discrimination, limited education or 
employment possibilities, criminality, political factors combined with an ideological and religious dimension, 
unstructured family ties, personal trauma and other psychological problems (139). Vulnerable people (women, 
children, prisoners, refugees, etc.) in such conditions are prone to being exploited by terrorist (religious or 
ideological) recruiters.  
Members of such vulnerable groups are targeted using manipulative information composed of both truths 
and lies, provided in a narrative that has been created ad hoc to influence thoughts and attitudes, with a view 
to encouraging people to behave in a particular manner. Some authors offer an analysis of the structure of 
recruitment processes that use effective, specific pitches, geared to the target individual or group (Gerwehr 
and Daly, 2006). The recruiter fine-tunes the customised pitch based on psychological attributes (personality, 
values, opinions, attitudes, interests, lifestyle, environment, etc.). What has been observed, on the one hand, is 
that there is no unique standard recruitment mode, that is, recruitment processes vary according to distinct 
locations (nodes), such as prisons, schools, etc., by region (geographical location) and depending on the 
specific characteristics (closed or open, local culture, etc.) of the context in which the recruitment group is 
operating. Processes vary over time and based on the situation. On the other hand, there is no one-size-fits-
all counter-recruitment approach to mitigate or prevent terrorist recruitment; counter-recruitment 
intervention design must be adjusted ad hoc to the particular characteristics of the target audience. 
The same authors also offer a non-exhaustive list of four examples of recruitment structures (based on 
patterns and descriptors characterising terrorist groups’ recruitment behaviour) used by Al-Qaeda to which 
counter-recruitment measures need to be adapted: 
— net — used for a specific population that is deemed homogeneous enough to be targeted in its entirety 
(i.e. one pitch for all); 
— funnel — used when a target population requires an incremental or phased approach to transform the 
identity and increase the motivation of potential recruits with the help of group identity-building 
exercises, violence, etc., resulting in the desired radically polarised and altered attitudes; 
— infection — used for a specific population that is deemed insular and a challenge to reach, with a trusted 
recruiting agent inserted to rally potential recruits in a more direct and ad hoc manner; 
— seed crystal — used for a specific population that is remote and inaccessible, for which trusted agents 
cannot be used and over which a media net cannot be cast, with recruiters therefore carefully designing 
a context for self-recruitment. 
Miller and Selig Chauhan (2017) examine explanatory models for the radicalisation process, the majority of 
which tend to describe similar sequential steps that lead ‘away from a state of apparent normalcy and 
toward a state of violent radicalism’. This is a process that starts with ideological engagement, shifts to 
radicalisation, moves next to a catalyst event and finally results in violent extremism or terrorism.  
Gøtzsche-Astrup (2018) classifies and evaluates radicalisation mechanisms based on empirical evidence. He 
presents six approaches (140) to psychological radicalisation, based on an in-depth literature review. He 
explains that it is of the utmost importance to understand radicalisation psychology and that it has become 
an empirical endeavour, where researcher–practitioner collaborations could lead to advances in this research 
field. He looks at the causes of radicalisation in the different models and claims that they have a common 
core, although conflicting claims may be made about radicalisation causes. 
These are all different ways looking at how terrorists (ideological or religious) may operate. They can all help 
us to better understand the complex mechanisms related to the radicalisation phenomenon and to design 
better counter-radicalisation strategies and action plans. 
                                           
(139)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism’ 
(COM(2016) 379 final), Brussels, 14.6.2016. 
(140)  The six approaches are uncertainty–identity theory (Hogg and Adelman, 2013), significance quest / ’3N’ (Webber and Kruglanski, 
2018), the devoted actor model (Atran, 2016), mindset and worldview (Borum, 2014), reactive approach motivation (McGregor, et 
al., 2015) and the two-pyramids approach (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017) (see pp.91-96 of paper for more details). 
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2.8.3 The European Union’s strategy for combating radicalisation and recruitment to 
terrorism 
Responsibility for fighting against violent radicalisation leading to terrorism is mainly a national matter; 
however, because of the transboundary nature of the issue, the EU provides a framework to help in 
coordinating national policies, sharing information and determining good practice. In 2005, the Council of the 
European Union established an EU counterterrorism strategy (Council of the European Union, 2005a) to fight 
terrorism globally and make Europe safer. The strategy focused on four pillars: prevent, protect, pursue and 
respond. The first pillar established ‘addressing the causes of radicalisation and terrorism recruitment’ as a 
key priority for the EU. To this end, the Council adopted in 2005 an EU strategy for combating radicalisation 
and recruitment to terrorism (Council of the European Union, 2005b). This strategy was revised in 2008 and 
2014 (Council of the European Union, 2008, 2014c), on the second occasion to take into consideration 
evolving threats such as lone-actor terrorism, foreign fighters and the use of social media by terrorists. 
In December 2014, the Council agreed on a set of guidelines to complement the revised EU strategy on 
radicalisation (Council of the European Union, 2014d). These guidelines were reviewed and updated in 2017 
(Council of the European Union, 2017b), taking into account the evolution of threats. 
For its part, the European Commission released in 2005 a communication on terrorist recruitment addressing 
the factors contributing to violent radicalisation (141). It identified priorities for action, with a focus on areas 
such as, broadcast media, the internet, education, youth engagement, employment, social exclusion and 
integration issues, equal opportunities and non-discrimination, and intercultural dialogue, among others. 
The evolution of trends in, means of and patterns of radicalisation led the Commission to adopt in 2014 a 
new communication on strengthening the EU’s response (142). In 2015, the European agenda on security (143) 
put the prevention of violent radicalisation in a broader policy context, making tackling terrorism and 
preventing radicalisation one of its three priorities (together with disrupting organised crime and combating 
cybercrime). 
In 2016, the Commission updated its actions to support the prevention of radicalisation in a new 
communication (144), which focused on how work at EU level can support Member States in facing the 
radicalisation challenge. It identified seven areas for action:  
1. countering terrorist propaganda and illegal hate speech online; 
2. addressing radicalisation in prisons; 
3. promoting inclusive education and EU common values; 
4. promoting an inclusive, open and resilient society and reaching out to young people; 
5. strengthening international cooperation: the EU will assist non-EU countries facing similar challenges 
in addressing radicalisation through law enforcement and human rights-compliant responses; 
6. boosting research, evidence building, monitoring and networks by producing concrete tools and policy 
analysis to better understand the process of radicalisation, to be directly usable by Member States’ 
security practitioners and policymakers, building also on the work of the Radicalisation Awareness 
Network Centre of Excellence; 
7. focusing on the security dimension — prevention of radicalisation also requires a core security 
approach involving measures to counter immediate and longer-term threats — such as travel 
prohibitions and the criminalisation of travelling to non-EU countries for terrorist purposes, as 
already proposed by the Commission —and actions by Member States including increased 
information sharing, making full use of security cooperation frameworks and information tools, and 
reinforcing the interconnection of information systems.  
In 2011, the Commission established the Radicalisation Awareness Network (145), an EU network connecting 
key organisations and networks of local actors involved in preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent 
                                           
(141)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Concerning terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent 
radicalisation’ (COM(2005) 313 final), Brussels, 21.9.2005. 
(142)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism: strengthening the 
EU’s response’ (COM(2013) 941 final), Brussels, 15.1.2014. 
(143)  European Commission communication COM(2015) 185 final. 
(144)  European Commission communication COM(2016) 379 final. 
(145)  https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network 
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extremism, including first-line practitioners and field experts such as social and health workers, teachers, civil 
society organisations, local authorities, law enforcement officers, security officials, counterterrorism 
specialists, think tanks, institutes and academics. Moreover, in 2015, the Commission set up the EU Internet 
Forum to tackle the problem of online radicalisation. 
Continuing with its work, in July 2017 the Commission set up the High-Level Expert Group on 
Radicalisation (146), tasked with offering advice on (i) ways to improve cooperation among stakeholders and 
Member States, (ii) the further development of policies for the prevention of radicalisation and (iii) a 
mechanism for future structured cooperation in this area. In May 2018, the group released its final report 
(High-Level Expert Group on Radicalisation, 2018) presenting a number of recommendations to the 
Commission to address challenges in the following areas:  
— radicalisation in prisons; 
— online propaganda and communication; 
— ideology and polarisation; 
— cooperation at local level; 
— education and social inclusion; 
— children returning from conflict zones or raised in a radicalised environment. 
In addition, the European Commission: 
— supports research and studies to better understand the radicalisation process, its key influencing factors, 
ideologies and recruitment mechanisms (e.g. to inform methods used to counter the dissemination of 
terrorist propaganda, especially on the internet); 
— has established a European Network of Experts on Radicalisation to provide an arena to discuss the 
radicalisation phenomenon and to assist EU and national-level policymakers in gathering expertise and 
identifying and exchanging good practices in the field of prevention; 
— promotes public-private partnerships and dialogue between law enforcement authorities and internet 
service providers to reduce terrorism-related and other illegal content on the internet; 
— enhances law enforcement authorities’ technical resources and know-how on tools and methodologies 
that detect illegal content online; 
— provides assistance to governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in developing EU-wide 
cooperation and actions to strengthen individual and community resilience against radicalisation under 
the prevention of and fight against crime programme (147). 
To complement the abovementioned activities, the EU continues to focus on actions related to education, 
youth participation, and interfaith and intercultural dialogue, as well as employment and social inclusion  (148). 
The Commission is focusing its efforts particularly on the younger generation, by combating youth 
radicalisation and marginalisation, as evidenced by a series of targeted actions under the following 
initiatives: the strategic framework for European cooperation on education and training (149), the European 
youth strategy (150), and the EU work plan for sport and culture (Council of the European Union, 2017c). 
Finally, with the aim of underpinning these actions, the Commission provides funding under the Erasmus+ 
and Creative Europe programmes (151), as well as through the European Social Fund (152).  
                                           
(146)  European Commission, Commission decision setting-up the high-level commission expert group on radicalisation (C(2017) 5149 
final), Brussels, 27.7.2017. 
(147)  European Commission, ‘Prevention of and fight against crime (ISEC)’( https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/security-
and-safeguarding-liberties/prevention-of-and-fight-against-crime). 
(148)  See European Union, ‘From awareness to prevention: how the EU is combating radicalisation across Europe’ 
(https://europa.eu/euprotects/our-safety/awareness-prevention-how-eu-combating-radicalisation-across-europe_en). 
(149)  Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training 
(‘ET 2020’) (2009/C 119/02), Brussels, 12.5.2009. 
(150)  European Commission, ‘EU youth strategy’ (https://ec.europa.eu/youth/policy/youth-strategy_en). 
(151)  These programmes support the mobility of teachers and youth workers; they promote youth exchanges and volunteering, strategic 
partnerships in the education and youth policy areas, transnational networks, school cooperation platforms, joint projects on 
citizenship education and collaborative partnerships in sport. 
(152)  The fund provides financial assistance to Member States by promoting social inclusion and combating poverty and discrimination. 
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2.8.4 Possible evolution of radicalisation within the next 5 years 
In the past decade, the concept of radicalisation has changed; these changes have been driven by the Syrian 
war and the rise of far-right nationalist parties in Europe, which have reshaped how political violence is 
analysed and explained. Greater attention has been paid to the resilience of society to extremist narratives 
and recruitment attempts. For this reason, experts advise further research on narrative commonalities 
between far-right and Islamist groups, in order to understand how these messages are constructed to appeal 
to a relatively large audience (Rieger et al., 2013). Differences in political cultures, ideologies, legal 
frameworks and religions need to be taken in consideration to avoid proposing a one-size-fits-all type of 
solution. Challenges may also come from terrorist recidivism, about which there are still not enough data to 
assess whether or not deradicalisation programmes have been successful (Koehler, 2016). Various experts 
have identified a number of near-future challenges: 
— the return of foreign fighters from Syria, Iraq and Libya; 
— travelling extremist preachers (153); 
— internet propaganda (Ahmed and Lloyd George, 2017); 
— extremist content on satellite TV; 
— radicalisation of second- and third-generation migrants as a result of failure to include them in society 
(Roy, 2016); 
— culture shock experienced by non-integrated first-generation migrants; 
— an increase in violent and hate speech by far-right groups. 
2.8.5 Stakeholders 
2.8.5.1 European Union stakeholders 
European Commission Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs 
DG Migration and Home Affairs is responsible for policymaking in the area of migration and security. It deals 
with dialogue and cooperation with countries outside the EU and assists in raising awareness among EU 
citizens of these important topics. 
In the effort to combat radicalisation, the Commission’s role is to support Member States. DG Migration and 
Home Affairs has a dedicated service, Unit D.2, Terrorism and Radicalisation, that deals with this complex, 
multidisciplinary and challenging task. In this endeavour, it cooperates with other units: Police Cooperation 
and Information Exchange (D.1), Organised Crime and Drugs Policy (D.3), Cybercrime (D.4), Information 
Systems for Borders and Security (B.3), and Innovation and Industry (B.4). Through DG Migration and Home 
Affairs’ Directorate E (Migration and Security Funds — Financial Resources and Monitoring), funding is 
provided to projects addressing this topic.  
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/radicalisation_en 
Radicalisation Awareness Network 
Established in 2011, the Radicalisation Awareness Network is an EU network of front-line or grass-roots 
practitioners (5 000 in 2018) from around Europe who work daily with people who have already been 
radicalised or who are vulnerable to radicalisation. Practitioners include police and prison authorities but also 
those who are not traditionally involved in counterterrorism activities, such as teachers, youth workers, civil 
society representatives, local authority representatives and healthcare professionals.  
The activities of the network are carried out within nine working groups: Communication and Narratives; 
Education; EXIT; Youth, Families and Communities; Local Authorities; Prison and Probation; Police and Law 
Enforcement; Terrorism Victims Remembrance; and Health and Social Care. 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network 
                                           
(153)  DW.COM, ‘Gulf States supporting ultraconservative Islam branch in Germany’ (https://www.dw.com/en/reports-gulf-states-
supporting-ultraconservative-islam-branch-in-germany/a-36746943). 
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European External Action Service 
The EEAS is the EU’s diplomatic service, which works closely with the foreign and defence ministries of the EU 
Member States and with EU institutions. It also has a strong working relationship with the UN and other 
international organisations. It helps the HR/VP to implement the EU’s CFSP. 
https://eeas.europa.eu/ 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) 
Europol is the EU’s law enforcement agency and assists the Member States in their fight against serious 
international crime and terrorism. Established as an EU agency in 2009, Europol is at the heart of the 
European security architecture and offers a unique range of services. Europol is a support centre for law 
enforcement operations, a hub for information on criminal activities and a centre for law enforcement 
expertise. 
In January 2016, Europol established the ECTC, an operations centre and hub of expertise that reflects the 
growing need for the EU to strengthen its response to terror. The ECTC focuses on the following activities: 
— providing operational support for investigations upon request from an EU Member State; 
— tackling foreign fighters; 
— sharing intelligence and expertise on terrorism financing (through the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program 
(TFTP) and financial intelligence units); 
— combating online terrorist propaganda and extremism (through the EU IRU); 
— fighting against illegal arms trafficking; 
— international cooperation among counterterrorism authorities. 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc  
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) 
The EUISS is the EU agency dealing with the analysis of foreign, security and defence policy issues. It was 
established in January 2002 as an autonomous agency under the CFSP to foster a common security culture 
for the EU, support the creation and implementation of its foreign policy, and enrich the strategic debate 
inside and outside Europe. Its core mission is to provide analyses and fora for discussion that can be of use 
and relevance for the formulation of EU policy. In carrying out that mission, it also acts as an interface 
between European experts and decision-makers at all levels. 
https://www.iss.europa.eu/ 
2.8.5.2 International stakeholders 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
UNODC is a world leader in the fight against illicit drugs and international crime. It has a mandate to help 
Member States in addressing illicit drugs, crime and terrorism. It is supported by three pillars: field-based 
technical cooperation projects to build the capacity of Member States to counter illicit drugs, crime and 
terrorism; research and analytical work to build the knowledge base required for evidence-based policy 
support and operational decision making; and normative work to assist Member States in ratifying and 
implementing international treaties, developing national legislation, etc. Its work includes collaborating with 
partners on radicalisation issues in many countries. 
An example of such work is UNODC’s efforts to manage violent extremist prisoners and to prevent 
radicalisation, on which it has produced a handbook (UNODC, 2016). 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/index.html  
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
The OECD promotes policies that aim to improve the economic and social well-being of people around the 
world. It draws on facts and real-life experience to focus on helping governments to restore confidence in 
markets and the institutions that make them function; re-establishing healthy public finances as a basis for 
future sustainable economic growth; fostering and supporting new sources of growth through innovation, 
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environmentally friendly ‘green growth’ strategies and the development of emerging economies; and 
ensuring that people of all ages can develop the skills to work productively and satisfyingly in the jobs of 
tomorrow. 
http://www.oecd.org/social/understanding-the-battle-against-extremism.htm  
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
UNDP builds on its strength and expertise, country relationships and presence on the ground in more than 
170 countries and territories. It works to strengthen international cooperation on developmental and 
economic issues. It connects countries around the globe to knowledge, experience and resources that can help 
them overcome a variety of challenges in the developmental realm. It helps people build a better life. It 
provides expert advice, training and grants to developing countries, with an increasing emphasis on 
assistance to the least developed countries. 
One of its recent reports addressed radicalisation and violent extremism from a development perspective 
(UNDP, 2016). It looks at drivers of violent extremism, describes pathways from radicalisation to violent 
extremism, and attempts to identify where the tipping point is in the process. It also presents building blocks 
for preventing violent extremism. 
www.undp.org 
2.8.6 Legislation and reference documents 
— European Commission, Commission communication, Preparedness and consequence management in the 
fight against terrorism (COM(2004) 701 final), Brussels, 20 October 2004. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Concerning terrorist recruitment: addressing the 
factors contributing to violent radicalisation’ (COM(2005) 313 final), Brussels, 21 September 2005. 
— Council of the European Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (14469/4/05), Brussels, 
30 November 2005. 
— Council Decision 2007/124/EC, Euratom, of 12 February 2007 establishing for the period 2007 to 2013, 
as part of General Programme on Security and Safeguarding Liberties, the Specific Programme 
‘Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security-related risks’, 
OJ L 58, 24.2.2007, p. 1-6. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Stepping up the fight against terrorism’ 
(COM(2007) 649 final), Brussels, 6 November 2007. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘The EU counter-terrorism policy: main achievements 
and future challenges’ (COM(2010) 386 final), Brussels, 20 July 2010. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent 
extremism: strengthening the EU’s response’ (COM(2013) 941 final), Brussels, 15 January 2014. 
— Council of the European Union, Revised EU strategy for combating radicalisation and recruitment to 
terrorism (9956/14), Brussels, 19 May 2014. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘The European agenda on security’ (COM(2015) 
185 final), Strasbourg, 28 April 2015. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Delivering on the European agenda on security to 
fight against terrorism and pave the way towards an effective and genuine security union’ 
(COM(2016) 230 final), Brussels, 20 April 2016. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading 
to violent extremism’ (COM(2016) 379 final), Brussels, 14 June 2016. 
— Council of the European Union, Review of the guidelines for the EU strategy for combating radicalisation 
and recruitment to terrorism (6700/17), Brussels, 9 March 2017. 
— Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating 
terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 
2005/671/JHA, OJ L 88, 31.3.2017, p. 6-21. 
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— European Commission, ‘Reflection paper on the future of European defence’ (COM(2017) 315 final), 
Brussels, 7 June 2017.  
— Europol, European Union (EU) serious and organised crime threat assessment — Crime in the age of 
technology, 2017. 
— Europol (2017), European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, 2017.  
2.9 Fighting against terrorism financing 
2.9.1 The European Union’s rationale for focusing on combating terrorism financing — 
the why and the what 
The EU continues to carry out its efforts and meet its responsibility to sustain the Pax Europaea (154); 
however, the continuously evolving security risk landscape is very challenging owing to its complexity and 
unpredictability. Among these security risks is terrorism. 
In the EU (155), terrorism financing is defined as ‘the provision or collection of funds, by any means, directly or 
indirectly, with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or 
in part, to carry out any of the offences defined in Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA’.  
In the quest to use violence and intimidation, terrorists (individuals and organisations) require funds to ensure 
that their networks flourish, their ideology is promoted, recruitment and training continue, supply flows are 
maintained and planned terrorist acts put into action. They are very creative and adaptive in obtaining 
financing for their activities, constantly evolving in their efforts to seek, gather and mobilise funds. Thus, 
‘terrorism financing’ refers to all activities related to the funding of terrorist acts.  
These funding activities can be carried out using legitimate sources: self-financing (own salary), diaspora 
funds (personal donations, profits from businesses, etc.), donations from religious organisations or social or 
charitable organisations, or government sponsorships. 
On the other hand, terrorism can also be financed from proceeds gained from traditional criminal sources 
(Napoleoni, 2005; USDOS, 2005; Freeman, 2011; Clunan, 2013; Bloemkolk, 2015; FATF, 2015a,b; Oftedal, 
2015; Aliu et al., 2017): misuse of legal financial systems (credit card and cheque fraud), narcotics 
trafficking, precious stones trafficking, arms trafficking, human trafficking, racketeering (extortion), 
counterfeiting, smuggling, and abduction and ransom demands. 
Terrorist groups tend to also use front companies, that is, commercial enterprises that engage in legal 
activities, with illicit money mixing with legitimate profits. This is where terrorists use money laundering 
techniques pioneered by very experienced transnational organised crime groups. 
Against this background, the Heads of State and Government of the seven most industrialised nations and 
Russia agreed at the Ottawa G8 Ministerial Meeting in December 1995 to ‘pursue measures aimed at 
depriving terrorists of their sources of finance’ (156). This initiative triggered the development of a series of 
subsequent events that contributed to building momentum towards an understanding of the importance of 
tackling terrorism financing at the global level. The first event was the adoption of a UN resolution outlining 
measures to eliminate international terrorism (UN, 1996). In 1999, the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism was adopted by the UN General Assembly (UN, 1999). In 2001, in 
the aftermath of the 11 September attacks in New York, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), initially 
established at the Paris G7 summit in 1989 to tackle money laundering in the drug trafficking scene, started 
to include combating terrorism financing as part of its mission (157).  
The attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent adoption of stringent anti-terrorism laws and 
regulations in the United States triggered two key focus-shifting phenomena (Napoleoni, 2005): 
                                           
(154)  This is the name given to the period of relative peace experienced by Europe following the Second World War, often associated 
above all with the creation of the EU and its predecessors; see, for example, The Nobel Prize, ‘European Union (EU) — Nobel lecture’ 
(https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2012/eu/26124-european-union-eu-nobel-lecture-2012/). 
(155)  Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73-117. 
(156)  http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/terrorism/terror96.htm 
(157)  FATF, ‘History of the FATF’ (http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/).  
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1. terrorist groups transferred their money laundering activities from the United States to Europe; 
2. financiers withdrew terrorism capital from the United States and moved it to Europe.  
These phenomena, accompanied by the occurrence of several terrorist acts (e.g. in Madrid in 2004 and in 
London in 2005), resulted in the EU stepping up its efforts to and investments in combating terrorism 
financing (Wesseling, 2013), which became a key initiative within the EU security agenda (158). Cutting off key 
financial sources was intended to cripple terrorists’ funding mechanisms. The EU has taken note of the FATF 
recommendations of 2012. Several are explicitly intended to target terrorism financing: Recommendation  5 
(criminalisation of terrorism financing), Recommendation 6 (targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism 
and its financing), Recommendation 7 (159) (financial sanctions related to proliferation) and 
Recommendation 8 (preventing the misuse of non-profit organisations). 
2.9.2 How does terrorism financing work? 
There are many types of terrorist organisations (160). They can range from small (e.g. Indian Mujahedin, 
Harakat-ul Jihad Islami), large regional organisations (e.g. ISIL) or global entities (e.g. Al-Qaeda). In recent 
years, ISIL has garnered attention for its particularly ruthless attacks and its unique funding streams (bank 
robbery, pirating oil fields and robbing other economic assets).  
Most terrorist organisations perform terrorist acts that are relatively low-cost given the damage they can 
inflict. In fact, the main terrorist attacks in the EU have cost less than EUR 22 000 (161). Furthermore, a study 
of how Jihadi terrorist cells in western Europe raise, move and spend money found that 90 % of the cells 
investigated were involved in income-generating activities, half of which were entirely self-financed (Oftedal, 
2015). Thus, the current terrorist threat to Europe seldom involves huge sums of money or suspicious 
international transfers (Oftedal, 2015; European Parliament, 2018a). 
What are costly are the operational costs of sustaining terrorist organisations. They have diverse revenue 
streams, legal and illegal. There is not much difference between terrorists and other criminals in their abuse 
of the financial system. While terrorism funding is different from money laundering, terrorists often exploit 
similar weaknesses in the financial system. Regardless of how they raise their capital, terrorist cells use 
several methods to ‘clean’ their money with the ultimate objective of disguising the origin of their funds by 
exploiting global financial networks, the illicit commodity trade, charities, attorneys or informal funds transfer 
systems, and cash couriers to launder money (USDOS, 2005).  
According to a European Parliament study (2018b), terrorism financing can take several forms, such as: 
— raising funds, for example through donations or criminal activity; 
— moving funds, for example by transferring funds through banks from Europe to countries near theatres 
of combat or simply by carrying cash;  
— storing funds, for example by maintaining reserves of cash that can later be spent on attacks, military 
operations, travel or other facilitation activities. 
The six most widely used methods that terrorists groups use to move money to finance their terrorist acts 
are, according to Freeman and Ruehsen (2013), the following: 
— Cash couriers. They move physical cash from one place to another, the ‘simplest and oldest way of 
moving value’ (Passas, 2003). When moving cash across international borders, terrorists typically conceal 
it in vehicles, packages, luggage or anything else that can hold large physical volumes of cash. When 
borders are uncontrolled or where the state’s resources are strained, they do not even conceal the cash 
(Money Laundering and Threat Assessment Working Group, 2005).  
— Informal transfer systems. There are several types of informal and traditional financial networks 
(Passas, 2003), in particular the widely used hawala (162). These networks operate in areas where the 
                                           
(158)  European Commission communication COM(2015) 185 final. 
(159)  In 2008, the FATF’s mandate was expanded to include dealing with the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(Recommendation 7). 
(160)  Navanti, ‘The periodic table of terrorist groups’ (https://www.navantigroup.com/news-1/2018/3/7/navanti-releases-updated-
periodic-table-of-terrorist-groups). 
(161)  World Economic Forum, ‘How terrorists fund their attacks — and how to stop them’ 
(https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/11/terror-attacks-are-increasingly-self-funded-how-can-we-stop-them/). 
(162)  Hawala networks are ‘age-old methods of conducting financial transactions across various borders and cultures using a system of 
trust and social investment’ (Hariharan, 2012). Belonging originally to the Islamic tradition, they operate in the following manner: a 
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formal banking sector is less established or where large ethnic diasporas live. Although most countries 
have legalised hawala, many hawaladars (hawala dealers) also operate illegally because of prohibitively 
high fees (licensing and registration). After 9/11, as a result of evidence that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq had used them, they were closely monitored. 
— Money service businesses (MSBs). MSBs are ‘currency dealers or exchangers; check cashers; issuers 
(or redeemers) of traveller's checks, money orders, or stored value cards; and money transmitters’ (163). 
MSBs are subject to the same regulations and laws as banks, including regulatory audits; however, they 
do not carry out similarly rigorous ‘know your customer’ procedures. Nor does a customer need to have 
an existing account; a valid form of identification is enough. Most MSBs, and particularly the more 
established ones, such as Western Union, transfer funds quickly (within minutes to most locations), are 
inexpensive and offer a low risk of detection, especially if the MSB is unregistered. 
— Formal banking. This is done by depository financial institutions, such as banks, savings and loan 
institutions, and credit unions. They are the only entities allowed ‘to engage in the business of receiving 
deposits and providing access to those deposits’ through a payment system of cheques, electronic 
networks, credit and debit cards, and bank-to-bank transfers (164). They are generally heavily regulated 
and required to maintain records, know their customers, report transactions over a certain threshold and 
report any suspicious transactions. Despite these safeguards, they continue to be abused by terrorists 
and other criminals, particularly when a bank asks no questions (e.g. the former al-Madina Bank in 
Lebanon) (Freeman and Ruehsen, 2013). Alternatively, if a bank is careless, it could be abused by way of 
correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts of correspondent banks (e.g. in the case of HSBC) 
(Freeman and Ruehsen, 2013). And, finally, there may be cases where a bank does all it is required to do 
with respect to customer due diligence, but the transactions still fail to raise any red flags (e.g. the 9/11 
hijackers’ accounts). 
— False trade invoicing. This is one of the most difficult laundering methods to detect, although it is 
widely used by both organised crime and terrorist groups (Ruehsen, 2001). It disguises the transmission 
of value from one jurisdiction to another by over- or under-invoicing (Zdanowicz, 2009). For example, if a 
terrorist based in the United States purchases American honey and then exports it to Yemen, he could 
overprice the shipment by USD 100 000 without attracting much attention. The additional USD 100 000 
goes to the terrorist who arranged for the shipment in the United States According to one government 
source, this is believed to have happened in the months leading up to 9/11 (Miller and Gerth, 2001). The 
detection risk is still relatively low; however, with the establishment of trade transparency units around 
the world, this risk is rising. In addition to assisting with port security, these units attempt to scour big 
data, searching for unusually priced transactions (165). 
— High-value commodities. Gold and diamonds are two main goods that are smuggled by terrorists 
across borders. They are both reliable, as they are easily converted into cash, easy to transport and also 
very difficult to trace (Cassara and Jorisch, 2010). However, it is important to note that obtaining gold 
and diamonds from the source (such as an African mine) is neither simple nor convenient, as they have 
to be transported by courier, which comes with a theft risk and at a price. 
— Other methods. There are three other methods worth mentioning, which could be used more in the 
future: 
● Stored value cards: they can be ‘closed’ cards that are tied to a particular business, or ‘open’ 
cards, such as prepaid debit cards, which can be used anywhere. These cards, especially the 
open ones, ‘provide a compact, easily transportable, and potentially anonymous way’ to move 
funds (Money Laundering and Threat Assessment Working Group, 2005);  
                                                                                                                                   
worker in Dubai, for example, wants to send USD 1 000 to his wife in Pakistan. He finds a hawaladar and gives him the funds. The 
hawaladar contacts a fellow hawaladar in Pakistan. The hawaladar in Dubai gives both the worker in Dubai and the hawaladar in 
Pakistan a transaction code. The worker’s wife goes to the hawaladar in Pakistan and gives him the code. If the codes match, the 
hawaladar in Pakistan gives the wife the rupee equivalent of USD 1 000 minus a small fee. (Note that no funds have actually 
crossed borders.) To settle the accounts, the simplest method is for the hawaladars to wait for a similar value of transactions to 
move in the other direction. As this rarely occurs, the hawaladars will periodically balance their books by using money service 
businesses, smuggling high value commodities or making false trade invoicing transactions to transfer funds (see Jost and Sandhu, 
2000; Freeman and Ruehsen, 2013). 
(163)  United States Bank Secrecy Act definition (Money Laundering and Threat Assessment Working Group, 2005). 
(164)  United States Bank Secrecy Act definition (Money Laundering and Threat Assessment Working Group, 2005). 
(165)  US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ‘ICE leads trade-based money-laundering investigations’ (https://www.ice.gov/trade-
transparency). 
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● Casinos: they are known to have been used for criminal money laundering; however, terrorists 
could potentially use them also to move funds; 
● Virtual currencies: these digital currencies (e.g. Bitcoin) are increasingly being used by criminals, 
especially drug dealers. Although there are only a few confirmed cases, terrorists have started 
to use virtual currencies to finance terrorism (European Parliament, 2018b). 
One of the biggest challenges in combating terrorism financing is the early identification of self-funding lone 
actors and small cells by financial institutions (European Parliament, 2018b). As movement of money can 
remain below legislative thresholds, it can be very difficult to distinguish such terrorism financing alert 
signals from the noise of normal everyday cash movements in society (grocery shopping, online goods 
shopping, utility payments, etc.). 
2.9.3 Countering terrorism financing in the European Union 
The European Commission has placed combating terrorism financing at the core of the EU’s strategy for 
fighting against terrorism. It endeavours to ensure that the EU adapts its legal instruments and measures to 
address the way terrorists and their sponsors constantly evolve their methods of raising, moving and using 
funds. In 2016, an action plan for strengthening the fight against terrorism financing was launched (166). It 
focuses on two main strands: 
— tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets, 
to ensure that financial movements can wherever possible help law enforcement to trace terrorists and 
stop them from committing crimes; 
— disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise 
funds. 
In this action plan, the main activities geared to preventing movement of funds and identifying terrorist 
funding are: 
— ensuring virtual currency exchange platforms are covered by the anti-money laundering directive; 
— tackling terrorism financing through anonymous pre-paid instruments; 
— improving access to information for and cooperation between EU financial intelligence units; 
— ensuring a high level of safeguards for financial flows from high-risk non-EU countries; 
— giving EU financial intelligence units access to centralised bank and payment account registers and 
central data retrieval systems. 
The action plan also mentions the main activities focused on disrupting revenue sources for terrorist 
organisations: 
— tackling terrorism financing sources such as illicit trade in cultural goods and wildlife; 
— working with non-EU countries to ensure a global response to tackling terrorism financing sources. 
In particular, the EU has developed measures to cut off terrorists’ access to funding. In 2005, the third anti-
money laundering directive (167) expressly widened the scope of the anti-money laundering regime to 
terrorism financing; it was followed by the fourth anti-money laundering directive (168). In July 2018, the fifth 
anti-money laundering directive (169) was issued, aiming to: 
— increase transparency about who owns companies and trusts to prevent money laundering and terrorism 
financing using opaque structures; 
— improve the work of financial intelligence units, with better access to information through centralised 
bank account registers; 
                                           
(166)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Action plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing’, 
(COM(2016) 50 final), Strasbourg, 2.2.2016. 
(167)  Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, OL L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 15-36. 
(168)  Directive (EU) 2015/849. 
(169)  Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the  
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 
2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU, OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 43-74. 
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— tackle terrorism financing risks linked to anonymous use of virtual currencies and pre-paid instruments; 
— improve the cooperation and exchange of information among anti-money laundering supervisors and 
between supervisors and the European Central Bank; 
— broaden the criteria for assessing high-risk non-EU countries and ensure a common high level of 
safeguards for financial flows from such countries. 
In October 2005, the regulation on cash control’ (170) was launched, requiring that cash in excess of 
EUR 10 000 be disclosed to competent authorities when entering or leaving the EU. This regulation aimed to 
introduce preventive action to fight money laundering and terrorism financing with the help of more effective 
customs cooperation. 
In November 2006, two other legal acts were adopted in the EU. 
— The regulation on funds transfers implements FATF Recommendation 7, ensuring that wire transfers are 
accompanied by identifying information. In particular, it lays down rules to ensure the traceability of 
transfers of funds. These rules are applicable to all payment service providers involved in the payment 
chain (171). 
— The payments services directive addresses FATF Recommendation 6 on alternative remittances. In 
particular, it lays down rules on payment services, such as credit transfers, direct debits and card 
payments. These rules include information requirements for payment services providers, including rights 
and obligations linked to the use of payment services (172). 
In addition, there are Council common positions on combating terrorism regarding procedures for listing 
persons and entities related to terrorism, from 2001 and 2009 (173). Their objective is to establish a list of 
individuals, groups and entities involved in terrorism whose funds and other financial assets are to be frozen 
as part of the fight against the financing of terrorism. 
The European Commission is an active member of the FATF, contributing in particular to the implementation 
of its recommendations. The Commission also cooperates with the UN and ensures that all relevant UN 
resolutions (174) and Council of Europe instruments, such as the Council of Europe Convention No. 198 (175), 
play an important role in this context. 
There is also a very good practical collaboration between the EU (the European Commission and Europol) and 
the United States (the CIA and the US Treasury Department) under the TFTP set up by the US Treasury 
Department in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Soon thereafter, the EU–US TFTP Agreement was sealed; it 
brought together US-led intelligence analytics and checks and balances modelled on European values (de 
Goede and Wesseling, 2017). Since 2012, the EU has had its own overseer inside the US Treasury to formally 
control the treaty agreements. More than 1 500 intelligence leads have been shared across the Atlantic 
thanks to this cooperation (de Goede and Wesseling, 2017). 
Finally, some studies commissioned by the European Commission revealed that NGOs are potentially 
vulnerable to exploitation for terrorism financing (Matrix Insight, 2008; European Parliament, 2015b). The 
Commission aims to work closely with the NGO sector and EU Member States in this area. 
                                           
(170)  Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on controls of cash entering or 
leaving the Community, OJ L 309, 25.11.2005,p. 9-12. 
(171)  Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 on information on the payer 
accompanying transfers of funds, OJ L 345, 8.12.2006, p. 1-9. 
(172)  Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal 
market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing 
Directive 2007/64/EC, OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35-127. 
(173)  Council of the European Union, Council common position on combating terrorism (2001/930/CFSP), Brussels, 27.12.2001; Council of 
the European Union, Council common position updating common position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to 
combat terrorism and repealing common position 2009/67/CFSP (2009/468/CFSP), Luxembourg, 15.6.2009. 
(174)  http://www.un.org/en/documents/; consulted on 6 August 2018. 
(175)  http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/html/198.htm; consulted on 6 August 2018. 
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2.9.4 Possible evolution of terrorism financing within the next 5 years 
According to Neumann (176), efforts to combat terrorism financing have mainly focused on banks and 
financial institutions. He highlights four important issues that should be taken into account when following 
the money: 
— Cash. It has been observed that most ISIS transactions have been in cash, because most people (98 %) 
in Syria and Iraq do not possess bank accounts and fewer have credit cards. Therefore, seeking ISIS’s 
money in the international financial system is unlikely to be successful. When dealing with ISIS, following 
the money means following the cash. 
— Territory. When terrorist organisations hold territory, they start working within it by taxing people and 
selling resources, such as oil. This makes it very difficult to cut them off from outside. Therefore, cutting 
off their finances means taking away their territory by defeating them on the ground. 
— Smuggling. Terrorists in conflict zones tend to be closely linked to illegal economies where smugglers 
have been working long before ISIS, Al-Qaeda or the Taliban existed. Thus, countering terrorism finance 
means countering illicit economies. 
— Small-dollar terrorism. Since 2014, none of the attacks in Europe have cost more than EUR 10 000. In 
fact, the majority cost less than EUR 1 000. Often, they were funded by the terrorists themselves, who 
used their savings, salaries or money they had borrowed from friends or parents. Others were funded 
from the proceeds of crime. In practice, none went through the formal financial system, resulting in no 
suspicious transactions that could have been identified. 
Against this backdrop, the same author recommends the following: 
— Evidence-based countering of terrorism finance. Responses to terrorism financing must fit the 
reality. That can mean doing different things in different places. In some cases, it may involve the 
international financial system. 
— Holistic approach to countering terrorism finance. Too much focus has been on the financial 
sector. There is a need to complement financial tools with political, diplomatic, military and law 
enforcement tools. In many cases, this requires partnerships with the private sector. 
— Integrated approach to countering terrorism finance. There is a need to be more integrated with 
the rest of counterterrorism. Countering terrorism finance has been practised as an activity that is 
completely separate from the rest of counterterrorism. 
Complementing the abovementioned list of challenges, the FATF (2015a) provides its own list: 
— Understanding the nature of an isolated transaction (e.g. a money transfer). Is it legitimate (e.g. 
a family remittance) or nefarious (e.g. used to support a terrorist group)? Financial intelligence units and 
operational authorities need to improve their ability to cooperate with the intelligence community and 
specific interagency task forces may need to be established. 
— Rapid expansion of social media. This is a relatively new worldwide channel of exploitation used by 
terrorist groups to raise funds. Through targeted propaganda, social networks are used to coordinate 
large-scale and well-organised fundraising schemes (crowdfunding, fundraising through pre-paid cards 
and e-wallets) aimed at terrorism financing, which may involve several thousand sponsors and may raise 
significant amounts of cash. 
— Exploitation of natural resources. Such activities allow terrorist organisations to control and occupy 
territory by sustaining burgeoning criminal activity related to this sector, such as extortion, smuggling, 
theft, illegal mining, kidnapping for ransom, corruption and other environmental crimes. The natural 
resources commonly exploited by terrorist groups are oil and gas, and mining. 
                                           
(176)  See International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, ‘Beyond banking: Professor Neumann’s opening keynote address at ‘No 
money for terror’ summit in Paris’ (https://icsr.info/2018/04/26/beyond-banking-professor-neumanns-opening-keynote-address-no-
money-terror-summit-paris/). 
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Terrorist groups are increasingly relying on closed chat programs, as social networks have become heavily 
monitored by law enforcement institutions. Monitoring of these private communications is virtually 
impossible. An American strategy to install a backdoor in software by coercion has proven disastrous (177).  
Cryptocurrencies have not been used frequently by terrorist groups, so their contribution to financing 
terrorism is so far negligible; nonetheless, a regulation is needed. It should be taken into consideration that, 
like money transfer operators and informal money transfer channels, digital currencies have begun to be 
used by migrants to send money home. Any anti-terrorism regulation should take this into consideration (178).  
2.9.5 Stakeholders 
2.9.5.1 European Union stakeholders 
European Commission Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs  
DG Migration and Home Affairs manages policies that aim to ensure that all activities necessary and 
beneficial to the economic, cultural and social growth of the EU can develop in a stable, lawful and secure 
environment. In particular, it looks at how terrorism financing links with organised crime, feeding terrorism 
through channels such as the supply of weapons, proceeds from drug smuggling and the infiltration of 
financial markets.  
In the effort to combat terrorism financing, the European Commission’s role is to support Member States. 
Through the DG’s Directorate E, Migration and Security Funds — Financial Resources and Monitoring, funding 
is provided to projects addressing this topic.  
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/financing_en  
European External Action Service 
The EEAS is the EU’s diplomatic service. A key aspect of the work of the EEAS is its ability to work closely with 
the foreign and defence ministries of the EU Member States and with EU institutions. It also has a strong 
working relationship with the UN and other international organisations. It helps the HR/VP to implement the 
EU’s CFSP. 
In 2016, the EU took unprecedented steps to increase internal cooperation in the field of security and 
defence. The HR/VP launched the EU global strategy on security and defence, which aims to invest in a 
stronger EU and, at the same time, in a stronger cooperation with EU partners. Combating terrorism financing 
is one of the priorities of the global strategy. 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en  
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) 
Europol is the EU’s law enforcement agency. It supports the EU Member States in their fight against 
terrorism, cybercrime and other serious and organised forms of crime. It also works with many non-EU 
partner states and international organisations.  
In January 2016, Europol created the ECTC, which is an operations centre and hub of expertise that aims to 
strengthen the EU’s response to terror and ensure an effective response to terrorism-related challenges. The 
ECTC focuses on several activities, including sharing intelligence and expertise on terrorism financing 
(through the TFTP and financial intelligence units). It also carries out the following activities: 
— provision of operational support for investigations upon request from an EU Member State; 
— tackling foreign fighters; 
— addressing online terrorist propaganda and extremism (through the EU IRU); 
— fighting against illegal arms trafficking; 
— international cooperation among counterterrorism authorities. 
                                           
(177)  Counter Extremism Project, ‘Terrorists on Telegram’ (https://www.counterextremism.com/terrorists-on-telegram); Vox, ‘Terrorists’ 
love for Telegram, explained’ (https://www.vox.com/world/2017/6/30/15886506/terrorism-isis-telegram-social-media-russia-pavel-
durov-twitter). 
(178)  https://cointelegraph.com/news/crypto-is-a-poor-form-of-money-for-terrorists-congressional-hearing-concludes; consulted on 4 
December 2018. 
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Since 2007, Europol has made available to the public EU terrorism situation and trend reports (Europol, 2017, 
2018b). These provide the European Parliament and all national governments and police forces with an 
annual overview of the European terrorism situation. A section of each report is dedicated to terrorism 
financing. 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc  
Eurojust 
Eurojust was established in 2002 as the EU’s Judicial Cooperation Unit. It is considered central to the EU’s 
pursuit pillar, for its capacity to improve cooperation between judicial authorities in tackling terrorism 
financing and depriving terrorists of their means of attack and communication. Eurojust has consistently 
aided in the investigation and prosecution of cross-border terrorism cases by coordinating cooperation among 
Member States and building relationships with judicial authorities in non-EU countries. 
http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/Pages/home.aspx 
2.9.5.2 International stakeholders 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Terrorism Prevention Branch 
The Terrorism Prevention Branch of UNODC works on the legal aspects of countering the financing of 
terrorism, including promoting the ratification of the relevant universal legal instruments, in particular the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Tofangsaz, 2018), and the 
implementation of these international standards. This entails reviews of domestic legislation, to ensure 
proper criminalisation of offences related to the financing of terrorism, and legislative drafting, developing 
the capacity of criminal justice and law enforcement officials to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate 
terrorism financing through the provision of specialised training on issues related to special investigation 
techniques, freezing, seizing and confiscating terrorist assets, and strengthening regional and international 
cooperation against the financing of terrorism. 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/news-and-events/terrorist-financing.html  
Financial Action Task Force  
The FATF is an intergovernmental body established in 1989 to build on the G7’s efforts to develop policies to 
combat money laundering in drug trafficking. In 2001, it widened its mandate to include terrorism financing. 
Its objectives are to set standards and promote the effective implementation of legal, regulatory and 
operational measures to combat money laundering, terrorism financing and other related threats to the 
integrity of the international financial system. The FATF is therefore a policymaking body that works to 
generate the necessary political will to bring about national legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas. 
In particular, it monitors progress in implementing the 40 FATF Recommendations (179). It works in 
collaboration with other international stakeholders to identify national-level vulnerabilities with the aim of 
protecting the international financial system from misuse. The FATF Secretariat is housed at the OECD 
headquarters in Paris. 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/  
Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 
The Global Initiative was founded in 2013 and headquartered in Geneva. It comprises a network of nearly 
300 independent global and regional experts working on human rights, democracy, governance and 
development issues, in relation to which organised crime has become increasingly pertinent. 
It provides a platform to promote greater debate and innovative approaches as the building blocks for an 
inclusive global strategy against organised crime. It commissions and shares research globally, curates a 
robust resource library of 2 000 reports and tools specific to organised crime, and uses its tremendous 
convening power to unite the private and public sectors against organised crime. 
The Global Initiative seeks to project the expertise of its members outwards and to make it available to a 
broad range of stakeholders, including by developing the evidence basis for policymaking, convening and 
                                           
(179)  The FATF developed 40 recommendations that are recognised as the international standard for countering money laundering and 
financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They were first issued in 1990 and were revised in 1996, 
2001, 2003 and 2012 to ensure that they remain relevant. 
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facilitating multisectoral dialogue, and developing tools and programmes needed to further the development 
of effective responses. 
http://globalinitiative.net  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NATO is a political-military alliance between 29 member states who have agreed to mutual defence based 
on the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949, in response to an attack by any external party. NATO’s 
headquarters are located in Brussels, Belgium, while the headquarters of Allied Command Operations is near 
Mons, Belgium. NATO’s purpose is to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through the 
following means: 
— political — by promoting democratic values and promoting members to consult and cooperate on 
defence- and security-related issues to solve problems, build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict; 
— military — if diplomatic efforts fail, NATO has the military power to undertake crisis management 
operations, which are executed under the collective defence clause of NATO’s founding treaty, under 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty or under a UN mandate, alone or in cooperation with other countries 
and international organisations. 
As part of its counterterrorism strategy, NATO collects intelligence in a multidisciplinary manner through 
cooperation across sectors and among member states on many fronts: defence, diplomacy, healthcare, law 
enforcement, the military and finance. In 2005, NATO, together with UNODC and OSCE, agreed on the need to 
gather and exchange data on terrorism financing and develop relevant international financial standards (180). 
https://www.nato.int/  
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
The IMF is an organisation of 189 countries that works to foster global monetary cooperation, secure 
financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, 
and reduce poverty around the world. Created in 1945, the IMF is governed by and accountable to its 
member countries. Like money laundering, terrorism financing can threaten a country’s economic stability. 
Thus, IMF is very active in supporting and promoting the FATF recommendations among IMF member 
countries. After 20 years, combating terrorism financing has become part of IMF’s core work, with activities 
including analysis and policy advice, assessing the health and integrity of financial sectors, providing financial 
assistance when needed, and helping countries build institutions and increase operational effectiveness. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/  
International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) 
Interpol’s Counter-Terrorism Fusion Centre investigates the organisational hierarchies, training, financing, 
methods and motives of terrorist groups. Its activities are global in scope and implemented through 
regionally focused but interlinked projects. The aim is to improve the exchange of law enforcement 
information across borders and to enrich law enforcement practices. Interpol considers disrupting money 
flows of terrorist groups to be a fundamental pillar of its worldwide efforts to combat terrorism. It currently 
has information on over 43 000 foreign terrorist fighter profiles, which the world’s police can access and 
consult. Its Criminal Analysis File (300 000 entities) includes financial identifiers and phone numbers. This 
growing repository of multidisciplinary and multisectoral intelligence information facilitates the mapping and 
understanding of critical information chain linkages among terrorist activities.  
https://www.interpol.int/Crimes/Terrorism  
2.9.6 Legislation and reference documents 
— Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed 
against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 70-75. 
— Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, OJ L 164, 
22.6.2002, p. 3-7. 
                                           
(180)  NATO, ‘International organisations join forces to combat terrorist financing’ 
(https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/news_21590.htm?selectedLocale=en). 
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— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Prevention of and the fight against terrorist 
financing through measures to improve the exchange of information, to strengthen transparency and 
enhance the traceability of financial transactions’ (COM(2004) 700 final), Brussels, 20 October 2004. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Preparedness and consequence management in the 
fight against terrorism’ (COM(2004) 701 final), Brussels, 20 October 2004. 
— Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing, OL L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 15-36. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘The prevention of and fight against terrorist 
financing through enhanced national level coordination and greater transparency of the non-profit 
sector’ (COM(2005) 620 final), Brussels, 29 November 2005. 
— Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 on 
information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds, OJ L 345, 8.12.2006, p. 1-9. 
— Council Decision 2007/124/EC, Euratom, of 12 February 2007 establishing for the period 2007 to 2013, 
as part of General Programme on Security and Safeguarding Liberties, the Specific Programme 
‘Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security-related risks’, 
OJ L 58, 24.2.2007, p. 1-6. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Stepping up the fight against terrorism’ 
(COM(2007) 649 final), Brussels, 6 November 2007. 
— Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment 
services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC 
and repealing Directive 97/5/EC, OJ L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1-36. 
— Council Decision 2010/412/EU of 13 July 2010 on the conclusion of the agreement between the 
European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of financial messaging 
data from the European Union to the United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Program, OJ L 195, 27.7.2010, p. 3-4. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘The EU counter-terrorism policy: main achievements 
and future challenges’ (COM(2010) 386 final), Brussels, 20 July 2010. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘A European terrorist finance tracking system: 
available options’ (COM(2011) 429 final), Brussels, 13 July 2011. 
— European Commission. Commission staff working document, ‘Report on the second joint review of the 
implementation of the agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
processing and transfer of financial messaging data from the European Union to the United States for 
the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program’ (SWD(2012) 454 final), Brussels, 14 December 
2012. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘A European terrorist finance tracking system (EU 
TFTS)’ (COM(2013) 842 final), Brussels, 27 November 2013. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Pursuant to Article 294(6) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union concerning the position of the Council on the adoption of a directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the financial system for 
the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing’ (COM(2015) 188 final), Brussels, 27 April 2015.  
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘The European agenda on security’ (COM(2015) 185 
final), Strasbourg, 28 April 2015.  
— Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, 
amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing 
Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 
2006/70/EC, OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73-117. 
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— Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
information accompanying transfers of funds and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006, OJ L 141, 
5.6.2015, p. 1-8. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Action Plan for strengthening the fight against 
terrorist financing’ (COM(2016) 50 final), Strasbourg, 2 February 2016. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Delivering on the European agenda on security to 
fight against terrorism and pave the way towards an effective and genuine security union’ 
(COM(2016) 230 final), Brussels, 20 April 2016. 
— European Commission, Commission report, On the joint review of the implementation of the agreement 
between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of 
financial messaging data from the European Union to the United States for the purposes of the Terrorist 
Finance Tracking Program (COM(2017) 31 final), Brussels, 19 January 2017. 
— Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating 
terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 
2005/671/JHA, OJ L 88, 31.3.2017, p. 6-21. 
— European Commission, ‘Reflection paper on the future of European defence’ (COM(2017) 315 final), 
Brussels, 7 June 2017. 
— Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending 
Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money 
laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU, OJ L 156, 
19.6.2018, p. 43-74. 
2.10 Space 
2.10.1 The importance of space for the European Union and for security 
There are two main reasons why space and security come together (181).  
First, space is the unique enabler of a number of security and defence applications. These include monitoring 
areas anywhere on earth and providing unassailable platforms for global positioning and communication for 
use with security and defence forces. After the launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957, the military forces of the 
superpowers were the first users of space, followed soon by space exploration missions for scientific and 
national motivation purposes (the race to the Moon). Classical security and defence uses of space include 
monitoring of foreign territories for signs of preparation of hostile activities, detection of intercontinental 
ballistic missile launches for immediate response, global positioning and navigation to support global military 
operations, and global communications links for command and control. Several of these uses have 
contributed to global stability in the past 60 years. The essential advantages of using space-based platforms 
for this are global reach and unassailability. 
The second main link between space and security is that today the economy and society have become 
dependent on space, primarily again because of space-based navigation and communication services, and 
also because of weather services. Any disruption would have grave economic consequences, and therefore 
the health of space assets has become a matter of security. We rely on communication satellites for 
broadcasting (television) and to communicate with ships, aeroplanes and remote locations, and even more 
strongly on positioning signals for the navigation of aeroplanes, ships, cars and individuals. Furthermore, 
weather services depend on satellite monitoring of the atmosphere, and satellite imaging of the Earth’s 
surface (Earth observation) enables a range of applications from making maps to agriculture control and 
global climate change monitoring. Space-based commercial applications are being expanded and contribute 
to significant economic (service provider) activity.  
While the abovementioned interests — the security and economic applications of space — are in the first 
instance national, investments in space can be huge. Historically, it was the superpowers, the United States 
                                           
(181)  In 2018, a thorough landscape study dedicated to space and security was performed by the JRC with the help of an external 
contractor (Lagazio et al., 2019). It involved a survey of policies, stakeholders, capabilities and R & D at EU level and in eight 
individual European countries selected on the basis of their total national space budget (France, Germany, Italy, the United 
Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, Sweden and Norway). It also indicated policy and capability gaps, and made recommendations for R & D. 
Much of the content of this chapter is based on that study. 
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and the Soviet Union, that were the first to benefit from space. Later, some large European countries 
followed (the United Kingdom, France), but their separate budgets of course could not match those of the 
superpowers. European countries have therefore pooled their resources, first through the European Space 
Agency (ESA) and later (in addition) at EU level. 
It is helpful to categorise space matters as follows:  
— space exploration and science — missions to the Moon and the planets, human space flight, astronomical 
satellites, space-based research and manufacturing; 
— communication and broadcasting — satellite TV and phones, military communications satellites, mainly 
from geostationary satellites, many commercially operated; 
— observation — meteorology, Earth observation, spy satellites; 
— positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) — includes the United States’ Global Positioning System (GPS), 
Galileo (Europe’s GNSS) and the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), and similar 
GNSS and regional ones from Russia, China and Japan; 
— space situational awareness (SSA) with three components — space surveillance and tracking (SST) to 
monitor satellites and debris in orbit and prevent collisions, monitoring of space weather to be warned of 
solar storms and their impact on earth, and monitoring of near-Earth objects (NEO) to be warned of 
impending impacts of asteroids and the like;  
— enabling structures — includes hard infrastructures such as launchers, launch facilities and ground 
stations, but also manufacturing (of launchers, vehicles, payloads) and service provision, and also 
aspects such as supply chain, general (critical) infrastructure (power supply, land communications, etc.), 
education, capacity building and governance. 
2.10.2 The European Union’s role and ambition in space 
The first European pooling of space activities was done by setting up the ESA in 1975. To this day, the ESA, 
as an intergovernmental organisation of 22 member states, has a leading role in European space efforts. Its 
member states channel part of their national space budget through the ESA in order to be part of a larger 
European effort. The ESA member states are not exactly the same as the EU Member States. Not all EU 
Member States participate in the ESA and, conversely, Norway is an ESA member state, as is Canada, 
although the latter does not have full membership. In spite of this, the EU channels a significant part of its 
space budget through the ESA for implementation. Particular areas where the ESA is active but the EU is not 
or is less so are space exploration; scientific (astronomical) satellites; space science, engineering and 
technology; and operating space assets. The ESA’s mandate is limited to peaceful use, but it does consider 
safety aspects, which sometimes overlap with security. In 2016, the ESA issued ‘Towards Space 4.0 for a 
United Space in Europe’ (182). The resolution restates the objectives of a United Space in Europe, establishes 
the ESA’s long-term plan and industrial policy, and calls for an optimised ESA for Space 4.0 (a concept that is 
intended to reflect new aspects of space; see Section 2.10.4).  
The EU’s mandate for space was set by the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. Specifically, the TFEU says, in Title XIX, 
‘Research and technological development and space’, Article 189, that the Union shall draw up a European 
space policy, that it shall establish appropriate relations with the ESA, and that the European Parliament and 
the Council may establish a European space programme.  
Already before that, in 2003, the Commission published a White Paper entitled ‘Space: a new European 
frontier for an expanding Union — an action plan for implementing the European space policy’ (183). Then, in 
2007, the Commission published the European space policy (184). It aims to foster better coordination of 
space activities between the EU, the ESA and their respective Member States, to maximise value for money 
and avoid unsustainable duplication, thus meeting shared European needs. Increased synergies between civil 
and defence space programmes and technologies are also targeted. It emphasises the importance of meeting 
Europe’s security and defence needs as regards space, and supporting Earth observation for security and 
defence and autonomous access to information relating to the environment, climate change and security, 
                                           
(182)  ESA, ‘Ministerial Council 2016’ (https://www.esa.int/About_Us/Ministerial_Council_2016). 
(183)  European Commission, ‘White Paper: space — a new European frontier for an expanding Union: an action plan for implementing the 
European Space policy’ (COM(2003) 673 final), Brussels, 11.11.2003. 
(184)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘European space policy’ (COM(2007) 212 final), Brussels, 26.4.2007. 
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which is of strategic importance for Europe. It underlines that space assets make a significant contribution to 
security and defence.  
The of the Council of the European Union resolutions of 2010 ‘Taking forward the European space policy of 
2008’ (185) and ‘Global challenges: taking full benefit of European space systems’ (Council of the European 
Union and Council of the European Space Agency, 2010) encouraged space developments, underlining 
European autonomy, innovation, EU–ESA coordination and the relation to security.  
In 2010, the GSA was set up (186), and in 2014 the EU established the Copernicus programme (187). Copernicus 
is a civil, user-driven programme which builds on the previous European Earth observation programme, 
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security, as well as on existing related national and European 
capacities. The objective of Copernicus is to provide accurate and reliable information in the field of the 
environment and security, tailored to the needs of users and supporting other EU policies, in particular 
relating to the internal market, transport, the environment, energy, civil protection and civil security, 
cooperation with non-EU countries and humanitarian aid. 
In 2016, the European Commission published its space strategy for Europe (188), which focuses on: 
— maximising the benefits of space for society and the EU economy; 
— fostering a globally competitive and innovative European space sector; 
— reinforcing Europe’s autonomy in accessing and using space in a secure and safe environment; 
— strengthening Europe’s role as a global actor and promoting international cooperation; 
— promoting partnerships between the actors — the Commission, the EU Member States, the ESA, the GSA, 
the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT), the EEAS, 
relevant agencies, industry, and research and user communities. 
Propelled by all this political will, the EU has indeed taken on a major role in space. It has developed two 
flagship programmes in space, Galileo/EGNOS for PNT and Copernicus for Earth observation. EGNOS provides 
augmentation services in Europe for positioning and navigation, augmenting the existing GPS, and thus 
enabling a number of specialist and safety-critical applications. Galileo encompasses a satellite constellation 
that provides global PNT services independently of GPS, and with greater accuracy and reliability. Copernicus 
consists of six constellations of EU-owned satellites with different Earth observation capacities (optical, 
radar, sea, atmosphere, etc.) plus six services aimed at broad application domains that use, in addition to the 
data from the Copernicus satellites, data from other satellites and non-space sources. With these capabilities, 
the EU makes a contribution at the level of other big players such as the United States. 
The EU’s investments in space are not only done to provide it with autonomous capabilities in PNT and Earth 
observation. The EGNOS, Galileo and Copernicus core services and data are provided for free, with the aim of 
stimulating (European) business. The EU deploys targeted activities to stimulate the development of 
businesses, including SMEs, in the space sector and downstream service sector.  
In addition to these two flagship programmes, the EU carries out activities on coordinating SST among the EU 
Member States and on stimulating research and innovation related to space. Attention is also paid to launch 
capabilities. A framework for SST support (189) was established in 2014; it aims to help protect satellites from 
space debris. Research is mainly dealt with through the European research framework programmes (see 
Section 3.1).  
Specifically on the security aspect of space, from the European Parliament there have been two resolutions, 
one in 2008 on space and security (190) and another in 2016 on space capabilities for European security and 
defence (191). Together, they call for the geospatial intelligence necessary for autonomous EU threat 
                                           
(185)  Council Resolution of 26 September 2008, ‘Taking forward the European Space Policy’, OJ C 268, 23.10.2008, p. 1-6. 
(186)  Regulation (EU) No 912/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2010 setting up the European GNSS 
Agency, repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1321/2004 on the establishment of structures for the management of the European 
satellite radio navigation programmes and amending Regulation (EC) No 683/2008, OJ L 276, 20.10.2010, p. 11-21. 
(187)  Regulation (EU) No 377/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 establishing the Copernicus 
Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 911/2010, OJ L 122, 24.4.2014, p. 44-66. 
(188)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Space strategy for Europe’ (COM(2016) 705 final), Brussels, 26.10.2016. 
(189)  Decision No 541/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 establishing a framework for space 
surveillance and tracking support, OJ L 158, 27.5.2014, p. 227-234. 
(190)  European Parliament Resolution 2008/2030(INI) on space and security, Strasbourg, 10 July 2008.  
(191)  European Parliament Resolution 2015/2276(INI) on space capabilities for European security and defence, Strasbourg, 8 June 2016. 
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assessment; the development of precision PNT, Earth observation and reconnaissance; the further 
development of Galileo and Copernicus for security and defence; secured and interoperable satellite 
telecommunication systems; SSA, space surveillance and intelligence; the use of space capabilities against 
ballistic missiles; the protection of space infrastructures (against jamming, spoofing, cyberattacks, space 
weather and debris); European non-dependence as regards critical space technologies and access to space; 
international cooperation on space policy, security and missile defence; and policies and research capabilities 
to open up future applications.  
The Council of the European Union issued a decision in 2014 on SatCen (192), repealing the original 
establishing joint action of 2001 while reaffirming the continuity of SatCen’s operations in the context of the 
EU’s CFSP and, in particular, the CSDP. 
The 2016 space strategy for Europe, referred to above, mentions reinforcing synergies between civil and 
security space activities, and close cooperation of the Commission with the EEAS, the EDA and SatCen, 
together with Member States and the ESA, to explore possible dual-use synergies arising from the space 
programmes. 
With regard to the security services currently provided by the EU space programmes, Galileo provides some 
PNT services of extra-high quality that are restricted to authorised governmental users, the Public Regulated 
Service. One of the six Copernicus services is the Security Service. This is the only part of Copernicus that is 
not free and open, but only for authorised government users. It currently has three sub-areas, maritime 
surveillance, border surveillance and support to external action, which is basically outside-EU surveillance. 
Like the other Copernicus services, it is based on user requirements; in this case, the users are security users 
for applications such as border control, policing, international treaty control, consular support, conflict 
monitoring, etc., who work in the EEAS, in EU agencies such as Frontex and the European Fisheries Control 
Agency, in Member State ministries of defence, in the Commission, etc. Unlike all the other Copernicus 
services, the products are mostly not based on the Copernicus satellites but on third-party satellites, since the 
former are designed for global monitoring as opposed to intelligence gathering.  
On the defence side, there are currently more bilateral programmes between individual Member States than 
joint EU level activities in space. SatCen, one of the three EU agencies under the HR/VP, constitutes a joint 
capability for satellite image intelligence for the Member State ministries of defence. This is military driven, 
as opposed to Copernicus, which is civil driven. The EDA, also under the HR/VP, has some programmes for 
assessing joint exploitation of space assets for defence purposes. 
2.10.3 The international scene 
Space is a ‘global commons’, a resource shared by all. The sustainability of its use can only be ensured by 
globally shared responsibility and governance. Therefore, the UN has taken a role from the earliest days in 
brokering international agreements on the use of space.  
The UN also has, of course, a primary role in international security. 
Besides its activities on security per se, the UN has several programmes and offices for using space in 
response to disasters: the UN Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response, the UN Operational Satellite Applications Programme and the UN Office for Disaster 
Risk Reduction. The UN also oversees the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), which provides the 
framework for cooperation at a global scale between national meteorological and hydrological services for 
the development of meteorology, climatology and operational hydrology. WMO runs a space programme with 
the objective of promoting the availability and use of satellite data and products for weather, climate, water 
and related applications to WMO member states. 
There are five UN treaties on space. In addition, five principles and a number of other resolutions on space 
have been adopted by the UN General Assembly, the first in 1963. All five treaties are from the 1960s and 
1970s. The 1980s and 1990s have seen four resolutions, which deal with contemporary developments such 
as TV broadcasting and Earth observation.  
Since the start of the 2000s, and especially in recent years, there has been less willingness from some key 
countries to come to new global agreements. This is in spite of urgent need, in view of the ever increasing 
use of space (the rise in the number of satellites and data links and the amount of space debris). The EU has 
proposed an international code of conduct for outer-space activities as a contribution to transparency and 
                                           
(192)  Council Decision 2014/401/CFSP.  
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confidence-building measures in relation to outer-space activities (193). However, so far this has not been 
adopted by the international community and the UN.  
While the UN General Assembly is the highest body to adopt positions, in relation to space such positions are 
typically prepared by the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which comes together in 
regular sessions with delegates from each member state. It is supported by the UN Office for Outer Space 
Affairs, which consists of UN staff and which also deploys additional space-related initiatives. One such 
activity is the Space 2030 agenda (194), which contains recommendations on the contribution of space 
activities to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, on the wider inclusion of nations and 
stakeholders in space activities, on increased resilience and sustainability, and on strengthened international 
governance of space. 
It is the EEAS that represents the EU at the UN, including on space and security. However, DG Internal Market, 
Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs also has a remit to deal with the UN on certain space matters.  
2.10.4 Possible evolution of space within the next 5 to 10 years 
Contemporary developments in technology and the economy are leading to rapid changes in the use of 
space. This is sometimes referred to as ‘New Space’ or ‘Space 4.0’. It is characterised by the following shifts:  
— from involvement in space by a few rich countries to involvement by many countries, including 
developing ones; 
— from a leading role for national space agencies and governmental funding to a leading role for private 
companies and private funding; 
— from a few big, expensive satellites to large constellations of small, cheap satellites; 
— from space assets being unassailable and impervious to interference to their being vulnerable to attacks 
and accidents;  
— from space being a limitless resource to space being congested and contested (and the same applies to 
the radiofrequency spectrum);  
— from use of space by specialist communities (science, defence) to the integration of space into the 
economy and pervasive use.  
These shifts bring great opportunities but also risks and threats. These are discussed in the following 
subsection. 
2.10.4.1 Main current threats and challenges 
Exponential increase in the number of satellites. The technology to manufacture and launch low-cost, 
small satellites makes it possible to launch large constellations. This opportunity is being picked up in 
particular by the commercial sector. Constellations of hundreds of small satellites are expected to be used 
for Earth observation and constellations of thousands for communication. This will exacerbate the problems 
of congestion in orbits and frequencies and of space debris. 
Congestion in popular orbits. Although many orbits can be used, some are more in demand than others. 
Much used orbits include the lowest possible ones, where atmospheric drag is not an issue and which are 
sun-synchronous, as well as geostationary orbits, which are limited to a fixed height above the equator. There 
is probably enough space for a lot of satellites, but coordination will be needed to prevent collisions in orbit 
and when bringing satellites into orbit or otherwise moving them around (space traffic management). 
Space debris. This is made up of orbiting objects such as defunct satellites, spent boosters, broken-off 
parts, solid propellant residues and the results of explosions or collisions of space objects. The last contribute 
most to the amount of dangerous debris parts. High orbital speeds make even tiny objects very dangerous, as 
a hit can cause serious or fatal damage. The amount of space debris is increasing, necessitating small orbit 
                                           
(193)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/203 of 9 February 2015 in support of the Union proposal for an international Code of Conduct for 
outer-space activities as a contribution to transparency and confidence-building measures in outer-space activities, OJ L 33, 
10.2.2015, p. 38-44. 
(194)  United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs ‘Space2030: Space as a driver for peace’ 
(http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/outreach/events/2018/spacetrust.html). 
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changes for manoeuvrable satellites from time to time, and may even lead to certain popular orbits 
becoming unusable. 
Space objects crashing to Earth. Although most objects and debris that re-enter the atmosphere burn up, 
some large objects may hit the ground. The precise crash site can be hard to predict, and sometimes the re-
entry comes as a surprise. This probably does not add much to the daily risks faced by the average person, 
but it creates bad publicity. 
Near-Earth objects. These are asteroids and comets that come close to Earth. The possibility that a big 
NEO could hit our planet is an omnipresent natural risk with a low probability but a high impact. This 
realisation has led to activities involving searching for and tracking NEOs. However, how to avert an 
impending collision once it has been predicted is still ascertained. 
Space weather. Solar activity in the form of strong flares or eruptions may not only hurt astronauts or 
damage or deactivate satellites — leading, for example, to loss of GNSS functionality — but also damage 
power and communications lines on Earth and pose a danger to air travellers. 
SST and SSA capability. To give forewarning against impending collisions, the larger space objects are 
being tracked, and their near-future positions are predicted (SST). However, tracking and prediction 
capabilities are limited, while the number of potentially dangerous objects is growing. SSA also encompasses, 
besides SST, the monitoring of NEOs and space weather. As with SST, the current monitoring capacity for 
NEOs and space weather is not sufficient to cover the risks. 
Sensitivity of some satellite positions. Nations that deploy military and strategic satellites want to keep 
their exact positions secret for protection. This may increase the risk of collisions and may interfere with full 
support, data exchange and cooperation on SST.  
Sensitivity of in-orbit servicing. Even very expensive satellites have a limited lifetime, as some 
consumables such as propellant or coolant will run out, or malfunctions or damage will occur. This could be 
remedied by in-orbit servicing as a cheaper alternative to launching a new satellite. Only in recent years has 
in-orbit servicing become practically and economically conceivable. However, the capacity to approach a 
satellite and tamper with it poses a risk in particular to military and strategic satellites. For that reason, 
developments in this direction may be discouraged. 
Radio spectrum conflicts. The available bandwidth for radiofrequency communications is limited, and 
demand threatens to exceed supply. Not only do satellites compete for the same frequency bands, but also 
terrestrial radiofrequency use can interfere with bands allocated for satellites, for example in the case of 
ground-based radars and wireless local area networks that operate on the frequencies of the EU’s Sentinel-1 
satellite, or radar and terrestrial very high-frequency communications that operate in the Automatic 
Identification System bands received by satellites. 
Geopolitical forces frustrate international agreements. Agreements on the use of space need by 
nature to be international, voluntary and global. Although the UN has had considerable success in 
establishing such agreements, the current exponential growth in the use of space means that updates to the 
international agreements are required. Progress is currently slow because of geopolitical issues. 
Export control. Whereas growing a space manufacturing and service industry that is globally competitive is 
an economic goal of the EU, some advanced products and applications may be deemed too sensitive to 
export outside the EU. This applies in particular to military and dual-use technologies and may restrict global 
growth opportunities for EU industry. 
Supply chain security. Satellites, launchers and all their building blocks work with a number of critical 
components and materials and are put together using advanced technologies. Access to and control over 
these should be secured. This means guaranteed access to some basic materials such as rare earth metals, 
but it also means retaining control over critical companies in the supply chain — companies that often have 
international shareholders. 
Cyber and communications security. The software that runs satellites can be hacked by malicious cyber-
tools that can be inserted at any stage in the operation or the production of the satellite or its components. 
Cyberattacks and cybercrime have become a serious daily issue on Earth and are a realistic threat to space 
assets as well. In addition, the communications links between satellites and ground receivers can be 
disrupted by jamming, spoofing or eavesdropping (unintentional radiofrequency interference has been 
mentioned above). 
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Security of the ground component. (Civilian) ground stations are not extensively protected against 
disruption. All space operations and services depend on terrestrial communications links, including the 
internet, which are targets for cyber- and physical attacks. Jamming, spoofing and eavesdropping are also 
threats relating to these links. 
Increasing use of space for military purposes. Just as civilian use of space is increasing, so is military 
use. The United States in particular but also Russia have historically been major military space users. Now, 
China, India, Canada and Australia are also building up capabilities. European countries, too, deploy military 
and dual-use satellites. Even the EU has started discussing the combination of space and defence activities. 
Defence capabilities, on Earth or in space, may contribute to global stability, so military use of space is not 
per se undesirable. However, a wasteful arms race should be avoided. 
Development of anti-satellite weapons. In the classic paradigm, a space asset was untouchable. Now, 
however, capabilities have been developed and are being further developed that can take out satellites. Anti-
satellite weapons include manoeuvrable satellites, precision-guided kinetic projectiles, explosives, directed 
energy and nuclear electromagnetic pulses. New developments include rail guns, high-power lasers, and high-
energy microwaves and radiofrequencies. These are weapons that have a low operational cost (a low ‘cost 
per shot’) and can be used from the ground or in space to target space assets. Laser and microwave weapons 
can be used in different degrees, from merely dazzling at low power to disrupting certain functions at 
medium power and destroying the target at high power. 
Inability to attribute outages of space assets to a cause. When a satellite unexpectedly stops 
functioning, the cause is often unknown. It can be hardware or software malfunction, the result of a hit by a 
cosmic ray or by space debris, or the result of an attack. Even if a malicious cause is strongly suspected, the 
question is, ‘Who did it?’ Today, there is little means of finding this out, and that contributes to impunity, 
uncertainty and potential instability. 
Equitable access to space. As space (including radiofrequency space) is becoming congested, latecomers 
may find the best places taken. This can put developing countries in particular at a disadvantage. 
2.10.4.2 Main current opportunities 
Technological advancements and consequent lowering of costs. These are the main drivers in the 
current increase in space actors, making space accessible for ever more countries and operators. Size and 
weight are what makes a launch expensive, so miniaturisation (made possible by technological 
advancements) is a big contributor to reducing launch costs. The use of commercial off-the-shelf parts leads 
to cost savings, as does standardisation on the basis of the cubesat model (elements measuring 
10 cm × 10 cm ×10 cm). Recent success in the development of reusable launchers will also help to save 
costs.  
More private actors. Private commercial firms are starting to offer products and services that were 
hitherto only provided by governments. While communication and Earth observation have a longer 
commercial history, commercial services in space tourism, SSA, in-orbit servicing, launch organisation, 
electronics intelligence (which used to be exclusively a defence activity) and extraterrestrial exploration are 
now also on offer. 
Increasing economic and societal benefits. The increased use of space will be to the benefit of more 
people, benefiting both consumers and industry. The growth of the space industry itself, and a shift from 
upstream (systems) to downstream (service provision), will be accompanied by growth in the economy thanks 
to the use of the new space-based services. Although this will contribute to the congestion in space (orbits, 
frequencies), it will also create more parties that have an interest in keeping the use of space sustainable.  
Availability of funds. Recent decades have seen extreme capital build-up by some countries and 
individuals. Some of these — private persons as well as countries — spend this capital on space programmes 
for idealistic reasons or to pursue a long-term vision. Others make it available as venture capital that 
finances start-up companies in space. 
Increased resilience due to many systems. The trend away from a few powerful, expensive satellites and 
towards constellations of small, inexpensive ones will lead to more resilience to outage of single satellites. 
Similarly, more independent systems and service providers will lead to less vulnerability, and the 
interoperability of GNSS will provide more reliable PNT services. In addition, the ‘responsive space’ concept is 
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gaining ground; this refers to being able to create functionality in space quickly, including by quickly 
replenishing outed satellites. 
New means of communication. Laser is a way of communicating between two points with a high 
bandwidth, securely and without disturbing other communications links. This technology can alleviate the 
problems of radiofrequency spectrum congestion. Satellite-to-satellite communication is easier than 
satellite–Earth communication by laser, because the latter is hindered by the atmosphere. In addition, 
quantum communications are being pursued as a promising means of achieving highly secure 
communications, and the very first trials involving satellite have been done by China. 
Increased recognition of space debris and orbit congestion. Both regulators and operators have 
started to recognise this issue more widely. Regulators are considering guidelines for operators, and the latter 
are even asking for them. Such guidelines would cover, for example, the obligation to de-orbit satellites at 
the end of their lifetime to free up orbit space and prevent future collisions. Furthermore, special missions to 
clean up debris are being considered, although this is a technological challenge. More countries are taking up 
SST activities, in addition to the United States, and international cooperation in this area is growing. In 
addition, commercial operators are starting to offer SST services and de-orbiting services. Space traffic 
management is starting to be considered in international forums. 
Increased recognition of the space weather threat. Governments are starting to take up the space 
weather threat to a greater extent, in the context of increasing resilience and protecting critical 
infrastructures. International cooperation mechanisms are being considered, for example under the aegis of 
the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space / the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs. 
International scientific cooperation. While current geopolitical issues are blocking some progress on 
international agreements, scientific cooperation is continuing, for example on the ISS and for proposed extra-
terrestrial missions.  
International coordination and governance. There is a significant and growing number of international 
coordination forums that work on space (and security): not only is there already a series of sub-organs under 
the UN, but also outside the UN there is a plethora of government, NGO and industry associations. The UN 
and others are continuing to try to strengthen international governance in order to promote security and 
sustainability, through various binding and non-binding agreements. 
Dual use. If the militarisation of space can be avoided, it will save much cost and risk. Nonetheless, defence 
was one of the first uses of space by the superpowers, and civil applications have in the end benefited much 
from military developments. While in Europe there is much less military use of space than, for example, by 
the United States, there is already experience with dual-use observation satellites, and this model could lead 
in the future to cost savings and increased efficiency. Furthermore, some of the new types of weapons could 
conceivably be used to neutralise space debris or protect against an NEO on a collision course. 
Near space. Although not quite space, the stratosphere is an attractive domain in which to place vehicles for 
long persistence. Technologies to make lightweight materials and to collect solar energy are starting to bring 
this within reach. This technology is referred to as ‘near-space platforms’, ‘high-altitude platforms’ or ‘high-
altitude pseudo-satellites’. Stratospheric platforms for Earth observation or for communication have the 
advantage of being able to remain stationary over a location, but at an altitude of tens of kilometres, as 
opposed to a 36 000 km altitude for a classical geostationary satellite. Persistence makes it possible to 
continuously monitor movements (which cannot be done with low-orbital satellites), while close range allows 
much higher spatial resolution than from geostationary orbit. 
2.10.4.3 The European Union’s position 
The Commission aims to position the EU for the next 7 years (2021-2027, the period of the next MFF) with 
an overarching EU space programme (195). It seeks to continue major EU investments in global positioning and 
navigation and in Earth observation through Galileo/EGNOS and Copernicus, respectively. It proposes new 
activities in satellite communications for government users while responding to challenges relating to SSA, 
although these two aspects will be pursued with much more limited investments through an approach of 
pooling Member State-level resources, as opposed to building up EU-level assets.  
                                           
(195)  European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation establishing the space programme of the Union and the European Union Agency 
for the Space Programme and repealing Regulations (EU) No 912/2010, (EU) No 1285/2013, (EU) No 377/2014 and Decision 
541/2014/EU’ (COM(2018) 447 final), Brussels, 6.6.2018. 
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The proposed space programme also emphasises the development of the space economy, the security 
aspects of space and the autonomy of Europe. To turn to security, the development of the Copernicus 
Security Service is already being addressed through studies and workshops. Of the Copernicus services, it is 
one of the last to have been developed, and its use is likely to grow among civil security users, and possibly 
also among military users, although it will remain a civil-driven service. 
With regard to autonomy, there is particular emphasis on the autonomy of access to space. Nowadays, many 
European satellites are launched by Russian, Indian and US launchers. This can be economically 
advantageous, but the EU should not depend on them (it should have its own alternatives); furthermore, the 
EU launch industry needs a large market in order to be viable. 
The Commission is proposing an increase in its framework R & D programme for the next MFF (Horizon 
Europe; see Section 3.1.8). Part of that budget will be earmarked for research on space and on security.  
The EU is reinforcing its position in defence, and one important ingredient is the European Defence Fund 
(EDF) for defence R & D, also proposed for the next MFF. The links between space and defence have been 
highlighted in recent political statements. The EDF may conceivably also provide funding for space-related 
projects.  
With regard to the longer term, European leaders have voiced some far-reaching visions on space. For 
example, in a recent speech (196) Commissioner Bieńkowska mentioned the notions of a collective European 
objective in space involving space exploration, of a European space council and of a European space force.  
2.10.5 Stakeholders 
2.10.5.1 European Union stakeholders 
In the EU, political directions, policies, strategies, regulations and decisions in space and security are made at 
the usual various levels of the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament 
and the Commission. In addition to those, the following stakeholders have been identified. 
Council Working Party on Space 
The Council Working Party on Space handles work on the development of the European space policy and the 
related legislation. This includes the development of Copernicus, SST, relations with the ESA and EU 
international relations in space. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/working-party-space/ 
European Union Military Committee  
The committee is the supreme military body of the Council of the EU, composed of the chiefs of defence of 
the Member States. It directs all military activities in the context of the EU, in particular the planning and 
execution of military missions and operations under the CSDP and the development of military capabilities. It 
has an interest in Earth observation, navigation and the use of space to support military missions and 
intelligence. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/european-union-military-committee/ 
European Commission Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and 
SMEs  
This is the Commission DG responsible for EU policy on the single market, industry, entrepreneurship and 
small businesses. Key requirements are related to: Development of Copernicus – The European Earth 
Observation Programme; EGNOS – The European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service; and Galileo – The 
Global Satellite Navigation System (GNSS) for further use in the security and defence. 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/  
                                           
(196)  Opening speech at the 11th Annual Conference on European Space Policy, Brussels, 22 January 2019 
(https://www.spaceconference.eu/downloads/2019/ESPI-proceedings-11th-European-Space-Policy-Conference.pdf). 
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European Commission Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology 
Connect is responsible for the Commission’s policies to create a digital single market, with key areas of 
responsibility such as data, cybersecurity and copyright. It has interests in secure communication and 
cybersecurity. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/communications-networks-content-and-technology_en 
European Commission Directorate-General Joint Research Centre 
The JRC is the European Commission’s science and knowledge service. It has solid research and policy 
support experience, developed in house, as well as broad networks with academia, industry, Member States 
and city authorities.  
Key space-related areas of its research are Earth observation; integrated maritime surveillance; emergency 
preparedness, response, disaster risk management and resilience in cases of natural and man-made hazards; 
the fight against crime and terrorism, including combating the illicit trafficking of people, drugs and weapons; 
cybersecurity, data protection and space infrastructures, as well as the use of communications data by 
security and intelligence agencies; technical aspects relating to the implementation of treaties and 
conventions on the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; and support for studies on 
the implications of demographic change, and the root causes, likely scale, timing and impact of migration. 
See Section 3.4 for more details. https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en  
European Commission European Political Strategy Centre 
The European Political Strategy Centre is the European Commission’s in-house think tank. It provides strategic 
analysis, advice and support to the President and the Commission. Tasked with a mission to innovate and 
disrupt, the centre provides the President and the College of Commissioners with strategic, evidence-based 
analysis and forward-looking policy advice. 
https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/home_en  
European Commission: user DGs 
Within the Commission, a number of DGs make use of space services to implement their security-related 
policies or to have their policies implemented by agencies. These are primarily: 
— DG Migration and Home Affairs — internal security, border security, migration; 
— DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, DG Mobility and Transport — maritime security and safety; 
— DG Taxation and Customs Union, DG Trade — customs, dual-use exports; 
— ECHO — disaster response, humanitarian aid; 
— DG International Cooperation and Development — international development, cooperation and aid; 
— Service for Foreign Policy Instruments — operational EU foreign policy, crisis and security support to non-
EU countries, enforcing EU sanctions. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments_en  
Research Executive Agency  
This is the European Commission’s funding body for research and innovation. It manages EU research grants, 
including for space-related projects. 
http://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/research-executive-agency_en 
European GNSS Agency 
The GSA manages Europe’s GNSS programmes, Galileo and EGNOS. Its interest is in furthering their 
development and uptake.  
https://www.gsa.europa.eu/  
European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) 
Frontex promotes, coordinates and develops European border management. It helps EU Member States and 
Schengen associated countries to manage their external borders, as well as to harmonise border controls 
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across the EU. It facilitates cooperation between the border authorities in the EU Member States, providing 
technical support and expertise. It runs the border surveillance component of the Copernicus Security Service, 
to provide information to itself and to Member State border authorities. 
https://frontex.europa.eu/  
European Maritime Safety Agency 
EMSA provides technical expertise and operational assistance to improve maritime safety, pollution 
preparedness and response, and maritime security. It also offers maritime services such as Earth observation. 
It runs the maritime surveillance component of the Copernicus Security Service, to provide information to 
European maritime security users, such as Frontex, the European Fisheries Control Agency, Europol and the 
Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre — Narcotics, and to Member State authorities. 
http://www.emsa.europa.eu/  
European Fisheries Control Agency 
This EU agency promotes the highest common standards for control, inspection and surveillance under the 
common fisheries policy. It makes use of ship detection and tracking through satellite communications and 
satellite imaging. 
https://www.efca.europa.eu  
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) 
Europol is the law enforcement agency of the EU supporting Member States in their fight against terrorism, 
cybercrime and other serious and organised crime. It has an interest in space assets for policing operation 
support, secure communication, Earth observation and image analysis, intelligence and cybersecurity. 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/  
European External Action Service 
The EEAS is the diplomatic service and foreign and defence ministry of the EU, helping the HR/VP to 
implement the EU’s CFSP. Its interest in space relates to surveillance and reconnaissance for military/security 
operations, satellite communications, autonomous access to space, permanent earth observation and 
cybersecurity. It aims to make use of the full potential of Copernicus and of the European GNSS for security 
purposes. 
http://eeas.europa.eu 
EEAS European Union Military Staff  
The Military Staff is a Directorate-General of the EEAS that contributes to the EU’s CSDP by providing 
strategic advice to the HR/VP and commanding non-executive operations through its military planning and 
conduct capability operational headquarters. Its interest in space relates to early warning, situation 
assessment, strategic planning for military operations, communications and information systems, concept 
development, and training and education. 
http://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5436/european-union-military-staff-
eums_en?page=1  
European Defence Agency 
The EDA supports the development of defence capabilities, military cooperation, defence R & T and the 
defence industry. Among its priorities are the preparatory action on defence research (PADR), the updating of 
the capability development plan, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, and key capability programmes 
governmental satellite communications. It is interested in further development of the next generation of 
European space systems, taking into account their potential for dual use, and supports initiatives on SST, 
governmental satellite communications, the use of Galileo for security purposes, Earth observation and 
imagery analysis, secure communications and data transmission, countering cyberthreats (cyberdefence), 
maritime patrolling and escorting naval surveillance systems, enhanced battlespace information and 
communication services, and space-based information services. 
https://www.eda.europa.eu/ 
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European Union Satellite Centre  
SatCen supports the decision making and actions of the EU in the field of the CFSP, in particular the CSDP, 
including EU crisis management missions and operations, by providing products and services resulting from 
the exploitation of relevant space assets and collateral data, including satellite imagery and aerial imagery, 
and related services. It has interests in Earth observation and navigation, humanitarian and civil protection 
missions, security and military surveillance/intelligence, protection of space infrastructures, secure 
communications and SSA. 
https://www.satcen.europa.eu/ 
European Union Institute for Security Studies  
The EUISS is the EU agency dealing with the analysis of foreign, security and defence policy issues. It 
supports the development of the CSDP through outreach activities and expert publications. It has interests in 
cybersecurity, independent space infrastructures, improving space system resilience, reducing external 
dependency, and ensuring a secure and sustainable environment for outer space activities. 
https://www.iss.europa.eu/  
Emergency Response Coordination Centre 
The Emergency Response Coordination Centre, operating within ECHO, was set up to support a coordinated 
and quicker response to disasters both inside and outside Europe, using resources from the countries 
participating in the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism. Use of space for analyses of real-time information on 
disasters; monitoring hazards; preparing plans for the deployment of experts, teams and equipment; mapping 
available assets and coordinating the EU’s disaster response efforts by matching offers of assistance to the 
needs of the disaster-stricken country; and better planning will further enhance the centre’s capacity for rapid 
response. 
https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/emergency-response-coordination-centre-ercc_en 
European Space Agency 
The ESA is an intergovernmental organisation with 22 member states, dedicated to the exploration of space. 
Established in 1975, it has a staff of about 2 200 and an annual budget of about EUR 5.7 billion (in 2019). 
The ESA’s space flight programme includes the launch and operation of unmanned exploration missions to 
other planets and the Moon; Earth observation, science and telecommunication; operating and developing 
launchers with industry; and maintaining a major spaceport, the Guiana Space Centre at Kourou, French 
Guiana. The ESA has headquarters in Paris and facilities in Noordwijk, the Netherlands; Frascati, Italy, 
Darmstadt, Germany; Cologne, Germany; Harwell, the United Kingdom; and Villanueva de la Cañada, Madrid, 
Spain. 
http://www.esa.int  
ESA SSA Space Weather Coordination Centre  
The ESA’s SSA Space Weather Coordination Centre is operated by a Belgian consortium on behalf of the 
Agency’s SSA Programme Office. It has the responsibility for overall coordination of the space weather asset 
network (in partnership with several expert service centres), maintenance of the associated ESA applications 
and monitoring of the system. 
https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/About_the_Space_Weather_Coordination_Centre 
2.10.5.2 International stakeholders 
UN Office for Outer Space Affairs 
This UN body works to promote international cooperation on the peaceful use and exploration of space, and 
on the use of space science and technology for sustainable economic and social development. It assists UN 
member states to establish legal and regulatory frameworks to govern space activities and strengthens the 
capacity of developing countries to use space science technology and applications for development. 
http://www.unoosa.org/  
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UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) 
The committee was set up by the UN General Assembly to govern the exploration and use of space for the 
benefit of all humanity for peace, security and development. It is tasked with reviewing international 
cooperation on peaceful uses of outer space, studying space-related activities that could be undertaken by 
the UN, encouraging space research programmes and studying legal problems arising from the exploration of 
outer space. There are two subsidiary bodies: the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and the Legal 
Subcommittee. 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.html  
International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems 
The committee promotes voluntary cooperation on matters of mutual interest related to civil satellite-based 
PNT. It encourages coordination among GNSS providers and regional systems, as well as improvements to 
ensure greater compatibility, interoperability and transparency, and it carries out activities to promote the 
introduction and use of these services. 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/icg/icg.html  
International Telecommunication Union 
This is the UN’s specialised agency for ICT. It allocates global radio spectrum and satellite orbits, and 
develops the technical standards that ensure networks and technologies seamlessly interconnect. 
https://www.itu.int/ 
2.10.6 Legislation and reference documents 
EU legislation and reference documents 
— European Commission, ‘White Paper: space — a new European frontier for an expanding Union: an action 
plan for implementing the European space policy (COM(2003) 673 final), Brussels, 11 November 2003. 
— European Council, European Security Strategy: A secure Europe in a better world, 12 December 2003.  
— European Commission and European Space Agency (2004), Framework agreement between the European 
Community and the European Space Agency (L 261/64), Brussels, 6 August 2004. 
— European Parliament Resolution 2004/2171(INI) on security research — the next steps, Brussels, 23 June 
2005. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘European space policy’ (COM(2007) 212 final), 
Brussels, 26 April 2007. 
— European Space Agency, Resolution on the European space policy (ESA BR 269), 22 May 2007. 
— European Parliament Resolution 2008/2030(INI) on space and security, Strasbourg, 10 July 2008. 
— Council Resolution of 26 September 2008, ‘Taking forward the European Space Policy’, OJ C 268, 
23.10.2008, p. 1-6. 
— European Parliament Resolution P6_TA(2008)0564 on the European space policy: how to bring space 
down to earth, Strasbourg, 20 November 2008. 
— Regulation No (EU) 911/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2010 on 
the European Earth monitoring programme (GMES) and its initial operations (2011 to 2013), OJ L 276, 
20.10.2010, p. 1-10.  
— Regulation (EU) No 912/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2010 
setting up the European GNSS Agency, repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1321/2004 on the 
establishment of structures for the management of the European satellite radio navigation programmes 
and amending Regulation (EC) No 683/2008, OJ L 276, 20.10.2010, p. 11-21. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘The EU internal security strategy in action: five 
steps towards a more secure Europe’ (COM(2010) 673 final), Brussels, 22 November 2010. 
— Council of the European Union and Council of the European Space Agency, 7th Space Council Resolution, 
‘Global challenges: taking full benefit of European space systems’, Brussels, 25 November 2010. 
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— European Commission, Commission communication, 'Towards a space strategy for the European Union 
that benefits its citizens' (COM(2011) 152 final), Brussels, 4 April 2011. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Establishing appropriate relations between the EU 
and the ESA’ (COM(2012) 671 final), Brussels, 14 November 2012. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘EU space industrial policy: releasing the potential 
for economic growth in the space sector’ (COM(2013) 108 final), Brussels, 28 February 2013.  
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Towards a more competitive and efficient defence 
and security sector’ (COM(2013) 542 final), Brussels, 24 July 2013.  
— Regulation (EU) No 1285/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on 
the implementation and exploitation of European satellite navigation systems and repealing Council 
Regulation (EC) No 876/2002 and Regulation (EC) No 683/2008 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, OJ L 347, 30.12.2013, p. 1-24. 
— High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Final Report by the High 
Representative/Head of the EDA on the common security and defence policy, Brussels, 15 October 2013.  
— European Commission, Commission report, Progress report on establishing appropriate relations between 
the European Union and the European Space Agency (ESA) (COM(2014) 56 final), Brussels, 6 February 
2014. 
— EEAS, International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (draft), 31 March 2014 (197). 
— Regulation (EU) No 377/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 establishing 
the Copernicus Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 911/2010, OJ L 122, 24.4.2014, p. 44-66. 
— Regulation (EU) No 512/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending 
Regulation (EU) No 912/2010 setting up the European GNSS Agency, OJ L 150, 20.5.2014, p. 72-92. 
— Decision No 541/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 establishing a 
framework for space surveillance and tracking support, OJ L 158, 27.5.2014, p. 227-234. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, The final implementation report of the EU Internal 
Security Strategy 2010-2014 (COM(2014) 365 final), Brussels, 20 June 2014. 
— Council Decision 2014/401/CFSP of 26 June 2014 on the European Union Satellite Centre and repealing 
Joint Action 2001/555/CFSP on the establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre, OJ L 188, 
27.6.2014, p. 73-84. 
— European Commission, Commission implementing decision on the procedure for participation of the 
Member States in the Space Surveillance and Tracking Support Framework (C(2014) 6342 final), 
Brussels, 12 September 2014. 
— Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/203 of 9 February 2015 in support of the Union proposal for an 
international Code of Conduct for outer-space activities as a contribution to transparency and 
confidence-building measures in outer-space activities, OJ L 33, 10.2.2015, p. 38-44. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘The European agenda on security’ (COM(2015) 185 
final), Strasbourg, 28 April 2015. 
— Council of the European Union, draft Council conclusions on the renewed European Union internal 
security strategy 2015-2020 (9798/15), Brussels, 10 June 2015.  
— European Parliament Resolution 2015/2276(INI) on space capabilities for European security and defence, 
Strasbourg, 8 June 2016. 
— European Parliament Resolution 2016/2731(RSP) on space market uptake, Strasbourg, 8 June 2016.  
— EEAS (2016), ‘Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe — A global strategy for the European 
Union’s foreign and security policy’, 10715/16, June 2016.  
— European Union and European Space Agency, Joint statement on shared vision and goals for the future 
of Europe in space, Brussels, 26 October 2016. 
                                           
(197)  https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/space_code_conduct_draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf 
 92 
 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Space strategy for Europe’ (COM(2016) 705 final), 
Brussels, 26 October 2016. 
— High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Implementation Plan on Security 
and Defence (14392/16), Brussels, 14 November 2016. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘European defence action plan’ (COM(2016) 950 
final), Brussels, 30 November 2016. 
— European Space Agency, Towards Space 4.0 for a United Space in Europe, Lucerne, 2 December 2016. 
— European Commission Decision C(2016) 8482 on a coordination plan for the space surveillance and 
tracking support framework and on the procedure for the participation of Member States, Brussels, 
19 December 2016 (not public). 
— Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on progress in implementing the EU global strategy in 
the area of security and defence (6875/17), Brussels, 6 March 2017. 
— European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Launching the European Defence Fund’ 
(COM(2017) 295 final), Brussels, 7 June 2017. 
— European Commission, ‘Reflection paper on the future of European defence’ (COM(2017) 315 final), 
Brussels, 7 June 2017. 
— European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation establishing the European Defence Industrial 
Development Programme aiming at supporting the competitiveness and innovative capacity of the EU 
defence industry’ (COM(2017) 294 final), Brussels, 7 June 2017. 
— Council Decision 14866/17 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the 
list of participating Member States, Brussels, 8 December 2017. 
— European Commission, Commission report on the implementation of the space surveillance and tracking 
(SST) support framework (2014-2017) (COM(2018) 256 final), Brussels, 3 May 2018. 
— European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation establishing the space programme of the Union and 
the European Union Agency for the Space Programme and repealing Regulations (EU) No 912/2010, 
(EU) No 1285/2013, (EU) No 377/2014 and Decision 541/2014/EU’ (COM(2018) 447 final), Brussels, 
6 June 2018. 
— European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation establishing Horizon Europe — the Framework 
Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination 
(COM(2018) 435 final), Brussels, 7 June 2018. 
— European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation establishing the Internal Security Fund’ 
(COM(2018) 472 final), Brussels, 13 June 2018. 
— European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation establishing the European Defence Fund’ 
(COM(2018) 476 final), Brussels, 13 June 2018. 
UN General Assembly legislation and reference documents  
Treaties (T) and resolutions (R) at the level of the UN General Assembly (see also UN Office for Outer Space 
Affairs, 2017). 
Item  Date Ref Link 
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space 
R 13.12.1963 1962 (XVIII) http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/e
n/ourwork/spacelaw/principles
/legal-principles.html  
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
T 19.12.1966 RES 2222 (XXI) http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/e
n/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/i
ntroouterspacetreaty.html  
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return 
of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space 
T 19.12.1967 RES 2345 
(XXII) 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/e
n/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/i
ntrorescueagreement.html  
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Item  Date Ref Link 
Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects 
T 29.11.1971 RES 2777 
(XXVI) 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/e
n/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/i
ntroliability-convention.html  
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space 
T 12.11.1974 RES 3235 
(XXIX) 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/e
n/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/i
ntroregistration-
convention.html  
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies  
T 05.12.1979 RES 34/68 http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/e
n/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/i
ntromoon-agreement.html  
Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial 
Earth Satellites for International Direct Television 
Broadcasting 
R 10.12.1982 RES 37/92 http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/e
n/ourwork/spacelaw/principles
/dbs-principles.html  
Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth 
from Outer Space 
R 03.12.1986 RES 41/65 http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/e
n/ourwork/spacelaw/principles
/remote-sensing-
principles.html  
Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power 
Sources In Outer Space 
R 14.12.1992 RES 47/68 http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/e
n/ourwork/spacelaw/principles
/nps-principles.html  
Declaration on International Cooperation in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit 
and in the Interest of All States, Taking into 
Particular Account the Needs of Developing 
Countries 
R 13.12.1996 RES 51/122 http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/e
n/ourwork/spacelaw/principles
/space-benefits-
declaration.html  
Transparency and confidence-building measures in 
outer space activities 
R 05.12.2013 RES 68/50 http://www.un.org/en/ga/searc
h/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES
/68/50  
Source: Authors. 
2.11 Defence  
Traditionally, internal and external security have been considered separately, conceptually and practically. 
However, in recent years the dividing lines have been fading, presenting a huge challenge for the design of 
security policies and the institutions safeguarding it. 
Having its origin in the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, the EU security policy is split between the CFSP and the 
justice and home affairs policy (198). Whereas both policies contain significant components relating to internal 
and external security, the justice and home affairs policy covers migration and asylum policy, judicial 
cooperation and criminal law, and policy cooperation, while the CFSP deals mainly with external security and 
military policy. 
The CFSP includes the European security and defence policy (ESDP), the main objectives of which are military 
and civilian crisis management operations, including response to natural, humanitarian or other disasters. 
Since 2003, the EU has deployed international interventions and missions within the ESDP framework. 
The origin of the ESDP dates back to the British-French Summit in Saint Malo in 1998, when the two states 
called for a European foreign policy that would allow Europe to fulfil its role on the global stage, including 
with regard to defence and security issues. For that purpose, the EU needed the capacity for autonomous 
action, backed by military forces, to respond to international crises. In 1999, the European Council of Cologne 
endorsed this view, confirming the ESDP role and setting out its goals (199).  
2.11.1 The European Security Strategy (2003) 
In 2003, the US military action in Iraq without a mandate from the UN and with the support of some EU 
Member States, while the EU’s common position was being drafted, created an internal EU crisis of 
confidence (Bailes, 2005). As a consequence, that same year the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier 
Solana, presented the first European security strategy, ‘A secure Europe in a better world’ (European Council, 
2003), adopted by the European Council in December 2003. 
                                           
(198)  The Maastricht Treaty changed the former European treaties and created a European Union based on three pillars: the European 
Communities, the CFSP, and cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs. 
(199)  EDA, ‘Inception’ (https://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/our-history/inception). 
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This strategy defined for the first time the EU’s security environment, identifying a number of challenges to 
Europe’s internal and external security related to the connected threats of terrorism, the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states and organised crime. It provided a conceptual 
framework for the CFSP, including what would later become the CSDP (200). 
In 2004, the European Council created as a complement to the security strategy the EDA, an 
intergovernmental agency to be active in the field of developing defence capabilities, research, acquisitions 
and armaments.  
In December 2007, the Council of the European Union invited the SG/HR (with the European Commission and 
the Member States) to examine the implementation of the European security strategy (201) with a view to 
improving it and proposing elements to complement it. A year later, Report on the implementation of the 
European security strategy: Providing security in a changing world (European Union, 2008) was published, 
reinforcing the strategy and identifying new security threats, such as cybersecurity, energy security and 
climate change. It also called for a greater emphasis on a more effective and capable Europe, on 
engagement with our neighbourhoods and on multilateralism. 
Figure 2 shows a historical timeline of the EU strategies on security, both external and internal, presented in 
this chapter. 
Figure 2: Historical timeline of the EU security strategies 
 
Source: Authors. 
2.11.2 The European Union internal security strategy (2010) 
The 2003 European security strategy looked at the external aspects of Europe’s security. In March 2010, the 
Council of the European Union complemented the strategy by approving an internal security strategy (Council 
of the European Union, 2010). 
The document presented current threats to internal security (i.e. terrorism, serious and organised crime, 
cybercrime, cross-border crime, violence, and natural and man-made disasters) and the existing activities 
responding to these challenges; it set out the principles behind the strategy, and finally gave some guidelines 
for future action. 
Later that year, the European Commission adopted a communication on the internal security strategy (202), 
which proposed five strategic directions with detailed actions: serious and organised crime, terrorism, 
cybercrime, border security and natural or man-made disasters. This document also highlighted the global 
perspective (external dimension) of internal security. 
                                           
(200)  The Treaty of Lisbon (signed in 2007 and entered into force in 2009) renamed the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It provided for the creation of the European External Action Service, and the 
Commission delegations in countries outside the EU became EU delegations. 
(201)  Council of the European Union Conclusions 16616/1/07. 
(202)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘The EU internal security strategy in action: five steps towards a more secure 
Europe’ (COM(2010) 673 final), Brussels, 22.11.2010. 
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2.11.3 The European agenda on security (2015) 
In June 2014, the European Council called on the Commission to review the EU internal security strategy and 
to update it by mid-2015 (203). A year later, the Commission presented the European agenda on security (204), 
which set out a new strategy to tackle security threats in the EU for the period 2015-2020. 
The security agenda identifies three priorities for EU action: terrorism and radicalisation, organised crime and 
cybercrime. It focuses on bringing EU added value by facilitating information exchange between law 
enforcement authorities and EU agencies, increasing operational police cooperation, and boosting training 
and co-funding for security at EU-level. 
2.11.4 The European Union global strategy (2016) 
Based on a mandate from the European Council of December 2014 to prepare an EU global strategy on 
foreign and security policy, the HR/VP, Federica Mogherini, engaged in a two-step process: an assessment of 
the EU’s challenges and opportunities in the evolving global environment (December 2014-June 2015) and a 
strategic reflection, in collaboration with the Commission and Member States, resulting in the proposal of an 
EU global strategy on foreign and security policy (by June 2016). 
The new EU global strategy, ‘Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe — a global strategy for the 
European Union’s foreign and security policy’ (EEAS, 2016), was presented in June 2016 and replaced the 
previous European security strategy. It presented five priorities: (1) the security and defence of the Union, 
(2) state and societal resilience in the EU’s eastern and southern neighbourhoods, (3) an integrated approach 
to conflict and crises, (4) cooperative regional orders and (5) global governance. 
Soon after the strategy was launched in November 2016, the HR/VP presented an implementation plan (High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2016), which set out proposals to 
implement the strategy in the area of security and defence. It aimed to deepen defence cooperation, moving 
towards a permanent structured cooperation (PESCO); enhance the EU’s military and civilian response tools; 
improve the planning and conduct of missions; and enhance CSDP partnerships with non-EU countries. The 
implementation of the strategy is closely monitored and detailed reports are issued annually (205). 
In December 2017, PESCO was launched. It stemmed from an opportunity provided by the Lisbon Treaty but 
never used before. Twenty-five Member States committed, inter alia, to join forces on common projects and 
to provide troops and assets for common missions and operations. 
PESCO complements two other important current initiatives: the EDF, which supports certain collaborative 
projects, and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, which supports Member States’ efforts to better 
identify opportunities for new collaborative initiatives (in particular PESCO projects). The alignment of these 
initiatives with PESCO and their orientation towards the agreed EU capability development priorities is key to 
focus the new dynamic in European defence matters on a more coherent European capability landscape and 
a full-spectrum force package usable for operations and missions. 
An initial list of 17 projects to be developed under PESCO was adopted by the Council on 6 March 2018 (206) 
and a second batch of 17 projects was added on 19 November 2018 (207). The list of these 34 projects, 
ordered by theme, can be found in Annex 3.  
Although PESCO projects are aimed at capability development or operations, and therefore are not R & D 
projects per se, they are closely related to R & D goals, and the EDF plans to offer more favourable funding if 
an R & D project contributes to PESCO project goals. 
                                           
(203)  Council of the European Union, Council conclusions EUCO 79/14, Brussels, 27.6.2014. 
(204)  European Commission communication COM(2015) 185 final. 
(205)  EEAS, ‘EU global strategy’ (https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/news). 
(206)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/340 of 6 March 2018 establishing the list of projects to be developed under PESCO, OJ L 65, 
8.3.2018, p. 24-27. 
(207)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1797 of 19 November 2018 amending and updating Decision (CFSP) 2018/340 establishing the list 
of projects to be developed under PESCO, OJ L 294, 21.11.2018, p. 18-22. 
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3 Security and defence research 
This chapter presents a short history of EU research in security (Section 3.1) and defence (Section 3.2), before 
reviewing the recent and current research projects funded through the EU Horizon 2020 Framework 
Programme (Section 3.3). An inventory of relevant projects covering the period 2014-2018 has been carried 
out, allowing the production of an informative statistical analysis, such as distribution of projects per building 
block, core priority, Horizon 2020 programme, country involved, etc. As a consequence of the growing overlap 
between both civil and defence domains, the dual-use nature of projects has also been looked at. This 
chapter also depicts the specific contribution of the Joint Research Centre to the various building blocks 
(Section 3.4).  
3.1 History and evolution of European Union security research 
A graphical overview of the European security research, including advisory bodies, with a timeline is 
presented in Figure 7. 
3.1.1 First steps: the Group of Personalities and the preparatory action on security 
research 
The events of 11 September 2001 can be seen as the origin of a paradigm shift in security as it was 
traditionally understood and implemented in western countries. The threats faced by our modern society 
involve international terrorism, organised crime, climate change, trafficking of people and goods, and natural 
disasters. All these phenomena are transnational in nature. 
The EU in particular is facing such security challenges, and the threats are multifaceted, complex and 
interrelated; therefore, a common EU approach relying on strong security research in the EU is needed.  
The former dividing lines between internal and external security are increasingly fading, posing an enormous 
challenge for the design of security policy and the institutions safeguarding it. The first European security 
strategy, ‘A secure Europe in a better world’ (European Council, 2003), was adopted by the European Council 
in 2003. It identified a number of challenges to Europe’s internal and external security, related to the 
connected threats of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing 
states and organised crime. The strategy provided the basis for a new European security policy, including a 
framework for European security-related research. 
To complement this security strategy, in 2004 the Council of Ministers decided to create an 
intergovernmental agency in the field of developing defence capabilities, research, acquisitions and 
armaments, the EDA (208). 
In 2003, the European Commission took the initiative and started the development of a European security 
research programme (ESRP), setting up a Group of Personalities in the field of security research. It was made 
up of two commissioners, four members of the European Parliament, and industrialists and security experts 
from international organisations and research institutes. Its mission was ‘to propose principles and priorities 
of a European Security Research Programme in line with the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy 
objectives’ (European Commission, 2004). 
In 2004, the Group of Personalities presented its final report, Research for a Secure Europe (European 
Commission, 2004), to the Commission; the report contained a number of recommendations, among which 
were the creation of an EU-funded ESRP, to be launched in 2007 under FP7, and the establishment of the 
European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB) to draw the strategic lines of action, prepare the ESRP’s 
research agenda and advise on the principles and mechanisms for its implementation. 
In February 2004, the Commission launched the first research programme dedicated to security: the 
preparatory action on the enhancement of the European industrial potential in the field of security 
research (209). Between 2004 and 2006, EUR 65 million were allocated to support 39 projects across 3 annual 
calls for proposals.  
                                           
(208)  https://www.eda.europa.eu/; consulted on 14 December 2018. 
(209)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Implementation of the preparatory action on the enhancement of the 
European industrial potential in the field of security research: towards a programme to advance European security through research 
and technology’ (COM(2004) 72 final), Brussels, 3.2.2004. 
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The purpose of the preparatory action on security research (PASR) was to test the feasibility of a full ESRP 
within the R & T framework programmes. The Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry was responsible 
for its preparation and implementation. 
Following the input of the Group of Personalities, the following five themes were defined in the PASR: 
1. Theme A — improving situation awareness; 
2. Theme B — optimising security and the protection of networked systems; 
3. Theme C — protecting citizens from terrorist attacks and CBRN and energetic substances; 
4. Theme D — enhancing crisis management; 
5. Theme E — achieving interoperability between EU security organisations. 
The main objective of the PASR was to develop, demonstrate and validate technological solutions in each of 
the above themes. Several topics were suggested in the calls, although some degree of flexibility was 
allowed to enable the applicants to explore broader topics (Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, 
2011a). The project priorities encouraged included networked systems, protection against terrorism, crisis 
management, interoperability and integrated systems, and situation awareness. 
The main areas of the 39 projects were access control, border control, transport, ICT and surveillance systems 
and, to a lesser extent, critical infrastructures and CBRN-E protection.  
The PASR paved the way and prepared the foundations for a comprehensive ESRP from 2007 onwards under 
FP7. 
In September 2004, the Commission presented the communication ‘Security research: the next steps’ (210), in 
which it set out the steps to be taken in security research: 
— Developing an ESRP under FP7 (2007-2013). This was intended to complement Community 
programmes and security and defence research activities conducted at national and intergovernmental 
levels. 
— Consultation and cooperation with stakeholders. The Commission established ESRAB to advise on 
the content of the ESRP and its implementation. The Commission ensured the coordination of ESRP with 
international organisations, such as the UN, the OSCE and NATO, and with European organisations such 
as the ESA. 
— Creating an effective institutional framework. The Commission ensured that the requirements of 
the European security strategy, the CFSP and the ESDP were fully taken into account in the development 
of security research. At the same time, it developed cooperation with the EDA and coordination with 
other important Commission policies relating to internal security to take them into account when 
developing security research. 
— Awarding contracts and funding relating to security research. The Commission put in place 
effective and flexible mechanisms governing contracts, participation and funding, for example to allow 
co-funding of new technologies by public authorities, to ensure a high degree of synergy. 
3.1.2 European Security Research Advisory Board (2005-2006) and and the seventh 
research framework programme 
3.1.2.1 The European Security Research Advisory Board 
In 2005, the Commission established ESRAB (211). The group was composed of 50 experts in security 
appointed from users and industry and research organisations, divided into two groups addressing security 
research demand requirements and technology supply chain requirements, respectively. The Board’s mission 
included outlining a strategic concept for the implementation of the security theme in FP7, providing clear 
implementation rules and drafting a communication strategy to promote awareness of European security 
research.  
                                           
(210)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Security research: the next steps’ (COM(2004) 590 final), Brussels, 7.9.2004. 
(211)  Commission Decision of 22 April 2005 establishing the European Security Research Advisory Board (2005/516/EC), OJ L 191, 
22.7.2005, p. 70-72. 
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ESRAB provided an initial definition of security research: ‘research activities that aim at identifying, 
preventing, deterring, preparing and protecting against unlawful or intentional malicious acts harming 
European societies; human beings, organisations or structures, material and immaterial goods and 
infrastructures, including mitigation and operational continuity after such an attack (also applicable after 
natural/industrial disasters)’ (European Commission, 2006). 
Among the main tasks of ESRAB were to outline a comprehensive European security research agenda; to 
establish a network of users and technical experts to identify technological capabilities; to recommend a 
strategy to improve the European industry’s technological base; to advise on strategic and operational 
aspects of future security research and implementation rules; to optimise the use of publicly owned research 
and evaluation infrastructures; and to develop and implement a communication strategy to promote 
awareness of European security research. In September 2006, ESRAB published its final report Meeting the 
Challenge: The European security research agenda (European Commission, 2006), setting the priorities for 
security research under FP7 (Thoma, 2011).  
ESRAB established a framework for structuring technology development, based on capabilities, and defined 
core and cross-cutting missions. The core missions were (i) border security, (ii) protection against terrorism 
and organised crime, (iii) critical infrastructure protection and (iv) restoring security in crisis situations. And 
the cross-cutting missions were (v) integration and interoperability, (vi) developing new capabilities and 
technologies and (vii) demonstration programmes. 
ESRAB also recommended the creation of a European Security Board to ‘bring together, in a non-bureaucratic 
manner, authoritative senior representatives from a cross stakeholder community of public and private 
stakeholders to jointly develop a strategic security agenda and act as a possible reference body for the 
implementation of existing programmes and initiatives’ (European Commission, 2006) (see Section 3.1.3). 
The ESRAB mandate concluded in December 2006. 
3.1.2.2 The seventh research framework programme 
FP7 was adopted in 2006 and covered the period 2007-2013. It had two main objectives: to strengthen the 
scientific and technological base of European industry, and to encourage international competitiveness while 
promoting research that supports EU policies. 
FP7 was structured according to five specific programmes that constituted its major building blocks: 
cooperation, ideas, people, capacities and nuclear research. The cooperation programme represented two 
thirds of the overall budget and fostered collaborative research across Europe and other partner countries 
through projects.  
The total budget for FP7 was more than EUR 50 billion. It included the first ESRP with a budget of 
EUR 1.4 billion, as one of the ten thematic areas (212) within the cooperation programme. This represented the 
first fully fledged EU security research programme (213).  
The security theme under FP7 had an exclusively civil orientation, although the need for close coordination 
with the EDA on areas relating to dual-use technology was recognised (214). 
Space was a thematic area within FP7, with a budget similar to security. 
Security research under FP7 
The ESRP was conceived as a mission-driven programme, addressing four main security missions and three 
cross-cutting domains. Each mission was distributed into several sub-areas (Figure 3). 
Six calls for proposals were published between 2007 and 2013. Of the 1 790 eligible proposals, 307 projects 
were funded through the FP7 security programme. The total cost of these projects was EUR 1 788 billion, 
                                           
(212)  Those were health; food, agriculture and fisheries, biotechnology; information and communication technologies; nanosciences, 
nanotechnologies, materials and new production technologies; energy; environment (including climate change); transport (including 
aeronautics); socioeconomic sciences and the humanities; space; and security 
(213)  DG Enterprise and Industry was originally responsible for the security research programme. On 1 January 2015, the Policy and 
Research and Security Unit moved from DG Enterprise and Industry to DG Migration and Home Affairs and became Unit B.4 of the 
DG, ‘Innovation and Industry for Security’. At the same time, DG Enterprise and Industry changed its name to DG Internal Market, 
Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs. 
(214)  Decision No 1982/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the seventh 
framework programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007-
2013), Brussels, OJ L 412, 30.12.2006, p. 1-43. 
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with the Commission contributing EUR 1 263 billion (71 %) (European Commission, 2015). The distribution of 
projects and funding by mission is shown in Table 3. 
Figure 3: Missions and cross-cutting areas of security research under FP7 
 
Source: Thoma (2011). 
Table 3: Distribution of projects, participation and funding in FP7 security research 
Missions Projects Participations 
Commission 
contribution 
Security of citizens  18 % 18 % 19 % 
Security of infrastructures and utilities  17 % 19 % 20 % 
Intelligent surveillance and border security 10 % 12 % 17 % 
Restoring security and safety in case of crisis 18 % 20 % 23 % 
Security systems integration, interconnectivity and 
interoperability 10 % 8 % 8 % 
Security and society 15 % 13 % 9 % 
Security Research coordination and structuring 11 % 11 % 6 % 
(Other) 1 % 0 % 0 % 
Total 307 3.74 EUR 1.263 bn 
Source: European Commission (2015). 
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3.1.3 The European Security Research and Innovation Forum 
In September 2007, the Commission presented a communication on public-private dialogue in security 
research and innovation, which established the European Security Research and Innovation Forum 
(ESRIF) (215). Its main objective was to develop a medium-to-long term strategy for EU security research with 
a specific agenda. Another aim was to share ideas, views and best practices to make better use of existing 
capabilities and to enhance the use of technology in security-related domains. It brought the ‘innovation’ part 
into the European agenda. 
ESRIF was composed of policymakers, representatives of industry, of end-users of security research, and of 
academic and research institutions. It involved more than 600 experts and 65 personalities working in 11 
specific working groups: security of citizens, security of critical infrastructures, border security, crisis 
management, foresight and scenarios, CBRN, situation awareness and the role of space, identification of 
people and assets, innovation issues, governance and coordination, and human and societal dynamics of 
security. 
ESRIF’s mandate ended in December 2009 with the publication of its final report (ESRIF, 2009) in which it 
proposed a European security research and innovation agenda (ESRIA) to run over the following 20 years, 
setting out the context, content and implementation of the agenda, and making recommendations to support 
the development of European security (see Table 4). 
ESRIF made policy and operational recommendations for achieving stronger security research and innovation 
results. These were (i) draw on collective strengths and knowledge by developing common European 
capabilities, (ii) provide support for new policy initiatives, (iii) take an integrated approach to security, (iv) 
consider the global dimension of civil security and (v) consider ESRIA a living document that will evolve with 
threats across Europe. 
Table 4: The ESRIA research content clusters and cluster components 
ESRIA clusters ESRIA cluster components 
Cluster 1: Preventing, protecting, preparing, 
responding and recovering 
Securing people 
Civil preparedness 
Crisis management 
Cluster 2:  Countering different means of attack 
Explosives 
CBRN threats 
New technologies, new threats 
Cluster 3: Securing critical assets 
Security of critical infrastructures, security 
of natural resources, energy, and transport 
Security economics 
Cluster 4: Securing identity, access and movement 
of people and goods 
Border security 
Identity management and protection 
Cluster 5: Cross-cutting enablers 
Information and communication technology 
Space 
Evidence and forensics 
Informed decision making 
Source: ESRIF (2009). 
                                           
(215)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Public-private dialogue in security research and innovation’ COM(2007) 511 
final, Brussels, 11.9.2007. 
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In response to ESRIF’s work, the Commission presented a communication in December 2009, with its initial 
reactions to ESRIF’s key findings and recommendations (216). It also highlighted a number of topics for the 
following Commission to consider analysing further. Among these topics were the establishment of a 
permanent working structure to implement ESRIF recommendations and the possibility of establishing a 
forum to strengthen the competitiveness of the security industry active in the field of research and 
innovation, such as a high-level group, with the involvement of all public sector, private sector and civil 
society stakeholders. 
3.1.4 Other funding programmes related to security (2007-2013) 
During the period 2007-2013, in addition to the FP7 security theme, there were a number of programmes 
and funds financing a wide variety of security related activities, which sometimes concerned research. They 
are briefly outlined hereafter. 
3.1.4.1 The European Union framework programme on security and safeguarding liberties 
The framework programme on security and safeguarding liberties (217) was composed of two specific 
programmes: the prevention of and fight against crime programme (ISEC) (218) and the prevention, 
preparedness and consequence management of terrorism and other security-related risks programme 
(CIPS) (219). 
ISEC and CIPS covered a very broad policy field, which between 1993 and 2009 largely fell under the ‘Police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters’ pillar of the EU, as introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht.  
ISEC replaced the framework programme on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (220), which 
covered the period 2003-2006 and aimed to strengthen EU cross-border cooperation between police, other 
law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities. The total allocated budget for ISEC amounted to 
EUR 522 million for the whole period. The general objectives were to prevent and combat crime, particularly 
terrorism, trafficking of people, offences against children, drug trafficking, the arms trade and trafficking, 
cybercrime, corruption and fraud; and to contribute to the establishment of policies at EU level. The 
programme’s four specific objectives addressed four main themes: (1) crime prevention and criminology, 
(2) law enforcement, (3) protection and support for witnesses and (4) protection of victims.  
For its part, CIPS focused on critical infrastructure and other security issues, including operational aspects in 
areas such as crisis management and preparedness in various sectors of critical importance. Its total 
allocated budget amounted to EUR 126.8 million for the whole period. CIPS had two general objectives, 
prevention, and preparedness and consequence management, which were further divided into seven specific 
objectives (221). These covered several thematic areas: (i) crisis management, (ii) terrorism and other security-
related risks within the area of freedom, security and justice, including risks relating to the environment, (iii) 
public health, (iv) transport, (v) R & T and (vi) economic and social cohesion.  
Both programmes were implemented under the direct management of the Commission, and the main 
conclusions of their ex post evaluation were published in 2018 (222). 
                                           
(216)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘A European security research and innovation agenda — Commission’s initial 
position on ESRIF’s key findings and recommendations’ (COM (2009) 691 final), Brussels, 21.12.2009.  
(217)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Establishing a framework programme on security and safeguarding liberties 
for the period 2007-2013’ (COM(2005) 124 final), Brussels, 6.4.2005. 
(218)  Council Decision 2007/125/JHA, of 12 February 2007 establishing for the period 2007-2013, as part of the General Programme on 
Security and Safeguarding Liberties, the Specific Programme ‘Prevention of and Fight against Crime’, OJ L 58, 24.2.2007, p. 7-12. 
(219)  Council Decision 2007/124/EC, Euratom, of 12 February 2007 establishing for the period 2007 to 2013, as part of General 
Programme on Security and Safeguarding Liberties, the Specific Programme ‘Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence 
Management of Terrorism and other Security-related risks’, OJ L 58, 24.2.2007, p. 1-6. 
(220)  Council Decision 2002/630/JHA of 22 July 2002 establishing a framework programme on police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters (AGIS), OJ L 203, 1.8.2002, p. 5-8. 
(221)  European Commission, Commission staff working document ‘Ex-post evaluation of the “Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence 
Management of Terrorism and other Security related risks” 2007-2013 Programme (CIPS)’ (SWD(2018) 331 final), accompanying 
Commission report COM(2018) 455 final, Brussels, 12.6.2018. 
(222)  European Commission, Commission report, Ex-post evaluation report for the period 2007-2013 of actions financed by the 
‘Prevention and fight against crime’ programme (ISEC) and the ‘Prevention, preparedness and consequence management of 
terrorism and other security related risks’ programme (CIPS) (COM(2018) 455 final), Brussels, 12.6.2018. 
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3.1.4.2 The External Borders Fund 
The External Borders Fund (EBF) (223) is the first EU instrument dedicated to funding external border 
management in the EU Member States, with a total budget of EUR 1.82 billion over the period 2007-2013. It 
was established as part of the more general programme ‘Solidarity and management of migration flows’, 
funded to EUR 4.0 billion, which also included the European Return Fund, the European Fund for Integration of 
Third-Country Nationals and the European Refugee Fund. 
The EBF was set up to promote financial solidarity between Member States, by supporting those facing a 
heavy financial burden in implementing common standards on external border controls. It allocated its 
support according to five priorities (224): (1) setting up of a common integrated border management system in 
respect of checks on persons and the surveillance of the external borders, (2) developing and implementing 
the national components of a European surveillance system for the EU’s external borders and of a permanent 
European patrol network for the southern maritime borders, (3) issuing visas and tackling illegal immigration, 
(4) establishing the IT systems required to implement EU border and visa legislation and (5) promoting the 
effective and efficient application of EU border and visa legislation. 
The EBF was implemented under shared management arrangements with national programmes. It also 
funded community actions and specific actions, which were directly managed by the European Commission 
and implemented by Member States. 
The European Court of Auditors provided recommendations on the implementation of this fund, which were 
taken into account by the Commission for the following period (European Court of Auditors, 2014). The 
successor of the EBF for 2014-2020 was the Instrument for Financial Support for External Borders and Visa, 
as part of the ISF. 
3.1.4.3 The competitiveness and innovation framework programme 
The competitiveness and innovation framework programme (CIP) (225) aimed to encourage the 
competitiveness of European enterprises. With SMEs as its main target, it supported innovation activities 
(including eco-innovation), provided better access to finance and delivered business support services in the 
regions. It encouraged better take-up and greater use of ICT and helped to develop the information society. It 
also promoted increased use of renewable energies and energy efficiency. 
The CIP ran from 2007 to 2013 and was organised around three multiannual programmes, each with specific 
objectives (226): (1) the entrepreneurship and innovation programme, (2) the information communication 
technologies policy support programme and (3) the intelligent energy Europe programme. 
The overall budget was EUR 3 621 million, distributed approximately as follows: EUR 2 166 million for the 
entrepreneurship and innovation programme (60 %), EUR 728 million for the information communication 
technologies policy support programme and EUR 727 million for the intelligent energy Europe programme.  
The information communication technologies policy support programme aimed to achieve wider uptake and 
greater use of ICT by citizens, governments and businesses, in particular SMEs. It mainly supported pilot 
projects and experience sharing in areas such as health, ageing and inclusion, digital libraries, government 
and governance, energy efficiency, the environment and smart mobility, public sector information, and 
internet evolution and security. 
The evaluation of the CIP was carried out in 2011 (Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, 2011b), with 
a summary of its overall performance presented by the joint CIP committees in 2013 (European Commission, 
2013a). The Commission highlighted the findings and recommendations of the overall evaluations in its 
report Evaluations of the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (227). It made some 
                                           
(223)  Decision No 574/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 May 2007 establishing the External Borders Fund 
for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the general programme ‘Solidarity and management of migration flows’, OJ L 144, 
6.6.2007, p. 22-44. 
(224)  Commission Decision of 27 August 2007 implementing Decision No 574/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as 
regards the adoption of strategic guidelines for 2007 to 2013 (2007/599/EC), OJ L 233, 5.9.2007, p. 3-6. 
(225)  Decision No 1639/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 establishing a competitiveness and 
innovation framework programme (2007 to 2013), OJ L 310, 9.11.2006, p. 15-40. 
(226)  CIP, ‘What Is CIP?’ (http://ec.europa.eu/cip/files/docs/factsheets_en.pdf). 
(227)  European Commission, Commission report, Evaluations of the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme 
(COM(2013) 2 final), Brussels, 15.1.2013. 
 103 
 
recommendations in particular on how to further improve the implementation of the CIP and design a 
possible successor programme. 
For the period 2014-2020, the successor of CIP is the programme for the competitiveness of enterprises and 
SMEs (COSME) and parts of H2020. 
3.1.5 Horizon 2020 (2014-2020) 
Horizon 2020 is the (8th) European framework programme for research and innovation (228), covering the 
period 2014-2020. It supports research and innovation projects and programmes in groundbreaking basic 
research, strategic and applied research, demonstration projects and close-to-market activities. It is the 
financial instrument implementing the Innovation Union, a Europe 2020 flagship initiative aimed at securing 
Europe’s global competitiveness. In principle, H2020 combines all research and innovation funding previously 
provided through the framework programmes for R & T and the innovation-related activities of the CIP and 
the EIT. Its total budget is EUR 70.2 billion for the period 2014-2020, with prices fixed at 2011 levels. 
H2020 consists of three main research areas or priorities (Figure 4): 
1. excellent science, which focuses on basic science; 
2. industrial leadership, with the goal of finding ways to modernise European industries that have 
suffered from a fragmented European market, based on the Europe 2020 and Innovation Union 
strategies; 
3. societal challenges, which funds potential solutions to social and economic problems with a focus on 
implementing solutions, rather than technology development. 
The framework programme is implemented by the European Commission. Its objective is to complete the 
European Research Area by coordinating national research policies and pooling research funding in certain 
areas to avoid duplication. H2020 itself is seen as a policy instrument for implementing other high-level 
policy initiatives of the EU, such as Europe 2020 and Innovation Union (i.e. the priority ‘Societal challenges’ 
responds directly to the policy priorities and societal challenges that are identified in the Europe 2020 
strategy). 
Figure 4: Structure of Horizon 2020 
 
Source: Regulation (EU) No 1291/2013. 
                                           
(228) Regulation (EU) No 1291/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing Horizon 2020 — 
the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020) and repealing Decision No 1982/2006/EC, Strasbourg, OJ 
L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 104-173; see also European Commission, ‘What is Horizon 2020?’ 
(https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/what-horizon-2020). 
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Figure 5 represents the distribution of the H2020 budget by priority. 
Figure 5: Distribution of H2020 budget 
 
Source: European Commission (2013b). 
For the priority ‘Societal challenges’, the total budget of EUR 29.7 billion is further distributed among seven 
areas, as shown in Table 5; societal challenge 7 — ‘Secure societies’ — accounts for a little less than 6 % of 
the budget. 
Table 5: Distribution of budget for Societal challenges under H2020 (36) 
Total funding for 2014-2020 (million EUR) 
Priority 3: Societal challenges 29 679 
1. Health, demographic change and wellbeing 7 472 
2. Food security, sustainable agriculture, etc. 3 851 
3. Secure, clean and efficient energy 5 931 
4. Smart, green and integrated transport 6 339 
5. Climate action, resource efficiency, raw materials 3 081 
6. Inclusive societies 1 309 
7. Secure societies  1 695 
Source: European Commission (2013b). 
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3.1.5.1 Secure Societies Challenge 
Security research under H2020 is funded through the Secure Societies Challenge. This challenge is about 
undertaking the research and innovation activities needed to protect EU citizens, society and the economy as 
well as infrastructures and services, to ensure the EU’s prosperity, political stability and well-being. 
The key objectives of the Secure Societies Challenge (229) can be summarised as follows: 
— border security and external security — to improve border security, ranging from improved maritime 
border protection to supply chain security, and to support the EU’s external security policies, including 
through conflict prevention and peace building; 
— fighting against crime and terrorism — it requires new technologies and capabilities for fighting and 
preventing crime (including cybercrime), illegal trafficking and terrorism (including cyberterrorism), 
including understanding and tackling terrorist ideas and beliefs to also avoid aviation-related threats; 
— disaster-resilience — to enhance the resilience of our society against natural and man-made disasters, 
ranging from the development of new crisis management tools to increasing communication 
interoperability, and to develop novel solutions for the protection of critical infrastructure; 
— digital security — to provide enhanced cybersecurity, ranging from secure information sharing to new 
assurance models, to ensure privacy and trust. 
The Secure Societies Challenge contributes to the implementation of the policy goals of the Europe 2020 
strategy, the security industrial policy, the internal security strategy and the cybersecurity strategy.  
Detailed topics relating to these objectives are to be found in three H2020 Secure Societies work 
programmes (2014-2015, 2016-2017 and 2018-2020) (230), the objectives of which are summarised in 
Table 6.  
The current H2020 work programme focuses its efforts on fewer topics with bigger budgets, directly 
supporting the Commission’s political priorities. Four focus areas receive a combined budget of over 
EUR 7 billion: (1) building a low-carbon, climate resilient future, (2) connecting economic and environmental 
gains — the circular economy, (3) digitising and transforming European industry and services, and (4) 
boosting the effectiveness of the security union. 
The focus area ‘Boosting the effectiveness of the security union’ (European Commission, 2017c), with a 
budget of EUR 1.074 billion, supports the implementation of the security union priorities and helps in tackling 
the challenges that Europe is facing on multiple fronts, such as cybercrime and other crimes, security threats 
and threats to infrastructure, natural and man-made disasters, and hybrid threats. Research on these threats, 
notably from terrorism, will underpin an effective and coordinated EU response, and better tools will reduce 
loss of life and material damage. 
Table 6: Evolution of topics in the Horizon 2020 Secure Societies work programmes (WPs) 
WP 2014-2015 WP 2016-2017 WP 2018-2020 
Disaster - 
resilience 
Crisis 
management 
Critical infrastructure protection 
 
Protecting infrastructure and people 
in the European smart cities 
 
Disaster 
resilience and 
climate change 
Critical 
infrastructure 
protection 
                                           
(229)  Council Decision 2013/743/EU of 3 December 2013 establishing the specific programme implementing Horizon 2020 — the 
Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020) and repealing Decisions 2006/971/EC, 2006/972/EC, 
2006/973/EC, 2006/974/EC and 2006/975/EC, OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 965-1041. 
(230)  European Commission, ‘Secure societies — protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens’ 
(https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/secure-societies-%E2%80%93-protecting-freedom-and-security-
europe-and-its-citizens). 
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WP 2014-2015 WP 2016-2017 WP 2018-2020 
Communication 
technologies and 
interoperability 
Ethical/ societal 
dimension 
Fight against 
crime and 
terrorism 
Forensics 
Security 
Disaster -resilience: 
safeguarding and 
securing society 
Security 
Disaster-
resilient 
societies 
Law enforcement 
capabilities 
Fight against crime 
and terrorism 
Fight against 
crime and 
terrorism 
Urban security 
Border security and 
external security 
Border and 
external security 
Ethical/ societal 
dimension 
General matters General matters 
Digital security: cybersecurity, 
privacy and trust 
  
Digital security 
 
Digital security 
Cybersecurity, 
digital privacy 
and data 
protection 
Management of 
cyber-attacks 
and other risks 
Border security 
and external 
security 
Maritime border 
security 
        
Border crossing 
points 
Supply chain 
security 
External security 
Ethical/ societal 
dimension 
Source: European Commission, ‘Secure societies — protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens’ 
(https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/secure-societies-%E2%80%93-protecting-freedom-and-security-
europe-and-its-citizens). 
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3.1.6 Other funds related to security (2014-2020) 
In addition to H2020, there were a number of programmes and funds financing a wide variety of security-
related activities, which sometimes concerned research. These are briefly outlined hereafter. 
3.1.6.1 The Internal Security Fund 
The ISF was set up for the period 2014-2020, with a total budget of EUR 3.8 billion. The ISF promotes the 
implementation of the internal security strategy, law enforcement cooperation and the management of the 
EU’s external borders. It is composed of two instruments: ISF Borders and Visa, and ISF Police. 
ISF Borders and Visa (231) 
This instrument’s main objective is to contribute to ensuring a high level of security in the EU while 
facilitating legitimate travel. This goal is achieved by supporting actions with the following specific objectives: 
— visa — to process effectively Schengen visas by supporting a common visa policy, providing a high 
quality of service to visa applicants, ensuring equal treatment of non-EU nationals and tackling irregular 
migration; 
— borders: to achieve a high level of control of the external borders by supporting integrated border 
management, harmonising border management measures within the EU and sharing information among 
EU Member States and with Frontex, to halt irregular migration and enable smooth crossing of the 
external borders 
A total budget of EUR 2.76 billion is available for funding actions under the ISF Borders and Visa instrument, 
of which EUR 1.55 billion is channelled through shared management and EUR 1.06 billion through direct 
management.  
Specific actions funded through this instrument include setting up and running IT systems, acquisition of 
operational equipment, promoting and developing training schemes, and ensuring administrative and 
operational coordination and cooperation. 
ISF Police (232) 
This instrument focuses on two objectives: 
1. Fight against crime: combating cross-border, serious and organised crime including terrorism, and 
fight against crime — combating cross-border, serious and organised crime including terrorism, and 
reinforcing cooperation between EU Member State law enforcement authorities, relevant EU bodies, 
such as Europol, and non-EU and international organisations; 
2. Managing risk and crisis — enhancing the EU’s capacity to manage effectively security-related risk 
and crisis, and protect people and critical infrastructures against terrorist attacks and other security 
incidents. 
A total budget of slightly over EUR 1 billion is available for funding actions under the ISF Police instrument, of 
which EUR 662 million is channelled through shared management and EUR 342 million through direct 
management. 
The specific actions funded through this instrument include initiatives similar to those mentioned above in 
relation to ISF Borders and Visa. 
                                           
(231)  European Parliament and Council of the European Union Regulation (EU) No 515/2014. 
(232)  European Parliament and Council of the European Union Regulation (EU) No 513/2014. 
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3.1.6.2 The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 
AMIF (233) was set up for the period 2014-2020, with a total of EUR 3.137 billion. It supports national and EU 
initiatives that promote the efficient management of migration flows and the implementation, strengthening 
and development of a common EU approach to asylum and immigration. This fund contributes to the 
achievement of four specific objectives: 
— asylum — strengthening and developing the Common European Asylum System by ensuring that EU 
legislation in this field is efficiently and uniformly applied; 
— legal migration and integration — supporting legal migration to EU Member States in line with labour 
market needs and promoting the effective integration of non-EU nationals; 
— return — creating fair and effective return strategies that contribute to combating irregular migration, 
with an emphasis on the sustainability and effectiveness of the return process; 
— solidarity — making sure that the EU Member States that are most affected by migration and asylum 
flows can count on solidarity from other EU Member States. 
This fund also provides financial resources for other activities, such as the European Migration Network, the 
Union Resettlement Programme and the transfer of beneficiaries of international protection from an EU 
Member State with high migratory pressure to another. 
Most AMIF funds (234) (approximately 88 %) are channelled through shared management. The rest is divided 
between EU actions and emergency assistance, to be implemented through direct management. 
3.1.6.3 The programme for the competitiveness of enterprises and small and medium-sized 
enterprises 
The goal of the programme COSME (235) is to contribute to the creation of jobs and economic growth by 
strengthening the competitiveness and sustainability of EU enterprises, particularly SMEs; encouraging 
entrepreneurial culture; and promoting the creation and growth of SMEs. Its planned budget amounts to 
EUR 2.3 billion. 
COSME has four specific objectives: (1) to improve access to finance for SMEs in the form of equity and debt, 
(2) to improve access to markets, (3) to improve framework conditions for the competitiveness and 
sustainability of EU enterprises and (4) to promote entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial culture. 
The Executive Agency for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises oversees the implementation of the COSME 
programme on behalf of the European Commission (236).  
An example of activities under this programme is in the COSME Call 2017, in the cluster ‘Go international’ in 
the defence and security sector. The main objective of the activities under ‘Go international’ was to support 
European defence- and security-related clusters and business network organisations to intensify 
collaboration across borders with other non-defence industrial clusters and to develop and implement joint 
strategies with non-EU countries in relation to dual-use technologies, products and services. 
3.1.6.4 The justice programme 
The justice programme (237) offers financial support to various organisations specialising in the area of 
justice. The general objective is to contribute to the further development of a European area of justice based 
on mutual recognition and mutual trust, in particular by promoting judicial cooperation on civil and criminal 
matters. A budget of EUR 378 million has been allocated to achieve this. 
                                           
(233)  Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 establishing the Asylum, Migration 
and Integration Fund, amending Council Decision 2008/381/EC and repealing Decisions No 573/2007/EC and No 575/2007/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Decision 2007/435/EC, OJ L 150, 20.5.2014, p. 168-194. 
(234)  Specific actions funded through AMIF include improvement of services for asylum seekers, campaigns on legal migration in non-EU 
countries, training for non-EU nationals, etc. 
(235)  Regulation (EU) No 1287/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing a programme for 
the competitiveness of enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (COSME) (2014-2020) and repealing Decision 
No 1639/2006/EC, OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 33-49. 
(236)  With the exception of the financial instruments delegated to the European Investment Fund. 
(237)  Regulation (EU) No 1382/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a Justice 
Programme for the period 2014 to 2020, Brussels, OJ L 354, 28.12.2013, p. 73-83. 
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The programme focuses on the following key areas: (i) judicial cooperation on civil matters, including civil and 
commercial matters, insolvencies, family matters and succession, etc., (ii) judicial cooperation on criminal 
matters, (iii) judicial training, including linguistic training on legal terminology, with a view to fostering a 
common legal and judicial culture, (iv) enabling effective access to justice in Europe, including protecting the 
rights of victims of crime and procedural rights in criminal proceedings and (v) initiatives in the field of drugs 
policy (judicial cooperation and crime prevention aspects).   
3.1.6.5 The rights, equality and citizenship programme 
The rights, equality and citizenship programme 2014-2020 (238) defends the rights and freedoms that people 
are entitled to under EU law. Its total budget is EUR 439.5 million.  
The specific objectives of the programme are (i) to promote non-discrimination, (ii) to combat racism, 
xenophobia, homophobia and other forms of intolerance, (iii) to promote gender equality and gender 
mainstreaming, (iv) to prevent violence against children, young people, women and other groups at risk, (v) to 
promote the rights of the child, (vi) to ensure the protection of personal data in the EU, (vii) to promote EU 
citizenship rights and (viii) to enforce consumer rights. 
3.1.7 Security advisory groups after the European Security Research and Innovation 
Forum 
3.1.7.1 Security advisory groups for the seventh framework programme (2007-2013) 
The Security Advisory Group (2007-2009) 
The Security Advisory Group was created in 2007, by the European Commission, as one of the 16 advisory 
groups set up for the various themes of FP7, with the purpose of advising the Commission on the 
implementation of the research programme. It started with 20 members, some of them already having 
participated in ESRIF. The Security Advisory Group and ESRIF coexisted during the period 2007-2009. 
Members of the group provided advice to the Commission services on strategy, relevant objectives, and 
scientific and technological priorities, regarding the security theme of the cooperation specific programme. 
Input was provided in written form (239) to support the preparation of the annual work programme. 
The Security Advisory Group (2009-2013) 
The Security Advisory Group was revised in 2009, being constituted of 21 individual experts from security 
end-user organisations, academia and industry, plus 3 members from the Commission. The membership 
changed every 2 years. The group produced two reports, in 2011 and 2012 (240). 
3.1.7.2 Security advisory groups for Horizon 2020 (2014-ongoing) 
Secure Societies Advisory Group (2014-2016) 
Under the specific programme implementing Horizon 2020 (2014-2020), the Commission continued to be 
assisted by expert groups in drawing up the multiannual work programmes. A registry of expert groups is 
publicly available, where the participants are identified and their activities published (241).  
In January 2014, the Secure Societies Advisory Group was established to provide advice regarding the Secure 
Societies Challenge. It provided in particular strategic input for the 2016-2017 call of the Secure Societies 
Challenge in July 2014, and in December 2015 it presented strategic recommendations to the European 
Commission on how the ‘Secure societies’ theme in H2020 should be developed to address longer-term 
priorities and opportunities (242). 
                                           
(238)  Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a Rights, Equality 
and Citizenship Programme for the period 2014 to 2020, OJ L 354, 28.12.2013, p. 62-72. 
(239)  For Security Advisory Group reports, see European Commission, ‘Advisory groups for FP7 — documents for the first two years of 
FP7 implementation’ (https://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/index_en.cfm?pg=eag-1st2years). 
(240) For mandate and reports, see European Commission, ‘Advisory groups for FP7’ 
(http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/index_en.cfm?pg=eag). 
(241)  European Commission, ‘Register of Commission expert groups and other similar entities’ 
(http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/; Consulted on 12 February 2019). 
(242)  For mandate and reports, see European Commission, ‘Group details — Commission expert group’ 
(http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3010). 
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Horizon 2020 Protection and Security Advisory Group (2016-2018) 
In 2016, the group was renewed and renamed the Horizon 2020 Protection and Security Advisory Group. In 
July 2017, it produced recommendations on international cooperation on security research, and in December 
2017 a document on developing capabilities and enhancing various subsectors of the industry (243) 
Horizon 2020 Protection and Security Advisory Group (PASAG) (2018-2020) 
A new mandate has been introduced for the period 2018-2020; it will end on 31 December 2020, at the 
same time as H2020. This group has not yet produced any specific input, although its activities and meeting 
minutes can be found in the registry of expert groups (244). 
3.1.8 Horizon Europe (2021-2027) 
In June 2018, the Commission published a proposal for a regulation establishing Horizon Europe, the new 
framework programme for research and innovation that will succeed H2020, from 2021 to 2027 (245). 
Horizon Europe’s general objective is to deliver scientific, economic and societal impact from the EU’s 
investments in research and innovation, in order to strengthen its scientific and technological base and foster 
its competitiveness — including that of its industry — deliver on its strategic priorities and contribute to 
tackling global challenges, including the Sustainable Development Goals. 
The programme has the following specific objectives: 
— to support the creation and diffusion of high-quality new knowledge, skills, technologies and solutions to 
global challenges; 
— to strengthen the impact of research and innovation in developing, supporting and implementing EU 
policies, and support the uptake of innovative solutions in industry and society to address global 
challenges; 
— to foster all forms of innovation, including breakthrough innovation, and strengthen market deployment 
of innovative solutions; 
— to optimise delivery for increased impact within a strengthened European Research Area. 
The Horizon Europe programme will be implemented through three pillars (Figure 6): 
1. The ‘Open science’ pillar (EUR 25.8 billion) supports frontier research projects chosen and driven by 
researchers themselves through the European Research Council (EUR 16.6 billion), funds fellowships 
and exchanges for researchers through Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions (EUR 6.8 billion) and invests 
in world-class research infrastructures. 
2. The ‘Global challenges and industrial competitiveness’ pillar (EUR 52.7 billion) directly supports 
research relating to societal challenges, reinforces technological and industrial capacities and 
establishes EU-wide missions with ambitious goals to tackle some of our biggest problems. It also 
includes activities pursued by the JRC (EUR 2.2 billion). 
3. The ‘Open innovation’ pillar (EUR 13.5 billion) aims to make Europe a frontrunner in market-creating 
innovation through the European Innovation Council (EUR 10 billion). It will help to develop the 
overall European innovation landscape, including by further strengthening the EIT to foster the 
integration of business, research, higher education and entrepreneurship (EUR 3 billion). 
                                           
(243)  For mandate and reports, see European Commission, ‘Group details — Commission expert group’ 
(http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3010). 
(244)  For mandate and reports, see European Commission, ‘Group details — Commission expert group’ 
(http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3010). 
(245)  European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing Horizon Europe — the 
Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination’ (COM(2018) 435 
final), Brussels, 7.6.2018. 
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Figure 6: Proposed structure of Horizon Europe 
 
Source: European Commission proposal COM(2018) 435 final. 
The proposed budget allocation of EUR 100 billion for the 7 years includes EUR 97.6 billion under Horizon 
Europe (EUR 3.5 billion of which will be allocated through the InvestEU Fund) and EUR 2.4 billion for the 
Euratom research and training programme.  
Horizon Europe and the Euratom research and training programme will promote effective and operational 
synergies with other future EU programmes and policies to promote faster dissemination and uptake of 
research and innovation results, including the EU cohesion policy (which plays an important part in EU funding 
for research and innovation through an increased focus on innovation and smart specialisation strategies), 
the new EDF (EUR 13 billion, EUR 4.1 billion of which will be devoted to defence research), the international 
fusion energy project ITER (EUR 6.1 billion), the digital Europe programme (EUR 9.2 billion for investments in 
high-performance computing and data, AI, cybersecurity and advanced digital skills), and the Connecting 
Europe Facility (EUR 3 billion to support the digital single market). 
3.1.8.1 ‘Inclusive and secure society’ (Cluster 2) 
In the current proposal for Horizon Europe, the security theme is one of the five clusters that compose the 
second pillar ‘Global challenges and industrial competitiveness’. The cluster is named ‘Inclusive and secure 
society’ and the proposed budget is EUR 2.8 billion. As the cluster includes the topic of inclusive societies, it is 
estimated that the budget dedicated to security as such will be similar to that allocated in H2020. 
The objectives of the cluster are the following, with the last two related to security: 
— strengthen European democratic values and address issues of trust; 
— safeguard and promote our cultural heritage;  
— take advantage of socioeconomic transformations and promote inclusive growth while responding to 
globalisation and technological advancements;  
— prepare for and respond to human-made and natural disasters, such as climate-related extreme weather 
events, terrorism, earthquakes; 
— respond to changing security threats, both physical and digital, and support EU border management.. 
The cluster covers the following six intervention areas, with the last three referring to security (246): 
(1) democracy, (2) cultural heritage, (3) social and economic transformations, (4) disaster-resilient societies, 
(5) protection and security, and (6) cybersecurity. 
                                           
(246)  There is continuity in the areas of intervention in security research between H2020 and Horizon Europe: (i) ‘Disaster-resilient 
societies’ corresponds to the area of the same name in ‘Secure societies — Societal Challenge 7’ (SC7); (ii) ‘Protection and 
security’ is related to the SC7 areas ‘Infrastructure protection’, ‘Fight against crime and terrorism’ and ‘Border and external 
security’; and (iii) ‘Cybersecurity’ corresponds to the area ‘Digital security’ in SC7. 
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In more detail, the topics covered by some of the areas of intervention related to the security theme are the 
following. 
— Disaster-resilient societies: 
● technologies and capabilities for first responders for emergency operations in crisis and disaster 
situations; 
● the capacity of society to better manage and reduce disaster risk, including through nature-
based solutions, by enhancing prevention, preparedness and response to existing and new risks; 
● interoperability of equipment and procedures to facilitate cross-border operational cooperation 
and an integrated EU market. 
— Protection and security: 
● innovative approaches and technologies for security practitioners (e.g. police forces, border and 
coast guards, customs offices), public health practitioners, operators of infrastructure and those 
managing open spaces; 
● human and social dimensions of criminality and violent radicalisation, in relation to those 
engaged or potentially engaged in such behaviour as well as to those affected or potentially 
affected;  
● addressing the mindset of citizens, public authorities and industry to prevent the creation of new 
security risks and to reduce existing risks, including those from new technologies such as AI; 
● combating disinformation and fake news with implications for security; 
● interoperability of equipment and procedures to facilitate cross-border and interagency 
operational cooperation and develop an integrated EU market.  
● ensuring the protection of personal data in law enforcement activities, in particular in view of 
rapid technological developments. 
An overview of the chronological evolution of the European security research structure, including advisory 
bodies, is provided in Figure 7, going from the first steps in the early 21st century to the soon-to-start 
Horizon Europe framework programme. 
 113 
Figure 7: Overview of European security research, including advisory bodies 
 
Note: GoP: Group of Personalities; ESRAB: European Security Research Advisory Board; ESRIF: European Security Research and Innovation Forum; SAG: Security Advisory Group; SSAG: Secure Societies Advisory 
Group; PASAG: Protection and Security Advisory Group 
Source: Authors 
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3.2 History and evolution of European Union defence research 
Graphical overview of the evolution of the European Defence Research under EU funds and associated 
legislation with a timeline is presented in Figure 10.  
3.2.1 European Defence Agency — first research activities outside the European Union 
budget 
In 2004, the European Council created to complement the European security strategy the EDA, an 
intergovernmental agency to be active in the field of developing defence capabilities, research, acquisitions 
and armaments. In pursuing its mission to develop capabilities in support of the CSDP, the EDA carries out 
R & T activities. In December 2005, the EDA awarded the first defence R & T contract. More than 
EUR 500 million has been allocated to over 150 R & T projects by Member States since the EDA’s creation. 
However, the EDA’s research activities have been funded not from the EU budget but by the participant 
countries. 
R & T activities are managed through the EDA capability technology groups, or CapTechs, which form a 
network of experts from participating Member States dedicated to a particular technology area. The strategic 
research agendas are important tools that provide strategic guidance on the R & T priorities addressed in the 
various CapTechs. There are 12 CapTechs, 6 on military capabilities (communication and information systems, 
simulation, aerial systems, ground systems, naval systems and ammunition technologies) and 6 on cross-
cutting enablers (materials and structures, technologies for components and modules, radiofrequency sensor 
technologies, electro-optical sensor technologies, CBRN and human factors, and guidance, navigation and 
control), plus 2 working groups (247). 
3.2.2 The Commission communication of July 2013 
In 2007, the European Commission presented a communication (248) highlighting the importance of improving 
the long-term competitiveness of the defence industry for Europe’s security and defence ambitions. It also 
included a number of policy measures to strengthen the defence industry market, including the pooling of 
R & D investment. According to a European Parliament report of 2016, The Future of EU Defence Research 
(European Parliament, 2016a), this communication was the first ever European political document to 
emphasise the importance of defence research. 
In July 2013, the European Commission presented a communication (249) calling for the exploitation of the 
dual-use potential synergies between civil and military research, such as civil applications developed under 
the H2020 ‘Secure societies’ theme (including KETs), and mentioning the coordination between the FP7 
security theme and European defence research activities. In addition, one of the actions set out in the 
communication reads: ‘The Commission will consider the possibility to support CSDP-related research, such as 
through a Preparatory Action. The focus would be on those areas where EU defence capabilities would be 
most needed, seeking synergies with national research programmes where possible.’ This was the first call for 
specific action on defence research. 
This communication was supported by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (250). 
Then the European Council of December 2013 (251) decided to review progress in June 2015 and invited the 
Member States to increase their investment in cooperative research programmes, informing them that a 
preparatory action on CSDP-related research would be set up. 
A year later, the Commission presented an implementation roadmap for the communication ‘A new deal for 
European defence’ (252). One of its points was dedicated entirely to ‘Exploiting dual-use potential of research 
and reinforcing innovation’, establishing two deliverables: 
                                           
(247)  More information can be found at the EDA website (https://eda.europa.eu). 
(248)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘A strategy for a stronger and more competitive European defence industry’ 
(COM(2007) 764 final), Brussels, 5.12.2007. 
(249)  European Commission communication, ‘Towards a more competitive and efficient defence sector’ (COM(2013) 542 final), Brussels, 
24.7.2013. 
(250)  European Parliament Resolution 2013/2105(INI) on the implementation of the common security and defence policy (based on the 
annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the common foreign and security policy), Strasbourg, 21 November 
2013; Council of the European Union conclusions 15992/13. 
(251)  Council of the European Union conclusions EUCO 217/13. 
(252)  European Commission report COM(2014) 387 final. 
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1. Dual-use research. This deliverable included the maximisation of synergies between the civil 
research under H2020 and the defence research coordinated by the EDA, and the identification of 
innovation fields and applications (including KETs and civil sectors of high interest to the defence and 
security industries); 
2. Preparatory action. This was intended to illustrate the added value of an EU contribution to new 
research areas, complementing the CSDP-related civilian research ongoing under H2020. The 
preparatory action is covered in Section 3.2.6. 
3.2.3 The European defence action plan (2016) 
In November 2016, the Commission took a further step towards the development of EU defence research and 
presented the European defence action plan (253), which included the establishment of the EDF and other 
actions to support Member States in more efficient spending on joint defence. The plan followed up on the 
Commission communication of July 2013 and on the conclusions of the European Council of December 2013, 
and it had three pillars: (1) the launch of the EDF, (2) the defence supply chain and (3) the single market for 
defence. 
Further details on the EDF were published by the European Commission in June 2017 (see Section 3.2.7).  
Also in June 2017, the Commission published a reflection paper (254) presenting three different scenarios for 
future cooperation on the defence area in the EU, moving from cooperation to shared security and on to 
common defence and security. 
3.2.4 First steps in European Union-funded defence research: the pilot project 
(2015-2016) 
The first fully fledged security research programme, which started under FP7 (the security theme), and the 
subsequent programme under H2020 (‘Secure societies’) had an exclusively civil orientation, although the 
need for close coordination with the EDA on areas relating to dual-use technology was recognised (see 
Section 3.1). So far, defence research had not been covered under the research framework programmes. 
In 2014, the European Parliament proposed an amendment to the EU budget to introduce a pilot project on 
defence research. The aim was to test and assess certain governance aspects in relation to the PADR and the 
capacity of the EDA to act as an executive agency to implement research on security and defence (European 
Parliament, 2016b). The pilot project was entrusted to the EDA (255) by the European Commission through a 
delegation agreement giving it responsibility for the execution and management of the projects. 
The pilot project was launched in 2015 and ran from 1 December 2015 until 1 December 2018. The aims 
were to (i) foster research cooperation between defence research actors in EU Member States, (ii) strengthen 
the defence industry’s competitiveness and (iii) raise the level of defence technological and industrial capacity 
for the armed forces. 
The EDA organised an EU-wide call for proposals between March and June 2016, receiving 21 submissions 
involving 83 participants from 20 countries. The following three projects were selected (see also Table 7): 
— ‘Inside building awareness and navigation for urban warfare (SPIDER)’; 
— ‘Standardisation of remotely piloted aircraft system detect and avoid (TRAWA)’; 
— ‘Unmanned heterogeneous swarm of sensor platforms (EuroSWARM)’ 
The pilot project paves the way for the launch of the European Commission’s PADR, which, in turn, will lead to 
a fully fledged European defence research programme as part of the EU’s next MFF (2021-2027). All of these 
activities (the pilot project, the preparatory action and the future European defence research programme) 
should support R & T (256), addressing the capability priorities identified by Member States in the EDA’s 
                                           
(253)  European Commission communication COM(2016) 950 final. 
(254)  European Commission, ‘Reflection paper on the future of European defence’ (COM(2017) 315 final), Brussels, 7.6.2017. 
(255)  Since 2004, the EDA has managed close to 200 R & T projects worth over EUR 1.1 billion; see EDA, ‘EDA at a glance’ 
(https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2018-09-24-eda-at-a-glance.pdf). 
(256)  For definitions of R & T and R & D, see European Parliament (2016a). 
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Capability Development Plan; these priorities will also be taken up in future collaborative capability 
programmes (257). The differences between R & T and R & D are explained in Figure 8. 
Figure 8: Differences between R & T and R & D in terms of technology readiness levels (TRLs) 
 
Source: European Parliament (2016a), using EDA definitions for R & T and R & D expenditure. 
3.2.5 The Group of Personalities (2015-2016) 
Similarly to the approach adopted to security research (see Section 3.1), the European Commission set up a 
Group of Personalities for Defence Research in March 2015, chaired by Commissioner Bieńkowska and 
supported by the HR/VP Federica Mogherini. The group was composed of 15 additional politicians, academics, 
representatives of think tanks and representatives — mostly chief executive officers — of defence industry 
and research technology organisations. Its aim was to advise on how the EU could support defence research 
programmes. 
The group presented its final report in February 2016 (EUISS, 2016), giving its views on the European context, 
the preparatory action and the future of defence research. The document contained nine key 
recommendations grouped into (i) principles, covering aspects of coordination, cooperation and governance; 
(ii) modalities, covering eligibility criteria, budget cover and supporting defence initiatives; and (iii) resources, 
setting the recommended budgets for the preparatory action and the European defence research programme 
post 2020. In addition, it suggested the creation of a European Defence Advisory Board, to be tasked with, 
among other things, advising on all aspects of the European defence action plan, giving guidance on the 
principles, structure and modalities of the European defence research programme and playing an active part 
in the creation of a European capabilities blueprint. It should also have direct access to the highest level of EU 
institutions during the preparation and negotiation of the next MFF. 
3.2.6 The preparatory action on defence research (PADR) (2017-2019) 
The EDF, launched in June 2017, was composed of two ‘windows’: research and capability. The research 
window was to fund collaborative defence research projects at EU level and was to be developed through the 
launch of the PADR, which would result in a dedicated EU programme in the post-2020 EU MFF. In outlining 
the activities under the preparatory action, the Commission took into consideration the recommendations 
made by the Group of Personalities in its report. The capability window, meanwhile, was to support the joint 
development of defence capabilities as agreed by the Member States. 
                                           
(257)  https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/capability-development-plan. 
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The PADR was decided on by the European Commission with one main objective in mind: to demonstrate the 
added value of EU-funded research in the defence sector. Set to start in mid-2017 and running over a 3-year 
period (2017-2019), the PADR would be a test bed used to prove the relevance of European defence research 
and lay the foundations for a fully fledged EU defence R & D programme in the MFF 2021-2027 (EDA, 2016).  
The key aspect in assessing the EU added value of the PADR would be the uptake of the technology research 
by the industry and ministries of defence, which would ensure the creation of new strategic capabilities for 
European armed forces and increase the competitiveness of the EU defence technological and industrial base. 
The scope of the PADR would be decided on in consultation with Member States, the European Parliament, the 
EDA, the EEAS and industry. The PADR has been designed taking into account the specificities of defence-
related research, including research areas and models, intellectual property rights, confidentiality of results, 
co-funding and rules of participation, and the role of Member States, while ensuring that is attractive for 
industry participants. 
The focus of the PADR is on defence research rather than dual-use research. Nevertheless, it complements 
existing EU programmes such as FP7, H2020 and R & T activities in the Member States and in the EDA. 
Following the mandate of a delegation agreement between the Commission and the EDA, signed on 31 May 
2017, the Commission entrusted the EDA with the management and implementation of the research projects 
to be launched within the PADR, which would be done through grants awarded in EU-wide calls for 
proposals (258). 
The budget for the PADR-related actions (EUR 90 million) is split over 3 years as follows: 
— EUR 25 million in 2017 (already committed, first projects started);  
— EUR 40 million in 2018 (approved and calls for proposals closed);  
— EUR 25 million in 2019 (approved and call for proposals open in March 2019).  
In April 2017, the Commission decision on financing the PADR and the use of unit costs for 2017 was 
published (259). The 2017 work programme included the following topics (further details can be found in Table 
7). 
— A technological demonstrator for enhanced situational awareness in a naval environment. The 
project aimed to show the added value of unmanned systems in enhancing situational awareness while 
operating alongside and communicating with other manned and unmanned systems. 
— Research in technology and products in the context of force protection and soldier systems. 
This topic focused on aspects such as future generic open soldier system reference architecture; 
technological advancements in tailor-made blast, ballistic and CBRN protection for military personnel; and 
novel developments in active and passive military camouflage methods. 
— Strategic technology foresight. The call requested the development and validation of a methodology 
and/or process for gathering data. These foresight activities will be carried out on a recurring basis. They 
will be used to develop realistic scenarios of potential future conflicts which would help in scoping EU-
funded defence research. 
For 2018, the PADR work programme included the following topics (260). 
— A European high-performance, trustable (re)configurable system-on-a-chip or system-in-a-
package (SoC/SiP) for defence applications. The project aims to design and validate a SoC/SiP and 
thus make a substantial contribution towards the development and manufacturing of European high-
performance, trustable (re)configurable SoC/SiP suitable for multiple defence applications. 
— Towards a European high-power laser effector. This topic focuses on an R & T project, followed later 
by a development phase, to design and build a European high-power laser effector, to become available 
for defence applications within the next decade. 
                                           
(258)  EDA, ‘What we do’ (https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/preparatory-action-for-defence-research). 
(259)  European Commission, Commission decision on the financing of the preparatory action on defence research and the use of unit 
costs for the year 2017 (C(2017) 2262 final), Brussels, 11.4.2017. 
(260)  European Commission Decision C(2918) 1383 final. 
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— Strategic technology foresight. This action aims to provide an effective way of tackling the issue of 
the critical defence technological dependencies of the EU in relation to current and future systems and 
capabilities. 
The 2019 PADR work programme was announced on 19 March 2019, with the following topics (261). 
— The first call (PADR-EMS-03-2019 ‘Electromagnetic spectrum dominance’) will result in the selection of 
one project for research activities at system and component levels for the development of compact, 
highly performing and lightweight multifunction radiofrequency systems (with a combination of radar, 
communications and electronic warfare functions), based on European active electronically scanned array 
technology, free from any non-EU nation end-user restrictions, compatible with aerial platforms and able 
to be integrated into other platforms. Indicative amount of the call: up to EUR 10 million.  
— The second call (PADR-FDDT-EMERGING-03-2019 ‘Emerging game-changers’) will result in the funding of 
five projects to contribute to the development of breakthrough technologies for defence applications in 
the following areas: 
● low-drift, small-scale, power-efficient, integrable systems capable of delivering autonomous PNT 
services in GNSS denied/contested environments; 
● use of AI in defence technologies across the whole military capability spectrum; 
● use of quantum technologies for defence applications; 
● radical solutions for cost-efficient long-range precision strikes; 
● augmenting soldier capacity. 
Indicative amount of the call: up to EUR 7.5 million. 
— The third call (PADR-US-03-2019 ‘Unmanned Systems’) will fund one project on interoperability 
standards for military unmanned systems allowing interoperability of various defence units using 
autonomous systems. Indicative amount of the call: up to EUR 1.5 million.  
— The fourth call is on future disruptive defence technologies (PADR-FDDT-OPEN-03-2019 ‘Challenging the 
future’); it should result in the selection of up to three projects on potential disruptive defence 
technologies. These projects should demonstrate (through convincing experimental proof of concept) the 
radical impact of technologies of any kind in the area of defence resulting in technological superiority 
over potential adversaries. Indicative amount of the call: up to EUR 4 million. 
3.2.7 The future of European defence research: the European Defence Fund 
The EDF was launched in June 2017 through a Commission communication (262). It will coordinate, 
supplement and amplify national investments in defence research, in the development of prototypes and in 
the acquisition of defence equipment and technology. 
The EDF is expected to boost the EU’s excellence and efficiency in defence equipment and technology by 
supporting the whole production chain: research, prototype development and acquisition. To achieve this, the 
fund has two strands with different legal and funding structures, which are complementary and are being 
deployed gradually. 
— Research (the ‘research window’). The EU will offer direct funding (grants) for research into 
innovative defence products and technologies, fully financed from the EU budget. 
— Development and acquisition (the ‘capability window’). Member States will pool financial 
contributions to jointly develop and acquire key defence capabilities. The EU will offer co-financing from 
the EU budget to incentivise cooperation and leverage national financing. 
Both strands will support the priorities agreed by the Member States, notably through the Capability 
Development Plan; the Member States will also ultimately own and operate the assets. 
                                           
(261)  European Commission, Commission decision on the financing of the preparatory action on defence research and the adoption of the 
work programme for 2019 (C(2019) 1873 final), Brussels, 19.3.2019. 
(262)  European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Launching the European Defence Fund’ (COM(2017) 295 final), Brussels, 
7.6.2017. 
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In the period up to and including 2020, the Commission will allocate EUR 590 million to the EDF. After 2020, 
the Commission is proposing to allocate at least EUR 1.5 billion per year. The fund is designed not to replace 
Member States’ defence investments but to enable and accelerate their cooperation. Taking into account 
Member States’ contributions to finance joint development projects, the fund could generate a total 
investment in defence research and capability development of EUR 5.5 billion per year after 2020 (Figure 9). 
Figure 9: Structure and details of the European Defence Fund 
 
Source: European Commission communication COM(2017) 295 final. 
Under the research window, the EU budget will fully and directly finance collaborative defence R & T activities 
across Europe, taking into account the defence capability and R & T priorities agreed by Member States. 
Priority areas could typically include critical and innovative technologies such as electronics, metamaterials, 
encryption software and robotics, and the research will explore future disruptive defence technologies and 
applications. 
The Commission, in close cooperation with Member State experts and with input from the EDA, will establish 
annual work programmes. By delegation agreement with the Commission, the EDA will be responsible for 
implementing the annual work programmes by publishing the calls for proposals, organising the evaluation of 
project proposals and managing the research projects selected to receive EU funding.  
The EDF is an unprecedented, comprehensive instrument covering funding for the whole defence industrial 
cycle to support European strategic autonomy. It will be launched during the next MFF period (2021-2027) 
and will incorporate the current PADR and European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) (263), 
which focus on defence research and capability development, respectively. Furthermore, the Fund will include 
the ‘Financial Toolbox’, a set of standardised instruments supporting collaborative procurement projects by 
Member States. 
For 2019 and 2020, the EDIDP has a budget of EUR 500 million and is designed to co-finance projects that 
contribute to excellence, innovation and competitiveness in the defence sector. The first call for proposals was 
launched in April 2019. 
In June 2018, the European Commission presented its proposal to establish the EDF under the 2021-2027 
MFF (264). The proposed budget for the period is EUR 13 billion. The fund will provide EUR 4.1 billion to directly 
                                           
(263)  European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation establishing the European Defence Industrial Development Programme aiming at 
supporting the competitiveness and innovative capacity of the EU defence industry’ (COM(2017) 294 final), Brussels, 7.6.2017. 
(264)  European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union establishing 
the European Defence Fund’ (COM(2018) 476 final), Brussels, 13.6.2018. 
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finance competitive and collaborative research projects, in particular through grants. In addition, the EDF will 
provide EUR 8.9 billion to complement Member States’ investments by co-financing the costs of prototype 
development and of certification and testing requirements. 
3.2.8 The European defence research programme and Horizon Europe  
In the MFF 2021-2027, the first fully fledged European defence research programme will be funded under 
the EDF research window, while Horizon Europe will continue funding civil security and dual-use research. 
The European Commission proposed in 2018 a budget of EUR 94.1 billion, at 2018 prices, to be allocated to 
the Horizon Europe framework programme (265). The main aims are to strengthen science and technology, to 
foster industrial competitiveness and to implement the Sustainable Development Goals in the EU. Horizon 
Europe will introduce new features such as the European Innovation Council, missions to promote research 
results and new forms of partnership. Horizon Europe also aims to reduce administrative burdens and 
promote the concept of open science (see Section 3.1.8 for more details).  
An overview of the historical evolution of European defence research and the relevant legislation is provided 
in Figure 10. 
3.2.9 Other funds related to defence (2014-2020) 
Currently, H2020 and the EDF (with the preparatory action and the EDIDP) are the main EU programmes for 
security and defence research. However, there are several more programmes that support defence research, 
development and innovation. The EDA is putting efforts into helping actors in the EU defence industry to find 
the right funding mechanisms. On its European Funding Gateway website, the main current EU funding 
instruments are listed (266). These are discussed hereafter. 
— The EDA’s ad hoc projects — the EDA funds cooperative defence R & T and capability projects on a 
continuing basis. 
— Connecting Europe Facility — through the programme facility’s transport programme ‘Single European sky 
ATM research (SESAR)’, it finances cooperative projects and studies, with a focus on European transport 
infrastructure. 
— European Structural and Investment Funds — cohesion policy: 
● the European Regional Development Fund, with the aim of creating jobs, innovation and 
competitiveness, can fund productive investment projects in the defence sector, projects 
modernising the defence supply chain, and defence and dual-use activities in R&I; 
● Interreg Europe, with the aim of achieving the European territorial cooperation goal, can fund the 
same type of projects of the European Regional Development Fund, but with a focus on cross-
border and transnational cooperation; 
● the European Social Fund can fund projects on key skills and competences in both the defence 
and dual-use domains, with a focus on human capital, training and skills; 
● the Cohesion Fund can fund energy projects on climate change adaptation, the environment and 
resource efficiency, and public administration efficiency and capacity, with the aim of reducing 
disparities and promoting sustainable development. 
— COSME: 
● the financial instruments under COSME (the Loan Guarantee Facility and the Equality Facility for 
Growth) can be used to finance high-risk SMEs working on defence and dual use; 
● COSME’s work on access to market aims to internationalise SMEs, including in the defence 
sector. 
                                           
(265)  European Commission proposal COM(2018) 435 final. 
(266)  EDA, European Funding Gateway (https://eda.europa.eu/eufunding). 
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— The LIFE programme for the environment and climate action: 
● LIFE can fund pilot, demonstration, best practice and information/awareness/dissemination 
projects related to water, waste, energy, the circular economy, chemicals (including REACH), 
noise, emissions, etc; 
● The LIFE financial instruments — Private Finance for Energy Efficiency (PF4EE) and the Natural 
Capital Financing Facility (NCFF) — can fund innovative natural capital management pilot 
projects (NCFF) and energy efficiency investments and technical assistance in relation to them 
(NCFF and PF4EE). 
— European Investment Bank — major project direct loans can fund dual-use R & T projects that are 
economically, financially, technically and environmentally sound and which further EU policy goals. 
— Erasmus+: the scheme funds learning mobility for individuals, strategic partnerships and knowledge 
alliances, which are applicable in the field of defence. 
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Figure 10: Overview of the evolution of European Defence Research under EU funds and associated legislation 
 
Note: GoP: Group of Personalities 
Source: Authors 
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Table 7: Defence research projects funded using the EU budget: pilot project and preliminary action (updated in December 2018) 
Programme Acronym Title Objective Budget (EUR) Start date End date 
Pilot project EuroSWARM 
Unmanned 
Heterogeneous 
Swarm of Sensor 
Platforms  
EuroSWARM aimed to test and demonstrate that efficient and 
effective operation of unmanned swarm systems can bring a 
profound impact to the military arena. The key focus was the 
minimisation of uncertainties in situational awareness information 
for surveillance operations through a swarm system of systems 
composed by static and mobile heterogeneous sensors. The main 
objectives of the activity were to: 
 • develop key techniques for adaptive, informative and 
reconfigurable operations of unmanned heterogeneous swarm 
systems, namely: optimal task allocation and resource 
management, sensor fusion, cooperative guidance, robust sensor 
network; 
• integrate the developed enabling techniques;  
• validate the developed enabling techniques based on empirical 
simulation studies; 
• demonstrate the proposed solutions based on a small scale of 
experiments. 
430 000 28.10.2016 27.10.2017 
Pilot project SPIDER 
Sensor Platform & 
network for Indoor 
Deployment and 
Exterior-based 
Radiofrequency 
Inside Building Awareness and Navigation for Urban Warfare: 
SPIDER aimed to develop an innovative system to support Urban-
Warfare operations by providing improved situational awareness to 
operational forces entering an unfriendly building. It focused on the 
use of radiofrequency (RF) stationary sensors and mobile ground 
robots. The main objectives of the activity were to:  
• develop and analyse a framework comprising the use of multiple 
sensors to perform indoor mapping and human detection in an 
Urban Warfare context; 
• consider the choice of a data fusion strategy to process and 
combine sensor data; 
• explore the advantages and constraints of using each solution as 
well as solutions encompassing autonomous robots combined with 
static RF sensor networks. 
430 225 22.11.2016 21.02.2018 
 124 
Programme Acronym Title Objective Budget (EUR) Start date End date 
Pilot project TRAWA Traffic Awareness 
Standardisation of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) Detect 
and Avoid: It aimed to contribute to the development of standards 
for a performant and affordable detect and avoid (DAA) system 
usable on-board Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS). It is 
focused on the Remain Well Clear (RWC) function and contributes to 
the standardisation activities in cooperation with other international 
efforts in full alignment with EUROCAE WG 105 Terms of 
Reference. The main objectives of the activity were to:  
• specify Remain Well Clear in quantitative terms and obtain 
validation via simulations; 
• specify sensor types, detection ranges and position estimation 
accuracy; 
• develop requirements for remote pilot HMI (Human Machin 
Interface) characteristics. 
430 292 11.11.2016 10.05.2018 
Preparatory 
Action 
PYTHIA 
Predictive 
methodology for 
technology 
intelligence analysis 
PYTHIA’s main objective is to deliver a methodology for improving 
civil and defence technology foresight. It aims to devise an 
innovative methodology for strategic technology foresight, able to 
deliver frequent “predictions” on technology-related matters, 
including the discovery of major trends in a particular area of 
research and development. Starting from a study of the cognitive 
factors influencing analysts’ ability to perform accurate forecasting, 
the project will leverage big data analytics techniques for 
automatically analysing large volumes of technology information 
collected from a wide range of publicly available sources, in order 
to identify future disruptive technologies and recommend themes 
for European defence research. The methodology will be assessed 
by an enlarged stakeholder group and validated scientifically and 
technologically in 4 workshops plus a testing session that will be 
organised throughout the project's lifetime. 
947 610 01.02.2018 31.07.2019 
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Programme Acronym Title Objective Budget (EUR) Start date End date 
Preparatory 
Action 
OCEAN2020 
Open Cooperation 
for European 
Maritime Awareness 
Ocean2020 supports maritime surveillance and interdiction 
missions at sea and to that end will enhance air, naval surface and 
underwater unmanned systems and integrate them into fleet 
operations. The information acquired will be combined with the 
whole set of naval info obtained by existing systems to build up a 
Recognise Maritime Picture of developing situations for military 
commanders. OCEAN2020’s main objective is indeed to develop 
integrated system concepts that culminate in large-scale 
technology demonstrations for enhanced situational awareness in a 
maritime environment. The planned demonstrations in the 
Mediterranean and Baltic seas will show how innovative solutions 
for fusion of multiple data sources can be integrated with Combat 
Management Systems (CMSs) into a secure network to create a 
Recognized Maritime Picture. It will also show how collaborative 
autonomy between multi-domain unmanned vehicles can provide a 
force multiplier. This will provide End Users with the advantage of 
interoperability for joint missions and at the same time offer 
industry an opportunity to build Command and Control (C2) 
modules in a multi-company environment. To be successful in 
reaching these goals, the OCEAN2020 Consortium will solve the 
problems of integrating EU systems as well as integrating the 
individual organisations into a coherent team. 
35 480 000 01.04.2018 31.03.2021 
Preparatory 
Action 
GOSSRA 
Generic Open Soldier 
System Reference 
Architecture 
GOSSRA will carry out research in the development of a Soldier 
System Reference Architecture ready for standardization which 
covers electronics, voice and data communication, software, human 
interface devices, sensors, and effectors. The GOSSRA study on 
Generic Open Soldier Systems Reference Architecture researches in 
the development and validation of the desired Reference 
Architecture by identifying trends and potentials with respect to 
operations and technologies; reviewing, refining and integrating the 
STASS I+II architectures; validating and enhancing the integrated 
architecture with respect to operational issues, maintenance and 
logistics, and technical issues; formulating the architecture for 
standardization; and finally technically validating, demonstrating 
and refining the architecture. 
1 488 642 01.06.2018 31.03.2020 
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Programme Acronym Title Objective Budget (EUR) Start date End date 
Preparatory 
Action 
VESTLIFE 
Ultralight Modular 
Bullet Proof Integral 
Solution for 
Dismounted Soldier 
Protection 
VESTLIFE aims to develop a new lightweight and modular 
bulletproof integral solution, which integrates a CBRN detection 
system. The garments will include the possibility of an increased 
coverage area whilst maintaining comfort, plus a weight reduction 
of the ballistic panels, thus ensuring optimum balance between 
protection and comfort, tailoring such a protective surface to the 
forecasted risk mission. The project strives towards the 
development of different types of ballistic protection armour with 
advanced features in performance. This protection system will 
consist of different levels, mainly soft armour and hard armour. To 
find the optimum architecture of materials on the body, an 
optimum has to be found, based on both the comfort experience 
and the protective performance. A software model will give insights 
into this. This model will be used to define clothing architectures, 
which will be created in the integration step to validate the 
performance of the clothing. 
2 433 425 01.05.2018 30.04.2021 
Preparatory 
Action 
ACAMSII 
Adaptive 
Camouflage for the 
Soldier II 
ACAMSII aims to integrate several active and passive adaptation 
mechanisms into a textile-based soldier camouflage system. It will 
address several wavelengths bands, such as visual, near infrared, 
short wave infrared, thermal infrared and radar. Military needs on 
sensing, fire power, mobility and endurance are considered. The 
reduction in detection range and hence the increase in survivability 
will be assessed using both well-established methods and new 
methods to capture the adaptive properties. The dialogue with 
military end-users will start early in the project to set requirements 
and continue throughout the project to ensure relevance. 
2 631 507 01.05.2018 30.04.2021 
Note: Projects shaded blue are financed under the pilot project and those shaded green under the PADR. 
Source: EDA. 
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3.3 Analysis of Horizon 2020 security- and defence-related research projects 
Horizon 2020, the current R & D framework programme of the EU, is the main funding tool for research 
projects at EU level (see Section 3.1). Its 7-year duration (2014-2020) and its multiple programmatic and 
thematic calls lead to the selection and funding of a vast number of projects. At the cut-off date of the 
present report (23 May 2018), the number of projects funded and recorded in the Cordis (267) database 
amounted to 16 928. 
From this set, the objective was to identify those projects dealing with security and defence. The first step 
was to produce a list of the projects in the form of a reference master table that could be used later for 
various analyses. An inventory of relevant projects covering the period 2014-2018 has been carried out, 
allowing the production of an informative statistical analysis, such as distribution of projects per building 
block, core priority, Horizon 2020 programme, country involved, etc. As a consequence of the growing overlap 
between both civil and defence domains, the dual-use nature of projects has also been looked at. 
3.3.1 Methodological introduction 
The selection of relevant projects was based on a set of 34 keywords (268), which covered all themes of 
interest to the study, namely building blocks and priorities identified on the basis of the JRC internal strategy 
on security and defence and the European agenda on security. In this manner, the number of projects to be 
scrutinised was reduced to 5 451. 
Each of these projects was then examined individually by JRC staff (a group of three reviewers) in order to 
decide whether to retain or reject it from the final master table. One additional criterion was used: the 
exclusion of all projects related solely to natural hazards, climate change, the financial crisis or purely safety-
related topics. This was a consequence of the scope of this landscape report, which considers exclusively 
man-made risks and threats that could intentionally harm individuals and societies. 
The selection or rejection of a project was assessed on the basis of its metadata available in Cordis — mainly 
the objective description but also the title, the H2020 programme or programmes it belongs to, the topic of 
the call, etc.  
It should be noted that, for these reasons, not all projects belonging to H2020 Programme 3.7, ‘Secure 
societies’, were retained (decision to reject were thoroughly checked) (269), whereas selected projects could 
belong to programmes other than 3.7. 
Additional characterisation of projects 
Each retained project was then further characterised using a series of new labels answering the following 
thematic questions. 
— Does the project belong to one or more building block, and if yes to which ones? 
— Does the project belong to one or more of the three priorities in the European agenda on security, and if 
yes to which ones? 
— What is/are the main focus or focuses of the project (i.e. deeper thematic characterisation)? 
— Does the project have a dual-use potential, that is, could the research carried out in the project could be 
applied both in the civilian field and in the defence field? 
Each project was assessed by a first reviewer and cross-checked by the two others in order to ensure 
consensus in the selection process. At every step of the creation of the final master table, every doubt 
regarding a project was considered by the three reviewers together. 
                                           
(267)  The Community Research and Development Information Service (CORDIS) is the European Commission’s primary source of results 
from the projects funded by the EU framework programmes for research and innovation (FP1 to Horizon 2020). 
(268)  ‘Aviation’, ‘border’ or ‘border control’, ‘CBRN’, ‘civil’, ‘criminal’ or ‘crime’, ‘critical infrastructure’, ‘critical supply’ or ‘critical supplies’, 
‘customs’, ‘cyber’, ‘defence’, ‘disinformation’, ‘dual use’, ‘explosive’, ‘extremism’ or ‘extremist’, ‘fake news’, ‘firearm’, ‘hybrid’, ‘hybrid 
threat’, ‘maritime’, ‘migration’, ‘military’, ‘nuclear’, ‘protection’, ‘public space’, ‘radicalisation’, ‘security’, ‘smuggling’, ‘soft target’, 
‘space’, ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist’, ‘threat’, ‘traffic’, ‘transport’, ‘war’. 
(269)  An example of a 3.7 H2020 project not retained for the master table: ‘Enhancing decision support and management services in 
extreme weather climate events’. 
 128 
EU dual-use perspective 
The interest in dual‑use research, in the sense that EU legislation gives to the expression ‘dual-use item’ (270), 
is a consequence of the growing overlap between the civil and the defence domains. Military forces and 
defence industries rely increasingly on civil technologies and innovations, whereas civil companies are buying 
up technologies that are also of interest to defence enterprises (Scalia et al., 2017). Quite logically, research 
projects and essential technologies such as those dealing with robotics, big data and human–machine 
interfaces, to name just a few, will become an important source of innovation for both the civil and the 
defence worlds. 
Although H2020 projects focus exclusively on civil applications, this does not prevent the occurrence of 
outputs that could lead to innovations with possible defence applications. The value of identifying those 
projects with dual-use potential applications is high, and this was therefore done as part of the present study. 
For this purpose, a report (Scalia et al., 2017) on the dual-use potential of KETs was used as a guide in 
deciding whether the research field of the examined H2020 project could be considered dual use or not.  
The final security and defence R & D master table contains 349 projects with their original and additional 
metadata, gathered in an Excel file (see Annex 4). A series of analyses of these projects according to the 
major metadata (e.g. building blocks, priorities, funding programmes, dual-use aspects), is presented in 
Section 3.3.2. 
3.3.2 Analysis of results 
The analysis of the 349 projects related to security and defence was performed on the basis of the following 
criteria:  
— building block; 
— Commission priority (under the European agenda on security); 
— main thematic focus of the project; 
— H2020 funding programme; 
— contributing countries — coordinator and participant; 
— legal status of the participant organisations; 
— dual-use potential. 
3.3.2.1 Distribution of projects by building block 
The building block is the first powerful discriminating classifier, and there are 11 of them in the chosen 
approach: border control, critical infrastructure protection, public space protection, critical supplies security, 
cybersecurity, CBRN-E threats, hybrid threats, combating radicalisation, countering terrorism financing, space 
and defence; acknowledging that they are not mutually exclusive as data show below. Figure 11 shows the 
distribution of the projects by building block in quantitative decreasing order. All the data obtained from the 
analysis of the projects are available in Annex 5. 
The most striking observation is the preponderance of cybersecurity projects, since roughly half of the 
projects (48 %, 167 projects) are related to this block. This does not come as a major surprise given the 
growing role of cyberspace in human activities, including, obviously, security.  
Three other blocks each account for more than 10 % of the projects, namely critical infrastructure protection 
(19 %, 68 projects), public space protection (12 %, 43 projects) and border control (11 %, 39 projects), all 
dealing with control of physical spaces and entities or making them secure. 
The number of defence projects is low, which is to be expected since H2020 finances only civilian research. 
However, we identified several projects having an important focus on external security or peacekeeping, for 
instance, and thus having indirect EU defence components.  
                                           
(270)  Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 defines dual-use items as ‘items, including software and technology, which can be used for 
both civil and military purposes, [including] all goods which can be used for both non-explosive uses and assisting in any way in the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices’. 
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Some projects were not assigned to any of the building blocks and are identified as ‘Others’. They represent 
14 % of the projects. Many of them deal with topics such as law enforcement problems or forensics or are 
theoretical studies (see Annex 4 for details). 
Figure 11: Proportions of projects by building block (%) 
 
Note: *Building blocks with fewer than 10 projects. 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Whereas an overwhelming majority of projects (79 %) clearly relate to only one building block, a significant 
number relate to two or more blocks, as shown in Figure 12 (why the sum of the proportions in Figure 11 is 
greater than 100%).  
Figure 12: Distribution of projects by number of building blocks to which they contribute (%) 
 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
The multi-thematic nature of many of the projects can be seen in Figure 13Error! Reference source not 
found., which shows how projects attributed to one particular building block (the y-axis) may also contribute 
to others (the composition of the horizontal bar). 
It should be noted that the breakdowns displayed for the blocks with a very low number of projects (in 
particular critical supplies protection, hybrid threats and countering terrorism financing) have no statistical 
relevance and are shown only for the sake of completeness. This comment also applies to all further analysis 
of the data by building block. 
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Figure 13: Breakdown of projects by building block 
 
Note: *Building blocks with fewer than 10 projects. 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
For example, out of the 167 cybersecurity projects, 21 also relate to critical infrastructures, and much smaller 
numbers to terrorism financing, space and public spaces, among other blocks. Other interesting interrelations 
are critical infrastructures and public spaces (26), border control and public spaces (9) and order control and 
CBRN-E (8). Projects dealing with physical entities (critical infrastructures and public spaces) appear to be the 
least mono-thematic. 
3.3.2.2 Distribution of projects by European Commission priority 
The European agenda on security established three main priorities: cybercrime, organised crime, and terrorism 
and radicalisation. The distribution of the 349 projects by these priorities is shown in Figure 14. 
Roughly half of them (48 %, 169 projects) fall under the priority cybercrime, while 34 % (120 projects) and 
13 % (46 projects) fall under terrorism and radicalisation, and organised crime, respectively. These figures 
tend again to reflect the current EU and worldwide trends: the increasing role of cyberspace and strong 
concerns about terrorism. In addition, 14 % (49 projects) were considered to fall outside these three priorities. 
Figure 14: Proportions of projects by priority (%) 
 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
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The sum of the proportions by priority is greater than 100 %, since, as was the case with the building blocks, 
a significant number of projects fit under more than one priority. As shown in Figure 15, 89 % are related to 
a single priority, 11 % are related to two priorities and a negligible proportion to all three priorities.  
Figure 15: Distribution of projects by number of priorities to which they contribute (%) 
 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Combining data by building blocks and priorities as shown in Figure 16 leads to further interesting 
observations. 
Figure 16: Distribution of projects by priorities and building blocks (%) 
 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
To fight against terrorism and radicalisation, competence and hence research in many fields are needed: 
projects related to all blocks, although not in equal proportions, are present under this priority. When it comes 
to the priority of combating organised crime, projects contributing to most of the blocks are also found here, 
although with a much more uneven distribution: border control is, logically, at the forefront among projects to 
counter organised crime, and a significant amount of ‘other’ research is also involved, dealing in particular 
with law enforcement support, social sciences research and forensic techniques. For its part, the priority of 
fighting cybercrime exhibits a very different block profile: projects dealing with research in cybersecurity 
represent, logically, more than 80 % of projects in this area. 
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3.3.2.3 Distribution of projects by main focus 
To go deeper than the building blocks and the priorities in characterising the projects, and in particular to 
provide some thematic labelling for those projects that could not be allocated to any of the building blocks or 
the three priorities, an additional content-related dimension, which we called ‘focus’, was introduced. A total 
of 33 specific focuses were assigned, such as privacy, biometrics, social media, disaster management, ethical 
dimension, resilience and peacekeeping, to name just a few. The full list (see in Figure 17) is certainly not 
exhaustive, as granularity in area identification can always be reduced. However, to maintain some statistical 
relevance, the lower limit was set at two having a focus in common for it to be included. In total, 80 % of the 
projects were labelled with one or several focuses, distributed as shown in Figure 17. 
Figure 17: Numbers of projects by main focus 
 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Since cybersecurity is overwhelmingly the main building block, it does not come as a surprise that the 
predominant research focuses of the projects included ICT, cryptography, privacy, the IoT and the cloud. 
Details by priority are provided in Figure 18, which shows the projects’ major themes. Other prominent 
research focuses are law enforcement and social sciences, which are spread fairly evenly among the 
priorities. 
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Figure 18: Numbers of projects by priority and main focus 
 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
3.3.2.4 Distribution of projects by Horizon 2020 funding programme 
H2020 funds are structured in four main programmes, matching four priorities: (1) excellent science, 
(2) industrial leadership, (3) societal challenges and (4) spreading excellence and widening participation. These 
are, in turn, divided into further areas or subprogrammes, according to their specific objectives (Table 8). 
For the purpose of this report, we use ‘programme’ to refer to each priority area and its subdivisions. 
Programme 3 (H2020-EU.3) has seven specific objectives (3.1 to 3.7) on which the funding is focused (Table 
8); these include the priority ‘Societal challenges’ (see Section 3.1.5 for details). 
Research on security is covered by Programme 3.7, ‘Secure societies — protecting freedom and security of 
Europe and its citizens’, marked in red in Table 8. This objective aims to foster secure European societies in 
the context of unprecedented transformations and growing global interdependencies and threats, while 
strengthening the European culture of freedom and justice.   
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Table 8: Structure of Horizon 2020 funding by programme, including a breakdown of the ‘Secure societies’ programme (Programme 3.7, in red) 
Programme Code Title 
H2020-EU.1 1 Excellent science 
H2020-EU.1.1 1.1 European Research Council 
H2020-EU.1.2 1.2 Future and emerging technologies 
H2020-EU.1.3 1.3 Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions 
H2020-EU.1.4 1.4 Research infrastructures 
      
H2020-EU.2 2 Industrial leadership 
H2020-EU.2.1 2.1 Leadership in enabling and industrial technologies 
H2020-EU.2.2 2.2 Access to risk finance 
H2020-EU.2.3 2.3 Innovation in SMEs 
      
H2020-EU.3 3 Societal challenges 
H2020-EU.3.1 3.1 Health, demographic change and well-being 
H2020-EU.3.2 3.2 Food security, sustainable agriculture and forestry, marine, maritime and inland water research and the bioeconomy 
H2020-EU.3.3 3.3 Secure, clean and efficient energy 
H2020-EU.3.4 3.4 Smart, green and integrated transport 
H2020-EU.3.5 3.5 Climate action, environment, resource efficiency and raw materials 
H2020-EU.3.6 3.6 Europe in a changing world — inclusive, innovative and reflective societies 
H2020-EU.3.7 3.7 Secure societies — protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens 
      
H2020-EU.3.7.1 3.7.1 Fight crime, illegal trafficking and terrorism, including understanding and tackling terrorist ideas and beliefs 
H2020-EU.3.7.2 3.7.2 Protect and improve the resilience of critical infrastructures, supply chains and transport modes 
H2020-EU.3.7.3 3.7.3 Strengthen security through border management 
H2020-EU.3.7.4 3.7.4 Improve cybersecurity 
H2020-EU.3.7.5 3.7.5 Increase Europe’s resilience to crises and disasters 
H2020-EU.3.7.6 3.7.6 Ensure privacy and freedom, including on the internet and enhance the societal, legal and ethical understanding of all areas of security, risk and management 
H2020-EU.3.7.7 3.7.7 Enhance standardisation and interoperability of systems, including for emergency purposes 
H2020-EU.3.7.8 3.7.8 Support the Union’s external security policies including through conflict prevention and peacebuilding 
      
H2020-EU.4 4 Spreading excellence and widening participation 
H2020-EU.4.a 4.a Teaming of excellent research institutions and low-performing research, development and innovation regions 
H2020-EU.4.b 4.b Twinning of research institutions 
H2020-EU.4.c 4.c Establishing ERA chairs  
H2020-EU.4.d 4.d A policy support facility 
H2020-EU.4.e 4.e Supporting access to international networks for excellent researchers and innovators who lack sufficient involvement in European and international networks 
H2020-EU.4.f 4.f Strengthening the administrative and operational capacity of transnational networks of national contact points 
Source: European Commission. 
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Overall distribution  
Contrary to what might have been expected — that all research projects related to security would be funded 
under Programme 3.7 — the analysis carried out in this study shows that a relatively high number of projects 
with a security component were funded under other H2020 programmes: of the 349 projects, 205 (59 %) 
were funded under Programme 3.7 and 144 (41 %) under other programmes (Figure 19).  
Figure 19: Numbers of projects funded under Programme 3.7 and under other programmes 
 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Projects funded under Programme 3.7 can be further divided into those exclusively funded under 3.7 (103 
projects) and those funded under 3.7 and at least one other programme (102 projects, mainly with 
Programme 2).  
With regard to the 144 projects not funded under Programme 3.7, almost half (68) got funding from 
Programme 1 (‘Excellent science’), 54 from Programme 2 (‘Industrial leadership’) and the remaining 22 were 
either funded under Programmes 3.1-3.6 or from Programme 4 (‘Spreading excellence and widening 
participation’) or were co-funded under Programmes 2 and 3. 
Figure 20 shows the distribution of the projects funded (or co-funded) under the various H2020 programmes 
in more detail. It should be noted that when a project is funded under more than one programme (e.g. under 
Programmes 3.7, 3.2 and 2.3), it is counted once for each of them. Therefore, the sum of projects funded 
under the various programmes is greater than the total number of projects. 
Projects funded under Programme 3.7 dominate, but Programme 2.3 (‘Innovation in SMEs’) and 
Programme 2.1 (‘Leadership in enabling and industrial technologies)’ finance significant shares of security 
research projects. It should be noted that Programme 1, which funds about 20 % of the projects, and always 
as an exclusive source, tends, logically, to gather projects that are oriented towards theoretical and 
fundamental research, whether they belong to natural/physical sciences or social sciences. 
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Figure 20: Numbers of projects by H2020 funding programme 
 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Distribution by programme and building block 
Although about 60 % of the projects were fully or partially funded under security-dedicated Programme 3.7, 
looking at individual building blocks brings nuance to the overall picture, as shown in Figure 21, where 
funding for each building block is divided into Programme 3.7 and non-Programme 3.7 funding. 
Figure 21: Distribution of projects by building block and funding programme 
 
Note: *Building blocks with fewer than 10 projects. 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Most building blocks with statistical relevance (i.e. including more than 10 projects) received much more than 
60 % of their funding from Programme 3.7. Only cybersecurity and combating radicalisation are below the 
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average, with about one half of their projects funded from outside the ‘Secure societies’ programme, 
reflecting the fact that cyber matters and radicalisation concerns are far from being only security issues.  
For cybersecurity, the main funding programmes outside 3.7 are 1.1 (European Research Council), 2.1.1 
(‘Industrial leadership’) and 2.3.1 (‘Mainstreaming SME support, especially through a dedicated instrument’). 
For combating radicalisation, the main funding programmes outside 3.7 are 1.1 (European Research Council) 
and 1.3.2 (‘Nurturing excellence by means of cross-border and cross-sector mobility’).  
For their part, the 10 projects in the space building block were fully or partially funded under the programmes 
‘Leadership in enabling and industrial technologies — space’ (Programme 2.1.6) and/or ‘Smart, green and 
integrated transport’ (Programme 3.4). 
3.3.2.5 Distribution of projects by participant countries 
Each H2020 project has one coordinating organisation (or coordinator) and may have an a priori 
undetermined number of participating organisations. Through these entities, there is therefore one 
coordinating country, while there may be several participating countries. Countries, whether EU Member 
States or non-EU countries, may contribute to a project through more than one organisation.   
Figure 22 and Figure 23 show the numbers of projects in which EU Member States and non-EU countries, 
respectively, have taken part, either as a coordinator or as a participant.  
Figure 22: Numbers of projects to which EU Member States contribute 
 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
The top five EU Member States in terms of contribution are the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Germany and 
France. They account for 56 % of the contributions of EU Member States. These are also the five largest EU 
Member States in terms of population. If we consider the ratio of contribution to population, the Member 
States making the greatest contributions are Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. 
Considering the severe crisis that hit Greece during the past decade, its performance as the 6th biggest 
Member State contributor to research projects is also to be noted. 
All in all, each EU Member State has contributed to security research projects. 
Looking at Member States’ as coordinators, it can be seen that the top five EU Member States change, with 
the inclusion of the Netherlands and the exclusion of Germany. The order is Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, 
France and the Netherlands. 
In addition to the EU Member States, 26 non-EU countries have contributed to H2020 security projects. The 
roles of Israel, Switzerland and Norway (53, 43 and 39 contributions, respectively) are particularly notable; 
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they account for 73 % of all non-EU contributions. Israel and Norway have also provided a significant 
proportion of project coordinators. 
Figure 23: Numbers of projects to which non-EU countries contribute 
 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
3.3.2.6 Organisations contributing to research projects: legal status 
Overall consideration 
Organisations that contribute to H2020 projects may have different legal statuses, being, according to the 
classification used by the European Commission, public bodies (e.g. ministries, public authorities and services), 
research organisations, private for-profit entities, or higher and secondary education establishments (mostly 
universities). The remaining category, ‘Others’, encompasses entities such as forums, foundations, NGOs and 
networks. 
The distribution of the 1 348 organisations that contributed to the 349 security-related projects by legal 
status is shown in Figure 24.  
Figure 24: Numbers of contributing organisations by legal status 
 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
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By far the highest share is held by private for-profit companies (645 entities or 48 % of the total). It is, 
however, worth noting that grouping together all other statuses (703) leads to a 52 % share for (largely) 
public institutions/organisations and non-profit entities. 
Another perspective from which to look at these data is to consider the number of contributions from the 
types of entities (since each entity can contribute to more than one project). This reveals that the 1 348 
entities contributed to the 349 projects through 2 190 individual contributions (349 as coordinators and 
1 841 as participants). The distribution of these contributions by the legal status of the entities is shown in 
Figure 25. 
Figure 25: Numbers of contributions from organisations by legal status 
 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
By far the highest share, both as coordinator and participant, is here too held by private for-profit companies 
(891 contributions or 41 % of the total). This means, however, that they tend to contribute less than their 
share of entities (48 %).  
Public bodies made 308 contributions, that is, 14 % of the total. Educational establishments and research 
organisations made 549 (25 %) and 367 (17 %) contributions, respectively. Altogether, public and other non-
profit entities made 59 % of contributions, more than their 52 % share of entities. 
In terms of coordination, private for-profit companies coordinated 54 % of projects, educational 
establishments 27 % and research organisations 15 %. It is worth noting that the low participation of public 
bodies as coordinators, at only 2 %, is consistent with the political nature of most of these entities (e.g. 
national ministries, municipalities, police departments). 
Building block and priorities perspectives on contributions 
Figure 26 presents the distribution of the 2 190 individual contributions to projects according to the legal 
status of the contributing entities and the related building block. Annex 6 provides a list of the contributing 
entities with information on the building blocks and numbers of projects to which they contribute. 
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Figure 26: Distribution of contributions from organisations by legal status and by building block 
 
Note: *Building blocks with fewer than 10 projects. 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Comparing each block with the overall situation (marked ‘All projects’ in the figure), a few specificities can be 
observed, such as the much lower degree of involvement of private for-profit companies in projects related to 
combating radicalisation and the greater role of public bodies in areas such as border control, combating 
radicalisation and protection of public spaces. Public bodies’ contribution is particularly low in the area of 
cybersecurity. 
Figure 27 shows a similar analysis with the European agenda on security priorities as a variable. 
Figure 27: Distribution of contributions from organisations by legal status and by priority 
 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
The most striking observation here, as for the analysis by block, concerns the contribution of public bodies: it 
is much lower than average in the fight against cybercrime, but it is much higher when it comes to countering 
organised crime and terrorism. 
 141 
3.3.2.7 Distribution of projects by dual-use aspect 
Applying the methodology described above, it appears that the overwhelming majority of the 349 security 
and defence research projects identified in the study were assessed as displaying dual-use potential: almost 
90 % (311 projects).   
Figure 28 and Figure 29 show that, with a low degree of variability, this holds true for all building blocks 
(having statistical significance) and priorities, respectively. 
Figure 28: Numbers of projects by building block and dual-use potential 
 
Note: *Building blocks with fewer than 10 projects. 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Figure 29: Numbers of projects by priority and dual-use potential 
 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
The only building block and the only priority that have more than 25 % of projects with no potential dual-use 
applications are combating radicalisation and organised crime, respectively, which has a certain logic. 
A more detailed study on dual-use projects is currently ongoing and results will be presented in the coming 
months. 
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3.4 JRC security-related research  
This chapter presents research projects and stakeholders cooperation in the building blocks where the Joint 
Research Centre is active.  
3.4.1 Border control 
Since 2014, the JRC has provided technical support to DG Migration and Home Affairs on its policies regarding 
border control, in particular in the development of Eurosur. This system, operational since December 2013, 
allows the various EU Member States’ competent authorities to share operational information and cooperate 
with Frontex and with neighbouring non-EU countries, with the goal of reinforcing control of the European 
southern maritime borders. 
This support has been provided under three administrative arrangements between the JRC and DG Migration 
and Home Affairs, Marhome 1 (from January 2014 to June 2015), Marhome 2 (from July 2015 to June 2017) 
and Marhome 3 (from July 2017 to December 2019). 
Under Marhome 3, the JRC continues to support the assessment and further development of the various 
components of Eurosur, with a special emphasis on the implementation of the common application of 
surveillance tools (Eurosur Fusion Services) and on situational pictures (National Situational Picture; European 
Situational Picture; Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture). 
The JRC, in close cooperation with DG Migration and Home Affairs and Frontex, also provides support for 
assessing technology research and innovation for border security, including the take-up of results. Among 
other matters, this support can cover the exploration of innovative technology areas and components, the 
study of the contribution of novel solutions to the reinforcement of operational capabilities, the monitoring of 
readiness levels of technologies under development and assessment of R & D project results in relation to 
user needs. 
CISE for maritime surveillance (271) is one of the pillars of the EUMSS (see Section 2.1.4.1) and plays a pivotal 
role in the protection of the EU’s borders at sea. 
CISE aims to create a political, legal and technical environment to enable the automatic exchange of maritime 
surveillance information between relevant maritime authorities in the European Economic Area member 
countries from different communities/sectors: maritime safety, security and pollution prevention; fisheries 
control; pollution response / the environment; customs; border control; general law enforcement; and defence. 
CISE is now entering a transitional phase, which will lead to its becoming operational by the end of 2020. 
The JRC has played a crucial role in providing scientific and technical advice to DG Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries and Member States since 2010. In close collaboration with experts from Member States, it has 
developed and maintains the CISE data and service models, which are the key interoperability tools for 
enabling the information exchange among the different communities; they could be repurposed to enable 
such interoperability among the many different systems involved in border control. 
Figure 30 provides a more detailed overview of the JRC’s work in the area of border control, organised by 
topic, action and deliverable. 
                                           
(271) European Commission, Commission communication, ‘Towards the integration of maritime surveillance’ (COM(2009) 538 final), 
Brussels, 15.10.2009. 
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Figure 30: Overview of JRC actions and deliverables in the area of border control, 2018 
 Source: Authors. 
 144 
3.4.2 Critical infrastructure protection 
In support of EU efforts to protect critical infrastructures, the JRC coordinates ERNCIP, a framework for 
sharing knowledge and expertise for better protection of critical infrastructures against all types of hazards; 
provides technical support for the review of the directive on ECI; and carries out various research activities 
such as the development of methods and tools for international cybersecurity exercises, an assessment of the 
vulnerability of networked infrastructures in case of extreme space weather events, and an evaluation of the 
resistance of buildings and transport systems to explosions. 
Figure 31 provides a more detailed overview of the JRC’s work in the area of critical infrastructure protection, 
organised by topic, action and deliverable. 
Figure 31: Overview of JRC actions and deliverables in the area of critical infrastructure, 2018 
 
Source: Authors. 
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3.4.3 Public space protection 
The JRC is actively involved in the implementation of the action plan on protecting public spaces. Its main 
actions are as follows. 
— It is developing guidance material, for example on the protection of buildings against terrorist attacks, 
and promoting the concept of ‘security by design’. The first guideline for the protection of city centres 
using barriers has recently been issued (Karlos et al., 2018a). 
— The JRC provides training for local authorities aiming to enhance urban security (272). 
— It has been working on fostering standardisation in the field of public space protection, for example by 
testing security barriers against vehicle ramming or windows against blasts. 
— It carried out a technology review to identify threats and new protection techniques. 
— The JRC supports horizon scanning and the assessment of emerging threats. 
Figure 32 provides a more detailed overview of the JRC’s work in the area of public space protection, 
organised by topic, action and deliverable. 
Figure 32: Overview of JRC actions and deliverables in the area of protection of public spaces, 2018-2019 
 
Source: Authors. 
                                           
(272)  As an example, a training session on protection of public spaces and vehicle attack and blast mitigation was organised by the JRC in 
June 2019; see European Commission, ‘Protection of public spaces, vehicle and blast mitigation — hands on training and exchange 
of best practices, JRC Ispra, 12-13 June 2019’ (https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/security-public-spaces/protection-public-spaces-
vehicle-and-blast-mitigation-hands-training-and). 
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3.4.4 Critical supplies security 
In 2016, the JRC finalised a report, Raw Materials in the European Defence Industry (Pavel and Tzimas, 2016), 
which was used and quoted in drafting the European defence action plan. A new administrative arrangement 
is currently ongoing with DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs with the objective of 
identifying bottlenecks and supply risks linked to raw materials and advanced materials included in dual-use 
technologies in Europe. The technologies considered are batteries; fuel cells and hydrogen storage; robotics; 
drones; additive manufacturing (3D printing); and electronics. 
In 2017, the JRC provided the methodology and the guidelines for assessing the most recent EU list of critical 
raw materials, published every 3 years by the European Commission (as a communication). The main novelty 
is related to an increased number of factors supporting criteria behind the security of supply, which include 
import dependency, trade barriers and additional socioeconomic and environmental impacts. 
The JRC has also supported DG Trade and DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs with 
trade-related information on raw material products used in negotiating free trade agreements on behalf of 
the EU. 
These activities are continuing during 2019-2021, with the 2020 EU list of critical raw materials being 
assessed by the JRC and specific information on raw materials and trade in relation to 31 non-EU countries 
being provided for EU future negotiations on free trade agreements. 
Figure 33 provides a more detailed overview of the JRC’s work in the area of critical supplies security, 
organised by topic, action and deliverable. 
Figure 33: Overview of JRC actions and deliverables in the area of critical supplies, 2018-2020 
 
Source: Authors. 
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3.4.5 Cybersecurity 
The JRC is currently involved in various scientific and technical activities supporting other DGs’ tasks. 
Significant examples are listed hereafter. Together with Connect, the JRC is active in particular in: 
— exploring new means of embedding the concept of privacy and security by design into digital services, 
mobile devices and the IoT;  
— empowering citizens in protecting their digital security and privacy;  
— establishing and supporting the contractual public-private partnership for the cybersecurity industry; 
— exploring cybersecurity issues related to emerging e-payment systems (crypto-currencies) and new 
cutting edge paradigms for e-services (distributed ledgers); 
— supporting the establishment of the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research 
Competence Centre (273), by publishing a cybersecurity landscape mapping (Bordin et al., 2017), then a 
taxonomy and classification scheme aligning cybersecurity terminologies, definitions and 
domains (Nai-Fovino et al, 2018a), as well as an identification and mapping of EU cybersecurity centres 
(e.g. research organisations, operational centres) according to their specific expertise, using the proposed 
taxonomy (Nai-Fovino et al, 2018a). 
The JRC, together with DG Migration and Home Affairs, works to: 
— develop digital forensic techniques as a contribution to the EU agenda for security; 
— increase the security of the external borders (e.g. helping to design and implement the EU Entry–Exit 
System, thus contributing to the protection of the external borders and the effective processing of 
Schengen visas);  
— strengthen the capacity of Frontex to carry out border controls, risk analysis and joint operations at the 
external borders;  
— provide scientific support to strengthen large EU information systems, including for the free movement of 
citizens (e.g. work on interoperability, new biometric arrangements, residence permits, digital identity 
management, smart card security, etc.). 
In the field of energy, the JRC is cooperating with DG Energy on putting in place sustainable structures, tools 
and procedures for a secure system of digital exchanges between Euratom Safeguards, EU nuclear operators, 
Member States and, possibly, the IAEA. The JRC also contributes to cybersecurity and privacy in the energy 
sector by facilitating the energy transition through smart grids and smart home applications, and by studying 
the application of the virtual currency and distributed ledger paradigms to create a seamless internal energy 
market. 
As far as transport is concerned, the JRC collaborates with DG Mobility and Transport on activities such as: 
— intelligent transport systems and electronic tools, providing technical support to implement the ‘smart 
tachograph’; 
— development of cooperative intelligent transport systems and connected automated vehicles (including 
vehicle cybersecurity);  
— development of electronic tools in support of quality inland water transport across Europe.   
Figure 34 provides a more detailed overview of the JRC’s work in the area of cybersecurity, organised by 
topic, action and deliverable. 
                                           
(273)  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/european-cybersecurity-industrial-technology-and-research-competence-centre; 
consulted on 28 January 2019. 
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Figure 34: Overview of JRC actions and deliverables in the area of cybersecurity, 2018 
 
Source: Authors. 
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3.4.6 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive threats 
The JRC is very active regarding nuclear safeguards using technologies and tools for nuclear material 
measurements and standards, containment and surveillance, as well as process monitoring. In particular, the 
JRC supports the Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment Program (274), which evaluates the performance of 
available commercial radiation detection equipment against consensus standards. The JRC also implements 
hands-on training and testing schemes for the detection of radionuclide materials (via the European Nuclear 
Security Training Centre) (275) and plays a role in following up on incidents involving the seizure of nuclear 
material. The JRC can determine the origin of nuclear materials for forensics purposes and brings this 
expertise to Member States. All these activities ensure that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful use. 
The JRC coordinates ERNCIP (276), a framework for sharing knowledge and expertise for better protection of 
critical infrastructures against all types of hazards, including CBRN-E threats. The JRC offers its know-how to 
improve management of industrial chemical risks and the implementation of the Seveso 
Directive-Technological Disaster Risk Reduction, as well as evaluating atmospheric dispersion models. It also 
works on the detection of homemade explosives and the protection of airports. 
The JRC is involved in the standardisation of biological toxin measurements as well as the harmonisation of 
biological threat detection equipment. It contributes to the proper implementation of dual-use export control 
policies through guidelines, technical advice and training, with a special focus on tangible–intangible transfers, 
transit, trans-shipment and brokering. Finally, the JRC offers technical support to the EU CBRN CoE, the main 
objective of which is to strengthen the institutional capacity of partner countries in order to mitigate CBRN 
risks.  
It is also worth noting that the JRC carried out a CBRN-E landscape study in 2017 (McCourt et al., 2017) and 
has edited in collaboration with Europol a CBRN-E glossary (277) to foster a common understanding of key 
terms.   
Figure 35 provides more a detailed overview of the JRC’s work in the area of CBRN-E, organised by topic, 
action and deliverable. 
                                           
(274) European Commission, ‘Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment Program (ITRAP+10) test campaign summary report’ 
(https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/illicit-trafficking-radiation-assessment-program-itrap10-test-campaign-summary-report). 
(275) European Commission, ‘The European Nuclear Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA)’ (https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/european-nuclear-
security-training-centre-eusectra). 
(276) European Commission, ‘European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Erncip) 
(https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/network-bureau/european-reference-network-critical-infrastructure-protection-erncip). See also 
Section 2.2. 
(277) European Commission, ‘Welcome to the European CBRNE Glossary’ (http://opencbrne.jrc.ec.europa.eu/main). 
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Figure 35: Overview of JRC actions and deliverables in the area of CBRN-E, 2018 
 
Source: Authors. 
3.4.7 Hybrid threats 
In order to support the implementation of Action 5 specified in the joint communication on countering hybrid 
threats, the JRC recently produced vulnerability and detection indicators, which were presented to the EU 
Member States in December 2017 (Giannopoulos et al., 2018). 
By mid-2018, the JRC had set up a transversal project on hybrid threats (Hybrit), which started in 2019, based 
on the consideration that no one alone can tackle research on this topic, owing to its unprecedented 
complexity, which requires something other than traditional defence mechanisms. Therefore, cross-sectoral 
and cross-actor information exchange is needed within a multidisciplinary approach, involving areas in which 
the JRC is already active, such as cybersecurity, critical infrastructure protection, media analysis (text mining 
and fake news), resilience, big data, and disaster and risk management. This project will consist of several 
work packages addressing the most challenging needs, notably the development of a conceptual framework 
on hybrid threats, and the area of early detection of hybrid threats. 
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Furthermore, the JRC and Hybrid CoE have been jointly developing a conceptual framework to characterise 
and better understand hybrid threats (see Section 2.7.2 for details). 
Figure 36 provides more a detailed overview of the JRC’s work in the area of hybrid threats, organised by 
topic, action and deliverable. 
Figure 36: Overview of JRC actions and deliverables in the area of hybrid threats, 2018 
 
Source: Authors. 
3.4.8 Space 
The greater part of the JRC’s space activities is devoted to Earth observation, including scientific research and 
operations linked to the Copernicus Global Land and Emergency Services, and support for environmental 
monitoring, climate change, agriculture (i.e. the common agricultural policy) and food security, the 
bioeconomy, water resources, renewable energies, transport, development cooperation, disaster and 
emergency management, marine and maritime issues, global and border security, and migration. There is also 
notable expertise in the JRC on GNSS (Galileo and EGNOS), radiofrequency spectrum, wireless 
communications (emerging 5G), protection of critical infrastructures and space weather. The JRC collaborates 
with space industry actors, Member State space agencies, EUMETSAT, the ESA, SatCen and the GSA. 
Worldwide, it works with the Group on Earth Observation and the G8 Committee on Earth Observing Satellites 
as well as the UN (the Office for Outer Space Affairs, the International Maritime Organization, the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation, the World Food Programme and the International Committee on Global Navigation 
Satellite Systems). Furthermore, the JRC is also active in other areas that are critically related to space, 
notably geospatial data infrastructures, the digital single market, cybersecurity, resilience, and security and 
defence. 
Figure 37 provides more a detailed overview of the JRC’s work in the area of space, organised by topic, 
action and deliverable. 
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Figure 37: Overview of JRC actions and deliverables in the area of space, 2018 
 
Source: Authors. 
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4 Future avenues for security and defence research and development 
In this chapter the authors suggest directions for developments in the security and defence R&D, by building 
block (Section 4.1). This future oriented discussion is complemented by more specific foresight insights 
gathered from a topical horizon scanning exercise carried out at the Joint Research Centre (Section 4.2). 
4.1 Subject-specific developments 
4.1.1 Border control 
Among possible future areas for R & D in border control, the following can be mentioned. 
Data management. With the implementation of the Entry–Exit System and ETIAS, in addition to all the other 
systems such as VIS, SIS, Eurodac, PNR and advance passenger information, the amount of data to be 
collected, stored, analysed and exchanged will grow exponentially. Robust R & D activities in data analysis will 
be necessary to support national security by enabling more accurate screening against watch lists or creating 
risk profiles that allow authorities to identify where to deploy resources and where to target their 
interventions. 
Biometric technology. Facial recognition is now being widely used in various applications to verify identity. 
However, identity fraud remains a key area of weakness for border management. More work needs to be done 
on properly matching names and faces. There is also a very large amount of research needed to improve 
efficiency in the use of biometric technology (e.g. biometric on the move solutions) to create a seamless, 
smart and sustainable experience for travellers while ensuring the highest possible level of security. 
Monitoring and surveillance. The integrity of physical borders remains critical, particularly in areas with 
long land or sea borders. Their surveillance can be enhanced by using technological innovations in both 
sensors (infrared sensors, heat-sensing cameras and various types of radar) and platforms (satellite and 
unmanned vehicles), as well as in the areas of sensor data integration and analysis and of system 
interoperability for information exchange.  
Standardisation and interoperability. The technical specifications of the equipment used by border guards 
are frequently provided and tested by the vendors alone. There is no reliable information that can be used to 
assess technical strengths and weaknesses in relation to performance results. No clear EU certification exists 
for this equipment. In addition, how interoperable the equipment is is not always known. 
4.1.2 Critical infrastructure protection 
Given the number of initiatives and the wealth of knowledge that has been produced in this domain, any 
future work should focus mainly on connecting the dots and establishing communities that can help to 
improve the resilience of critical infrastructures. The knowledge centres established by the European 
Commission can be considered a best practice in this regard and be applied to other areas. 
This, however, does not exclude conducting research on new or emerging issues affecting the protection and 
resilience of critical infrastructures. Research should be adapted on the basis of the evolution of critical 
infrastructures in the next 5 years, as described in Section 2.2.4, in order to provide the necessary knowledge. 
In particular, it is expected that more research on AI and machine learning will be needed to address two 
major upcoming challenges. The first is the tendency to have more autonomous systems that require 
intelligent algorithms embedded within machine-learning capabilities. This revolution is already taking place in 
the transport sector, in particular in road transport, and it is expected to grow. The second main challenge is 
the large amount of data produced by infrastructures as a result of increased connectedness and ICT 
pervasiveness (e.g. smart systems); these data need to be analysed to adapt the performance of critical 
infrastructures and render their services more efficient.  
Research should also take into account to a greater extent the needs of the defence sector and accommodate 
them to provide reassurance that future critical infrastructures will be able to take on board defence-related 
needs. Increasing concerns about hybrid threats and the need for closer collaboration between the civilian and 
defence sectors will result in a blurring of the limits between the two domains even in the context of research. 
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4.1.3 Public space protection 
Terrorist organisations are continuously innovating in their techniques and modus operandi. Therefore, the EU 
needs to be equally innovative in its response, harnessing technology and pooling expertise to detect and 
counter or mitigate emerging threats (Karlos et al., 2018b), notably drones and ramming vehicles. 
Drones can easily overcome ground-based protective perimeters and efficiently deliver explosives (Larcher et 
al., 2017), weapons or harmful substances, or conduct reconnaissance to prepare for a ground attack. Work is 
ongoing (European Aviation Safety Agency, 2017) to introduce regulations to ensure the safety and security 
of civilian-operated drones (278). 
Commercial drones constitute a problem also for the military. American forces during the Mosul siege faced 
ISIS attacks with small drones dropping grenades and miniaturised explosives. Clearly, this is a classical case 
leading to a search for dual-use solutions. The great challenges are first the detection of these small drones 
and then the identification of suitable countermeasures for their neutralisation. 
To detect small drones, different types of sensors and technologies can be used, such as radar, acoustic, 
thermal, laser and radio-magnetic (Tarchi et al., 2014). Some are passive — they use the radio, acoustic or 
thermal emission of the intruding object to detect it — while others are active and base their detection on the 
reflection of a signal generated by the sensor when it hits the drone. Difficulties arise from the facts that 
existing radar systems are designed to detect much bigger objects and that most drones are constructed of 
plastic (not easily spotted electronically), are small and fly low to the ground. 
With regard to countermeasures, various solutions are employed: communication jamming, GPS jamming, GPS 
spoofing, drone engine jamming, wind-blowing machines, water cannons, shooting and net-trapping systems 
delivered by guns or other drones. These countermeasures should lead to the development of two ways of 
combating terrorist drones (Fitzpatrick, 2018): ’hard kill’ solutions that involve physically disabling drones and 
‘soft kill’ ones that bring them down electronically. 
Regarding the use of vehicles as weapons, this is not expected to cease and shows that critical infrastructures 
are no longer the main target of terrorists, as this would require substantial resources and extensive planning, 
with the chances of success being low. However, an increase in vehicle-ramming attacks is expected, as they 
are easily planned and require minimal expertise, and a variety of vehicles can be accessed without difficulty. 
In response to this threat, several countries are trying to introduce physical security measures that aim to 
make crowded places safe. However, these measures are not always selected based on a structured 
approach; rather, selection largely depends on the practices adopted by the local security authorities and the 
availability of specific solutions. There is clearly a growing need to design and implement specialised methods 
and techniques to increase the safety of public spaces (Karlos et al., 2017). Moving from a one-size-fits-all to 
a tailor-made approach would require the development of a European standard for barrier testing (European 
Committee for Standardization, 2010) and the introduction of a simple and clear barrier selection procedure 
that can be used by security officers, premises owners, building designers, technical experts and other 
interested professionals. In the EU, documentation on the design, installation methodologies, cost and 
selection of available products is rather limited, and encouragement and effort on the part of the European 
Commission towards the development of such material would be useful.  
Protection can also be achieved through the concept of smart cities, which includes the deployment of sensors 
for various applications in the urban environment. These sensors can also be used to increase the safety of 
public spaces. They build complex systems and need specific measurements and analysis approaches to 
provide metrics for performance assessment. Novel metrics and analysis methods (e.g. agent-based 
modelling, graph theory, machine learning) can set the basis for the integration of intelligent streaming of 
sensor data and distributed signal processing into large-scale networks for the realisation of smart and safe 
cities.. 
New detection technologies have recently been developed that allow monitoring of a much greater flow of 
people. This could enable a much more flexible use in many situations where nowadays detection is simply 
not possible (e.g. in transport hubs and shopping malls). However, more detection also implies more alarms, 
both false and accurate. For busy public spaces, this means getting prepared both in terms of training and 
reaction capacities. 
Because of the open nature of our society, new public space protection measures will always be characterised 
and triggered by emerging threats. Therefore, it is difficult to identify needs for further protection. 
                                           
(278)  European Commission, draft regulation laying down rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft, Brussels. 
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Incorporating safety measures into the design of buildings and public spaces will always be useful. The need 
for detection will also continue to be very high, as new dangerous materials will need to be identifiable. These 
includes new home-made explosives, highly toxic substances and weapons built by 3D printers.  
4.1.4 Critical supplies security 
Technologies are becoming more and more complex, achieving more sophisticated effects and finding novel 
applications. Some of these technologies — AI, big data analytics, robotics, new energy systems, additive 
manufacturing, advanced and smart materials, quantum computing, virtual and augmented reality, unmanned 
systems, remote sensing — enable products to produce new effects and therefore are central to most modern 
civil and military (dual-use) applications.  
R & D in relation to materials is at the heart of some of these technologies. It is also seen as a priority for 
innovation and a source of competitive advantage. Much of the ongoing research on materials involves 
investigating their structure and properties at a very small scale. For instance, currently there is a great deal 
of competition worldwide to translate the potential of materials such as graphene into real applications. An 
example of an innovation success story is the development of carbon fibre, which has become recognised as 
a strong, resilient and lightweight composite material. This material is a feasible substitute for heavier steel 
and aluminium in many industrial applications including in aerospace, automotives, energy, construction and 
sporting equipment. 
The energy transition has produced an important collateral effect in the replacement of energy-intensive 
technologies and products with products and technological processes using raw materials (new minerals and 
critical metals) intensively. The current increase in demand in the world and the EU for critical raw materials 
and other minerals and metals (including those considered to be base metals by now) is unsustainable, and 
the security of their responsible and sustainable sourcing is becoming a real challenge, reflected in recent 
policy documents and media reporting. The notion of ’trade wars’ has been mentioned frequently in the past 
2 years by actors in global political and societal movements. The EU is creating its own responses to these 
threats, such as actions to promote endogenous EU industrial value chains for strategic products using raw 
materials intensively (e.g. batteries) and actions relating to the end-of-life of products and raw material 
supply chains (e.g. recycling, reuse). 
4.1.5 Cybersecurity 
Demand for EU policies related to cybersecurity, privacy, data protection and cybercrime is clearly here to stay 
and will most probably increase over the coming years, with the aims of better protecting the rights of 
individuals, ensuring national security, developing new EU digital infrastructures and services, and further 
developing EU industry and the EU economy. 
From an R & D perspective, areas that will need support include the following: 
— With the general data protection regulation now in force in the EU, work will be needed to better specify 
the technical requirements imposed by the new legislation. 
— Cybersecurity and privacy will have to be further streamlined in all traditional industrial sectors benefiting 
from the ICT revolution, such as energy, transport, finance, health and nuclear power. 
— Law enforcement actors and judicial communities will need to combat effectively with new tools, 
procedures and cooperation schemes the increasing challenge posed by the use of ICT in terrorism, 
organised crime and cybercrime. 
— Internal security will have to rely on more integrated EU large-scale IT systems (fuelled by national and 
central databases containing more reliable and accurate information), as well as on more trustworthy 
identity and travel documents (less prone to fraudulent manipulation, required for all individuals and with 
a convergence of security measures imposed on non-EU nationals and EU citizens). 
— The defence and external security dimension of cybersecurity — including hybrid threats emerging from 
cyberspace, dual use of some ICT and export control issues — will call for an increase in synergies and 
bridges between the civil and military worlds. 
— The socioeconomic dimensions of cybersecurity will require more attention from both policymakers and 
researchers in the social sciences. On the one hand, the economy of cybersecurity, the costs of 
cybercrimes, the risks that digital technologies entail and the associated liabilities will have to be further 
addressed. On the other hand, societal aspects, including, in particular, awareness raising, digital hygiene, 
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education, ethics and cyber professional skills, may require new policy initiatives. Behavioural insights 
could also be applied to understand such societal aspects. 
4.1.6 Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive threats 
To combat CBRN-E threats, R & D should focus on surveillance but also on preparedness and response, 
especially for first responders.  
A better understanding of possible future CBRN-E attacks should be developed, for example of which 
products/materials could be used, alone or in combination (based on ease of access and ease of manipulation, 
hazard, potential dissemination, public vulnerabilities, etc.). Innovative methods for early detection of CBRN-E 
threats (sensors, with wide spectrum), suitable for use by first responders or for automatic use, are much 
needed. Automatic CBRN-E sensors (alone or in series) can be used in public spaces for constant monitoring 
and early warning systems. Studies on the appropriate combination of such sensors with air-flow modelling in 
closed or semi-open public spaces are required to protect public spaces and critical infrastructures. The 
creation of specific measurements, including standards and certification for detection equipment, are needed 
for a greater comparability of data detection, both within EU and beyond. A specific project accomplishing this 
task is the ITRAP project (described in Section 3.4.6). 
Concerning response, research should aim to improve the protective equipment used by first responders, 
facilitate its use and reduce the costs. The communication and IT tools used during this type of intervention 
should be improved. Tools for quick and efficient triage of victims need to be upgraded. Light but protective 
equipment for front-line healthcare personnel in hospitals is required. The development of appropriate 
medical countermeasures and availability plans will necessitate further reflection and adaptation. 
Decontamination methods are a central topic because they are often very expensive and time-consuming; 
new products and technologies are required.  
Finally, in the face of a CBRN-E incident, the whole of society is affected; police, military, government and 
healthcare services must be qualified and coordinated before an incident occurs. Methods for continuous 
cooperation between relevant actors should be developed and exercises organised on a regular basis in the 
EU. 
4.1.7 Hybrid threats 
The issue of hybrid threats has not been yet adequately addressed by the research community, which can be 
attributed to a lack of awareness, especially before the events in Ukraine. Taking into account the lead time 
between the identification of a research need and its actual implementation in terms of project proposals and 
execution of the work, it should not be a surprise that outcomes from the scientific community are still rather 
limited. However, this situation is changing and more institutions are aiming to carry out work in the domain 
of hybrid threats. 
There are specific challenges related to attribution of hybrid threats, which seems to be one of the most 
demanding issues in the domain. It is expected that significant research will be required on data fusion, visual 
analytics and related techniques, to develop methods and tools that will support security authorities in 
correlating date from different sources. Such work could contribute to situational awareness, early warning 
and attribution of hybrid threats. 
The volume of data will probably continue to increase in the years to come and as a consequence new 
methods based on AI should emerge. This area of research should be at the core of future efforts towards 
data fusion to facilitate attribution. 
Given the nature of hybrid threats, more research is needed to gain a better understanding of the interactions 
between technological systems and societies. Such research should focus on identifying the emerging 
behaviour of complex sociotechnical systems.  
Tackling hybrid threats is certainly an issue that will benefit from dual-use research, considering that this 
topic is by definition a dual-use concept, since it is tightly linked to hybrid warfare. Although hybrid warfare 
and hybrid threats are not the same issue, they are closely related and it is expected that research addressing 
the challenges posed by each of them will ultimately help in tackling both. 
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4.1.8 Combating radicalisation 
Regarding digital technology and social media used for radicalisation, there is a need to make people less 
vulnerable and more resilient to such profiling. 
According to the Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016), the following are the main research needs: 
— to better identify the causes, processes and mechanisms of radicalisation in order to develop effective 
preventive measures and countermeasures; 
— to understand the relationships between radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism; 
— to grasp how visual and audio materials influence individuals on their radicalisation path; 
— to better connect measures aimed at combating and preventing radicalisation with insights we have 
gained into how radicalisation functions in the first place; 
— to overcome the false exceptionalism of radicalisation; 
— to compare different types of radicalisation based on different ideologies; 
— to change the current structure of research funding needs. 
Political scientist Gøtzsche-Astrup (2018) calls for a focus on research designs capable of arbitrating on 
matters of causality, not just correlation. He argues that because both theoretical approaches and current 
interventions propose cause-and-effect relationships, it is imperative that research shifts its focus to 
experimental research designs capable of making causal inferences. With the help of empirical evidence, we 
could increase our knowledge to gain a better understanding radicalisation mechanisms by mapping which 
interventions work effectively.   
4.1.9 Fighting against terrorism financing 
According to a study commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs (European Parliament, 2018b), mitigating the terrorism financing risks associated with 
virtual currencies is a significant security priority. Although these risks are currently a low priority owing to the 
limited number of publicly documented and confirmed cases, there is a need to pursue and better understand 
developments in this technology, as its use could increase significantly in the future because of its high levels 
of privacy and anonymity.  
Another appealing feature for terrorists that might lead them to adopt virtual currencies more broadly is the 
utilisation of encryption technology on social media and other online platforms. In addition, a better 
understanding of the nexus between terrorist actors and other criminal activities (e.g. between terrorism with 
cybercrime) would make it possible to better identify where to focus efforts to design resilient solutions to 
anticipate terrorism financing through virtual currencies. 
Furthermore, because of the trend towards lower cost terrorist attacks, there is a need to better understand 
possible scenarios and monitor potential target areas to prepare communities for and make them resilient to 
such events. 
4.1.10 Space 
The recent JRC landscape study on space and security (Lagazio et al., 2019) reviewed space- and security-
related R & D projects funded either at EU level or at national level in eight countries (Belgium, Germany, 
Spain, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom). This study also analysed several capability 
gaps. This was done by comparing EU policies and strategies with existing capabilities. By combining this 
analysis with a survey of current R & D efforts, it identified several as yet insufficiently addressed areas that 
need (further) research:  
— cybersecurity for space infrastructures; 
— the physical protection and resilience of space-related assets; 
— the development and evolution of space-enabled resources and services specifically for users in the 
security domain, including for emerging users such as law enforcement; 
— advanced secure satellite communication (SATCOM).  
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These topics should benefit from EU-level R & D funding, for example under the new framework programme 
Horizon Europe or the EDF.  
Furthermore, the following priorities were listed:  
— promote and support big data research infrastructures for space, to fully exploit all space data collected 
and the potential for combining them with non-space big data;  
— include SSA systems and their development as a structural element of the European space R  & D 
landscape, aiming at a global SSA system of systems, and develop SST to deal with increasing pressure 
from orbital congestion and deep space needs;  
— promote security-by-design approaches to R & D for space infrastructures, to facilitate affordable 
solutions that are better aligned with security requirements; 
— extend the coverage of Copernicus and Galileo/EGNOS, and provide a long-term R & D vision for their 
development, taking into account the security user communities’ needs; 
— develop virtual R & D initiatives for security domains of strategic importance, involving end users and 
manufacturers as well as the research community; 
— support the development of spin-off mechanisms from space-related R & D so that key European security 
domains benefit more from space developments. 
4.2 Horizon scanning on security 
In the context of its foresight activities (279), the JRC organised in 2018 a horizon-scanning exercise focusing 
on security. This is a foresight method for identifying emerging issues that may be of future importance in 
the context of security. The main results of this exercise are presented hereafter, following a brief account of 
the methodology used. 
4.2.1 Methodology 
JRC staff were invited to submit items — factual information from research studies, articles, news items, 
conference presentations, blogs, social media posts, etc. — about developments indicating something new, 
different and potentially important in the domain of security. The items submitted were then discussed in a 
‘sense making’ session, the purpose of which was to detect new trends, drivers of change, weak signals or 
discontinuities. Based on the discussion of 120 items relating to recent events or situations, the participants in 
the sense-making session identified over 70 individual issues, which were then clustered into 26 common 
issues. These issues were then mapped by the participants, according to their perceived importance for 
security and the extent to which they were already addressed within the JRC. The mapping was followed by a 
prioritisation exercise, where each participant was allowed to express one positive vote (for an issue that 
merited further consideration in the JRC in the context of security consequences) and one negative vote (for 
an issues that did not need further consideration either because it was already addressed by the JRC or 
because it was considered of less importance for the JRC and the EU in terms of security consequences).   
4.2.2 Results 
The results of the mapping and prioritisation of the 26 issues are depicted in Figure 38.  
The mapping positions the security issues along the horizontal axis (extent to which they are addressed by the 
JRC at the time of the exercise) and the vertical axis (participants' perceived importance for security). The 
prioritisation (i.e. whether the issue merits further consideration in the JRC in the context of security 
consequences or not) is depicted using colour coding. Issues presented on blue labels are those that received 
two or more positive votes; those on pink ones got two or more negative votes; yellow labels indicate issues 
that obtained one or zero votes, or an equal number of positive and negative votes. The number in brackets 
indicates the number of votes received. 
                                           
(279)  European Commission, ‘Foresight and horizon scanning’ (https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research/crosscutting-activities/foresight). 
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Figure 38: Horizon scanning mapping and prioritisation 
 
Source: Authors.
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4.2.2.1 Issues considered important and not (or not to a significant extent) addressed by the JRC 
The top left quadrant in Figure 38 includes eight issues that participants concluded were most important for 
security and not or not adequately addressed, at the time of the exercise, by JRC. They are presented 
hereafter, in decreasing order of votes (280). 
The first two issues received the highest number of positive votes, indicating that a high proportion of the 
participants in the workshop considered them issues that needed to be addressed. 
Misuse of DNA data. With affordable and faster genome sequencing technologies, more and more DNA data 
is becoming available, stored in private and public databases. This data holds important personal information 
and, with the use of machine-learning algorithms, there are ways of de-anonymising it.    
— Main topical security aspects: privacy, ethical dimensions, cybersecurity. 
— Main overarching discipline: life sciences, data. 
Threat of gene editing (CRISPR). The wide availability and low cost of gene editing technologies brings the 
danger of engineering pathogens that could be used as bioweapons, and also the possibility of engineering 
human embryos.  
— Main topical security aspects: (bio)terrorism, CBRN-E, ethical dimensions, hybrid threats. 
— Main overarching discipline: life sciences. 
Quantum computing. The creation of quantum computers will increase the processing capacities and 
computing power. More immediately, it will impact cryptography and cybersecurity in general. However, 
increased computing power and communication speed means increased speed of online interactions, sensing, 
positioning etc.   
— Main topical security aspects: cybersecurity, cryptography. 
— Main overarching discipline: physics/technology (281). 
Control society — surveillance profiling. Increased connectivity and availability of big data regarding 
economic and social interactions allow for closer monitoring of the behaviour of individuals. This can infringe 
the right to privacy and enable interventions in society on this basis (such as China's social rating system). 
— Main topical security aspects: privacy, ethical dimensions. 
— Main overarching discipline: life sciences, data. 
Autonomous weapons. The development of AI and robotics will enable the creation of autonomous 
weapons that could change the nature of warfare and the landscape of threats.  
— Main topical security aspects: terrorism, defence, hybrid threats, cybersecurity. 
— Main overarching discipline: technology. 
Brain manipulation. While currently privacy concerns relate to people’s physical or online activities, there 
are increased attempts to impact brain activity (e.g. interpreting and manipulating brain activity, direct brain 
simulation). 
— Main topical security aspects: privacy, ethical dimensions. 
— Main overarching discipline: life sciences. 
Misuse of robotisation. Autonomous devices (robots, drones) will feature more prominently in people’s 
everyday lives. While they can have many positive roles, the safety and security aspects are considerable. On 
the other hand, autonomous security robots can be used for unmanned patrolling, surveillance and inspection.  
— Main topical security aspects: terrorism, defence, cybersecurity.  
— Main overarching discipline: technology.     
                                           
(280)  The main security topical aspects and main overarching disciplines are deduced from the selected items which inspired the 
clustering of issues (see Annex 7). 
(281)  In these analyses and comments, “technology” includes all developments related to artificial intelligence. 
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Note: this issue is strongly linked to the abovementioned autonomous weapons, as they have many aspects in 
common. 
Overreliance on AI (282). Increased dependence on algorithms running different processes leaves people 
vulnerable to wrong decisions taken by AI systems, as the machine-learning methods applied reproduce 
biases or do not sufficiently interpret the context of a given situation. 
— Main topical security aspects: privacy, ethical dimensions. 
— Main overarching discipline: technology. 
4.2.2.2 Issues considered important and already addressed by the JRC 
The top right quadrant of Figure 38 gathers the 10 issues that participants considered as being important 
and already addressed within the JRC. The votes for the first two issues indicate that they need to be 
addressed further:  
Subversion of government — new governance. The reliance on central government for the provision of 
public goods has been waning with increased decentralisation and individualisation. People are experimenting 
with governance approaches for large-scale cooperation between the people without the coordination of a 
central authority.  
— Main topical security aspects: privacy, blockchains, ethical dimensions.  
— Main overarching discipline: social sciences. 
Media changing the society. Social media have changed the society in the social (relationships, identity), 
economic (personal brands, advertising, online micro transactions) and political (echo-chambers, fake news 
psychometrics) spheres, which have an impact on the perceptions and understanding of security. 
— Main topical security aspects: social media, terrorism, privacy, ethical dimensions. 
— Main overarching discipline: social sciences. 
High-tech crime. Technology is reshaping governance of crime organisation (e.g. crime-as-a-service) and 
creating new opportunities in cybercrime, but also new approaches to organising police work (e.g. 
crowdsourcing). 
— Main topical security aspects: organised crime, cybersecurity, law enforcement. 
— Main overarching discipline: technology. 
Robotisation — impact on society. The trend for replacing current jobs with AI and robots will require a 
different organisation of society, which could lead to tensions and upheavals.  
— Main topical security aspects: ethical dimensions. 
— Main overarching discipline: social sciences. 
Blurring the line between security and defence. With increased digital activity and globalisation, the 
strict division between external defence issues and internal security issues is no longer possible in the face of 
hybrid threats.  
— Main topical security aspects: terrorism, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, defence. 
— Main overarching discipline: technology. 
Decreased privacy. Increased use of data in various spheres of life (health, consumption, mobility) means 
that people have been increasingly sacrificing their privacy for the convenience of better products and 
services or for security. 
— Main topical security aspects: privacy, ethical dimensions, cybersecurity. 
— Main overarching discipline: data. 
                                           
(282)  Since this horizon scanning exercise, the JRC planned a set of deliverables on these aspects for 2019/2020. 
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New law enforcement techniques. New technologies have an impact on law enforcement techniques, 
especially regarding image processing, mobile tracking, etc. 
— Main topical security aspects: privacy, ethical dimensions, law enforcement. 
— Main overarching discipline: technology. 
New use of resources. The scarcity of resources will lead to increased tensions; new technologies with new 
security concerns are emerging (e.g. small modular nuclear reactors); and resources will play an important 
role in any consideration of space exploration.  
— Main topical security aspects: supply of (critical) raw materials, organised crime. 
— Main overarching discipline: technology. 
Two issues received a negative priority rating (i.e. no need for further consideration): cybersecurity (since it 
is already widely addressed within the JRC and the Commission) and autonomous mobility.  
4.2.2.3 Issues considered of less importance for security 
Finally, eight issues were considered by participants to have relatively few security implications. Only three 
had one positive vote: ‘New pathogens from climate change’, ‘New tech for outbreak preparedness’ and 
‘Inequalities increasing from AI’. The remaining five received a negative rating: ‘Miniaturisation of nuclear 
reactors’, ‘Unintended geoengineering consequences’, ‘Lack of space governance’, ‘Better camouflage’ and 
‘Demographics — complexity, engineering’. 
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Table 9 gathers the issues considered by participants most important in terms of security concerns, and their main overarching discipline, deduced from the selected 
items that inspired the clustering of issues (see Annex 7).  
Table 9: Horizon scanning: security issues by main overarching discipline 
Issues  Life sciences Physics/technology Data Social sciences 
Misuse of DNA data 
Issues considered important and 
not (or not to a significant extent) 
addressed by the JRC 
X  X  
Threat of gene editing X    
Quantum computing  X   
Control society — surveillance profiling X  X  
Autonomous weapons  X   
Brain manipulation X    
Misuse of robotisation  X   
Overreliance on AI  X   
Subversion of government — new governance 
Issues considered important and 
already addressed by the JRC 
   X 
Media changing the society    X 
High-tech crime  X   
Robotisation — impact on society    X 
Blurring the line between security and defence  X   
Decreased privacy   X  
New law enforcement techniques  X   
New use of resources   X   
Source: Authors. 
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Table 10 gathers the issues considered by participants most important in terms of security concerns and their main topical aspects, deduced from the selected items 
that inspired the clustering of issues (see Annex 7). 
Table 10: Horizon scanning: security issues by main topical aspects 
Issues Terrorism Cybersecurity 
Organised 
crime 
Defence Privacy Cryptography CBRN-E 
Ethical 
dimensions 
Social 
media 
Hybrid 
threats 
Law 
enforcement 
Supply of 
raw 
materials 
Block 
chains 
Not (or not to a significant extent) addressed by the JRC 
Misuse of DNA 
data 
 X   X   X      
Threat of gene 
editing 
X      X X  X    
Quantum 
computing 
 X    X        
Control society 
— surveillance 
profiling 
    X   X      
Autonomous 
weapons 
X X  X      X    
Brain 
manipulation 
    X   X      
Misuse of 
robotisation 
X X  X      X    
Overreliance 
on AI 
    X   X      
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Issues Terrorism Cybersecurity 
Organised 
crime 
Defence Privacy Cryptography CBRN-E 
Ethical 
dimensions 
Social 
media 
Hybrid 
threats 
Law 
enforcement 
Supply of 
raw 
materials 
Block 
chains 
Addressed by the JRC 
Subversion of 
government — 
new 
governance 
    X   X     X 
Media 
changing the 
society 
X    X   X X     
High-tech 
crime 
 X X        X   
Blurring the 
line between 
security and 
defence 
X X  X      X    
Decrease of 
privacy 
 X   X   X      
New law 
enforcement 
techniques 
    X   X   X   
Robotisation — 
impact on 
society 
       X      
New use of 
resources 
  X         X  
Total 5 7 2 3 8 1 1 10 1 4 2 1 1 
Source: Authors. 
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4.2.3 Comments 
With regard to the main overarching discipline (Table 9), half of the issues fall under the heading 
‘physics/technology’ (including AI), which is not surprising, as issues relating to AI, robots, unmanned systems, 
etc. are very numerous. In addition, physics/technology issues are equally distributed between those already 
addressed by the JRC and those not yet or not sufficiently addressed. 
Maybe a more significant forward-looking observation is the relative importance of issues relating to life 
sciences. They represent one quarter of the issues (4 out of 16), but even more worthy of note is that they all 
belong to the group of issues that are not yet addressed by the JRC (4 out of 8). And the two issues with the 
largest numbers of votes are life sciences ones. This may indicates a trend that will need to be monitored 
with increased care: the growing role of manipulation of the living, raising all kinds of concerns, including with 
regard to security.  
This can be seen also in the topical aspects that characterise these security issues (Table 10): concerns about 
privacy and ethical dimensions (each relating to more than half of the issues) are the major topics by far that 
emerge from this analysis. 
More focused horizon-scanning sessions might allow fine-tuning of these first conclusions. 
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5 Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to provide in a single document a landscape review of security and defence R & D 
in the EU. For this purpose, a substantive part of the report has been dedicated to setting the scene, that is, 
describing current security threats, policy initiatives and strategies in place for combating them, the main 
stakeholders involved (including the specific contributions of the JRC) and the relevant legislation in the field. 
This overview has been carried out with a focus on various building blocks (i.e. thematic areas).  
The backstage picture has been completed with a history of the EU security and defence R & D programmes 
and funding. Against this background, 349 thematically relevant R & D projects financed from 2014 to 2018 
under the H2020 framework programme were identified and analysed on the basis of several criteria. 
Among the results obtained from the analysis of these projects, two are worth highlighting here. First, despite 
the fact that about one third of the projects are multi-thematic (i.e. linked to two or more building blocks), 
there is a very uneven thematic project distribution: whereas half of the projects deal with various 
cybersecurity aspects, several blocks, such as hybrid threats or countering terrorism financing, have a very low 
number of projects. There is obviously potential for more thematically balanced project selection in the future. 
Second, the overwhelming majority (90 %) of the projects were characterised as having potential dual-use 
applications, meaning that their outputs with civil application could also be used in the defence sector. More 
fine-tuned analysis is however needed on this important aspect. 
Finally, suggestions for future avenues for security and defence research have been made for each building 
block specifically, and, furthermore, the results of a foresight exercise carried out in the JRC hint at the 
importance of life sciences for the future and the attention that will need to be paid to the growing role of 
manipulation of the living, which raises all kinds of concerns, including in terms of security. 
This 2019 edition of this landscape report is meant to be the basis for an online living document, to be 
updated with new data and analysis when appropriate. A potential avenue for future enrichment would be an 
analysis of EU-funded R & D projects in terms of achieved outputs and impact on society at large (e.g. 
innovation, policy development, knowledge transfer and dissemination, etc.), once the H2020 framework 
programme is completed. Another area for future deeper analysis is the dual-use potential of such projects. 
This last analysis being undertaken by the editorial team for this report and should be available early in 2020. 
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eu-LISA  European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
EUMETSAT European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites 
EUMSS  European Union maritime security strategy 
Eurodac  European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database 
Europol  European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation 
Eurosur  European Border Surveillance System 
FATF  Financial Action Task Force 
FP7  Seventh framework programme for research and technological development 
Frontex  European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
GHSA  Global Health Security Agenda 
GNSS  global navigation satellite system(s) 
GPS  Global Positioning System 
GSA  European Global Navigation Satellite Systems Agency 
H2020  Horizon 2020 
HR/VP  High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President 
of the Commission 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency 
IcSP  Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 
ICT  information and communication technology 
IFBA  International Federation of Biosafety Associations 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
Interpol  International Criminal Police Organisation 
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IoT  internet of things 
ISEC  prevention of and fight against crime programme 
ISF  Internal Security Fund 
ISIL  Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant  
ISIS  Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
ITU  United Nations International Telecommunication Union 
JITs  Joint Investigation Teams 
JRC  Joint Research Centre 
KET  key enabling technology 
MFF  multiannual financial framework 
MO  modus operandi 
MSB  money service business 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCFF  Natural Capital Financing Facility 
NEO  near-Earth objects 
NGO  non-governmental organisation 
NIS  network and information security 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OIE  World Organisation for Animal Health  
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
PADR  preparatory action on defence research 
PASR  preparatory action on security research 
PCEI  protection of critical energy infrastructures 
PESCO  permanent structured cooperation 
PF4EE  Private Finance for Energy Efficiency 
PNR  passenger name record(s) 
PNT  positioning, navigation and timing 
R & D  research and development 
R & T  research and technological development 
Railpol  European Network of Railway Police Forces 
SatCen  European Union Satellite Centre 
SIS  Schengen Information System 
SMEs  small and medium-sized enterprises 
SoC/SiP  system-on-a-chip/system-in-a-package 
SSA  space situational awareness 
SST  space surveillance and tracking 
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
TFTP  Terrorist Finance Tracking Program 
UAV  unmanned aerial vehicle 
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UN  United Nations 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNODC  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
VIS  Visa Information System 
WHO  World Health Organization 
WMO  World Meteorological Organization 
ACER  Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
AIRPOL  EU Airport Police Network  
BTWC  Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
C2  Command and Control 
CBRN-E  Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive 
CCDCOE  Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
CEAS  Common European Asylum System 
CERT-EU  Computer Emergency Response Team of the European Union 
CF SEDSS  Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector 
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CI  Critical infrastructure 
CIPRNet  Critical Infrastructure Preparedness and Resilience Research Network 
CIWIN  Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network 
CoR  The European Committee of the Regions 
cPPP  Contractual public private partnership 
CRM  Critical raw material  
CSDP  Common Security and Defence Policy 
CWC  Chemical Weapons Convention 
DG CNECT Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology  
DG DEVCO Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development 
DG ECHO  Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 
DG ENER  Directorate-General for Energy 
DG ENV  Directorate-General for Environment 
DG GROW  Directorate‑General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs 
DG HOME  Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs 
DG MARE  Directorate‑General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 
DG MOVE  Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport 
DG REGIO  Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy 
DG RTD  Directorate-General for Research and Innovation 
DG SANTE Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety 
DG TRADE  Directorate-General for Trade 
EASME  European Agency for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
EASO  European Asylum Support Office 
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EBSA  European Biosafety Association 
ECDC  European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control  
ECI  European Critical Infrastructure 
ECTC  European Counter Terrorism Centre 
EC3  European Cybercrime Centre 
EDA  European Defence Agency 
EDAP  European Defence Action Plan 
EDIDP  European Defence Industrial Development Programme 
EDPS  European Data Protection Supervisor 
EDRP  European Defence Research Programme 
EEAS  European External Action Service 
EFCA  European Fisheries Control Agency 
EFSA  European Food Safety Authority 
EIP  European Innovation Partnership 
EIS  Europol Information System 
EISAC  European Infrastructures Simulation & Analysis Centre 
EIT  European Institute of Innovation and Technology 
EMSA  European Maritime Safety Agency 
ENER  European Network of Experts on Radicalisation 
ENISA  European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
ENLETS  European Network of Law Enforcement Technology Services  
ENSEC CoE Energy Security Centre of Excellence 
EO  Earth Observation 
EPE  Europol Platform for Experts 
EPCIP  European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
ERDF  European Regional Development Fund 
ERECON  European Rare Earth Competency Network 
ERNCIP  European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection  
ESDP  European Security and Defence Policy 
ESA  European Space Agency 
ESS  European Security Strategy 
ETIAS  European Travel Information and Authorisation System 
ETSI  European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
EUGS  EU Global Strategy 
EU IRU  European Union Internet Referral Unit 
EUISS  European Union Institute for Security Studies 
eu-LISA  European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of 
freedom, security and justice 
EUMSS  European Union Maritime Security Strategy 
EURODAC  European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database 
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EUROPOL  European Police Office 
EUROSUR  European Border Surveillance System 
EWRS  Early Warning and Response System 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
FATF  Financial Action Task Force 
FP7  7th Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development 
Frontex  European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
GDPR  General Data Protection Regulation 
GEO  Geostationary orbit 
GHSA  Global Health Security Agenda 
GHSI  Global Health Security Initiative 
GNSS  Global Navigation Satellite System 
GOVSATCOM Governmental Satellite Communications 
GPS  Global Positioning System 
GSA  European Global Navigation Satellite Systems Agency 
HES  Higher or Secondary Education Establishments 
HR  High Representative 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency 
IcSP  Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 
ICTs  Information and communication technologies 
IFBA  International Federation of Biosafety Associations 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
IMINT  Imagery Intelligence 
INSC  Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 
INTCEN  EU Intelligence and Situation Centre 
INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organisation 
ISACs  Sectorial Information Sharing and Analysis Centres 
ISF  Internal Security Fund 
ISIL  Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant  
ISIS  Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
ISS  Internal Security Strategy 
ITU  United Nation International Telecommunication Union 
J-CAT  Cybercrime Action Taskforce 
JISD  Joint Intelligence and Security Division of NATO 
JITs  Joint Investigation Teams 
JRC  Joint Research Centre 
KETs  Key Enabling Technologies 
MFF  Multiannual financial framework 
MS  Member State 
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NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NIS  Network and information security 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OIE  Office international des épizooties  
OPCW  Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
OSCE  Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
OSP  Operator Security Plan 
PADR  Preparatory Action for Defence Research 
PCEI  Protection of critical energy infrastructures 
PESCO  Permanent Structured Cooperation 
PNR  EU Passenger Name Records 
PPP  Public private partnership 
R&D  Research and development 
R&T  Research and technological development 
RAILPOL  European Network of Railway Police Forces 
RAN  Radicalisation Awareness Network 
RPAS  Remotely piloted airborne systems 
SatCen  European Union Satellite Centre 
SATCOM  Satellite Communications 
SG  Secretary-General of the European Commission 
SIENA  Secure Information Exchange Network Application 
SIS II  Schengen Information System  
SoC/SiP  System-on-a-Chip/System-in-Package 
SSA  Space Situational Awareness 
SWE  Space Weather 
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
TNCEIP  Thematic Network on Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection 
UAS  Unmanned aircraft systems 
UAV  Unmanned aircraft vehicles 
UN  United Nations 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNICRI  United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute 
UNODC  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
VDES  Vessel Data Exchange System 
VIS  Visa Information System 
VP  Vice-President 
WHO  World Health Organisation 
WMD  Weapons of mass destruction 
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Country codes: 
AL Albania LT Lithuania 
AT Austria LU Luxembourg 
AU Australia LV Latvia 
BA Bosnia and Herzegovina MD Moldova 
BE Belgium MK North Macedonia 
BG Bulgaria ML Mali 
BR Brazil MT Malta 
CH Switzerland MY Malaysia 
CN China NL Netherlands 
CU Cuba NO Norway 
CY Cyprus PL Poland 
CZ Czechia PT Portugal 
DE Germany RO Romania 
DK Denmark RS Serbia 
EE Estonia RU Russia 
EL Greece SE Sweden 
ES Spain SG Singapore 
FI Finland SI Slovenia 
FR France SK Slovakia 
GE Georgia TH Thailand 
GI Gibraltar TN Tunisia 
HK Hong Kong TR Turkey 
HR Croatia TW Taiwan 
HU Hungary UA Ukraine 
IE Ireland UK United Kingdom 
IL Israel US United States 
IN India VN Vietnam 
IS Iceland XK Kosovo 
IT Italy YE Yemen 
KR South Korea ZA South Africa 
 
 191 
List of figures 
Figure 1: Key suppliers of critical raw materials (CRMs) for advanced Lithium-ion batteries, fuel cells, 
robotics, drones and 3D printing ........................................................................................................................................................................... 30 
Figure 2: Historical timeline of the EU security strategies ................................................................................................................. 94 
Figure 3: Missions and cross-cutting areas of security research under FP7 ........................................................................... 99 
Figure 4: Structure of Horizon 2020 .............................................................................................................................................................. 103 
Figure 5: Distribution of H2020 budget....................................................................................................................................................... 104 
Figure 6: Proposed structure of Horizon Europe .................................................................................................................................... 111 
Figure 7: Overview of European security research, including advisory bodies ................................................................... 113 
Figure 8: Differences between R & T and R & D in terms of technology readiness levels (TRLs) .......................... 116 
Figure 9: Structure and details of the European Defence Fund ................................................................................................... 119 
Figure 10: Overview of the evolution of European Defence Research under EU funds and associated 
legislation .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 122 
Figure 11: Proportions of projects by building block (%) .................................................................................................................. 129 
Figure 12: Distribution of projects by number of building blocks to which they contribute (%) ............................. 129 
Figure 13: Breakdown of projects by building block ............................................................................................................................ 130 
Figure 14: Proportions of projects by priority (%) ................................................................................................................................. 130 
Figure 15: Distribution of projects by number of priorities to which they contribute (%) ........................................... 131 
Figure 16: Distribution of projects by priorities and building blocks (%) ............................................................................... 131 
Figure 17: Numbers of projects by main focus ...................................................................................................................................... 132 
Figure 18: Numbers of projects by priority and main focus........................................................................................................... 133 
Figure 19: Numbers of projects funded under Programme 3.7 and under other programmes .............................. 135 
Figure 20: Numbers of projects by H2020 funding programme ................................................................................................. 136 
Figure 21: Distribution of projects by building block and funding programme .................................................................. 136 
Figure 22: Numbers of projects to which EU Member States contribute ............................................................................... 137 
Figure 23: Numbers of projects to which non-EU countries contribute .................................................................................. 138 
Figure 24: Numbers of contributing organisations by legal status ........................................................................................... 138 
Figure 25: Numbers of contributions from organisations by legal status ............................................................................ 139 
Figure 26: Distribution of contributions from organisations by legal status and by building block ..................... 140 
Figure 27: Distribution of contributions from organisations by legal status and by priority .................................... 140 
Figure 28: Numbers of projects by building block and dual-use potential ........................................................................... 141 
Figure 29: Numbers of projects by priority and dual-use potential .......................................................................................... 141 
Figure 30: Overview of JRC actions and deliverables in the area of border control, 2018 ........................................ 143 
Figure 31: Overview of JRC actions and deliverables in the area of critical infrastructure, 2018 ........................ 144 
Figure 32: Overview of JRC actions and deliverables in the area of protection of public spaces, 2018-2019
 ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 145 
Figure 33: Overview of JRC actions and deliverables in the area of critical supplies, 2018-2020 ...................... 146 
Figure 34: Overview of JRC actions and deliverables in the area of cybersecurity, 2018 ......................................... 148 
 192 
Figure 35: Overview of JRC actions and deliverables in the area of CBRN-E, 2018 ...................................................... 150 
Figure 36: Overview of JRC actions and deliverables in the area of hybrid threats, 2018 ........................................ 151 
Figure 37: Overview of JRC actions and deliverables in the area of space, 2018 ........................................................... 152 
Figure 38: Horizon scanning mapping and prioritisation .................................................................................................................. 159 
 
 193 
List of tables 
Table 1: Non-exhaustive list of assaults against various types of public spaces in Europe in recent years, 
indicating the modus operandi (MO) ................................................................................................................................................................... 23 
Table 2: Timeline of implementation of the EU cyberdefence policy framework ................................................................ 38 
Table 3: Distribution of projects, participation and funding in FP7 security research ....................................................... 99 
Table 4: The ESRIA research content clusters and cluster components .................................................................................. 100 
Table 5: Distribution of budget for Societal challenges under H2020 (36) ............................................................................ 104 
Table 6: Evolution of topics in the Horizon 2020 Secure Societies work programmes (WPs) .................................. 105 
Table 7: Defence research projects funded using the EU budget: pilot project and preliminary action (updated 
in December 2018) ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 123 
Table 8: Structure of Horizon 2020 funding by programme, including a breakdown of the ‘Secure societies’ 
programme (Programme 3.7, in red) ............................................................................................................................................................... 134 
Table 9: Horizon scanning: security issues by main overarching discipline .......................................................................... 163 
Table 10: Horizon scanning: security issues by main topical aspects ...................................................................................... 164 
Table 11: Distribution of projects by building block ............................................................................................................................. 222 
Table 12: Distribution of projects by number of building blocks to which they contribute ........................................ 222 
Table 13: Number of projects related to different building block............................................................................................... 223 
Table 14: Distribution of projects by priority ............................................................................................................................................ 224 
Table 15: Distribution of projects by number of priorities to which they contribute ...................................................... 224 
Table 16: Distribution of projects by priority and building block ................................................................................................. 224 
Table 17: Number of projects by main focus........................................................................................................................................... 225 
Table 18: Number of projects by building block and main focus ................................................................................................ 226 
Table 19: Number of projects by priority and main focus ............................................................................................................... 230 
Table 20: Number of projects funded under Programme 3.7 and under other programmes ................................... 232 
Table 21: Number of projects per H2020 funding programme ................................................................................................... 233 
Table 22: Distribution of projects by building block and funding programme .................................................................... 234 
Table 23: Number of projects to which countries contribute ......................................................................................................... 234 
Table 24: Number of projects by building block to which countries contribute ................................................................. 236 
Table 25: Number of contributing organisations by legal status ................................................................................................ 246 
Table 26 Number of contributions from organisations by legal status and role .............................................................. 246 
Table 27: Number of contributions from organisations by building block, legal status and role ........................... 246 
Table 28: Number of contributions from organisations by priority, legal status and role .......................................... 249 
Table 29: Number of projects with dual-use potential ...................................................................................................................... 249 
Table 30: Number of projects by priority and dual-use potential ............................................................................................... 250 
Table 31: Number of projects by building block and dual-use potential ................................................................................ 250 
Table 32: Entities participating in at least 2 projects related to "Border control" ............................................................. 251 
Table 33: Entities participating in at least 2 projects related to "CBRN-E" ........................................................................... 252 
Table 34: Entities participating in at least 2 projects related to "Combating radicalisation" .................................... 252 
 194 
Table 35: Entities participating in at least 2 projects related to "Critical infrastructures" .......................................... 252 
Table 36: Entities participating in projects related to "Critical supplies"................................................................................. 253 
Table 37: Entities participating in at least 4 projects related to "Cybersecurity" .............................................................. 254 
Table 38: Entities participating in at least 2 projects related to "Defence" .......................................................................... 255 
Table 39: Entities participating in projects related to "Hybrid threats" .................................................................................... 255 
Table 40 Entities participating in at least 2 projects related to "Public spaces" ................................................................ 256 
Table 41: Entities participating in projects related to "Space" ....................................................................................................... 257 
Table 42: Entities participating in at least 2 projects related to "Terrorism financing" ................................................. 258 
 
 195 
Annexes 
Annex 1. List of European critical infrastructure sectors as listed in Directive 2008/114/EC 
Sector Subsector 
I Energy 
 
1. Electricity 
 
Infrastructures and facilities for generation and transmission of electricity 
in respect of supply electricity 
2.  Oil 
 
Oil production, refining, treatment, storage and transmission by pipelines 
3. Gas 
 
Gas production, refining, treatment, storage and transmission by pipelines 
Liquefied natural gas terminals 
II Transport 
 
4. Road transport 
 
5. Rail transport 
 
6. Air transport 
 
7. Inland waterways transport 
 
8. Ocean and short-sea shipping and ports 
 
 
Annex 2. Examples of critical infrastructure disruptions 
Below are given examples of critical infrastructure disruptions due to accidental, natural, or intentional causes. 
Unless specified, they are taken from Setola et al. (2016) 
Year Critical infrastructure disruptions 
2001 On 18 July 2001, train wagons containing chloride acid derailed in a downtown tunnel in Baltimore, 
the United States. Firefighters, in the absence of information about the presence of chloride acid on 
the train, decided to let the train burn. Also unknown was that a high-pressure water mains, a set of 
glass fibres and a power transmission cable were located close to the same tunnel. Because of the 
fire, the water transport pipeline to downtown burst open. As a result, over 70 million gallons of water 
flooded downtown streets and houses, the drinking water supply failed and the firefighters lost their 
water supply. Glass fibres melted and caused a noticeable worldwide slowdown of the internet as 
well as local and international telephony outages. Over 1 200 buildings lost power. 
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Year Critical infrastructure disruptions 
2001 The collapse of the World Trade Center owing to the events of 9/11 caused the inoperability of many 
infrastructures (electricity, water, gas, communication, steam distribution, etc.) in a large area of 
Manhattan. Moreover, the presence in that area of important telecommunication nodes induced 
degradation in telecommunication and internet availability outside the United States. This major 
impact was caused by the co-location of a multitude of vital critical infrastructures inside the World 
Trade Center. In those buildings were hosted the Port Authority Emergency Management Center, the 
Office of Emergency Management Operations Center, electrical power substations, steam and gas 
distribution facilities and metro stations. Moreover, the emergency operations were affected by such 
extreme co-location. For instance, the Verizon building at 140 West Street. contained 306 000 
telephony and over 55 000 data lines from 30 operators and provided services to 34 000 customers 
in lower Manhattan. A set of these lines was connected to antennae for first responders and mobile 
telephony on the roofs of the World Trade Centre towers and adjacent buildings. Communication 
capacity for the first responders was almost immediately lost because of fire and the collapse of the 
towers. Data and telephony services failed as the Verizon building became damaged by falling debris. 
Lines were cut and backup power was lost because of the flooding of batteries. Many of the 
communication backup lines for first responders and agencies involved in disaster management were 
co-located with the primary circuits and failed. The remaining fixed and wireless communication for 
emergency response failed, as police did not allow Verizon to refill the fuel tanks for their backup 
power generators at two other, still operational, communication switch locations. During the recovery 
phase, police did not allow crews of all co-located operators to enter the closed-off area; only Verizon 
crews were allowed to work on repairs. By wearing Verizon T-shirts, AT&T repair crews and crews 
from other telecommunication companies were able to enter the area and perform their work. 
2004 During the night of 31 December there was a problem with the air-conditioning system of an 
important telecommunication node in Rome, Italy. The problem had not been adequately managed, 
causing an increased degradation up to the complete collapse of the node. The operator had no way 
of predicting which services would be impacted by the failure. It decided to not provide any warning 
while trying to solve the problem internally. Unfortunately, it was unable to manage the situation. The 
direct consequence was the cessation for 6 hours of all wired and mobile telephone communication 
in a large area of Rome. And, as an indirect consequence, more than 5 000 banks and 3 000 postal 
offices nationwide were without communications. In addition, 70% of check-in desks at Rome airport 
were inoperable. Finally, a blackout nearly occurred because the electrical distribution system 
operators abruptly lost the ability to supervise and manage half of Rome’s power grid. 
2010 In mid-April 2010, the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland erupted through a fast-cooling ice cap (a so-
called VEI 4 class eruption). As a result, glass particles were blown into the air and transported to 
Europe in several waves during a month. Depending on the jet stream, some 30 European nations 
had to close down their airspace, affecting hundred thousands of passengers. Just-in-time transport 
by plane, for example of repair parts and of medicines and donor organs for transplantation, could 
not take place. The financial loss for the tourist sector was EUR 1 billion. The air transport industry 
lost EUR 1.5-2.5 billion. The worldwide impact on gross domestic product was USD 5 billion. 
2015 and 2017 
(Styczinski et al., 
2016) 
On 23 December 2015, three Ukrainian electricity distribution companies suffered widespread power 
outages due to a cyberattack. In the first known cyber-enabled disruption of electricity service, the 
attacks were executed every 30 minutes and resulted in outages for 225 000 customers for 1-6 
hours. An investigation is under way regarding a second attack on Ukraine’s power grid that resulted 
in parts of the capital, Kiev, being without power on 17-18 December 2016. The attackers hijacked 
distribution-level industrial control systems and issued commands through a human–machine 
interface that resulted in power outages. Meanwhile, the attackers locked out the grid operators to 
diminish the operators’ ability to override the attack. 
2016 On 4 January 2016, a special weather condition caused a layer of 5 cm of black ice in the north of 
the Netherlands, which impacted various critical infrastructures for several days. High voltage lines 
develop a ‘wing profile’, causing dangling of the lines, with power dips as a result. Hospitals regarded 
the risk of power outages as too high and stopped all non-essential surgeries. Schools were closed. 
Road and rail transport was generally not possible. Milk collection at farms was halted. Milk products 
could not be produced and distributed to supermarkets across a large part of the Netherlands. The air 
force was unable to scramble their F16s. 
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Annex 3. Permanent structured cooperation projects 
This annex lists the 34 approved PESCO projects (see Section 2.11.4), and was taken from 
https://pesco.europa.eu/ on 16 April 2019. The projects are ordered under thematic headings.  
Training, facilities 
—      European Union Training Mission Competence Centre (EU TMCC) 
—      European Training Certification Centre for European Armies 
—      Helicopter Hot and High Training (H3 Training) 
—      Joint EU Intelligence School 
—      EU Test and Evaluation Centres 
Land, formations, 
systems 
—      Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package 
—      Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle / Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light Armoured 
Vehicle 
—      Indirect Fire Support Capability (EuroArtillery) 
—      EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC) 
—      Integrated Unmanned Ground System (UGS) 
—      EU Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) Land Battlefield Missile Systems 
Maritime 
—      Maritime (semi) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM) 
—      Harbour and Maritime Surveillance and Protection (HARMSPRO) 
—      Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance 
—      Deployable Modular Underwater Intervention Capability Package (Divepack) 
Air, systems 
—      European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems – 
MALE RPAS (Eurodrone) 
—      European Attack Helicopters TIGER Mark III 
—      Counter Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS) 
Enabling, joint 
—      European Medical Command 
—      Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations 
—      Military Mobility 
—      Energy Operational Function (EOF) 
—      Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Surveillance as a Service 
(CBRN SaaS) 
—      Co-basing 
—      Geo-meteorological and Oceanographic (GeoMETOC) Support Coordination 
Element (GMSCE) 
Cyber, C4ISR 
—      European Secure Software defined Radio (ESSOR) 
—      Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform 
—      Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security 
—      Strategic Command and Control (C2) System for CSDP Missions and Operations 
—      European High Atmosphere Airship Platform (EHAAP) – Persistent Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capability 
—      One Deployable Special Operations Forces (SOF) Tactical Command and Control 
(C2) Command Post (CP) for Small Joint Operations (SJO) – (SOCC) for SJO 
—      Electronic Warfare Capability and Interoperability Programme for Future Joint 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) Cooperation 
Space —      EU Radio Navigation Solution (EURAS) 
—      European Military Space Surveillance Awareness Network (EU-SSA-N) 
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Annex 4. Horizon 2020 security- and defence-related projects (master table) 
Project id 
Project 
acronym 
Programme Project title Start Date End Date Total Cost (€) 
EC Max 
Contribution 
(€) 
Call 
Coordinator 
Country 
Participant 
Countries 
Building block(s) Priority(ies) Main focus(es) 
Dual 
Use 
700829 
3D-
Forensics/FTI 
H2020-EU.3.; 
H2020-EU.2. 
Mobile high-resolution 3D-Scanner and 3D data 
analysis for forensic evidence fast track to 
innovation 
1/07/2016 31/12/2018 1 582 384 1 219 389 
H2020-
FTIPilot-
2015-1 
DE DE;UK;NL;IT Other 
Organised 
crime 
Law enforcement;  
Forensics 
YES 
671562 5G-ENSURE H2020-EU.2.1.1.3. 
5G Enablers for Network and System Security and 
Resilience 
1/11/2015 31/10/2017 7 584 046 7 584 046 
H2020-ICT-
2014-2 
FI FR;SE;UK;IT;ES;FI Cybersecurity Cybercrime ICT YES 
664354 ADWICE H2020-EU.4.a. 
Advanced Wireless Technologies for Clever 
Engineering 
1/06/2015 31/05/2016 349 687 349 687 
H2020-
WIDESPREA
D-2014-1 
CZ AT Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
740647 AEGIS 
H2020-EU.3.7.6.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.4.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.8. 
Accelerating EU-US DialoGue for Research and 
Innovation in CyberSecurity and Privacy 
1/05/2017 30/04/2019 744 263 500 000 
H2020-DS-
SC7-2016 
ES US;IE;IT Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy NO 
673751 AIRIMGO 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
ADVANCE IRIS RECOGNITION IN MOVE 1/07/2015 31/12/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
ES 
 
Public spaces; 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Privacy YES 
740859 ALADDIN 
H2020-EU.3.7.6.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.1. 
Advanced hoListic Adverse Drone Detection, 
Identification Neutralization 
1/09/2017 31/08/2020 4 998 240 4 998 240 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
FR 
PL;ES;EL;IT;DE; 
BE;PT; FR;UK 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Organised 
crime 
Law enforcement; 
UAV 
YES 
700002 ALFA H2020-EU.3.7. 
Advanced Low Flying Aircrafts Detection and 
Tracking 
1/01/2017 31/12/2019 4 613 831 4 613 831 
H2020-
BES-2015 
AT NL;DE;ES; PT;IT 
Border control; 
Public spaces; 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Organised 
crime; Terrorism 
& radicalisation 
UAV YES 
740972 
ALGSTRONGC
RYPTO 
H2020-EU.1.1. Algebraic Methods for Stronger Crypto 1/10/2017 30/09/2022 2 447 439 2 447 439 
ERC-2016-
ADG 
NL 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography YES 
669891 AlmaCrypt H2020-EU.1.1. Algorithmic and Mathematical Cryptology 1/01/2016 31/12/2020 2 403 125 2 403 125 
ERC-2014-
ADG 
FR FR Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography YES 
731558 ANASTACIA 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
Advanced Networked Agents for Security and 
Trust Assessment in CPS/IOT Architectures 
1/01/2017 31/12/2019 5 420 209 3 999 209 
H2020-DS-
LEIT-2016 
IT 
CH;ES;FR; 
EL;FI;IT;IE 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime CPS; IoT YES 
672109 Andrupos 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Automatic non-destructive recognition of used 
printing techniques on substrates 
1/04/2015 30/09/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
DE DE;NL 
Terrorism 
financing 
Organised 
crime; Terrorism 
& radicalisation 
Law enforcement;  
Forensics 
YES 
700085 ARIES H2020-EU.3.7. reliAble euRopean Identity EcoSystem 1/09/2016 28/02/2019 2 247 003 2 247 003 
H2020-FCT-
2015 
ES 
FR;BE;UK; 
ES;PT;CZ 
Border control; 
Cybersecurity 
Cybercrime; 
Organised 
crime 
Biometrics; Law 
enforcement 
YES 
688237 ARMOUR H2020-EU.2.1.1. Large-Scale Experiments of IoT Security Trust 1/02/2016 31/01/2018 1 999 559 1 999 559 
H2020-ICT-
2015 
FR FR;ES;PT;EL;BE Cybersecurity Cybercrime IoT; ICT YES 
700381 ASGARD H2020-EU.3.7. Analysis System for Gathered Raw Data 1/09/2016 29/02/2020 11 992 556 11 992 553 
H2020-FCT-
2015 
ES 
SE;DE;BE; 
AT;ES;IE;EL;NL; 
FR;CY;PT;FI;IT;UK 
Other 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Organised 
crime 
Forensics; Law 
enforcement 
YES 
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677917 ASYFAIR H2020-EU.1.1. 
Fair and Consistent Border Controls? A Critical, 
Multimethodological and Interdiscipli-nary Study 
of Asylum Adjudication in Europe 
1/09/2016 31/08/2021 1 252 067 1 252 067 
ERC-2015-
STG 
UK 
 
Border control 
 
Ethical dimension NO 
700581 ATENA H2020-EU.3.7. 
Advanced Tools to assEss and mitigate the 
criticality of ICT compoNents and their 
dependencies over Critical InfrAstructures 
1/05/2016 30/04/2019 8 111 938 6 889 925 
H2020-DS-
2015-1 
IT 
LU;ES;BE;IT;PT; 
EE;IL 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Cybersecurity 
Cybercrime 
 
YES 
653590 AUGGMED H2020-EU.3.7. 
Automated Serious Game Scenario Generator for 
Mixed Reality Training 
1/06/2015 31/05/2018 5 535 674 5 535 674 
H2020-FCT-
2014 
UK 
UK;ES;IL;DE;EL; 
BE 
Other 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Organised 
crime 
Law enforcement;  
Training 
YES 
781707 Babbler 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Babbler feasibility study in adjacent market 
segments. 
8/05/2017 7/10/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
NL 
 
Border control 
Organised 
crime 
IoT; Supply chain YES 
640110 BASTION H2020-EU.1.1. 
Leveraging Binary Analysis to Secure the Internet 
of Things 
1/03/2015 29/02/2020 1 472 269 1 472 269 
ERC-2014-
STG 
DE 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime IoT YES 
774802 
BlockchainKY
C 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Blockchain-based, 100% automated KYC (Know 
Your Customer) service 
1/07/2017 30/11/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
IS 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
Biometrics; 
Blockchain 
YES 
653676 BODEGA H2020-EU.3.7. 
BOrdDErGuArd - Proactive Enhancement of 
Human Performance in Border Control 
1/06/2015 30/09/2018 4 999 238 4 999 238 
H2020-
BES-2014 
FI 
FI;AT;IT;FR;BE; 
ES;EL 
Border control 
 
Ethical dimension NO 
767454 BOTFIND H2020-EU.1.1. 
BOTFIND:  Finding Bots, Detect Harassing 
Automation, and Restoring Trust in Social Media 
Civic Engagement 
1/08/2017 31/01/2019 149 921 149 921 
ERC-2017-
PoC 
UK 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Social media YES 
700380 BROADMAP H2020-EU.3.7. 
Mapping Interoperable EU PPDR Broadband 
Communication Applications and Technology 
1/05/2016 30/04/2017 2 169 138 2 169 138 
H2020-
DRS-2015 
BE 
FI;BE;IT;NO; 
HR;BA;IE; 
SE;RO;DE; 
EL;ES;IL;FR;NL 
Public spaces 
 
Communication 
technologies;  
Emergency 
YES 
700294 C3ISP H2020-EU.3.7. 
Collaborative and Confidential Information 
Sharing and Analysis for Cyber Protection 
1/10/2016 30/09/2019 5 000 045 4 176 446 
H2020-DS-
2015-1 
IT UK;FR;DE;IT;PL Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
740736 CAMELOT 
H2020-EU.3.7.3.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.7. 
C2 Advanced Multi-domain Environment and Live 
Observation Technologies 
1/05/2017 30/04/2020 9 942 598 8 020 921 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
PT 
RO;FR;IE; 
BG;PL;UK; BE; 
CH;PT; EL;ES 
Border control 
 
Surveillance YES 
700540 CANVAS H2020-EU.3.7. 
Constructing an Alliance for Value-driven 
Cybersecurity 
1/09/2016 31/08/2019 1 569 125 1 000 000 
H2020-DS-
2015-1 
CH 
ES;CH;IE; 
DE;BE;FI;NL 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Ethical dimension YES 
653748 CARISMAND H2020-EU.3.7. 
Culture And RISk management in Man-made And 
Natural Disasters 
1/10/2015 30/09/2018 3 788 526 3 788 526 
H2020-
DRS-2014 
NL 
IT;RO;PT;NL; 
ES;UK;FR; 
BG;MT;RS;DE 
Other 
 
Disaster 
management; Ethical 
dimension 
YES 
695305 Cathedral H2020-EU.1.1. 
Post-Snowden Circuits and Design Methods for 
Security 
1/09/2016 31/08/2021 2 369 250 2 369 250 
ERC-2015-
AdG 
BE 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography YES 
653323 C-BORD H2020-EU.3.7. 
Effective Container inspection at BORDer control 
points 
1/06/2015 30/11/2018 11 826 453 11 826 453 
H2020-
BES-2014 
FR 
PL;FR;UK; 
NO;IT;DE; 
NL;HU;BE 
Border control; 
CBRN-E 
Organised 
crime 
Supply chain YES 
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731456 certMILS 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
Compositional security certification for medium- 
to high-assurance COTS-based systems in 
environments with emerging threats 
1/01/2017 31/12/2020 5 616 544 3 999 056 
H2020-DS-
LEIT-2016 
AT CZ;DE;ES;AT Cybersecurity Cybercrime Certification; CPS YES 
780075 CHARIOT H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
Cognitive Heterogeneous Architecture for 
Industrial IoT 
1/01/2018 31/12/2020 4 928 563 4 928 563 
H2020-IOT-
2017 
UK EL;FR;IT;IE;CY;BE Cybersecurity Cybercrime Blockchain; IoT YES 
674716 ChemSniff 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Chemical sniffer device for multi-mode analysis of 
threat compounds 
1/09/2015 30/04/2018 2 262 000 1 577 030 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2014 
NL UK 
CBRN-E; Public 
spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
700378 CIPSEC H2020-EU.3.7. 
Enhancing Critical Infrastructure Protection with 
innovative SECurity framework 
1/05/2016 30/04/2019 7 017 235 5 258 316 
H2020-DS-
2015-1 
ES 
RO;DE;EL; 
CH;ES;IL;UK;IT 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Cybersecurity 
Cybercrime; 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
ICT YES 
700665 CITADEL H2020-EU.3.7. 
Critical Infrastructure Protection using Adaptive 
MILS 
1/06/2016 31/05/2019 6 065 267 4 842 819 
H2020-DS-
2015-1 
UK 
DE;UK;SE; 
AT;IT;FR;CZ;NL; 
ES 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Cybersecurity 
Cybercrime; 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
ICT YES 
653811 CITYCoP H2020-EU.3.7. 
Citizen Interaction Technologies Yield Community 
Policing 
1/06/2015 31/05/2018 5 576 716 5 576 716 
H2020-FCT-
2014 
NL 
IT;BE;DE; 
RO;FR;AT; 
UK;PT;NO; 
MT;ES;RS;BG 
Other 
 
Law enforcement; 
Social sciences 
YES 
757279 CIVICS H2020-EU.1.1. Criminality, Victimization and Social Interactions 1/03/2018 28/02/2023 1 187 046 1 187 046 
ERC-2017-
STG 
NO NO Other 
Organised 
crime 
Social sciences NO 
700197 CIVILEX H2020-EU.3.7. Supporting European Civilian External Actions 1/05/2016 30/04/2017 1 100 351 1 100 351 
H2020-
BES-2015 
ES NL;IT;DE;ES Defence 
 
External security;  
Information exchange 
YES 
644024 CLARUS H2020-EU.2.1.1.3. 
A FRAMEWORK FOR USER CENTRED PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY IN THE CLOUD 
1/01/2015 31/12/2017 4 193 548 4 193 548 
H2020-ICT-
2014-1 
ES FR;DE;ES;UK;BE Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy; Cloud; ICT YES 
781400 CLTRe 
H2020-EU.2.1.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
The Cybersecurity Behavioural Toolkit 1/06/2017 30/11/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
NO 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Social sciences YES 
740712 COMPACT H2020-EU.3.7.4. 
COmpetitive Methods to protect local Public 
Administration from Cyber security Threats 
1/05/2017 31/10/2019 4 283 480 3 648 793 
H2020-DS-
SC7-2016 
IT 
IT;DE;ES;AT;UK; 
PT;BE 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
NO 
653454 CREDENTIAL H2020-EU.3.7. Secure Cloud Identity Wallet 1/10/2015 30/09/2018 6 686 660 5 978 083 
H2020-DS-
2014-1 
AT 
AT;IT;DE;ES;LU; 
EL;SE 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy; Cloud YES 
740723 CS-AWARE H2020-EU.3.7.4. 
A cybersecurity situational awareness and 
information sharing solution for local public 
administrations based on advanced big data 
analysis 
1/09/2017 31/08/2020 4 648 363 3 728 604 
H2020-DS-
SC7-2016 
FI 
IT;UK;AT;EL;IE; 
DK;DE;NL 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
740920 CYBECO H2020-EU.3.7.4. 
Supporting Cyberinsurance from a  Behavioural 
Choice Perspective 
1/05/2017 30/04/2019 1 983 510 1 983 510 
H2020-DS-
SC7-2016 
EL ES;UK;FR;LU;NL Cybersecurity Cybercrime Social sciences NO 
740129 
cyberwatchin
g.eu 
H2020-EU.3.7.6.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.4.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.8. 
The European watch on cybersecurity  privacy 1/05/2017 30/04/2021 1 999 896 1 999 896 
H2020-DS-
SC7-2016 
UK IT;BE;ES;CH;UK Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy YES 
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684723 CYPRES 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
CYPRES the ICS and SCADA security companion 1/09/2015 28/02/2018 2 428 706 1 700 094 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2015 
FR FR 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces; 
Cybersecurity 
Cybercrime 
 
YES 
730843 CYRail H2020-EU.3.4.8.2. Cybersecurity in the RAILway sector 1/10/2016 30/09/2018 1 498 150 1 498 150 
H2020-
S2RJU-OC-
2015-01-2 
PT FR;ES;SE;DE 
Cybersecurity; 
Hybrid threats 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Cybercrime 
Transport YES 
700367 DANTE H2020-EU.3.7. 
Detecting and ANalysing TErrorist-related online 
contents and financing activities 
1/09/2016 28/02/2019 6 199 229 4 998 528 
H2020-FCT-
2015 
IT 
AT;ES;EL; 
DE;IT;PT;FR;UK; 
BE;IE 
Terrorism 
financing; 
Combating 
radicalisation 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Law enforcement; 
Social media 
YES 
725349 DARE H2020-EU.3.6.1.2. Dialogue About Radicalisation and Equality 1/05/2017 30/04/2021 4 999 054 4 999 054 
H2020-
SC6-REV-
INEQUAL-
2016 
UK 
HR;NL;RU; 
TR;DE;UK; 
NO;PL;MT; 
FR;TN;BE;EL 
Combating 
radicalisation 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Violence;  Social 
sciences 
YES 
653289 DARWIN H2020-EU.3.7. 
Expecting the unexpected and know how to 
respond 
1/06/2015 31/05/2018 4 998 896 4 998 896 
H2020-
DRS-2014 
NO SE;IE;IT;IL;DE 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Cybersecurity 
Cybercrime; 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Disaster 
management; 
Resilience 
YES 
740898 DEFENDER 
H2020-EU.3.7.4.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.2. 
Defending the European Energy Infrastructures 1/05/2017 30/04/2020 8 859 938 6 790 838 
CIP-2016-
2017-1 
IT 
SI;IT;DE;RO;FR; 
UK;IL;PT;EL 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Cybersecurity 
Cybercrime CPS; Physical threats YES 
700692 DiSIEM H2020-EU.3.7. Diversity Enhancements for SIEMs 1/09/2016 31/08/2019 4 020 019 3 445 876 
H2020-DS-
2015-1 
PT DE;ES;PT;UK Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cloud YES 
731945 DITAS H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
DITAS: Data-intensive applications Improvement 
by moving daTA and computation in mixed 
cloud/fog environmentS 
1/01/2017 31/12/2019 4 890 066 4 420 188 
H2020-ICT-
2016-1 
ES 
CH;DE;ES; 
IT;EL;IL 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cloud; ICT YES 
653618 DOGANA H2020-EU.3.7. 
aDvanced sOcial enGineering And vulNerability 
Assesment Framework 
1/09/2015 31/08/2018 5 808 217 4 599 806 
H2020-DS-
2014-1 
IT 
AT;FR;BE; 
UK;DK;IT;IL;EL; 
PT;CH;RO 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Social media NO 
666148 DSTB 
H2020-EU.2.1.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Dyadic Secures The Breach 1/04/2015 31/03/2017 2 882 500 2 017 750 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2014 
IL 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime ICT YES 
645421 ECRYPT-CSA H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
European Coordination and Support Action in 
Cryptology 
1/03/2015 28/02/2018 1 000 000 1 000 000 
H2020-ICT-
2014-1 
BE FR;DE;UK;NL 
Cybersecurity; 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Cybercrime Cryptography; ICT YES 
643161 ECRYPT-NET H2020-EU.1.3.1. 
European Integrated Research Training Network 
on Advanced Cryptographic Technologies for the 
Internet of Things and the Cloud 
1/03/2015 28/02/2019 3 893 200 3 893 200 
H2020-
MSCA-ITN-
2014 
BE FR;BE;DE;UK;NL Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
Cryptography; IoT; 
Cloud 
YES 
691025 ENCASE H2020-EU.1.3.3. 
EnhaNcing seCurity And privacy in the Social wEb: 
a user centered approach for the protection of 
minors 
1/01/2016 31/12/2019 2 160 000 2 160 000 
H2020-
MSCA-RISE-
2015 
CY UK;EL;IT;ES;CY Cybersecurity Cybercrime Social media YES 
740450 ENCIRCLE 
H2020-EU.3.7.1.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.5. 
European Cbrn Innovation for the maRket CLuster 10/03/2017 9/03/2021 1 997 085 1 997 085 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
BE 
FI;IT;UK;FR;PL; 
DE 
CBRN-E 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
740521 eNOTICE 
H2020-EU.3.7.6.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.2.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.3.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.1.; 
European Network Of CBRN TraIning CEnters 1/09/2017 31/08/2022 3 587 423 3 497 735 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
BE 
IT;PL;FR;BE;SE; 
DE;UK; CZ;TR 
CBRN-E 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
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H2020-EU.3.7.7.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.8.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.5. 
695022 EPoCH H2020-EU.1.1. 
Exploring and Preventing Cryptographic Hardware 
Backdoors: Protecting the Internet of Things 
against Next-Generation Attacks 
1/10/2016 30/09/2021 2 498 286 2 498 286 
ERC-2015-
AdG 
DE 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography; IoT YES 
714048 
ERNCIP 
CBRNE STDS 
16 
H2020-EU.3.7. 
ERNCIP thematic group activities in 2016 
supporting development of Mandate 487 for 
standards in security 
1/01/2016 31/12/2016 250 000 250 000 
H2020-
Adhoc-
2014-20 
BE 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
CBRN-E 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
656971 EU and SSR H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
LOCAL OWNERSHIP IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 
ACTIVITIES WITHIN CSDP OPERATIONS OF THE EU 
7/10/2015 6/10/2017 183 455 183 455 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2014 
UK 
 
Defence 
 
External security;  
Peace keeping; Social 
sciences 
YES 
653227 EU-CIVCAP H2020-EU.3.7. 
Preventing and responding to conflict: developing 
EU CIVilian CAPabilities for a sustainable peace 
1/12/2015 30/11/2018 1 714 975 1 714 975 
H2020-
BES-2014 
UK UK;BE;DK; 
IT;NL;ES;RS 
Defence 
 
External security;  
Peace keeping 
YES 
747947 EU-Drones H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
The European Commission in Drone Community: a 
New Cooperation Area in the Making 
1/04/2017 31/03/2019 160 800 160 800 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2016 
BE 
 
Other 
 
UAV YES 
740507 EUNITY 
H2020-EU.3.7.6.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.4.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.8. 
Cybersecurity and privacy dialogue between 
Europe and Japan 
1/06/2017 31/05/2019 499 813 499 813 
H2020-DS-
SC7-2016 
FR PL;EL;ES;BE Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy NO 
748647 EVACUATION H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
Testing communication strategies to save lives in 
emergency evacuation 
1/03/2018 29/02/2020 195 455 195 455 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2016 
UK 
 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Emergency YES 
717915 EXTREMDRON 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle for protecting 
soft/critical urban infrastructures, and the general 
public in extreme environments. 
1/04/2016 31/07/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2015 
ES 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
UAV YES 
780355 FANDANGO H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
FAke News discovery and propagation from big 
Data ANalysis and artificial intelliGence 
Operations 
1/01/2018 31/12/2020 3 583 125 2 879 250 
H2020-ICT-
2017-1 
IT EL;ES;BE;IE;IT Hybrid threats 
 
Social media; ICT YES 
780108 FENTEC 
H2020-EU.3.7.4.; 
H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
Functional Encryption Technologies 1/01/2018 31/12/2020 4 223 141 4 223 141 
H2020-DS-
LEIT-2017 
ES 
FI;SI;CH;FR;DE; 
BE;UK 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography YES 
740575 FIRE-IN 
H2020-EU.3.7.6.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.2.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.3.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.1.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.7.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.8.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.5. 
FIRE-IN - Fire and Rescue Innovation Network 1/05/2017 30/04/2022 3 496 241 3 496 241 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
FR 
ES;IT;DE;PL;FR; 
CZ;SE;EL 
Other 
 
Rescue NO 
701306 FLAME H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
Fragility and Geopolitics in the Middle East and 
North Africa 
1/09/2016 31/08/2018 172 800 172 800 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2015 
BE 
 
Other 
 
External security NO 
766719 FLASH H2020-EU.1.2.1. 
Far-infrared Lasers Assembled using Silicon 
Heterostructures 
1/11/2017 31/10/2020 3 206 499 3 206 499 
H2020-
FETOPEN-1-
2016-2017 
IT DE;CH;UK Border control 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
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653879 FLYSEC H2020-EU.3.7. 
Optimising time-to-FLY and enhancing airport 
SECurity 
1/05/2015 30/04/2018 4 141 375 4 089 500 
H2020-
DRS-2014 
EL UK;IL;LU;DE;EL 
Border control; 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Biometrics; 
Surveillance 
YES 
682317 FOLLOW H2020-EU.1.1. 
Finance/Security practice after 9/11: Following the 
Money from Transaction to Trial 
1/09/2016 31/08/2021 1 999 858 1 999 858 
ERC-2015-
CoG 
NL 
 
Terrorism 
financing 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Organised 
crime 
 
NO 
653355 FORENSOR H2020-EU.3.7. FOREnsic evidence gathering autonomous seNSOR 1/09/2015 31/08/2018 4 937 834 4 043 546 
H2020-FCT-
2014 
EL 
BE;IL;EL;ES;IT; 
FR;PT 
Other 
Organised 
crime 
Law enforcement; 
Surveillance ;  
Forensics 
YES 
740690 FORTIKA H2020-EU.3.7.4. 
FORTIKA  - Cyber Security Accelerator for trusted 
SMEs IT Ecosystems 
1/06/2017 31/05/2020 4 918 813 3 997 025 
H2020-DS-
SC7-2016 
EL 
UK;EL;ES;IT;SI;IE;
DE;BG;BE 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
641492 FOSTER ITS H2020-EU.2.1.6. 
First Operational, Secured and Trusted galilEo 
Receiver for ITS 
1/01/2015 31/12/2017 2 590 461 1 813 323 
H2020-
Galileo-
2014-1 
FR DE;FR;IT 
Space; 
Cybersecurity 
Cybercrime 
Applications in 
satellite navigation; 
Transport 
YES 
779391 FutureTPM 
H2020-EU.3.7.4.; 
H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
Future Proofing the Connected World: A Quantum-
Resistant Trusted Platform Module 
1/01/2018 31/12/2020 4 868 890 4 868 890 
H2020-DS-
LEIT-2017 
AT 
AT;CH;DE; 
UK;EL;LU;  
CY; IE;PT 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography YES 
700542 FutureTrust H2020-EU.3.7. 
Future Trust Services for Trustworthy Global 
Transactions 
1/06/2016 31/05/2019 7 474 031 6 338 949 
H2020-DS-
2015-1 
DE 
BE;GE;UK; 
LU;ZA;TR; 
AT;PT;RS;DE 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
700670 GAP H2020-EU.3.7. Gaming for Peace 1/09/2016 28/02/2019 2 035 438 2 035 438 
H2020-
BES-2015 
IE 
PL;FI;IE;BG;NL; 
PT;UK 
Defence 
 
External security;  
Peace keeping;  
Training 
YES 
783183 GATEMAN H2020-EU.3.4.7. GNSS NAVIGATION THREATS MANAGEMENT 1/01/2018 31/12/2019 565 744 565 744 
H2020-
SESAR-
2016-2 
ES FI;IT 
Space; 
Cybersecurity 
Cybercrime 
Applications in 
satellite navigation; 
Transport 
YES 
776293 GAUSS 
H2020-EU.3.4.2.2.; 
H2020-EU.3.4.1.2.; 
H2020-EU.2.1.6.3.; 
H2020-EU.2.1.6.1.2. 
Galileo-EGNOS as an Asset for UTM Safety and 
Security 
1/03/2018 28/02/2021 3 695 758 2 972 489 
H2020-
GALILEO-
GSA-2017-
1 
ES EL;IT;ES;NL;UK Space 
 
Applications in 
satellite navigation; 
UAV 
YES 
740923 GHOST H2020-EU.3.7.4. 
Safe-Guarding Home  IoT  Environments with 
Personalised  Real-time Risk Control 
1/05/2017 30/04/2020 4 995 519 3 603 832 
H2020-DS-
SC7-2016 
ES 
EL;NO;UK; 
CH;ES;DE 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime IoT YES 
758834 GRIEVANCE H2020-EU.1.1. 
Gauging the Risk of Incidents of Extremist 
Violence Against Non-Combatant Entities 
1/01/2018 31/12/2022 1 458 345 1 458 345 
ERC-2017-
STG 
UK 
 
Combating 
radicalisation 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Social sciences;  
Violence 
YES 
683133 
GROUPVIOLE
NCE 
H2020-EU.1.1. 
Groups and Violence: A Micro-sociological 
Research Programme 
1/09/2016 31/08/2021 1 918 306 1 918 306 
ERC-2015-
CoG 
NL 
 
Combating 
radicalisation 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Social sciences; 
Violence 
NO 
670172 GTCMR H2020-EU.1.1. 
Global Terrorism and Collective Moral 
Responsibility: Redesigning Military, Police and 
Intelligence Institutions in Liberal Democracies 
1/01/2016 31/12/2020 2 479 810 2 479 810 
ERC-2014-
ADG 
NL UK 
Combating 
radicalisation 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Ethical dimension; 
Social sciences; 
Violence 
YES 
644052 HECTOR H2020-EU.2.1.1. HARDWARE ENABLED CRYPTO AND RANDOMNESS 1/03/2015 28/02/2018 4 494 088 4 494 088 
H2020-ICT-
2014-1 
AT 
AT;FR;NL;IT;BE; 
SK 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography; ICT YES 
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740689 HEIMDALL H2020-EU.3.7.5. 
HEIMDALL - MULTI-HAZARD COOPERATIVE 
MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR DATA EXCHANGE, 
RESPONSE PLANNING AND SCENARIO BUILDING 
1/05/2017 31/10/2020 8 591 344 7 836 371 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
DE 
IT;DK;ES;EL;FR; 
UK;DE 
Public spaces; 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Preparedness;  
Resilience; Disaster 
management 
YES 
740322 HERMENEUT H2020-EU.3.7.4. 
Enterprises intangible Risks Management via 
Economic models based on simulatioN of modErn 
cyber-aTtacks 
1/05/2017 30/04/2019 2 007 693 2 007 693 
H2020-DS-
SC7-2016 
IT 
UK;IT;FR;BE;IL; 
DE 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Social sciences YES 
756672 
HumanTraffic
king 
H2020-EU.1.1. Human Trafficking: A Labor Perspective 1/04/2018 31/03/2023 1 492 250 1 492 250 
ERC-2017-
STG 
IL 
 
Other 
Organised 
crime 
Migration; Social 
sciences 
NO 
700626 iBorderCtrl H2020-EU.3.7. Intelligent Portable Border Control System 1/09/2016 31/08/2019 4 501 878 4 501 878 
H2020-
BES-2015 
LU 
ES;UK;HU; 
EL;LV;PL;CY;DE 
Border control 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
653909 ICT4COP H2020-EU.3.7. 
Community-Based Policing and Post-Conflict 
Police Reform 
1/06/2015 31/05/2020 4 999 999 4 999 998 
H2020-FCT-
2014 
NO IE;UK;NO; DE;PL Other 
Organised 
crime 
Law enforcement; 
Social sciences 
NO 
736454 IDAaaS 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Trusted online service for identity assurance 1/10/2016 31/03/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
NO 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy YES 
690907 IDENTITY H2020-EU.1.3.3. 
Computer Vision Enabled Multimedia Forensics 
and People Identification 
1/01/2016 31/12/2019 2 025 000 2 025 000 
H2020-
MSCA-RISE-
2015 
UK SI;AT;IT;FR;ES Other 
 
Biometrics; Law 
enforcement;  
Forensics 
YES 
653371 IECEU H2020-EU.3.7. 
Improving the Effectiveness of the Capabilities 
(IEC) in EU conflict prevention 
1/05/2015 31/01/2018 2 081 110 2 081 110 
H2020-
BES-2014 
FI NL;DK;FI;AT;IE;SI Defence 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Organised 
crime 
External security YES 
740685 I-LEAD 
H2020-EU.3.7.6.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.2.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.3.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.1.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.7.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.8.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.5. 
Innovation - Law Enforcement Agencies Dialogue 1/09/2017 31/08/2022 3 483 718 3 483 716 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
NL 
BE;RO;NL;IT;FR;P
L;LT;PT;FI;EL;ES;
UK 
Other 
 
Law enforcement NO 
740714 ILEAnet 
H2020-EU.3.7.6.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.2.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.3.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.1.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.7.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.8.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.5. 
Innovation by Law Enforcement Agencies 
networking 
1/06/2017 31/05/2022 3 482 146 3 482 146 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
FR CY;IE;FR;IT;RO;A
T;SK;IL;HU;EE; 
ES;LV;UK;CZ; 
BG;PL;DE 
Other 
 
Law enforcement NO 
653383 IMPACT H2020-EU.3.7. 
Impact of Cultural aspects in the management of 
emergencies in public Transport 
1/05/2015 31/10/2017 1 398 913 1 398 913 
H2020-
DRS-2014 
IT 
TR;NL;UK;IT;PL;B
G 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Emergency; Social 
sciences; Transport 
YES 
653390 IMPROVER H2020-EU.3.7. 
Improved risk evaluation and implementation of 
resilience concepts to critical infrastructure 
1/06/2015 31/05/2018 4 323 979 4 323 979 
H2020-
DRS-2014 
SE 
NO;UK;DK; 
FR;PT;BE 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Resilience YES 
776487 INFACT H2020-EU.3.5.3. 
Innovative, Non-invasive and Fully Acceptable 
Exploration Technologies 
1/11/2017 31/10/2020 5 624 030 5 624 030 
H2020-
SC5-2017-
OneStageB 
DE 
ES;FI;DE;FR;IT; 
UK;ZA 
Critical supplies 
 
Supply security YES 
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740627 IN-PREP H2020-EU.3.7.5. 
An INtegrated next generation PREParedness 
programme for improving effective inter-
organisational response capacity in complex 
environments of disasters and causes of crises 
1/09/2017 31/08/2020 9 580 781 7 999 556 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
EL 
IE;FR;IT;EL;DE; 
NL;UK 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Preparedness;  
Disaster 
management 
YES 
774928 iSAFE 
H2020-EU.3.6.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
iSAFE Internet Safety Awareness for European 
primary school children 
1/06/2017 31/12/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
IE 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Violence YES 
664639 KIOS H2020-EU.4.a. 
KIOS Research Center of Excellence for Intelligent 
Systems and Networks 
1/06/2015 31/05/2016 417 000 417 000 
H2020-
WIDESPREA
D-2014-1 
CY UK 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
ICT YES 
739551 KIOS CoE H2020-EU.4.a. 
KIOS Research and Innovation Centre of 
Excellence 
1/03/2017 29/02/2024 15 000 000 15 000 000 
H2020-
WIDESPREA
D-01-2016-
2017-
TeamingPha
se2 
CY UK 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
ICT YES 
727528 KONFIDO 
H2020-EU.3.7.4.; 
H2020-EU.3.1. 
KONFIDO - Secure and Trusted Paradigm for 
Interoperable eHealth Services 
1/11/2016 31/10/2019 4 992 078 4 992 078 
H2020-DS-
SC1-2016 
UK 
IT;BE;EL;UK;DK; 
FR;ES 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy YES 
653587 LAW-TRAIN H2020-EU.3.7. 
Mixed-reality environment for training teams in 
joint investigative interrogation-Intelligent 
interrogation training simulator 
1/05/2015 30/04/2018 5 095 688 5 095 687 
H2020-FCT-
2014 
IL 
AT;ES;RO;IL;PT; 
BE 
Other 
Organised 
crime 
Law enforcement NO 
740466 LETS-CROWD 
H2020-EU.3.7.6.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.1. 
Law Enforcement agencies human factor methods 
and Toolkit for the Security and protection of 
CROWDs in mass gatherings 
1/05/2017 31/10/2019 2 919 308 2 919 308 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
ES 
DE;UK;BE; 
ES;IT;RO;IL;PT 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Organised 
crime 
Law enforcement YES 
727982 LINCOLN H2020-EU.3.2.5. Lean innovative connected vessels 1/10/2016 30/09/2019 7 808 691 6 343 600 
H2020-BG-
2016-1 
IT 
NO;ES;IT; 
DE;CY;EL 
Other 
 
Emergency; Rescue; 
IoT 
YES 
761947 LocationWise 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
LocationWise Payment Card Validation: A cloud 
based location verification system that 
willsignificantly lower cost of payment card cyber 
security 
1/03/2017 31/08/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
UK 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
661362 LV-Pri20 H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
Logic-based Verification of Privacy-Preservation in 
Europe's 2020 ICT 
22/06/2015 21/06/2017 195 455 195 455 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2014 
UK UK Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy; IoT YES 
752144 MAPS H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
MAPS – Migrants And People Smugglers: A 
Comparative Study of Smuggling Networks in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and the Central American 
corridors 
1/09/2017 31/08/2020 262 269 262 269 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2016 
IT 
 
Border control 
Organised 
crime 
Migration; Social 
sciences 
NO 
653004 MARGIN H2020-EU.3.7. Tackle Insecurity in Marginalized Areas 1/05/2015 30/04/2017 1 881 400 1 881 400 
H2020-FCT-
2014 
ES ES;FR;HU;IT;UK Other 
 
Social sciences NO 
740698 MARISA 
H2020-EU.3.7.3.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.7. 
Maritime Integrated Surveillance Awareness 1/05/2017 31/10/2019 9 765 659 7 997 493 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
IT 
IT;FI;NL;EL;DE; 
BE;FR; PT;ES 
Border control 
Organised 
crime; Terrorism 
& radicalisation 
Migration; 
Surveillance 
YES 
700281 MEDIA4SEC H2020-EU.3.7. 
The emerging role of new social media in 
enhancing public security 
1/07/2016 31/12/2018 1 917 006 1 902 006 
H2020-FCT-
2015 
UK 
NL;SI;DE;ES;FR; 
BE;EL;UK 
Cybersecurity; 
Combating 
radicalisation 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Cybercrime 
Social media YES 
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653626 microMole H2020-EU.3.7. 
SEWAGE MONITORING SYSTEM FOR TRACKING 
SYNTHETIC DRUG LABORATORIES 
1/09/2015 31/08/2018 5 451 388 4 992 866 
H2020-FCT-
2014 
PL 
FR;BE;DE; 
SE;IS;NL;PL 
Other 
Organised 
crime 
Law enforcement; 
Forensics 
YES 
740543 MINDb4ACT 
H2020-EU.3.7.6.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.1. 
Mapping, IdentifyiNg and Developing skills and 
opportunities in operating environments to co-
create innovative, ethical and effective ACTions to 
tackle radicalization leading to violent extremism 
1/09/2017 31/08/2020 2 999 310 2 999 310 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
ES 
DE;FR;IT;AT;PL; 
BE;DK; ES;UK;FI 
Combating 
radicalisation 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Migration; Social 
media;  Violence 
NO 
653212 MITIGATE H2020-EU.3.7. 
Multidimensional, IntegraTed, rIsk assessment 
framework and dynamic, collaborative Risk 
ManaGement tools for critical information 
infrAstrucTurEs 
1/09/2015 28/02/2018 3 549 869 3 109 795 
H2020-DS-
2014-1 
DE 
UK;AT;RO; 
ES;IT;EL;DE 
Cybersecurity; 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Cybercrime 
Supply chain; 
transport 
YES 
687338 MOBNET H2020-EU.2.1.6. 
MOBile NETwork for people's location in natural 
and man-made disasters 
1/01/2016 28/02/2018 1 242 534 986 272 
H2020-
Galileo-
2015-1 
ES DE;PL;NL;ES 
Space; Public 
spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Applications in 
satellite navigation; 
Rescue; UAV 
YES 
644429 MUSA H2020-EU.2.1.1.3. MUlti-cloud Secure Applications 1/01/2015 31/12/2017 3 574 190 3 574 190 
H2020-ICT-
2014-1 
ES 
DE;FI;IT;UK;FR; 
ES 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cloud; ICT YES 
703071 
MUSLIM-
NLNO 
H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
Muslims condemning violent extremism - An 
interdisciplinary analysis of public initiatives in the 
Netherlands and Norway 2001-2015 
1/06/2016 31/05/2018 177 599 177 599 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2015 
NL 
 
Combating 
radicalisation 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Social sciences NO 
707482 MWDIR H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
Media Warfare and the Discourse of Islamic 
Revival: The Case of the Islamic State (IS) 
1/02/2017 31/01/2019 195 455 195 455 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2015 
UK 
 
Combating 
radicalisation 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Social media; Social 
sciences 
NO 
754682 
NANOELECTR
OCHEM 
H2020-EU.1.1. 
Electrocatalytic Nanoreactors for Absorption, 
Detection and Decontamination of Hazardous 
Compounds 
1/12/2017 31/05/2019 149 912 149 912 
ERC-2016-
PoC 
UK 
 
CBRN-E 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
675320 NeCS H2020-EU.1.3.1. European Network for Cyber-security 1/09/2015 31/08/2019 3 882 228 3 882 228 
H2020-
MSCA-ITN-
2015 
IT ES;UK;IT;DE Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
Preparedness;  
Training 
YES 
653839 NOSY H2020-EU.3.7. New Operational Sensing sYstem 1/09/2015 31/08/2018 5 389 133 4 198 685 
H2020-FCT-
2014 
IT IT;PT;SE;UK;FR Other 
Organised 
crime 
Law enforcement;  
Forensics 
YES 
748164 NWICWEP H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
NON-WESTERN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS AND 
THE CHARACTER OF WARFARE IN THE EUROPEAN 
PERIPHERY 
1/09/2018 31/08/2020 180 277 180 277 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2016 
IT 
 
Defence 
 
Social sciences; 
External security 
YES 
705207 OCGN H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
Traditional Organised Crime and the Internet: The 
changing organization of illegal gambling  
networks 
22/05/2017 21/11/2018 146 591 146 591 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2015 
UK 
 
Cybersecurity 
Organised 
crime; 
Cybercrime 
Social sciences YES 
647850 OCTAVE H2020-EU.3.7. Objective Control for TAlker VErification 1/06/2015 31/07/2017 5 208 985 4 406 116 
H2020-DS-
2014-1 
IT 
IT;UK;FI;EL;ES; 
FR;DK 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Biometrics YES 
703225 OHS H2020-EU.1.3.2. On Human Shielding 1/09/2017 31/08/2019 195 455 195 455 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2015 
UK 
 
Defence 
 
Social sciences;  
External security;  
Violence 
NO 
653704 OPERANDO H2020-EU.3.7. 
Online Privacy Enforcement, Rights Assurance and 
Optimization 
42125 43220 4 455 811 3 746 037 
H2020-DS-
2014-1 
UK IT;RO;ES; 
DE;EL;UK;IL 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy YES 
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644814 PaaSword H2020-EU.2.1.1.3. 
A Holistic Data Privacy and Security by Design 
Platform-as-a-Service Framework Introducing 
Distributed Encrypted Persistence in Cloud-based 
Applications 
1/01/2015 31/12/2017 4 461 513 3 984 575 
H2020-ICT-
2014-1 
DE 
EL;CH;RO; 
SE;DE;CY;LU 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
Cryptography; Cloud; 
ICT 
YES 
653497 PANORAMIX H2020-EU.3.7. 
Privacy and Accountability in Networks via 
Optimized Randomized Mix-nets 
42248 43496 4 459 711 3 796 625 
H2020-DS-
2014-1 
UK NL;EE;EL;DE;BE;
UK 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy YES 
700583 
PeaceTraining
.eu 
H2020-EU.3.7. 
Strengthening the Capabilities and Training 
Curricula for Conflict Prevention and Peace 
Building Personnel with ICT-based Collaboration 
and Knowledge Approaches 
1/09/2016 31/10/2018 1 499 920 1 499 920 
H2020-
BES-2015 
AT 
DE;UK;AT; 
XK;EE;RO;ES;BE 
Defence 
 
External security;  
Peace keeping;  
Training 
YES 
740773 Pericles 
H2020-EU.3.7.6.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.1. 
Policy recommendation and improved 
communication tools for law enforcement and 
security agencies preventing violent radicalisation 
1/05/2017 30/04/2020 2 999 648 2 999 648 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
DE 
FR;IE;NL;ES;EL; 
UK;DE;BA 
Combating 
radicalisation 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Law enforcement;  
Violence 
YES 
677595 
POLICIES_FOR
_PEACE 
H2020-EU.1.1. 
The economics of lasting peace: The role of 
policies and institutions 
1/08/2016 31/07/2021 1 013 720 1 013 720 
ERC-2015-
STG 
CH 
 
Other 
 
Social sciences;  
External security;  
Peace keeping 
NO 
708815 
POMEGRANAT
E 
H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
Practice-Oriented Security Models and Granular 
Designs for Future-Proof Authenticated Encryption 
1/09/2017 30/08/2020 172 800 172 800 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2015 
BE 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
Cryptography; IoT; 
Cloud 
YES 
714955 POPSTAR H2020-EU.1.1. 
Reasoning about Physical properties Of security 
Protocols with an Application To contactless 
Systems 
1/02/2017 31/01/2022 1 499 750 1 499 750 
ERC-2016-
STG 
FR 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography YES 
645622 PQCRYPTO H2020-EU.2.1.1. Post-quantum cryptography for long-term security 1/03/2015 28/02/2018 3 964 791 3 851 791 
H2020-ICT-
2014-1 
NL 
FR;IL;NL;DE;BE; 
DK;TW 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
Cryptography; IoT; 
Cloud; ICT 
YES 
740072 PRACTICIES 
H2020-EU.3.7.6.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.1. 
Partnership against violent radicalization in the 
cities 
1/05/2017 30/04/2020 3 378 970 3 378 970 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
FR 
TN;FR;AT; 
BE;ES;PT;EL;IT 
Combating 
radicalisation 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Social media; Social 
sciences 
YES 
644962 
PRISMACLOU
D 
H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
PRIvacy and Security MAintaining services in the 
CLOUD 
1/02/2015 31/07/2018 8 381 953 7 983 009 
H2020-ICT-
2014-1 
AT 
AT;CH;FR;UK;DE;
IT;ES;IL;SE 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy; Cloud; ICT YES 
653426 PRIVACY FLAG H2020-EU.3.7. 
Enabling Crowd-sourcing based privacy protection 
for smartphone applications, websites and 
Internet of Things deployments 
1/05/2015 30/04/2018 4 538 438 3 143 000 
H2020-DS-
2014-1 
EL 
SE;EL;DK; 
RS;IT;LU;CH;UK 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy YES 
780477 PRIViLEDGE 
H2020-EU.3.7.4.; 
H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography in Distributed 
Ledgers 
1/01/2018 31/12/2020 4 527 918 4 527 918 
H2020-DS-
LEIT-2017 
EE 
EL;IT;EE;CH;NL; 
UK 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
Privacy; 
Cryptography; 
Blockchain 
YES 
780701 PROMETHEUS 
H2020-EU.3.7.4.; 
H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
PRivacy preserving pOst-quantuM systEms from 
advanced crypTograpHic mEchanisms Using 
latticeS 
1/01/2018 31/12/2021 5 496 969 5 496 969 
H2020-DS-
LEIT-2017 
FR 
FR;NL;IL;ES;CH; 
DE;UK 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy; Cryptography YEs 
690972 PROTASIS H2020-EU.1.3.3. 
Restoring Trust in the cyber space: a Systems 
Security Proposal 
1/05/2016 30/04/2020 702 000 702 000 
H2020-
MSCA-RISE-
2015 
EL NL;ES;DE;IT;FI Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
700259 PROTECT H2020-EU.3.7. 
Pervasive and UseR Focused BiomeTrics BordEr 
ProjeCT 
1/09/2016 31/08/2019 4 981 753 4 981 753 
H2020-
BES-2015 
UK 
DE;AT;PL;FR;UK;
BE 
Border control 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Organised 
crime 
Biometrics YES 
 208 
Project id 
Project 
acronym 
Programme Project title Start Date End Date Total Cost (€) 
EC Max 
Contribution 
(€) 
Call 
Coordinator 
Country 
Participant 
Countries 
Building block(s) Priority(ies) Main focus(es) 
Dual 
Use 
700071 PROTECTIVE H2020-EU.3.7. 
Proactive Risk Management  through Improved 
Cyber Situational Awareness 
1/09/2016 31/08/2019 4 693 613 4 160 597 
H2020-DS-
2015-1 
IE 
CZ;ES;AT;PL;IE;D
E;UK;RO 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Preparedness YES 
699824 PROTON H2020-EU.3.7. 
Modelling the PRocesses leading to Organised 
crime and TerrOrist Networks 
1/10/2016 30/09/2019 4 464 507 4 094 812 
H2020-FCT-
2015 
IT 
BE;DE;US;UK;NL;
IT;CH;ES; 
PL;IL;SE 
Combating 
radicalisation; 
Cybersecurity 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Cybercrime 
Social sciences NO 
714294 QUASYModo H2020-EU.1.1. 
Symmetric Cryptography in the Post-Quantum 
World 
1/09/2017 31/08/2022 1 330 463 1 330 463 
ERC-2016-
STG 
FR 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography YES 
700326 RAMSES H2020-EU.3.7. 
Internet Forensic platform for tracking the money 
flow of financially-motivated malware 
1/09/2016 31/08/2019 3 803 088 3 532 000 
H2020-FCT-
2015 
ES 
DE;BE;IT;PT;ES; 
UK 
Cybersecurity; 
Terrorism 
financing 
Cybercrime 
Law enforcement;  
Forensics 
YES 
756482 REACT H2020-EU.1.1. Realizable Advanced Cryptography 1/10/2017 30/09/2022 1 493 803 1 493 803 
ERC-2017-
STG 
IL 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography YES 
731591 REASSURE 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
Robust and Efficient Approaches to Evaluating 
Side Channel and Fault Attack Resilience 
1/01/2017 31/12/2019 3 528 635 3 478 748 
H2020-DS-
LEIT-2016 
BE FR;DE;NL;UK Cybersecurity Cybercrime Certification; IoT YES 
740688 RED-Alert 
H2020-EU.3.7.6.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.1. 
Real-time Early Detection and Alert System for 
Online Terrorist Content based on Natural 
Language Processing, Social Network Analysis, 
Artificial Intelligence and Complex Event 
Processing 
1/06/2017 31/05/2020 5 064 438 5 064 438 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
RO 
RO;UK;IL; 
MD;HU;ES; 
MT;FR 
Other 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Law enforcement; 
Social media 
YES 
775251 REDSENTRY 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Proactive Operational Intelligence  Cybersecurity 
Platform for the Financial Services Industry 
1/07/2017 31/12/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
ES 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
792793 REJREG H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
Rejection Regimes: An Ethnographic Study of the 
Social Life of Intra-EU Border Regimes 
1/04/2018 31/03/2020 165 599 165 599 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2017 
NL 
 
Border control 
 
Migration; Social 
sciences 
NO 
653260 RESILENS H2020-EU.3.7. 
RESILENS: Realising European ReSiliencE for 
CritIcaL INfraStructure 
1/05/2015 30/04/2018 4 091 843 4 091 843 
H2020-
DRS-2014 
IE PT;IE;DE;IL;UK 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Resilience YES 
700389 ResiStand H2020-EU.3.7. 
Increasing disaster Resilience by establishing a 
sustainable process to support Standardisation of 
technologies and services 
1/05/2016 30/04/2018 1 962 554 1 962 554 
H2020-
DRS-2015 
FI 
NL;ES;FI;DE;IT; 
NO;UK 
Other 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Resilience; 
Standardisation;  
Disaster 
management 
YES 
653460 RESOLUTE H2020-EU.3.7. 
RESilience management guidelines and 
Operationalization appLied to Urban Transport 
Environment 
1/05/2015 30/04/2018 3 848 581 3 848 581 
H2020-
DRS-2014 
IT IT;EL;DE;PT;FR 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Resilience; Transport YES 
731678 
RESTASSURE
D 
H2020-EU.2.1.1. Secure Data Processing in the Cloud 1/01/2017 31/12/2019 4 996 299 4 996 297 
H2020-ICT-
2016-1 
IL FR;DE;UK Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cloud; ICT YES 
673801 ROBIN 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
ROBotic security INnovative system 1/07/2015 31/12/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
ES 
 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
740593 ROBORDER 
H2020-EU.3.7.3.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.7. 
autonomous swarm of heterogeneous RObots for 
BORDER surveillance 
1/05/2017 30/04/2020 8 997 782 7 999 316 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
PT 
RO;ES;CH; 
EL;FI;BG;DE;IT; 
PT;BE;EE;UK;HU 
Border control 
Organised 
crime; Terrorism 
& radicalisation 
Surveillance YES 
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700264 ROCSAFE H2020-EU.3.7. 
Remotely Operated CBRNe Scene Assessment  
Forensic Examination 
1/07/2016 30/06/2019 4 781 061 4 781 061 
H2020-FCT-
2015 
IE ES;IT;IE;DE;PT CBRN-E 
 
Law enforcement; 
Forensics 
YES 
653884 SafeCloud H2020-EU.3.7. Secure and Resilient Cloud Architecture 1/09/2015 31/08/2018 3 298 988 2 150 810 
H2020-DS-
2014-1 
PT EE;DE;CH;PT Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy; Cloud YES 
644729 SAFEcrypto H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
Secure Architectures of Future Emerging 
Cryptography 
1/01/2015 31/12/2018 4 081 827 3 266 927 
H2020-ICT-
2014-1 
UK FR;CH;UK;DE;IE Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography; ICT YES 
700643 SafeShore H2020-EU.3.7. 
System  for  detection of  Threat Agents in  
Maritime Border  Environment 
1/05/2016 31/10/2018 5 133 583 5 133 583 
H2020-
BES-2015 
BE 
RO;CZ;BE; 
BG;IL;UK;IT 
Border control 
Organised 
crime 
Surveillance YES 
644080 SAFURE H2020-EU.2.1.1.1. 
SAFety and secURity by design for interconnected 
mixed-critical cyber-physical systems 
1/02/2015 31/01/2018 5 702 631 5 231 375 
H2020-ICT-
2014-1 
AT 
FR;DE;IT;CH;AT;E
S 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime CPS; ICT YES 
776099 SARA 
H2020-EU.3.2.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.1.6.3.; 
H2020-EU.2.1.6.1.2. 
Search And Rescue Aid and Surveillance using 
High EGNSS Accuracy 
1/02/2018 31/01/2020 1 942 328 1 455 583 
H2020-
GALILEO-
GSA-2017-
1 
IT DK;IT;BE;NL;PL 
Border control; 
Space 
 
Migration; Rescue; 
Surveillance; 
Applications in 
satellite navigation;  
UAV 
YES 
740477 SAURON 
H2020-EU.3.7.4.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.2. 
Scalable multidimensionAl sitUation awaReness 
sOlution for protectiNg european ports 
1/05/2017 30/04/2020 8 491 173 6 926 370 
CIP-2016-
2017-1 
ES 
FR;UK;AT;IT;SI; 
EL;ES;BE 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Hybrid threats; 
Cybersecurity 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Cybercrime 
Physical threats YES 
644425 SCISSOR H2020-EU.2.1.1. Security In trusted SCADA and smart-grids 1/01/2015 31/12/2017 3 989 850 3 534 850 
H2020-ICT-
2014-1 
FR 
FR;CH;PL;IT;AT; 
BE 
Cybersecurity; 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Cybercrime ICT YES 
777996 SealedGRID H2020-EU.1.3.3. 
Scalable, trustEd, and interoperAble pLatform for 
sEcureD smart GRID 
1/01/2018 31/12/2021 1 080 000 1 080 000 
H2020-
MSCA-RISE-
2017 
EL RO;ES;EL 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Cybersecurity 
Cybercrime Physical threats YES 
763599 SECOPS H2020-EU.3.4.7. 
An Integrated Security Concept for Drone 
Operations 
1/10/2017 30/09/2019 909 294 909 294 
H2020-
SESAR-
2016-1 
NL FI;BE;NL Other 
 
UAV YES 
736395 SecTrap 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Critical urban infrastructure and soft target cyber 
attack protection. Users and application 
Behavioural Analysis supported by artificial 
intelligence to preempt security cyber attacks. 
1/09/2016 28/02/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
PT 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces; 
Cybersecurity 
Cybercrime 
 
YES 
779899 SecureIoT H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
Predictive Security for IoT Platforms and Networks 
of Smart Objects 
1/01/2018 31/12/2020 4 860 335 4 860 335 
H2020-IOT-
2017 
BE 
FR;DE;NL; 
RO;EL;ES; 
CY;BE;LU 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime IoT YES 
645114 SEERS H2020-EU.2.1.1.6. 
Snapshot spEctral imagEr for cost effective IR 
Surveillance 
1/02/2015 31/01/2018 3 750 535 3 750 535 
H2020-ICT-
2014-1 
ES 
NL;ES;IT;FR;TR; 
UK 
Other 
 
ICT; Surveillance YES 
645011 SERECA H2020-EU.2.1.1.3. Secure Enclaves for REactive Cloud Applications 1/03/2015 28/02/2018 3 834 340 3 834 340 
H2020-ICT-
2014-1 
DE UK;DE;IT;IE 
Cybersecurity; 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Cybercrime CPS; IoT; Cloud; ICT YES 
653450 SEREN 3 H2020-EU.3.7. Security Research NCP Network 3 1/05/2015 30/04/2018 1 995 451 1 995 451 
H2020-
DRS-2014 
IT 
LV;ES;EE;IS;BE; 
CY;TR;SK;EL;PL; 
IL;ZA; HR;RO;CZ 
Other 
 
Information exchange NO 
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780139 SerIoT H2020-EU.2.1.1. Secure and Safe Internet of Things 1/01/2018 31/12/2020 4 999 084 4 999 084 
H2020-IOT-
2017 
PL 
CY;EL;ES;AT;DE;
UK;BE 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime IoT YES 
682451 SEXHUM H2020-EU.1.1. 
Sexual Humanitarianism: understanding agency 
and exploitation in the global sex industry 
1/10/2016 30/09/2020 1 600 000 1 600 000 
ERC-2015-
CoG 
UK FR Border control 
Organised 
crime 
Migration; Social 
sciences 
NO 
734035 ShaMROCK 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
ShaMROCK – Secure professional Mobile Radio 
Over Commercial networKs 
1/09/2016 31/10/2018 1 835 445 1 284 812 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2016-2017 
ES 
 
Other 
 
Emergency YES 
663021 ShaMROCK 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
ShaMROCK – Secure professional Mobile Radio 
Over Commercial networKs 
1/02/2015 31/07/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
ES 
 
Other 
 
Emergency YES 
644571 SHARCS H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
Secure Hardware-Software Architectures for 
Robust Computing Systems 
1/01/2015 31/12/2017 3 105 763 3 105 763 
H2020-ICT-
2014-1 
EL NL;DE;GI;IL;SE Cybersecurity Cybercrime ICT YES 
727301 SHiELD 
H2020-EU.3.7.4.; 
H2020-EU.3.1. 
European Security in Health Data Exchange 1/01/2017 31/12/2019 3 897 268 3 897 268 
H2020-DS-
SC1-2016 
ES UK;ES;DE;IT;IL Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy YES 
700199 SHIELD H2020-EU.3.7. 
Securing against intruders and other threats 
through a NFV-enabled environment 
1/09/2016 28/02/2019 4 552 061 3 607 245 
H2020-DS-
2015-1 
EL 
EL;IT;ES;UK;LU; 
PT 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
778550 Signa2.0 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Signaturit 1/01/2018 30/06/2019 1 739 188 1 217 431 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2016-2017 
ES 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
Biometrics; 
Blockchain 
YES 
700621 
SmartResilien
ce 
H2020-EU.3.7. 
Smart Resilience Indicators for Smart Critical 
Infrastructures 
1/05/2016 30/04/2019 4 960 831 4 809 949 
H2020-
DRS-2015 
DE 
RS;AT;IE;SE; 
EL;DE;NO;HU;FI;
UK;CH;IL 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Resilience YES 
740787 SMESEC H2020-EU.3.7.4. 
Protecting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
digital technology through an innovative cyber-
SECurity framework 
1/06/2017 31/05/2020 5 683 820 3 998 922 
H2020-DS-
SC7-2016 
ES 
RO;CH;FR; 
ES;EL;NL;IL 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
740931 SMILE 
H2020-EU.3.7.3.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.7. 
SMart mobILity at the European land borders 1/07/2017 30/06/2020 4 999 276 4 999 276 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
EL 
RO;UK;DE; 
EL;FR;BG; 
NO;HU 
Border control 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Organised 
crime 
Biometrics; Cloud YES 
653569 SMR H2020-EU.3.7. Smart Mature Resilience 1/06/2015 31/05/2018 4 641 233 4 641 233 
H2020-
DRS-2014 
ES 
SE;IT;UK; 
NO;LV;DE; 
DK;ES 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Resilience YES 
705020 SOLOMON H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
Self-Organisation and Learning Online in Mobile 
Observation Networks 
1/02/2017 31/01/2019 195 455 195 455 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2015 
UK 
 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Law enforcement YES 
681402 SOPHIA H2020-EU.1.1. Securing Software against Physical Attacks 1/09/2016 31/08/2021 1 964 750 1 964 750 
ERC-2015-
CoG 
AT 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
Cryptography; 
Physical threats 
YES 
653586 SpeechXRays H2020-EU.3.7. 
Multi-channel biometrics combining acoustic and 
machine vision analysis of speech, lip movement 
and face 
1/05/2015 30/04/2018 5 343 606 4 102 467 
H2020-DS-
2014-1 
FR UK;EE;EL;FR;RO Cybersecurity Cybercrime Biometrics YES 
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645865 SPOOC H2020-EU.1.1. 
Automated Security Proofs of Cryptographic 
Protocols: Privacy, Untrusted Platforms and 
Applications to E-voting Protocols 
1/09/2015 31/08/2020 1 903 500 1 903 500 
ERC-2014-
CoG 
FR 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy; Cryptography YES 
641486 spyGLASS H2020-EU.2.1.6. 
GALILEO-BASED PASSIVE RADAR SYSTEM FOR 
MARITIME SURVEILLANCE 
1/01/2015 31/12/2017 1 510 250 1 069 317 
H2020-
Galileo-
2014-1 
IT UK;DE;IT Space 
Organised 
crime 
Applications in 
satellite navigation; 
Surveillance 
YES 
780439 StandICT.eu H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
Supporting European Experts Presence in 
International Standardisation Activities in ICT 
1/01/2018 31/12/2019 2 000 000 2 000 000 
H2020-ICT-
2017-1 
UK DE Cybersecurity Cybercrime Standardisation; ICT NO 
740610 STOP-IT 
H2020-EU.3.7.4.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.2. 
Strategic, Tactical, Operational Protection of water 
Infrastructure against cyber-physical Threats 
1/06/2017 31/05/2021 9 616 525 8 255 320 
CIP-2016-
2017-1 
NO 
NO;NL;DE; 
ES;BE;IL;EL 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Cybersecurity 
Cybercrime CPS; Physical threats YES 
773932 STORM 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
The first cybersecurity management system 
providing evidence based metrics for cyber risk at 
the business asset level in real-time 
1/07/2017 31/10/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
IL 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
NO 
689364 STRADE H2020-EU.3.5.3. 
Strategic Dialogue on Sustainable Raw Materials 
for Europe 
1/12/2015 30/11/2018 1 977 509 1 977 509 
H2020-
SC5-2015-
one-stage 
DE UK;ZA;DE;SE Critical supplies 
 
Supply security YES 
700416 SUCCESS H2020-EU.3.7. 
Securing Critical Energy InfrastructuresSUCCESS - 
Securing Critical Energy Infrastructures 
1/05/2016 31/10/2018 4 999 946 4 999 946 
H2020-
DRS-2015 
DE 
DE;IE;SE;NL;BE; 
EL;RO;IT;FI 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Cybersecurity 
Cybercrime CPS; Physical threats YES 
644666 SUNFISH H2020-EU.2.1.1.3. 
SecUre iNFormation SHaring in federated 
heterogeneous private clouds 
1/01/2015 31/12/2017 4 520 048 4 520 029 
H2020-ICT-
2014-1 
IT 
UK;AT;EE; 
MT;IL;IT 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cloud; ICT YES 
643964 SUPERCLOUD H2020-EU.2.1.1.3. 
USER-CENTRIC MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY AND 
DEPENDABILITY IN CLOUDS OF CLOUDS 
1/02/2015 31/01/2018 6 863 279 5 398 280 
H2020-ICT-
2014-1 
AT PT;FR;CH;NL;DE Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cloud; ICT YES 
720417 SURVANT 
H2020-EU.3.; 
H2020-EU.2. 
SURveillance Video Archives iNvestigation 
assisTant 
1/01/2017 31/12/2018 2 578 960 1 994 797 
H2020-
FTIPilot-
2015-1 
IT EL;IT;ES;IE Other 
 
Law enforcement; 
Surveillance 
YES 
700688 TAKEDOWN H2020-EU.3.7. 
Understand the Dimensions of Organised Crime 
and Terrorist Networks for Developing Effective 
and Efficient Security Solutions for First-line-
practitioners and Professionals 
1/09/2016 31/08/2019 3 421 063 3 146 375 
H2020-FCT-
2015 
AT 
AT;ES;IT;UK;BG; 
CH;CZ; 
PL;RO;DE; 
SK;IL;BE 
Other 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Organised 
crime 
Law enforcement; 
Social sciences 
NO 
653350 TARGET H2020-EU.3.7. 
Training Augmented Reality Generalised 
Environment Toolkit 
1/05/2015 31/10/2018 5 992 360 5 992 360 
H2020-FCT-
2014 
FR 
AT;FR;NO; 
UK;DE;LU; 
ES;EE;NL;SK 
Other 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Cybersecurity 
Law enforcement;  
Training 
YES 
700024 TENSOR H2020-EU.3.7. 
Retrieval and Analysis of Heterogeneous Online 
Content for Terrorist Activity Recognition 
1/09/2016 31/08/2019 5 618 028 4 977 201 
H2020-FCT-
2015 
UK 
UK;ES;DE; 
BE;EL;FR;IT 
Combating 
radicalisation 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Organised 
crime 
Law enforcement YES 
781623 TFence 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
A patent pending solution/microchip for the IoT 
cybersecurity market requirements: no access 
toonline software updates, very small size, 
inexpensive hardware, low energy consumption. 
1/08/2017 30/11/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
IL 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime IoT YES 
740558 TITANIUM 
H2020-EU.3.7.6.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.1. 
Tools for the Investigation of Transactions in 
Underground Markets 
1/05/2017 30/04/2020 4 991 600 4 991 600 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
AT 
FR;NL;AT; 
ES;DE;UK;FI 
Cybersecurity; 
Terrorism 
financing 
Cybercrime; 
Organised 
crime 
Law enforcement YES 
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682815 TOCNeT H2020-EU.1.1. Teaching Old Crypto New Tricks 1/04/2016 31/03/2021 1 882 244 1 882 244 
ERC-2015-
CoG 
AT 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography YES 
653409 TOXI-triage H2020-EU.3.7. 
INTEGRATED AND ADAPTIVE RESPONSES TO TOXIC 
EMERGENCIES FOR RAPID TRIAGE:                   
ENGINEERING THE ROADMAP FROM CASUALTY TO 
PATIENT TO SURVIVOR. 
1/09/2015 31/08/2019 12 931 869 11 966 511 
H2020-
DRS-2014 
UK 
FI;DE;NL;CZ;EL; 
NO;ES;UK 
CBRN-E 
 
Emergency; Rescue YES 
656198 TRANSIT H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
The daily governance of transit migration in 
Turkey at European Union borders: The two-way 
influence of Turkish-European Union border and 
migration management practices 
1/09/2015 31/08/2017 165 599 165 599 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2014 
NL 
 
Border control 
 
Migration; Social 
sciences 
NO 
776355 TransSec 
H2020-EU.3.4.2.2.; 
H2020-EU.3.4.1.2.; 
H2020-EU.2.1.6.3.; 
H2020-EU.2.1.6.1.2. 
Autonomous emergency manoeuvring and 
movement monitoring for road transport security 
1/02/2018 31/01/2021 3 007 614 2 527 229 
H2020-
GALILEO-
GSA-2017-
1 
DE IE;ES;DE;AT 
Public spaces; 
Space 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Applications in 
satellite navigation; 
Transport 
YES 
644412 TREDISEC H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
Trust-aware, REliable and Distributed Information 
SEcurity in the Cloud. 
1/04/2015 31/03/2018 6 470 619 4 412 063 
H2020-ICT-
2014-1 
ES 
FR;EL;CH; 
DE;UK;ES 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cloud; ICT YES 
740934 TRIVALENT 
H2020-EU.3.7.6.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.1. 
Terrorism pReventIon Via rAdicaLisation countEr-
NarraTive 
1/05/2017 30/04/2020 2 720 420 2 720 420 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
IT 
IT;PT;PL;BE;ES; 
FR;LV;AL;IL;UK 
Combating 
radicalisation 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Social sciences;   
Violence 
YES 
653449 TYPES H2020-EU.3.7. 
Towards transparencY and Privacy in the onlinE 
advertising businesS 
1/05/2015 31/10/2017 4 661 143 3 992 663 
H2020-DS-
2014-1 
ES 
EL;ES;BE;IL;UK 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy YES 
752743 UCOC H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
Understanding the Commitment in Organized 
Crime 
1/03/2018 28/02/2021 264 668 264 668 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2016 
FR 
 
Other 
Organised 
crime 
Social sciences NO 
653729 Unity H2020-EU.3.7. Unity 1/05/2015 30/04/2018 4 538 120 4 330 900 
H2020-FCT-
2014 
UK 
BG;DE;BE; 
ES;MK;UK; 
HR;EE;NL;FI 
Other 
 
Law enforcement YES 
731453 VESSEDIA 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
VERIFICATION ENGINEERING OF SAFETY AND 
SECURITY CRITICAL DYNAMIC INDUSTRIAL 
APPLICATIONS 
1/01/2017 31/12/2019 4 192 059 4 192 059 
H2020-DS-
LEIT-2016 
AT 
FR;ES;DE;FI;HU; 
BE 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime IoT YES 
740754 VICTORIA 
H2020-EU.3.7.6.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.1. 
Video analysis for Investigation of Criminal and 
TerrORIst Activities 
1/05/2017 30/04/2020 5 007 125 5 007 125 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
FR 
RO;AT;DE; 
FR;ES;BE;UK 
Other 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Organised 
crime 
Law enforcement; 
Surveillance 
YES 
740580 VISAGE 
H2020-EU.3.7.1.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.7. 
Visible Attributes through Genomics: Broadened 
Forensic Use of DNA for Constructing Composite 
Sketches from Traces 
1/05/2017 30/04/2021 5 007 779 5 000 000 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
NL 
DE;FR;UK; 
ES;AT;PL;SE;NL 
Other 
 
Forensics YES 
653321 WISER H2020-EU.3.7. Wide-Impact cyber SEcurity Risk framework 1/06/2015 30/11/2017 3 396 455 2 562 596 
H2020-DS-
2014-1 
ES 
IT;NO;SI;BE;FR; 
UK 
Cybersecurity; 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Cybercrime 
 
YES 
644371 WITDOM H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
empoWering prIvacy and securiTy in non-trusteD 
envirOnMents 
1/01/2015 31/12/2017 4 020 281 2 764 031 
H2020-ICT-
2014-1 
ES SI;CH;IT;ES;BE Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy; ICT YES 
653866 WOSCAP H2020-EU.3.7. 
Whole-of-Society Conflict Prevention and 
Peacebuilding 
1/06/2015 30/11/2017 2 018 035 1 990 114 
H2020-
BES-2014 
NL UK;DE;FR; 
ML;GE;UA; 
Defence 
 
Peace keeping; 
External security 
YES 
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ES;NL;YE 
780498 YAKSHA H2020-EU.2.1.1. 
Cybersecurity Awareness and Knowledge Systemic 
High-level Application 
1/01/2018 30/06/2020 2 506 226 1 998 814 
H2020-ICT-
2017-1 
PT 
IT;FI;BG;FR;TH; 
ES;VN; EL;MY 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime ICT; Supply chain YES 
725194 CRIMTANG H2020-EU.1.1. 
Criminal Entanglements. A new ethnographic 
approach to transnational organised crime. 
1/02/2018 31/01/2023 1 999 909 1 999 909 
ERC-2016-
COG 
DK 
 
Other 
Organised 
crime 
Migration; Social 
sciences 
NO 
775989 
CBRNE STNDS 
2017 
H2020-EU.3.7.2.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.7.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.5. 
ERNCIP CBRNE STANDARDS 2017 and 2018 – 
support to Mandate 487 
1/06/2017 31/05/2019 500 000 500 000 
H2020-IBA-
SC7-
ERNCIP-
2017 
BE 
 
CBRN-E; Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Standardisation YES 
753223 
NARCOREADE
R 
H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
Novel electrochemical strategies for rapid, on-site 
multiscreening of illicit drugs 
1/05/2017 30/04/2019 160 800 160 800 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2016 
BE 
 
Other 
Organised 
crime 
Law enforcement;  
Forensics 
YES 
757455 DUST H2020-EU.1.1. 
Data Assimilation for Agent-Based Models: 
Applications to Civil Emergencies 
1/01/2018 31/12/2022 1 499 840 1 499 840 
ERC-2017-
STG 
UK 
 
Other 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Emergency;  Disaster 
Management 
YES 
678341 USECFrontiers H2020-EU.1.1. 
Frontiers of Usable Security – Principles and 
Methods for Administrator and Developer Usable 
Security Research 
1/08/2016 31/07/2021 1 498 976 1 498 976 
ERC-2015-
STG 
DE 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
678921 SIREN H2020-EU.1.1. Securing Internet Routing from the Ground Up 1/02/2016 31/01/2021 1 468 200 1 468 200 
ERC-2015-
STG 
IL 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
775707 UNFRAUD 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
An advanced online anti-fraud software equipped 
with deep learning Artificial Intelligence that can 
face and detect, current fraudulent techniques and 
their continued evolution in a cost effective man 
1/06/2017 30/09/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
IT 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
762383 GICA 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Geolocalisation of Individuals in Critical Areas 1/04/2017 30/09/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
FR 
 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Rescue YES 
733711 FACCESS 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Enabling the large-scale deployment of Facial 
Recognition in banking security 
1/12/2016 30/11/2018 2 418 000 1 692 600 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2016-2017 
ES 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Biometrics; Privacy YES 
726818 ProBOS 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Protection Beyond Operating System - 
Development of the next generation cyber security 
solution 
1/10/2016 30/09/2018 2 814 766 1 970 336 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2016-2017 
MT 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
634943 PASS H2020-EU.2.1.6. 
Preparation for the establishment of a European 
SST Service provision function 
1/09/2014 31/12/2016 1 153 250 1 000 000 
H2020-
Adhoc-
2014-20 
ES 
 
Space 
  
YES 
808316 
Radiation 
detector 
H2020-EU.2.1.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Novel radioactive radiation technology feasibility 
verification 
1/03/2018 30/06/2018 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
FI 
 
Border control; 
CBRN-E 
Organised 
crime; Terrorism 
& radicalisation  
YES 
673980 CyberWiz 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Cyber-Security Visualization and CAD-Tool for the 
Vulnerability Assessment of Critical 
Infrastructures 
1/09/2015 31/08/2017 2 279 375 1 595 563 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2014 
DE SE 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Cybersecurity 
Cybercrime 
 
YES 
 214 
Project id 
Project 
acronym 
Programme Project title Start Date End Date Total Cost (€) 
EC Max 
Contribution 
(€) 
Call 
Coordinator 
Country 
Participant 
Countries 
Building block(s) Priority(ies) Main focus(es) 
Dual 
Use 
685074 IRON 
H2020-EU.3.5.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
High sensitivity multi-gas handheld gas analysis 
technology 
1/09/2015 31/08/2017 3 351 725 2 346 208 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2015 
FI 
 
CBRN-E 
  
YES 
687329 STRIKE3 H2020-EU.2.1.6. 
Standardisation of GNSS Threat reporting and 
Receiver testing through International Knowledge 
Exchange, Experimentation and Exploitation 
1/02/2016 31/01/2019 1 315 429 1 170 615 
H2020-
Galileo-
2015-1 
UK 
SE;KR;FI;IN;DE; 
UK 
Space; 
Cybersecurity 
Cybercrime 
Applications in 
satellite navigation; 
Standardisation 
YES 
690111 SecureCloud H2020-EU.2.1.1. Secure Big Data Processing in Untrusted Clouds 1/01/2016 31/12/2018 2 285 377 1 499 627 
H2020-
EUB-2015 
DE IT;CH;UK;DK;IL Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cloud YES 
703613 DSMM H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
“(De) Securitising Muslims in Cyber space: Social 
Media, Civil society and Marginalisation After 
Charlie Hebdo and the Islamic State” 
1/10/2016 30/09/2018 173 076 173 076 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2015 
FR 
 
Combating 
radicalisation 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Social media; Social 
sciences 
YES 
783977 
Wardiam 
Perimeter 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
An innovative intruder detection hidden technology 
based on Controlled Magnetic Fields able to detect 
threats before happening 
1/02/2018 31/07/2019 1 390 600 973 420 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2016-2017 
ES 
 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Surveillance; Physical 
threats 
YES 
784247 IDAaaS 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Trusted online service for identity assurance 1/10/2017 31/05/2019 1 940 661 1 358 462 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2016-2017 
NO 
 
Cybersecurity; 
Terrorism 
financing 
Cybercrime; 
Organised 
crime; Terrorism 
& radicalisation 
 
YES 
724725 SWORD H2020-EU.1.1. Security Without Obscurity for Reliable Devices 1/09/2017 31/08/2022 1 997 661 1 997 661 
ERC-2016-
COG 
BE 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography YES 
639554 aSCEND H2020-EU.1.1. Secure Computation on Encrypted Data 1/06/2015 31/05/2020 1 253 893 1 253 893 
ERC-2014-
STG 
FR 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography; Cloud YES 
694995 BIOSEC H2020-EU.1.1. 
Biodiversity and Security: understanding 
environmental crime, illegal wildlife trade and 
threat finance. 
1/09/2016 31/08/2020 1 822 729 1 822 729 
ERC-2015-
AdG 
UK 
 
Terrorism 
financing 
Organised 
crime 
Social sciences NO 
704330 ACTING-NOW H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
Algorithmic Containment of Threats in Graphs, 
Networks or Webs 
12/09/2016 11/09/2018 183 455 183 455 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2015 
UK 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
639366 FELICITY H2020-EU.1.1. Foundations of Efficient Lattice Cryptography 1/10/2015 30/09/2020 1 311 688 1 311 688 
ERC-2014-
STG 
FR 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography YES 
715753 SECOMP H2020-EU.1.1. 
Efficient Formally Secure Compilers to a Tagged 
Architecture 
1/01/2017 31/12/2021 1 498 444 1 498 444 
ERC-2016-
STG 
FR 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
683032 CIRCUS H2020-EU.1.1. 
An end-to-end verification architecture for 
building Certified Implementations of Robust,  
Cryptographically Secure web applications 
1/04/2016 31/03/2021 1 885 248 1 885 248 
ERC-2015-
CoG 
FR 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography YES 
659316 CYBERNETS H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
Cybernetic Communication Networks: 
Fundamental Limits and Engineering Challenges 
1/06/2015 31/05/2017 185 076 185 076 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2014 
FR 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
746667 AF-Cyber H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
Logic-based Attribution and Forensics in Cyber 
Security 
1/02/2018 31/01/2020 183 455 183 455 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2016 
UK 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Forensics YES 
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757731 LightCrypt H2020-EU.1.1. New Directions in Lightweight Cryptanalysis 1/10/2017 30/09/2022 1 487 500 1 487 500 
ERC-2017-
STG 
IL 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography; IoT YES 
791486 Glyco-DeCon 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Decontamination by glycosylation based wipes 1/01/2018 30/06/2018 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
IE 
 
CBRN-E 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
790554 
Genomcore 
Identity 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Genomcore Identity: databank proxy for DNA 
fingerprinting from whole exome/genome for 
biometric identifica-tion 
1/01/2018 30/06/2018 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
ES 
 
Other 
 
Biometrics; Law 
enforcement;  
Forensics 
YES 
791727 ProtonSuite 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
The world’s largest secure collaboration suite 1/12/2017 31/03/2018 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
CH 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy YES 
791208 V-SPHERE 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Vulnerability Search and Prevention through 
Holistic End-to-end Risk Evaluation 
1/02/2018 31/05/2018 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
NO 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
790798 PMT4NIIS 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Predictive Maintenance Tool for Non-Intrusive 
Inspection Systems 
1/01/2018 30/06/2018 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
BG 
 
Border control 
Organised 
crime; Terrorism 
& radicalisation 
Supply chain YES 
778571 Smart-Trust 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Smart Trust: Secure Mobile ID for Trusted Smart 
Borders 
1/01/2018 31/12/2019 2 991 000 2 093 700 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2016-2017 
PT 
 
Border control 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Biometrics; 
Blockchain 
YES 
651669 CAPTOR 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
cAPTor captures Advanced System Threats 1/10/2014 28/02/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
ES 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces; 
Cybersecurity 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Cybercrime  
YES 
740146 NESPINT 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
NEutron Spectrometry to Prevent Illicit Nuclear 
Trafficking 
1/01/2017 30/06/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
IT 
 
Border control; 
CBRN-E 
Organised 
crime 
 
YES 
781524 UR Browser 
H2020-EU.2.1.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
The first all-European web browser capable of 
guaranteeing comprehensive online privacy and 
security for EU Internet users 
1/06/2017 30/09/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
FR 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy YES 
745088 NK-52-2016 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Next generation authentication for the digital age 1/04/2017 30/09/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
LV 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
712120 TRUEPIVOT 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Advanced engineering analytics for the detection 
of errors in the structural design of critical urban 
infrastructure. 
1/02/2016 31/07/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2015 
IE 
 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Physical threats YES 
673627 SafeSky 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
SafeSky - Integrated system for critical 
infrastructure and personal sphere monitoring and 
protection against aerial threats 
1/07/2015 31/10/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
PL PL 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
674422 PreserviX 
H2020-EU.2.1.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Reshaping Digital Preservation 1/05/2015 31/10/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
NO 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime ICT YES 
674563 ART 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Feasibility assessment on Alarm Resolution 
Technology, using X-Ray Echo Methodology 
1/06/2015 31/10/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
NL 
 
Border control; 
CBRN-E 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Organised 
crime 
 
YES 
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663680 Starlight 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Demonstration of a High Definition Low Light 
Sensor (Starlight) for use in the Surveillance and 
Protection of Urban Soft Targets and Critical 
Infrastructures. 
1/06/2015 30/11/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
UK 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Surveillance YES 
707135 GenoPri H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
Quantifying and Protecting the Privacy of Genomic 
Data 
1/05/2016 30/04/2018 157 846 157 846 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2015 
TR 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy YES 
679924 QINTERNET H2020-EU.1.1. Quantum communication networks 1/03/2016 28/02/2021 1 498 725 1 498 725 
ERC-2015-
STG 
NL 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography YES 
648608 EXCHANGE H2020-EU.1.1. 
Forensic Geneticists and the Transnational 
Exchange of DNA data in the EU: Engaging Science 
with Social Control, Citizenship and Democracy 
1/10/2015 30/09/2020 1 838 150 1 838 150 
ERC-2014-
CoG 
PT 
 
Other 
Organised 
crime; Terrorism 
& radicalisation 
Ethical dimension NO 
672045 
Smart firearm 
safety 
H2020-EU.2.1.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Project iP9 Smart firearm safety Introduction of 
the first smart firearm safety to the institutional 
market (police) 
1/04/2015 30/09/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
DE 
 
Other 
 
Law enforcement; 
Certification; ICT 
YES 
662784 
Gait 
Biometrics 3 
H2020-EU.2.1.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Main goal of the project is to create a prototype of 
the software, which will be able to identify people 
just based on the way how they walk. 
1/02/2015 31/07/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
CZ 
 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Biometrics; Law 
enforcement; ICT;  
Forensics 
YES 
684761 SPIN 
H2020-EU.2.1.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Secure and protected interoperability 1/07/2015 31/12/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2015 
SE 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
Information 
exchange; ICT 
YES 
650796 SignSigma 
H2020-EU.2.1.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Launching the next generation of mobile and 
multi-platform signature system based on 
biometric parameters 
1/09/2014 30/11/2014 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
ES 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Biometrics; ICT YES 
684168 Excalibur 2.0 
H2020-EU.2.1.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Revolutionary trustworthy platform for seamless 
authentication of Internet users 
1/06/2015 31/08/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2015 
PL 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography; ICT YES 
684458 REVEN-X1 
H2020-EU.2.1.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
REVEN-X1: Automatic Vulnerability Detection in 
Binary 
1/07/2015 31/12/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2015 
FR 
 
Cybersecurity; 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Cybercrime ICT YES 
696828 
NED- Nano 
Eye Device 
H2020-EU.2.3.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.1.2. 
THE NANO EYE DEVICE 1/09/2015 31/01/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2015 
IT 
 
Other 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
674379 ACT4INFRA 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Innovative Actuators for empowering smart 
pipeline infrastructures towards secure water, gas 
and heating supply 
1/07/2015 31/12/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
DE 
 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
663815 LineVu 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
A novel optical sensor platform for detection and 
measurement of contaminants in gas pipelines to 
protect critical infrastructure from disruption and 
damage - Linevu 
1/03/2015 31/08/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
UK 
 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Supply security; 
Surveillance 
YES 
662822 Invest 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
INtelligent Video analytics to analyse complex 
scenes and Enhance Security of critical 
infrastructure and urban soft Targets 
1/01/2015 30/06/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
UK 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Law enforcement; 
Surveillance 
YES 
664032 BIWAS 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Biological Water Alarm System (BiWAS) for 
protection of urban drinking water infrastructure 
against CBRN threats 
1/02/2015 31/07/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
NO SE 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
CBRN-E 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
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719660 OneCard 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Increasing the security of access to urban critical 
infrastructure with a Near Field Communication 
micro SD smart card for mobile devices using on-
chip state of the art technology 
1/03/2016 31/05/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2015 
SK 
 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
684849 
Loca 
Credibilia 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Data and document integrity for services provided 
through critical information infrastructures 
1/05/2015 31/10/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2015 
HU 
 
Cybersecurity; 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Cybercrime 
 
YES 
712317 QuardCard 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Powered smart card with a biometric one time 
password system 
1/04/2016 31/08/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2015 
DK DK Cybersecurity Cybercrime Biometrics YES 
719382 DAPS 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Drone Alarm and Protection System 1/01/2016 31/05/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2015 
DK 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
UAV YES 
710770 PROTECT-2 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
PeRsonnel lOcation and Tracking for safEty of 
Critical InfrasTructures 
1/03/2016 31/08/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2015 
IT 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
672428 UPAC S-100 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Feasibility study for URBAN PROTECTION 
AVIATION COPTER S-100 
1/07/2015 31/12/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
AT 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces; 
Border control 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
UAV; Surveillance;  
Disaster 
management 
YES 
717736 
WARDIAM 
PERIMETER 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
WARDIAM PERIMETER 1/04/2016 30/09/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2015 
ES 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Surveillance YES 
650476 SmartPatch 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Use of a cost effective smart skin sensor system 
for remote Structural Health Monitoring and post 
event structural damage assessment in Soft 
Urban Targets and Critical Infrastructures 
Protection 
1/07/2014 31/12/2014 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
IT 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Emergency;  Disaster 
management 
YES 
673969 Bio-AX 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
A new wearable, cost effective and non-invasive 
biometric solution for accurate and high 
throughput screening of people, bags and vehicles 
1/06/2015 31/08/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
UK 
 
Border control; 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Biometrics YES 
684441 AIRS 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Advanced Intelligent Raman System for detection 
of explosives and harmful substances at urban 
soft targets 
1/09/2015 29/02/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2015 
UK 
 
Public spaces; 
CBRN-E; Border 
control 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
697593 OMIS 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Optical Mid Infrared Spectrometer 1/11/2015 30/04/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2015 
IT 
 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
696917 FACCESS 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Enabling the large-scale deployment of Facial 
Recognition in banking security 
1/09/2015 31/01/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2015 
ES 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
Biometrics; Ethical 
dimension 
YES 
684759 INNOPROCITI 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
INNOVATIVE ENZYMES TO PROTECT CITIZENS AND 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES 
1/09/2015 29/02/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2015 
IT 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Border control; 
CBRN-E 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
674434 SMS 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
SMS - Safety Micro Sensor 1/07/2015 31/12/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
IT IT 
CBRN-E; Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
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650513 SURVEIRON 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
SURVEIRON: Advanced surveillance system for the 
protection of urban soft targets and urban critical 
infrastructures 
1/09/2014 28/02/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
ES 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
UAV; Surveillance; 
Emergency 
YES 
673138 SENEX 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Table Top Device based on Nanostructured 
Sensors for the continuous ENvironmental 
monitoring of EXplosive substances in sensitive 
areas 
1/07/2015 31/12/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
IT 
 
Border control; 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
CBRN-E 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
651272 HOLOSCAN 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Holographic Scanner for Safe Real-Time High 
Throughput Screening of People and Their Bags 
1/12/2014 31/05/2015 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2014 
NO 
 
Public spaces; 
Border control 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
735092 SK PRES SSH H2020-EU.3.6. 
Social Sciences and Humanities: a New Agenda for 
Europe's Challenges 
1/09/2016 31/08/2017 150 000 150 000 
H2020-
Adhoc-
2014-20 
SK 
 
Combating 
radicalisation 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Social sciences NO 
700176 SISSDEN H2020-EU.3.7. 
Secure Information Sharing Sensor Delivery event 
Network 
1/05/2016 30/04/2019 6 341 775 4 912 693 
H2020-DS-
2015-1 
PL 
UK;CH;NL; 
FR;IT;DE 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Law enforcement YES 
711264 SURVEIRON 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
SURVEIRON: Advanced surveillance system for the 
protection of urban soft targets and urban critical 
infrastructures 
1/03/2016 28/02/2018 2 479 593 1 735 715 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2015 
ES 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
UAV; Surveillance; 
Emergency;  Disaster 
management 
YES 
696945 IMPRINT 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Defeat of Insider Theft in Nuclear and Radioactive 
Sites 
1/12/2015 30/11/2017 1 474 325 1 032 027 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2015 
IL 
 
CBRN-E 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
719806 BIO-AX 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
A novel wearable, cost-effective and non-invasive 
biometric body worn video solution for accurate 
and high throughput screening of people, bags 
and vehicles 
1/03/2016 28/02/2018 1 103 261 772 283 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2015 
UK 
 
Public spaces; 
Border control 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Biometrics YES 
674274 SPIDERS 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Synthetic aPerture Interferometric raDiometer for 
sEcurity in cRitical infraStructures 
1/10/2015 31/05/2018 1 166 000 816 200 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2014 
FR 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces; 
Border control 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
696973 HDIV 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
HDIV: SELF-PROTECTED WEB APPLICATIONS 1/11/2015 31/10/2017 1 325 000 927 500 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2015 
ES 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Cybersecurity 
Cybercrime 
 
YES 
666490 AquaSHIELD 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Protecting citizens against intentional drinking 
water contamination with a water quality firewall 
1/01/2015 31/05/2017 1 123 136 786 195 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2014 
NL 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Physical threats YES 
672001 ACES 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
ACES: Air Cargo Explosive Screener 1/10/2015 30/09/2017 1 233 329 863 330 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2014 
ES 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
CBRN-E; Public 
spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Certification; 
Transport 
YES 
666432 CITRIMACC 
H2020-EU.3.4.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Circulation Pilot with Continuous Control of Multi-
Modal Air Cargo Containers 
1/08/2015 31/07/2017 3 412 665 2 388 865 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2014 
NL UK;NL;LU 
Border control; 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Transport YES 
640652 DCM H2020-EU.1.1. Distributed Cryptography Module 1/11/2014 30/04/2016 149 776 149 776 
ERC-2014-
PoC 
IL 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Cryptography YES 
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673336 CLAPPRO 
H2020-EU.2.1.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Cloud Protection: Centralized encryption 
technology for file sharing 
1/07/2015 30/06/2017 871 615 610 131 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2014 
ES 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
Cryptography; Cloud; 
ICT 
YES 
719375 
QR-PATROL 
PRO 
H2020-EU.2.1.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
A cost effective cloud-based platform for 
delivering the highest level of security, supervision 
and management for security companies utilizing 
Push-to-Talk and Internet of Things technologies. 
1/07/2016 30/06/2018 1 927 423 1 349 196 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2015 
EL 
 
Other Cybercrime IoT YES 
697515 KMaaS 
H2020-EU.2.1.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Key Management as-a-Service 1/02/2016 31/01/2018 3 259 375 2 281 563 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2015 
DK DK Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
Cryptography; Cloud; 
ICT 
YES 
666287 
PAYPLUG 
LABS 
H2020-EU.2.1.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Next generation online payments and fraud 
detection API for European SMEs 
1/06/2015 31/12/2017 2 977 725 1 750 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2014 
FR 
 
Cybersecurity cybercrime ICT YES 
767542 INSIKT 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Novel Social Data Mining Platform to Detect and 
Defeat Violent Online Radicalization 
1/10/2017 30/09/2019 2 190 219 1 533 153 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2016-2017 
ES 
 
Combating 
radicalisation 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Law enforcement; 
Social media 
YES 
772665 3ants 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Enhancing security of digital property rights and 
citizens’ awareness through an innovative anti-
piracy framework of digital content based on 
Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence 
1/07/2017 31/12/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
ES 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
747249 PyroProf H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
Chemical Profiling of Inorganic and Pyrotechnic 
Explosives 
4/09/2017 3/09/2019 177 599 177 599 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2016 
NL 
 
CBRN-E 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Forensics; Law 
enforcement 
YES 
750348 CPR H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
A cross-country comparison of Communications 
designed to Prevent Radicalisation 
1/11/2017 31/10/2019 200 195 200 195 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2016 
DK 
 
Combating 
radicalisation 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Social sciences YES 
736783 Zoovel-UC 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Inaudible SMART CROWDS SECURITY through 
existing loudspeakers” 
1/10/2016 31/03/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
ES 
 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Violence YES 
739685 SecIoT H2020-EU.2.3.2.2. 
Cybersecurity Threat Detection for Internet of 
Things Connected Devices 
1/09/2017 31/08/2018 117 844 117 844 
H2020-
INNOSUP-
02-2016 
UK 
 
Cybersecurity cybercrime IoT YES 
745114 X5 bitworker 
H2020-EU.2.1.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
X5 bitworker - The Copying System for the 
Internet of Things and Industry 4.0 
1/12/2016 31/05/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
AT 
 
Cybersecurity cybercrime IoT YES 
749314 RefBORDER H2020-EU.1.3.2. 
Reflexivity as capacity in EU’s border security: a 
contribution to theory and practice through the 
case of Polish Border Guard training 
1/09/2017 31/08/2019 183 455 183 455 
H2020-
MSCA-IF-
2016 
UK 
 
Border control 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Ethical dimension NO 
744484 INSTET 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Integral Security Trust Element for the Internet of 
Things 
1/10/2016 31/03/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
NL 
 
Cybersecurity cybercrime IoT YES 
774256 ePatriot 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Evolved Sky Patriot – Phase 1 Feasibility Study 1/07/2017 31/12/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
UK 
 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Law enforcement; 
UAV 
YES 
672109 Andrupos 
H2020-EU.3.; 
H2020-EU.2. 
Automatic non-destructive recognition of used 
printing techniques on substrates 
1/07/2017 31/12/2019 1 753 434 1 269 421 
H2020-
FTIPilot-
2016-1 
DE DE;NL;UK Border control 
Organised 
crime; Terrorism 
& radicalisation 
Law enforcement;  
Forensics 
YES 
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739799 IPISA H2020-EU.2.3.2.2. 
Inkjet Printed Sensor Arrays for high efficient, low 
cost, environmental monitoring 
1/09/2017 31/08/2018 108 750 108 750 
H2020-
INNOSUP-
02-2016 
CY 
 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
726317 IPCOM 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Next generation IP-based smart Push-to-Talk 
communication device for public security 
1/07/2016 30/06/2018 2 446 250 1 712 375 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2016-2017 
FI 
 
Other 
 
Law enforcement; 
Communication 
technologies 
YES 
781271 UltraFiBi 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Next-generation Strong Ultrasonic Fingerprint 
Biometrics 
1/10/2017 31/03/2018 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
FR 
 
Other 
 
Biometrics YES 
781027 ARIA 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Advanced ultra-wideband Radar for Integrated 
Applications 
1/08/2017 30/11/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
IT 
 
Other 
 
Surveillance YES 
763240 CHINO 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
The Health Data Security Platform for EU 
Developers Enterprises 
1/01/2017 30/06/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
IT 
 
Cybersecurity cybercrime Privacy YES 
768242 KNOX 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Cost advantageous and scalable drone alarm and 
protection system for urban contexts 
1/08/2017 31/07/2019 1 804 500 1 258 775 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2016-2017 
DK 
 
Public spaces; 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
UAV YES 
767383 
COUNTERCRA
FT 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Intelligence campaigns in the digital realms 1/09/2017 31/08/2019 1 619 375 1 133 563 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2016-2017 
ES 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
775593 GO 4G 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
InvizBox Go 4G - Security and Privacy, Everywhere 1/07/2017 31/12/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
IE 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy YES 
775636 MASS 
H2020-EU.3.4.; 
H2020-EU.2.1.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Micro AIS Shore Station - MASS 1/06/2017 30/11/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
TR 
 
Border control 
Organised 
crime 
Surveillance YES 
757096 QuardCard 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Powered smart card with a biometric one time 
password system 
1/02/2017 31/01/2019 2 314 632 1 620 243 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2016-2017 
DK DK Cybersecurity Cybercrime Biometrics YEs 
739367 ColdNano-X 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
ZnO-nanotech cold cathode x-ray tube for the 
security market 
1/10/2016 31/12/2018 2 730 653 1 911 457 
H2020-
SMEINST-2-
2016-2017 
SE 
 
Border control; 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
743996 U2PIA 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Universal application 2 conduct Privacy Impact 
Assessment analysis and reports 
1/11/2016 31/03/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
IT 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Privacy YES 
744926 I-MUST 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
A handheld, ultra-sensitive device for rapid 
contactless explosive vapour detection in open air, 
based on Ion Mobility Universal Sensor Technology 
1/12/2016 31/03/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
NL 
 
Public spaces; 
Border control; 
CBRN-E 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
744397 
PerfectDashb
oard 2.0 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
First single platform for efficient and security 
aware management of CMS based websites 
1/10/2016 31/12/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
PL 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
743831 DNA TRUSTAG 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
DNA TRUSTAG - A paradigm shift in authentication 
technologies 
1/01/2017 31/05/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
PT 
 
Other 
Organised 
crime 
Forensics YES 
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736300 Eye-O-T 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Cyber security system with a high IoT network 
visibility and fast vulnerability detection for Smart 
Homes. 
1/08/2016 31/12/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
IL 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime IoT YES 
735630 SCR 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Disruptive Cybersecurity SaaS for SMEs and 
freelance developers 
1/07/2016 31/12/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
UK 
 
Cybersecurity cybercrime IoT YES 
735734 ThreatMark 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Advanced Fraud Detection System - Protecting 
digital transactions against cyber attacks 
1/08/2016 30/11/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
CZ 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
735472 NASUM 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Innovative nanotech-based detection equipment in 
the area of homeland security 
1/10/2016 31/01/2017 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
IT 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation; 
Organised 
crime 
 
YES 
729165 BISS 
H2020-EU.2.1.1.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Biometric Identification Security System 1/06/2016 30/11/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
AT 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Biometrics YES 
728408 iNTACT 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Commercialisation of the world’s first iNTelligent 
Access Cover Technology for the protection of ALL 
underground infrastructure. 
1/05/2016 31/07/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
UK 
 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
728532 IDENTITY 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Usable Digital Signature 1/07/2016 31/12/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
ES 
 
Cybersecurity cybercrime Cloud YES 
728516 
ConnectProtec
t 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
A total cyber protection service to Small 
Businesses operating critical infrastructure and 
Residential customers 
1/07/2016 31/12/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
UK 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime 
 
YES 
728673 StandBy-U 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Real Time Response System towards Safety and 
Emergency Management Improvement in critical 
infrastructures and soft targets 
1/06/2016 31/08/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
NL 
 
Critical 
infrastructures; 
Public spaces 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
Emergency YES 
728649 LipVerify 
H2020-EU.3.7.; 
H2020-EU.2.3.1. 
Feasibility study on the development of LipVerify - 
a new viseme based user authentication service. 
1/07/2016 31/12/2016 71 429 50 000 
H2020-
SMEINST-1-
2016-2017 
UK 
 
Cybersecurity Cybercrime Biometrics YES 
740189 EuroBioTox 
H2020-EU.3.7.1.; 
H2020-EU.3.7.5. 
European programme for the establishment of 
validated procedures for the detection and 
identification of biological toxins 
1/06/2017 31/05/2022 9 526 721 7 998 747 
H2020-
SEC-2016-
2017-1 
DE 
SE;FI;BE;FR;UK; 
CH;DE 
CBRN-E 
Terrorism & 
radicalisation 
 
YES 
713762 3SST2015 H2020-EU.2.1.6. 
Third funding line in 2015 for the establishment 
of a European SST service provision function 
1/01/2016 31/12/2017 9 017 433 9 000 000 
H2020-
Adhoc-
2014-20 
IT ES;DE;UK;FR Space 
 
Surveillance YES 
763702 PercEvite H2020-EU.3.4.7. 
PercEvite - Sense and avoid technology for small 
drones 
1/09/2017 31/08/2020 899 008 899 008 
H2020-
SESAR-
2016-1 
NL NL;FR;BE Other 
 
UAV YES 
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Annex 5. Data from the analysis of Horizon 2020 security- and defence-related projects 
Table 11: Distribution of projects by building block 
Building block Number of projects Share of projects 
Cybersecurity 167 48% 
Critical infrastructures 68 19% 
Public spaces 43 12% 
Border control 39 11% 
CBRN-E 24 7% 
Radicalisation 18 5% 
Space 10 3% 
    
Defence* 9 3% 
Terrorism financing* 7 2% 
Hybrid threats* 3 1% 
Critical supplies* 2 1% 
    
Other (outside building blocks) 48 14% 
    
Total  349  
Note: *Building blocks with fewer than 10 projects. 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 12: Distribution of projects by number of building blocks to which they contribute 
Number of building blocks Number of projects Share of projects 
1 building block 274 79% 
2 building blocks 61 17% 
3 building blocks 14 4% 
Total  349  
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
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Table 13: Number of projects related to different building block 
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Cybersecurity  21 3 1  2 3  3 2  134 
Critical 
infrastructures 
21  26 7 7     1  18 
Public spaces 3 26  9 6  2     9 
Border control 1 7 9  8  1     20 
CBRN-E  7 6 8        9 
Combating 
radicalisation 
2        1   15 
Space 3  2 1        4 
              
Defence*            9 
Terrorism 
financing* 
3     1      3 
Hybrid threats* 2 1          1 
Critical supplies*            2 
Note: *Building blocks with fewer than 10 projects. 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
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Table 14: Distribution of projects by priority 
Priority Number of projects Share of projects 
Cybercrime 169 48% 
Terrorism and radicalisation 120 34% 
Organised crime 46 13% 
Outside priorities 49 14% 
    
Total  349  
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 15: Distribution of projects by number of priorities to which they contribute 
Number of priorities Number of projects 
Share in total projects 
belonging to priorities 
1 priority 266 89% 
2 priorities 33 11% 
3 priorities 1 0.3% 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 16: Distribution of projects by priority and building block 
 Priority  
 
Cybercrime 
Terrorism and 
radicalisation 
Organised crime Outside priority 
Building block Number of projects 
Border control 1 25 17 6 
Critical infrastructures 21 52 3  
Public spaces 3 40 3 1 
Critical supplies    2 
Cybersecurity 167 9 4  
CBRN-E  19 4 3 
Hybrid threats 2 2  1 
Radicalisation 2 18 1  
Terrorism financing 3 4 5  
Space 3 2 1 4 
Defence  1 1 8 
Other (outside building blocks) 2 10 17 25 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
 225 
Table 17: Number of projects by main focus 
Main focus Number of projects 
ICT 41 
Law enforcement 40 
Social sciences 34 
Cryptography 31 
Privacy 27 
IoT 25 
Cloud 22 
Surveillance 22 
Biometrics 22 
Forensics 17 
UAV 15 
Emergency 12 
Social media 12 
External security 11 
Violence 10 
Transport 9 
Disaster management 9 
Physical threats 9 
Migration 9 
Applications in satellite navigation 8 
Ethical dimension 8 
Resilience 8 
CPS 7 
Rescue 6 
Peace keeping 6 
Supply chain 5 
Training 5 
Blockchain 5 
Certification 4 
Preparedness 4 
Standardisation 4 
Supply security 3 
Information exchange 3 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
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Table 18: Number of projects by building block and main focus 
Building block / Main focus Number of projects 
Border control  
Surveillance 8 
Biometrics 7 
Migration 6 
Social sciences 4 
Ethical dimension 3 
Supply chain 3 
UAV 3 
Law enforcement 2 
Applications in satellite navigation 1 
Blockchain 1 
Cloud 1 
Disaster management 1 
Forensics 1 
IoT 1 
Rescue 1 
Transport 1 
CBRN-E  
Forensics 2 
Law enforcement 2 
Certification 1 
Emergency 1 
Rescue 1 
Standardisation 1 
Supply chain 1 
Transport 1 
Combating radicalisation  
Social sciences 12 
Social media 7 
Violence 7 
Law enforcement 4 
Ethical dimension 1 
Migration 1 
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Building block / Main focus Number of projects 
Critical infrastructures  
Surveillance 9 
UAV 9 
ICT 8 
Physical threats 8 
Resilience 7 
Disaster management 6 
CPS 4 
Emergency 4 
Transport 4 
Law enforcement 3 
Preparedness 2 
Biometrics 1 
Certification 1 
Cloud 1 
Cryptography 1 
IoT 1 
Privacy 1 
Rescue 1 
Standardisation 1 
Supply chain 1 
Supply security 1 
Critical supplies  
Supply security 2 
Cybersecurity  
Cryptography 31 
ICT 31 
Privacy 26 
IoT 22 
Cloud 21 
Biometrics 12 
CPS 7 
Physical threats 6 
Social sciences 5 
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Building block / Main focus Number of projects 
Blockchain 4 
Law enforcement 4 
Social media 4 
Transport 4 
Applications in satellite navigation 3 
Certification 2 
Ethical dimension 2 
Forensics 2 
Preparedness 2 
Standardisation 2 
Supply chain 2 
Disaster management 1 
Information exchange 1 
Resilience 1 
Training 1 
Violence 1 
Defence  
External security 9 
Peace keeping 5 
Social sciences 3 
Training 2 
Information exchange 1 
Violence 1 
Hybrid threats  
ICT 1 
Physical threats 1 
Social media 1 
Transport 1 
Public spaces/Soft targets  
UAV 8 
Emergency 7 
Surveillance 6 
Disaster management 5 
Law enforcement 4 
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Building block / Main focus Number of projects 
Biometrics 3 
Transport 3 
Applications in satellite navigation 2 
Preparedness 2 
Certification 1 
Forensics 1 
ICT 2 
Physical threats 1 
Privacy 1 
Rescue 1 
Resilience 1 
Social sciences 1 
Standardisation 1 
Violence 1 
Space  
Applications in satellite navigation 8 
Surveillance 3 
Transport 3 
UAV 3 
Rescue 2 
Migration 1 
Standardisation 1 
Terrorism financing  
Law enforcement 4 
Forensics 2 
Social media 1 
Social sciences 1 
Other (outside of building blocks)  
Law enforcement 22 
Forensics 10 
Social sciences 9 
Surveillance 5 
Emergency 4 
Biometrics 3 
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Building block / Main focus Number of projects 
Disaster management 3 
UAV 3 
Ethical dimension 2 
External security 2 
ICT 3 
IoT 2 
Migration 2 
Rescue 2 
Training 2 
Certification 1 
Information exchange 1 
Peace keeping 1 
Resilience 1 
Social media 1 
Standardisation 1 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 19: Number of projects by priority and main focus 
Priority / Main focus Number of projects 
Cybercrime  
ICT 33 
Cryptography 31 
Privacy 26 
IoT 23 
Cloud 21 
Biometrics 12 
CPS 7 
Physical threats 6 
Law enforcement 5 
Social sciences 5 
Blockchain 4 
Social media 4 
Transport 4 
Applications in satellite navigation 3 
Certification 2 
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Priority / Main focus Number of projects 
Ethical dimension 2 
Forensics 2 
Preparedness 2 
Standardisation 2 
Supply chain 2 
Training 2 
Disaster management 1 
Information exchange 1 
Resilience 1 
Violence 1 
Organised crime  
Law enforcement 18 
Social sciences 10 
Forensics 9 
Surveillance 7 
Migration 5 
Biometrics 3 
Supply chain 3 
UAV 2 
Applications in satellite navigation 1 
Cloud 1 
Ethical dimension 1 
External security 1 
IoT 1 
Training 1 
Terrorism and radicalisation 
Law enforcement 19 
Social sciences 14 
Surveillance 12 
UAV 10 
Disaster management 8 
Resilience 8 
Social media 8 
Violence 8 
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Priority / Main focus Number of projects 
Biometrics 7 
Emergency 7 
Transport 6 
Forensics 5 
ICT 5 
Physical threats 4 
Ethical dimension 3 
Applications in satellite navigation 2 
Migration 2 
Preparedness 2 
Rescue 2 
Standardisation 2 
Training 2 
Blockchain 1 
Certification 1 
Cloud 1 
External security 1 
Privacy 1 
Supply chain 1 
Supply security 1 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 20: Number of projects funded under Programme 3.7 and under other programmes 
  Funded under 3.7 Funded under other 
programmes 
Programme 3.7 103  
Programmes 3.7 & 2 100  
Programmes 3.7 & 3.1 2  
Programme 1  68 
Programme 2  54 
Programmes 2 & 3  10 
Programme 3  9 
Programme 4  3 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
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Table 21: Number of projects per H2020 funding programme 
H2020 Programme Number of projects 
1.1. 36 
1.2.1. 1 
1.3.1. 2 
1.3.2. 25 
1.3.3. 4 
2 3 
2.1.1. 45 
2.1.1.1. 1 
2.1.1.3. 7 
2.1.1.6. 1 
2.1.2. 1 
2.1.6. 6 
2.1.6.1.2. 3 
2.1.6.3. 3 
2.3.1. 114 
2.3.2.2. 2 
3 3 
3.1. 2 
3.2.1. 1 
3.2.5. 1 
3.4. 2 
3.4.1.2. 2 
3.4.2.2. 2 
3.4.7. 3 
3.4.8.2. 1 
3.5. 1 
3.5.3. 2 
3.6. 2 
3.6.1.2. 1 
3.7. 163 
3.7.1. 16 
3.7.2. 8 
3.7.3. 8 
3.7.4. 19 
3.7.5. 9 
3.7.6. 16 
3.7.7. 10 
3.7.8. 7 
4.a. 3 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
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Table 22: Distribution of projects by building block and funding programme 
 H2020 funding programme 
 3.7 Non-3.7 
Building block Number of projects 
Cybersecurity 87 80 
Critical infrastructures 60 8 
Public spaces 37 6 
Border control 27 12 
CBRN-E 20 4 
Combating radicalisation 9 9 
Space  10 
    
Defence* 6 3 
Terrorism financing* 5 2 
Hybrid threats* 1 2 
Critical supplies*  2 
    
Others (outside building blocks) 28 20 
    
All projects 205 144 
Note: *Building blocks with fewer than 10 projects. 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 23: Number of projects to which countries contribute 
 Role in the project  
Country Coordinator Participant Total 
EU Member States 
UK 48 204 252 
ES 51 188 239 
IT 40 191 231 
DE 22 195 217 
FR 31 153 184 
EL 12 114 126 
BE 16 94 110 
NL 25 74 99 
PT 10 60 70 
AT 17 49 66 
FI 8 46 54 
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 Role in the project  
Country Coordinator Participant Total 
PL 6 47 53 
IE 8 44 52 
RO 1 41 42 
SE 3 31 34 
DK 7 22 29 
LU 1 16 17 
BG 1 15 16 
CY 4 12 16 
CZ 3 13 16 
EE 1 14 15 
HU 1 13 14 
SI 0 12 12 
SK 2 6 8 
MT 1 6 7 
LV 1 5 6 
HR 0 4 4 
LT 0 2 2 
Other countries 
IL 12 41 53 
CH 3 40 43 
NO 11 28 39 
TR 2 7 9 
RS 0 6 6 
ZA 0 5 5 
US 0 4 4 
IS 1 2 3 
TN 0 3 3 
BA 0 2 2 
GE 0 2 2 
TH 0 2 2 
VN 0 2 2 
AL 0 1 1 
GI 0 1 1 
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 Role in the project  
Country Coordinator Participant Total 
IN 0 1 1 
KR 0 1 1 
MD 0 1 1 
MK 0 1 1 
ML 0 1 1 
MY 0 1 1 
RU 0 1 1 
TW 0 1 1 
UA 0 1 1 
XK 0 1 1 
YE 0 1 1 
Total 349 1828 2177 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 24: Number of projects by building block to which countries contribute 
Border control Role in the project  
Country Coordinator Participant Total 
EU Member States    
UK 7 19 26 
IT 7 16 23 
EL 2 17 19 
FR 2 17 19 
DE 1 17 18 
PT 3 13 16 
NL 6 8 14 
BE 1 11 12 
ES 1 11 12 
PL 0 11 11 
RO 0 10 10 
FI 2 5 7 
HU 0 6 6 
BG 1 4 5 
AT 2 2 4 
LU 1 3 4 
CZ 0 2 2 
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IE 0 2 2 
CY 0 1 1 
DK 0 1 1 
EE 0 1 1 
LV 0 1 1 
SE 1 0 1 
Other countries    
IL 0 5 5 
CH 0 3 3 
NO 1 2 3 
TR 1 0 1 
Total 39 188 227 
CBRN-E Role in the project  
Country Coordinator Participant Total 
EU Member States    
IT 4 10 14 
UK 3 11 14 
DE 1 12 13 
FR 1 11 12 
FI 2 7 9 
BE 4 4 8 
IE 2 5 7 
NL 4 2 6 
PL 0 6 6 
ES 1 4 5 
SE 0 3 3 
CZ 0 2 2 
EL 0 2 2 
HU 0 2 2 
PT 0 1 1 
Other countries    
CH 0 3 3 
NO 1 2 3 
IL 1 0 1 
TR 0 1 1 
Total 24 88 112 
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Combating radicalisation Role in the project  
Country Coordinator Participant Total 
EU Member States    
ES 2 20 22 
IT 3 18 21 
FR 2 17 19 
UK 5 14 19 
BE 0 13 13 
DE 1 12 13 
NL 3 9 12 
EL 0 8 8 
PL 0 7 7 
AT 0 5 5 
PT 0 5 5 
IE 0 4 4 
DK 1 1 2 
FI 0 1 1 
HR 0 1 1 
LV 0 1 1 
MT 0 1 1 
SE 0 1 1 
SI 0 1 1 
SK 1 0 1 
Other countries    
TN 0 3 3 
IL 0 2 2 
AL 0 1 1 
BA 0 1 1 
CH 0 1 1 
NO 0 1 1 
RU 0 1 1 
TR 0 1 1 
US 0 1 1 
Total 18 151 169 
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Critical infrastructures Role in the project  
Country Coordinator Participant Total 
EU Member States    
IT 10 40 50 
DE 7 38 45 
ES 14 28 42 
UK 6 33 39 
FR 6 20 26 
EL 3 22 25 
BE 3 11 14 
NL 3 10 13 
IE 2 10 12 
PT 1 11 12 
SE 1 8 9 
AT 2 6 8 
LU 0 6 6 
PL 1 5 6 
RO 0 6 6 
DK 2 3 5 
SI 0 5 5 
HU 1 2 3 
CY 2 0 2 
FI 0 2 2 
CZ 0 1 1 
EE 0 1 1 
LV 0 1 1 
SK 1 0 1 
Other countries    
IL 0 12 12 
NO 3 9 12 
CH 0 3 3 
RS 0 1 1 
Total 68 294 362 
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Critical supplies Role in the project  
Country Coordinator Participant Total 
EU Member States    
DE 2 4 6 
ES 0 5 5 
FI 0 4 4 
SE 0 2 2 
UK 0 2 2 
FR 0 1 1 
IT 0 1 1 
Other countries    
ZA 0 3 3 
Total 2 22 24 
Cybersecurity Role in the project  
Country Coordinator Participant Total 
EU Member States    
ES 28 89 117 
UK 20 93 113 
IT 14 98 112 
DE 10 94 104 
FR 19 72 91 
EL 7 65 72 
BE 7 41 48 
AT 13 25 38 
NL 4 31 35 
PT 5 20 25 
FI 2 16 18 
DK 3 13 16 
SE 1 15 16 
IE 3 12 15 
RO 0 14 14 
LU 0 11 11 
PL 4 6 10 
EE 1 8 9 
SI 0 9 9 
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CY 1 7 8 
CZ 2 6 8 
BG 0 3 3 
MT 1 2 3 
HU 1 1 2 
LV 1 0 1 
SK 0 1 1 
Other countries    
CH 2 32 34 
IL 9 21 30 
NO 7 6 13 
US 0 4 4 
RS 0 2 2 
TH 0 2 2 
TR 1 1 2 
VN 0 2 2 
GE 0 1 1 
GI 0 1 1 
IN 0 1 1 
IS 1 0 1 
KR 0 1 1 
MY 0 1 1 
TW 0 1 1 
ZA 0 1 1 
Total 169 829 998 
Defence Role in the project  
Country Coordinator Participant Total 
EU Member States    
UK 3 8 11 
NL 1 6 7 
FI 1 5 6 
IE 1 5 6 
ES 1 4 5 
AT 1 3 4 
DE 0 4 4 
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DK 0 4 4 
BE 0 3 3 
IT 1 2 3 
PL 0 2 2 
SI 0 2 2 
BG 0 1 1 
EE 0 1 1 
FR 0 1 1 
PT 0 1 1 
RO 0 1 1 
Other countries    
GE 0 1 1 
ML 0 1 1 
RS 0 1 1 
UA 0 1 1 
XK 0 1 1 
YE 0 1 1 
Total 9 59 68 
Hybrid threats Role in the project  
Country Coordinator Participant Total 
EU Member States    
ES 1 7 8 
FR 0 4 4 
IT 1 3 4 
EL 0 3 3 
BE 0 2 2 
AT 0 1 1 
DE 0 1 1 
IE 0 1 1 
PT 1 0 1 
SE 0 1 1 
SI 0 1 1 
UK 0 1 1 
Total 3 25 28 
 243 
Public spaces/Soft targets Role in the project  
Country Coordinator Participant Total 
EU Member States    
ES 10 14 24 
UK 7 12 19 
IT 5 11 16 
DE 2 9 11 
NL 4 7 11 
FR 2 7 9 
BE 2 3 5 
EL 1 4 5 
PL 1 4 5 
IE 0 4 4 
PT 1 3 4 
AT 2 1 3 
DK 2 1 3 
RO 0 2 2 
SE 1 1 2 
BG 0 1 1 
CY 1 0 1 
CZ 1 0 1 
FI 0 1 1 
HR 0 1 1 
Other countries    
IL 0 2 2 
NO 1 1 2 
BA 0 1 1 
TR 0 1 1 
Total 43 91 134 
Space Role in the project  
Country Coordinator Participant Total 
EU Member States    
ES 4 6 10 
IT 3 6 9 
DE 1 6 7 
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UK 1 4 5 
FR 1 2 3 
NL 0 3 3 
FI 0 2 2 
PL 0 2 2 
AT 0 1 1 
IE 0 1 1 
BE 0 1 1 
DK 0 1 1 
EL 0 1 1 
SE 0 1 1 
Other countries    
IN 0 1 1 
KR 0 1 1 
Total 10 39 49 
Terrorism financing Role in the project  
Country Coordinator Participant Total 
EU Member States    
ES 1 10 11 
DE 1 7 8 
UK 1 6 7 
IT 1 5 6 
AT 1 3 4 
NL 1 3 4 
BE 0 2 2 
FR 0 2 2 
PT 0 2 2 
EL 0 1 1 
FI 0 1 1 
IE 0 1 1 
Other countries    
NO 1 0 1 
Total 7 43 50 
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Other (outside building blocks) Role in the project  
Country Coordinator Participant Total 
EU Member States    
ES 6 37 43 
IT 6 34 40 
UK 4 37 41 
DE 2 34 36 
FR 6 26 32 
BE 3 21 24 
NL 6 17 23 
PT 2 13 15 
RO 1 14 15 
EL 2 12 14 
AT 1 12 13 
PL 1 12 13 
FI 2 6 8 
SE 0 8 8 
BG 0 6 6 
IE 0 6 6 
SK 0 5 5 
CY 0 4 4 
CZ 0 4 4 
EE 0 4 4 
HU 0 4 4 
MT 0 3 3 
HR 0 2 2 
LT 0 2 2 
LU 0 2 2 
LV 0 2 2 
SI 0 1 1 
Other countries    
NO 2 12 14 
IL 2 10 12 
TR 0 3 3 
CH 1 1 2 
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IS 0 2 2 
RS 0 2 2 
DK 1 0 1 
MD 0 1 1 
MK 0 1 1 
ZA 0 1 1 
Total 48 361 409 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 25: Number of contributing organisations by legal status 
Legal status Number of organisations 
Private for-profit entities 645 
Higher and secondary education establishments  296 
Research organisations 178 
Public bodies 163 
Others 66 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 26 Number of contributions from organisations by legal status and role 
All projects Role in the project  
Legal status Coordinator Participant Total 
Private for-profit entities 189 702 891 
Higher or secondary education establishments 95 454 549 
Research organisations 54 313 367 
Public bodies 8 300 308 
Others 3 72 75 
Total 349 1841 2190 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 27: Number of contributions from organisations by building block, legal status and role 
Border control Role in the project  
Legal status Coordinator Participant Total 
Private for-profit entities 26 76 102 
Public bodies 0 47 47 
Higher or secondary education establishments 9 32 41 
Research organisations 4 29 33 
Other 0 4 4 
Total 39 188 227 
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CBRN-E Role in the project  
Legal status Coordinator Participant Total 
Private for-profit entities 14 28 42 
Higher or secondary education establishments 5 23 28 
Research organisations 4 20 24 
Public bodies 1 16 17 
Other 0 1 1 
Total 24 88 112 
Combating radicalisation Role in the project  
Legal status Coordinator Participant Total 
Higher or secondary education establishments 11 46 57 
Public bodies 2 45 47 
Private for-profit entities 2 30 32 
Research organisations 3 20 23 
Other 0 10 10 
Total 18 151 169 
Critical infrastructures Role in the project  
Legal status Coordinator Participant Total 
Private for-profit entities 51 140 191 
Research organisations 10 53 63 
Higher or secondary education establishments 7 55 62 
Public bodies 0 37 37 
Other 0 9 9 
Total 68 294 362 
Critical supplies Role in the project  
Legal status Coordinator Participant Total 
Private for-profit entities 0 12 12 
Research organisations 2 3 5 
Higher or secondary education establishments 0 4 4 
Other 0 2 2 
Public bodies 0 1 1 
Total 2 22 24 
Cybersecurity Role in the project  
Legal status Coordinator Participant Total 
Private for-profit entities 95 413 508 
Higher or secondary education establishments 41 209 250 
Research organisations 30 135 165 
Public bodies 1 50 51 
Other 0 22 22 
Total 167 829 996 
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Defence Role in the project  
Legal status Coordinator Participant Total 
Higher or secondary education establishments 6 25 31 
Research organisations 0 12 12 
Private for-profit entities 2 9 11 
Public bodies 0 8 8 
Other 1 5 6 
Total 9 59 68 
Hybrid threats Role in the project  
Legal status Coordinator Participant Total 
Private for-profit entities 2 13 15 
Research organisations 1 4 5 
Higher or secondary education establishments 0 4 4 
Other 0 3 3 
Public bodies 0 1 1 
Total 3 25 28 
Public spaces/Soft targets Role in the project  
Legal status Coordinator Participant Total 
Private for-profit entities 37 32 69 
Public bodies 0 31 31 
Higher or secondary education establishments 2 15 17 
Research organisations 3 11 14 
Other 1 2 3 
Total 43 91 134 
Space Role in the project  
Legal status Coordinator Participant Total 
Private for-profit entities 8 15 23 
Research organisations 1 10 11 
Higher or secondary education establishments 0 11 11 
Public bodies 1 3 4 
Total 10 39 49 
Terrorism financing Role in the project  
Legal status Coordinator Participant Total 
Private for-profit entities 4 15 19 
Public bodies 0 12 12 
Higher or secondary education establishments 2 9 11 
Research organisations 1 7 8 
Total 7 43 50 
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Other (outside building blocks) Role in the project  
Legal status Coordinator Participant Total 
Private for-profit entities 19 89 108 
Public bodies 3 99 102 
Higher or secondary education establishments 17 83 100 
Research organisations 8 68 76 
Other 1 22 23 
Total 48 361 409 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 28: Number of contributions from organisations by priority, legal status and role 
Priority: Cybercrime Role in the project 
 
Legal status Coordinator Participant Total 
Private for-profit entities 97 419 516 
Higher or secondary education establishments 41 214 255 
Research organisations 30 138 168 
Public bodies 1 53 54 
Other 0 23 23 
Total 169 847 1016 
Priority: Organised crime Role in the project 
 
Legal status Coordinator Participant Total 
Private for-profit entities 23 103 126 
Higher or secondary education establishments 15 75 90 
Public bodies 1 87 88 
Research organisations 7 49 56 
Other 0 13 13 
Total 46 327 373 
Priority: Terrorism and radicalisation Role in the project 
 
Legal status Coordinator Participant Total 
Private for-profit entities 76 196 272 
Higher or secondary education establishments 26 154 180 
Public bodies 3 141 144 
Research organisations 15 110 125 
Other 0 31 31 
Total 120 632 752 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 29: Number of projects with dual-use potential 
Dual use Number of projects 
Yes 311 
No 38 
Total 349 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data 
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Table 30: Number of projects by priority and dual-use potential 
 Priority  
Dual use Cybercrime Terrorism  
& radicalisation 
Organised crime Outside priorities 
Yes 161 110 34 37 
No 8 10 12 12 
Total 169 120 46 49 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 31: Number of projects by building block and dual-use potential 
 Dual use 
Building block Yes No 
Cybersecurity 159 8 
Critical infrastructures 68  
Public spaces 43  
Border control 32 7 
CBRN-E 24  
Combating radicalisation 12 6 
Space 10  
   Defence* 8 1 
Terrorism financing* 5 2 
Hybrid threats* 3  
Critical supplies* 2  
   Other (outside building blocks) 33 15 
Note: *Building blocks with fewer than 10 projects. 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
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Annex 6. Entities participating in H2020 security- and defence-related projects 
Abbreviations used for “Legal status”: 
HES: Higher or secondary education establishments 
REC: Research organisations 
PRC: Private for-profit entities (excluding higher or secondary education establishments) 
PUB: Public bodies (excluding research organisations and higher or secondary education establishments) 
OTH: Other 
Table 32: Entities participating in at least 2 projects related to "Border control" 
Name of entity 
Legal 
status 
Country 
Number 
of projects 
FRAUNHOFER GESELLSCHAFT ZUR FOERDERUNG DER ANGEWANDTEN 
FORSCHUNG E.V. 
REC DE 4 
INSPECTORATUL GENERAL AL POLITIEI DE FRONTIERA PUB RO 4 
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, GREECE PUB EL 3 
ORSZAGOS RENDOR - FOKAPITANYSAG PUB HU 3 
NATO SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION REC BE 3 
SERVICIUL DE PROTECTIE SI PAZA PUB RO 3 
ATOS SPAIN SA PRC ES 3 
MINISTERIO DA ADMINISTRACAO INTERNA PUB PT 3 
KENTRO MELETON ASFALEIAS REC EL 3 
UNIVERSITE DE NAMUR ASBL HES BE 2 
MINISTERIO DA DEFESA NACIONAL PUB PT 2 
INSTITUT PO OTBRANA REC BG 2 
AUDAX GLOBAL SOLUTIONS LIMITED PRC UK 2 
NEDERLANDSE ORGANISATIE VOOR TOEGEPAST 
NATUURWETENSCHAPPELIJK ONDERZOEK TNO 
REC NL 2 
COMMISSARIAT A L'ENERGIE ATOMIQUE ET AUX ENERGIES 
ALTERNATIVES 
REC FR 2 
AGENZIA DELLE DOGANE PUB IT 2 
ENGINEERING - INGEGNERIA INFORMATICA SPA PRC IT 2 
ITTI SP ZOO PRC PL 2 
ETHNIKO KENTRO EREVNAS KAI TECHNOLOGIKIS ANAPTYXIS REC EL 2 
MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR PUB ES 2 
EXODUS ANONYMOS ETAIREIA PLIROFORIKIS PRC EL 2 
TEKNOLOGIAN TUTKIMUSKESKUS VTT OY REC FI 2 
HOME OFFICE PUB UK 2 
UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM HES NL 2 
INOV INESC INOVACAO - INSTITUTO DE NOVAS TECNOLOGIAS REC PT 2 
KOMENDA GLOWNA STRAZY GRANICZNEJ PUB PL 2 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
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Table 33: Entities participating in at least 2 projects related to "CBRN-E" 
Name of entity 
Legal 
status 
Country 
Number of 
projects 
JRC -JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE- EUROPEAN COMMISSION REC BE 4 
HELSINGIN YLIOPISTO HES FI 2 
ENVIRONICS OY PRC FI 2 
UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN HES BE 2 
COMMISSARIAT A L'ENERGIE ATOMIQUE ET AUX ENERGIES 
ALTERNATIVES 
REC FR 2 
UNIVERSITAET PADERBORN HES DE 2 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 34: Entities participating in at least 2 projects related to "Combating radicalisation" 
Name of entity 
Legal 
status 
Country 
Number of 
projects 
AYUNTAMIENTO DE MADRID PUB ES 4 
KENTRO MELETON ASFALEIAS REC EL 4 
EUROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY SCRL PRC BE 3 
POLICE SERVICE OF NORTHERN IRELAND PUB UK 3 
MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR PUB ES 3 
THE UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK HES UK 2 
EXPERT SYSTEM IBERIA SL PRC ES 2 
ETHNIKO KENTRO EREVNAS KAI TECHNOLOGIKIS ANAPTYXIS REC EL 2 
MINISTERO DELL'INTERNO PUB IT 2 
FORUM EUROPEEN POUR LA SECURITE URBAINE OTH FR 2 
NEDERLANDSE ORGANISATIE VOOR TOEGEPAST 
NATUURWETENSCHAPPELIJK ONDERZOEK TNO 
REC NL 2 
FRAUNHOFER GESELLSCHAFT ZUR FOERDERUNG DER ANGEWANDTEN 
FORSCHUNG E.V. 
REC DE 2 
SHEFFIELD HALLAM UNIVERSITY HES UK 2 
HOCHSCHULE FUR DEN OFFENTLICHEN DIENST IN BAYERN HES DE 2 
UNIVERSITA CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE HES IT 2 
UNIVERSITEIT UTRECHT HES NL 2 
MINISTERIO DA JUSTICA PUB PT 2 
MINISTERO DELLA GIUSTIZIA PUB IT 2 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 35: Entities participating in at least 2 projects related to "Critical infrastructures" 
Name of entity 
Legal 
status 
Country 
Number of 
projects 
FRAUNHOFER GESELLSCHAFT ZUR FOERDERUNG DER ANGEWANDTEN 
FORSCHUNG E.V. 
REC DE 6 
ATOS SPAIN SA PRC ES 4 
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Name of entity 
Legal 
status 
Country 
Number of 
projects 
STIFTELSEN SINTEF REC NO 4 
KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN HES BE 3 
JRC -JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE- EUROPEAN COMMISSION REC BE 3 
MINISTERO DELL'INTERNO PUB IT 3 
ENGINEERING - INGEGNERIA INFORMATICA SPA PRC IT 3 
TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITAET BRAUNSCHWEIG HES DE 3 
IMPERIAL COLLEGE OF SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY AND MEDICINE HES UK 3 
UNIVERSITY OF PIRAEUS RESEARCH CENTER HES EL 3 
SINGULARLOGIC ANONYMI ETAIREIA PLIROFORIAKON SYSTIMATON KAI 
EFARMOGON PLIROFORIKIS 
PRC EL 2 
ONTECH SECURITY SL PRC ES 2 
TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITEIT EINDHOVEN HES NL 2 
FUNDACION DE LA COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA PARA LA INVESTIGACION, 
PROMOCION Y ESTUDIOS COMERCIALES DE VALENCIAPORT 
REC ES 2 
RHEINISCH-WESTFAELISCHE TECHNISCHE HOCHSCHULE AACHEN HES DE 2 
AEORUM ESPANA S.L. PRC ES 2 
AIT AUSTRIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY GMBH REC AT 2 
INOV INESC INOVACAO - INSTITUTO DE NOVAS TECNOLOGIAS REC PT 2 
MYDEFENCE COMMUNICATION APS PRC DK 2 
THALES SA PRC FR 2 
PIRAEUS PORT AUTHORITY  SA PRC EL 2 
UNIVERSITE DU LUXEMBOURG HES LU 2 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 36: Entities participating in projects related to "Critical supplies" 
Name of entity Legal 
status 
Country Number of 
projects 
OEKO-INSTITUT E.V. - INSTITUT FUER ANGEWANDTE OEKOLOGIE REC DE 1 
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND JOHANNESBURG HES ZA 1 
SRK EXPLORATION SERVICES LIMITED PRC UK 1 
AARHUS GEOFISICA SRL PRC IT 1 
HELMHOLTZ-ZENTRUM DRESDEN-ROSSENDORF EV REC DE 1 
AGENCIA DE INNOVACION Y DESARROLLODE ANDALUCIA PUB ES 1 
PROJEKT-CONSULT BERATUNG IN ENTWICKLUNGSLANDERN GMBH PRC DE 1 
ASISTENCIAS TECNICAS CLAVE SL PRC ES 1 
SUPRACON AG PRC DE 1 
ATALAYA RIO TINTO MINERA SL PRC ES 1 
GEORANGE IDEELLA FORENING OTH SE 1 
COBRE LAS CRUCES SA PRC ES 1 
ITA-SUOMEN YLIOPISTO HES FI 1 
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Name of entity Legal 
status 
Country Number of 
projects 
DIALOGIK GEMEINNUETZIGE GESELLSCHAFT FUER KOMMUNIKATIONS- 
UND KOOPERATIONSFORSCHUNG mbH 
REC DE 1 
OULUN YLIOPISTO HES FI 1 
DMT-KAI BATLA PTY LTD PRC ZA 1 
SNL FINANCIAL SWEDEN AB PRC SE 1 
FEDERATION EUROPEENNE DES GEOLOGUES OTH FR 1 
SUOMEN YMPARISTOKESKUS REC FI 1 
FRAUNHOFER GESELLSCHAFT ZUR FOERDERUNG DER ANGEWANDTEN 
FORSCHUNG E.V. 
REC DE 1 
UNIVERSITY OF DUNDEE HES UK 1 
GALSA (PTY) LTD PRC ZA 1 
AA SAKATTI MINING OY PRC FI 1 
GEOGNOSIA SLL PRC ES 1 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 37: Entities participating in at least 4 projects related to "Cybersecurity" 
Name of entity Legal 
status 
Country Number of 
projects 
ATOS SPAIN SA PRC ES 19 
KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN HES BE 16 
INSTITUT NATIONAL DE RECHERCHE ENINFORMATIQUE ET 
AUTOMATIQUE 
REC FR 11 
RUHR-UNIVERSITAET BOCHUM HES DE 9 
FRAUNHOFER GESELLSCHAFT ZUR FOERDERUNG DER ANGEWANDTEN 
FORSCHUNG E.V. 
REC DE 8 
IBM RESEARCH GMBH PRC CH 8 
TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITAT DARMSTADT HES DE 7 
IBM ISRAEL - SCIENCE  AND TECHNOLOGY LTD PRC IL 7 
AIT AUSTRIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY GMBH REC AT 7 
THALES COMMUNICATIONS & SECURITY SAS PRC FR 6 
TECHNIKON FORSCHUNGS- UND PLANUNGSGESELLSCHAFT MBH PRC AT 6 
UNIVERSITY OF PIRAEUS RESEARCH CENTER HES EL 6 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON HES UK 6 
IMPERIAL COLLEGE OF SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY AND MEDICINE HES UK 6 
FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY HELLAS REC EL 6 
XLAB RAZVOJ PROGRAMSKE OPREME IN SVETOVANJE DOO PRC SI 5 
TRUST-IT SERVICES LIMITED PRC UK 5 
TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITAET GRAZ HES AT 5 
TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITEIT EINDHOVEN HES NL 5 
CONSIGLIO NAZIONALE DELLE RICERCHE REC IT 5 
COMMISSARIAT A L'ENERGIE ATOMIQUE ET AUX ENERGIES 
ALTERNATIVES 
REC FR 5 
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Name of entity Legal 
status 
Country Number of 
projects 
ENGINEERING - INGEGNERIA INFORMATICA SPA PRC IT 5 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON HES UK 4 
MONTIMAGE EURL PRC FR 4 
UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL HES UK 4 
THE CHANCELLOR, MASTERS AND SCHOLARS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
OXFORD 
HES UK 4 
THALES SERVICES SAS PRC FR 4 
ROYAL HOLLOWAY AND BEDFORD NEW COLLEGE HES UK 4 
TELEFONICA INVESTIGACION Y DESARROLLO SA PRC ES 4 
TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITAET BRAUNSCHWEIG HES DE 4 
IDEMIA IDENTITY & SECURITY FRANCE PRC FR 4 
FUNDACION TECNALIA RESEARCH & INNOVATION REC ES 4 
INSTITUTE OF COMMUNICATION AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS REC EL 4 
FONDAZIONE CENTRO SAN RAFFAELE REC IT 4 
ETHNIKO KENTRO EREVNAS KAI TECHNOLOGIKIS ANAPTYXIS REC EL 4 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 38: Entities participating in at least 2 projects related to "Defence" 
Name of entity 
Legal 
status 
Country 
Number of 
projects 
UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL HES UK 2 
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND MAYNOOTH HES IE 2 
NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY HES FI 2 
EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE PUB ES 2 
ROSKILDE UNIVERSITET HES DK 2 
FORSVARET OG FORSVARSMINISTERIETS STYRELSER PUB DK 2 
ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI REC IT 2 
LAUREA-AMMATTIKORKEAKOULU OY HES FI 2 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 39: Entities participating in projects related to "Hybrid threats" 
Name of entity Legal 
status 
Country Number of 
projects 
INNOVASEC LTD PRC UK 1 
THALES SA PRC FR 1 
NOATUM PORTS VALENCIANA, S.A.U. PRC ES 1 
AIT AUSTRIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY GMBH REC AT 1 
UNIVERSITY OF PIRAEUS RESEARCH CENTER HES EL 1 
ATSEC INFORMATION SECURITY AB PRC SE 1 
LIVE TECH SRL PRC IT 1 
AUTORITA DI SISTEMA PORTUALE DEL MAR TIRRENO SETTENTRIONALE PUB IT 1 
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Name of entity Legal 
status 
Country Number of 
projects 
S2 GRUPO DE INNOVACION EN PROCESOS ORGANIZATIVOS SL PRC ES 1 
CASSIDIAN CYBERSECURITY SAS PRC FR 1 
UNIVERSIDAD POLITECNICA DE MADRID HES ES 1 
DE VLAAMSE RADIO EN TELEVISIEOMROEPORGANISATIE NV OTH BE 1 
IDEMIA IDENTITY & SECURITY FRANCE PRC FR 1 
ENGINEERING - INGEGNERIA INFORMATICA SPA PRC IT 1 
KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN HES BE 1 
ETHNIKO KENTRO EREVNAS KAI TECHNOLOGIKIS ANAPTYXIS REC EL 1 
LUKA KOPER, PORT AND LOGISTIC SYSTEM, D.D. PRC SI 1 
ETRA INVESTIGACION Y DESARROLLO SA PRC ES 1 
PIRAEUS PORT AUTHORITY  SA PRC EL 1 
EVOLEO TECHNOLOGIES LDA PRC PT 1 
SINDICE LIMITED PRC IE 1 
FORTISS GMBH REC DE 1 
UNION INTERNATIONALE DES CHEMINS DE FER OTH FR 1 
FUNDACION CIUDADANA CIVIO OTH ES 1 
UNIVERSITAT POLITECNICA DE VALENCIA HES ES 1 
FUNDACION DE LA COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA PARA LA INVESTIGACION, 
PROMOCION Y ESTUDIOS COMERCIALES DE VALENCIAPORT 
REC ES 1 
AGENZIA ANSA - AGENZIA NAZIONALE STAMPA ASSOCIATA - SOCIETA 
COOPERATIVA 
PRC IT 1 
FUNDACIÓN INVESTIGACIÓN UNIVERSIDAD EMPRESA JAKINTZA 
LANEZKO IKERKUNTZA  - EUSKOIKER 
REC ES 1 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 40 Entities participating in at least 2 projects related to "Public spaces" 
Name of entity Legal 
status 
Country Number of 
projects 
MINISTERO DELL'INTERNO PUB IT 3 
MINISTERIO DA ADMINISTRACAO INTERNA PUB PT 2 
PROPRS Ltd. PRC UK 2 
AUDAX GLOBAL SOLUTIONS LIMITED PRC UK 2 
MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR PUB ES 2 
DEEP BLUE SRL PRC IT 2 
MYDEFENCE COMMUNICATION APS PRC DK 2 
DEUTSCHES ZENTRUM FUER LUFT - UND RAUMFAHRT EV REC DE 2 
AEORUM ESPANA S.L. PRC ES 2 
UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS HES UK 2 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
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Table 41: Entities participating in projects related to "Space" 
Name of entity Legal 
status 
Country Number of 
projects 
EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE PUB ES 2 
SATELLITE APPLICATIONS CATAPULT LIMITED REC UK 1 
ISTITUTO SUPERIORE MARIO BOELLA SULLE TECNOLOGIE 
DELL'INFORMAZIONE E DELLE  TELECOMUNICAZIONI ASSOCIAZIONE 
REC IT 1 
AGENCIA ESTATAL CONSEJO SUPERIOR DEINVESTIGACIONES 
CIENTIFICAS 
REC ES 1 
AGENZIA SPAZIALE ITALIANA REC IT 1 
NOTTINGHAM SCIENTIFIC LTD PRC UK 1 
AGIT AACHENER GESELLSCHAFT FUR INNOVATION UND 
TECHNOLOGIETRANSFER MITBESCHRANKTER HAFTUNG 
PRC DE 1 
TELECONSULT AUSTRIA GMBH PRC AT 1 
AKADEMIA MORSKA W SZCZECINIE AM HES PL 1 
UNIVERSITA DEGLI STUDI DI ROMA LA SAPIENZA HES IT 1 
ARATOS SYSTEMS BV PRC NL 1 
NAVCERT GMBH PRC DE 1 
ASOCIACION CENTRO TECNOLOGICO CEIT-IK4 REC ES 1 
ORBITAL SISTEMAS AEROESPACIALES SL PRC ES 1 
ASTER SPA PRC IT 1 
SISTEMATICA SPA PRC IT 1 
BUSINESS INTEGRATION PARTNERS BELGIUM PRC BE 1 
THE UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM HES UK 1 
CENTRE NATIONAL D'ETUDES SPATIALES - CNES REC FR 1 
UNIVERSIDAD DE SEVILLA HES ES 1 
CENTRO PARA EL DESARROLLO TECNOLOGICO INDUSTRIAL. PUB ES 1 
WATERFORD INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY HES IE 1 
CHANNARAYAPATNA SHIVARAMAIAH NAGARAJ PRC IN 1 
MAANMITTAUSLAITOS REC FI 1 
CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY HES UK 1 
NAVPOS SYSTEMS GMBH PRC DE 1 
DAIMLER AG PRC DE 1 
NOVACOM SERVICES SA PRC FR 1 
DELFT DYNAMICS B.V. PRC NL 1 
RINA CONSULTING SPA PRC IT 1 
DEUTSCHES ZENTRUM FUER LUFT - UND RAUMFAHRT EV REC DE 1 
SATWAYS - PROIONTA KAI YPIRESIES TILEMATIKIS DIKTYAKON KAI 
TILEPIKINONIAKON EFARMOGON ETAIRIA PERIORISMENIS EFTHINIS EPE 
PRC EL 1 
ELECTRONICS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH INSTITUTE REC KR 1 
STMICROELECTRONICS SRL PRC IT 1 
ELETTRONICA GMBH PRC DE 1 
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Name of entity Legal 
status 
Country Number of 
projects 
THE MAIN SCHOOL OF FIRE SERVICE HES PL 1 
EURODEV BV PRC NL 1 
TOPVIEW SRL START UP INNOVATIVA PRC IT 1 
TOTALFORSVARETS FORSKNINGSINSTITUT REC SE 1 
TTY-SAATIO HES FI 1 
UK SPACE AGENCY PUB UK 1 
EVERIS AEROESPACIAL Y DEFENSA SL PRC ES 1 
UNIVERSITA DEGLI STUDI DI FIRENZE HES IT 1 
FRANCE DEVELOPPEMENT CONSEIL (FDC) SARL PRC FR 1 
UNIVERSITAET STUTTGART HES DE 1 
FUNDACION CENTRO DE TECNOLOGIAS DE INTERACCION VISUAL Y 
COMUNICACIONES VICOMTECH 
REC ES 1 
AARHUS UNIVERSITET HES DK 1 
GMV AEROSPACE AND DEFENCE SA PRC ES 1 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data. 
Table 42: Entities participating in at least 2 projects related to "Terrorism financing" 
Name of entity Legal 
status 
Country Number of 
projects 
TRILATERAL RESEARCH LTD PRC UK 3 
MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR PUB ES 3 
RISSC - CENTRO RICERCHE E STUDI SUSICUREZZA E CRIMINALITA 
ASSOCIAZIONE 
REC IT 2 
AIT AUSTRIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY GMBH REC AT 2 
MINISTERIO DA JUSTICA PUB PT 2 
Source: JRC analysis of Cordis data.   
 259 
Annex 7. Horizon scanning on security: selected items which inspired collective clusters 
Misuse of DNA data 
A portrait without ever seeing your face: a realistic mugshot using just your DNA 
Summary: Scientists trained an algorithm to link facial features to people’s genetic code. Using this algorithm the team 
were able to identify people from their genomes. The study raises privacy concerns for those with their DNA stored in 
databases. Research volunteers are typically promised anonymity before they give samples. The new research suggests 
this level of privacy is impossible in the long-run. Using this information, scientists will be able to work back to individuals 
and figure out their traits, which could lead to business opportunities. “Just like Google and others now sell advertising to 
you based on what is in your searches and emails, you could get adverts targeted to you based on what's in your 
genome,” Dr Venter added. Tim Hubbard, head of Genome Analysis at Genomics England, the organisation responsible for 
the 100 000 Genomes Project, told the Times that safeguards were in place to protect the identity of database volunteers. 
He said that as well as all data being “de-identified”, any person, institution or company that attempts to identify people 
through database DNA is breaking the law. Those doing so could face criminal charges or substantial fines, he said. 
Why it could be important? Using this information, scientists will be able to work back to individuals and figure out their 
traits, which could lead to business opportunities. There are also privacy issues to studying predisposition to addictions. 
Date: 5 September 2017; Source URL: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4853084/Scientists-use-GENES-build-
image-face.html 
Building a biobank 
Summary: Researchers to create genome sequence database so that treatment can match needs of patients.  A pilot 
project involving three Thai medical research facilities and a China-based genomics company will build a genome-
sequence database of Thais in order to better match medical treatment to patient needs. The Thailand Centre of 
Excellence for Life Sciences (TCELS), Thailand Research Fund (TRF), and Ramathibodi Hospital’s Centre for Medical 
Genomics have together teamed up with Shenzen-based BGI Genomics, one of the world’s genome sequencing centres, to 
collect the entire genome sequence for Thais. The five-year pilot project will collect the whole 19,000 genome sequencing 
of 10 000 Thai volunteers. The results of the pilot project would then form the initial data as a national “bio-bank” for 
Thais is kicked off. The sequencing work will begin at a TCELS lab, before being expanded and moved to Thailand Science 
Park, which will also serve as the home of the national bio-bank data centre. Sirisak Tapakam, TCELS’ deputy director for 
academic affairs and innovation, said that collected genomic information will help ensure that Thais receive precise 
medical treatment in future. 
Why it could be important? The ultimate goal is also to hope the result of the two genome sequencing projects (the 100 
drug-related genes sequences from 1 000 subjects in SEA, and the 19 000 genome sequences from 10 000 Thais) will 
provide sufficient data to allow government to make decisions about adjusting and improving public health policy and 
more efficient budget spending. 
Date: 25 February 2018; Source URL: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/Startup_and_IT/30339675    
How Just 13 DNA Snippets Could Identify You 
Summary: Just 13 snippets of DNA may be enough to make conclusions about hundreds of thousands of genetic markers, 
even those not present in the sample, possibly revealing enough to indicate personal identity information. The new study’s 
results may help foster scientific collaborations and aid researchers working with degraded or incomplete DNA samples, 
such as those collected from wildlife or archaeological sites, says Noah Rosenberg, a professor of biology at Stanford 
University and the new paper’s senior author. But the ability to infer so much on the basis of so little information raises 
privacy concerns as well, Rosenberg says. The new findings are based on two sets of genetic data from 872 human 
genomes. The first comprised just 13 markers that until this year were the basis of the FBI’s forensic genetic marker set, 
the Combined DNA Index System, or CODIS. (The system was recently upgraded to include seven additional markers, 
bringing the total to 20). The second, much broader dataset included 642 563 genetic markers that did not overlap with 
the first set. The question was, how well could Rosenberg and his team match a person’s record in one dataset to their 
record in the other? Put differently, how well could they predict the second set of genetic markers based solely on the 
first, forensic set? Pretty well, actually. Rosenberg and team found there were strong enough patterns in our DNA—or at 
least in the DNA of the diverse set of people they studied—that they could match upward of 90 percent of the records. If 
they added in 17 more forensic markers, bringing the total to 30, they could match more than 99 percent of the records in 
the two datasets—meaning that with the right combination of databases, it may be possible to infer a wealth of genetic 
information based on a very small set of markers. 
Why it could be important? It can help forensics to perform their job in complex cases. There is an ethical issue regarding 
the privacy of the medical information (genomic information) 
Date: 21 May 2017; Source URL: https://knowridge.com/2017/05/how-just-13-dna-snippets-could-identify-you/    
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Threat of gene editing (CRISPR) 
CRISPR -- potentially dangerous technology freely available 
Summary: Methods of engineering microorganisms' DNA are readily available and getting more powerful. What’s more, a 
new “do it yourself” movement is starting to shift genetic engineering out of large institutions and into DIY labs or 
people’s homes, where it’s harder to keep tabs on. Biological expertise can’t easily be contained. The challenge is that the 
same germs, techniques, and skills needed to study disease can also be used as weapons. The result: potentially 
dangerous technology is freely available. Another security risk is connected to large DNA and biological databases. The US 
is mounting a million-person precision medicine study that will gather such data, and vast commercial troves exist 
already. In February, the US declared gene editing, a new way of easily modifying DNA, to be a potential WMD. At the 
same time, home kits to modify the genes of bacteria using the method, called CRISPR, are on sale online for USD 140. 
Why it could be important? While having huge potential positive implications for health, CRISPR also has unpredictable 
security implications that are yet to be addressed.  
Source URL: https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602643/on-patrol-with-americas-top-bioterror-cop/  
Could CRISPR be used as a biological weapon? 
Summary:  The gene editing technique CRISPR has been in the limelight after scientists reported they had used it to safely 
remove disease in human embryos for the first time. This follows a “CRISPR craze 
(http://science.sciencemag.org/content/341/6148/833)” over the last couple of years, with the number of academic 
publications on the topic growing steadily.  There are good reasons for the widespread attention to CRISPR. It allows 
scientists to “cut and paste” DNA more easily (https://www.labor-spiez.ch/pdf/en/  Report_on_the_second_workshop-5-
9_September_2016.pdf) than in the past. It is being applied to a number of different peaceful areas, ranging from cancer 
therapies to the control of disease carrying insects. Some of these applications – such as the engineering of mosquitoes 
to resist the parasite that causes malaria – effectively involve tinkering with ecosystems. CRISPR has therefore generated 
a number of ethical and safety concerns. Some also worry that applications being explored by defence organisations 
(https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2016-09-07) that involve “responsible innovation in gene editing” may send worrying 
signals to other states. Concerns are also mounting that gene editing could be used in the development of biological 
weapons. In 2016, Bill Gates remarked that “the next epidemic could originate on the computer screen of a terrorist intent 
on using genetic engineering to create a synthetic version of the smallpox virus”. More recently, in July 2017, John Sotos, 
of Intel Health & Life Sciences, stated that gene editing research could "open up the potential for bioweapons of 
unimaginable destructive potential". 
Why it could be important? An annual worldwide threat assessment report of the US intelligence community in February 
2016 argued that the broad availability and low cost of the basic ingredients of technologies like CRISPR makes it 
particularly concerning. 
Date: 31 August 2017; Source URL: https://phys.org/news/2017-08-crispr-biological-weapon.html and 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/600774/top-us-intelligence-official-calls-gene-editing-a-wmd-threat  
Synthetic genome engineering gets infectious 
Summary:  Since the start of this century, a handful of research groups have pursued the synthesis and large-scale 
engineering of genomes. Work on synthetic genomes has seen the field scale-up from the full synthesis of the small 
poliovirus genome (2002), to a complete working synthetic bacterial genome (2010), and more recently to the 
construction and validation of multiple rewritten eukaryote chromosomes for the model organism Saccharomyces 
cerevisiae (2014, 2017). The costs and time-scales for assembling entire bacterial genomes and eukaryotic chromosomes 
mean that synthetic genome engineering is not yet a routine approach to manipulating cells for research or biotechnology. 
However, by stepping down a scale from bacteria to viruses, opportunities quickly arise, even for those viruses with 
comparatively large genomes, like the double-stranded DNA herpes simplex virus (HSV) type 1 genome, over 150 kb in 
length. In PNAS, Oldfield et al. engineer the HSV KOS strain genome, leveraging synthetic genomic cloning approaches to 
rapidly construct HSV variants with combinatorial mutations for functional evaluation. Large-scale genomic engineering 
has been achieved by a handful of groups taking different approaches, but broadly the strategies employed fall into two 
categories: multiplexed editing and hierarchical assembly. For editing, new technologies, such as multiplex automated 
genome engineering-based targeted mutation and the new genome editing tools of CRISPR-Cas9 allow existing genomes 
to be extensively modified toward a target sequence over several generations within their host cells. This can be an 
efficient approach if the cell grows fast and is easy to manipulate with molecular biology methods. For the alternative 
hierarchical assembly strategy, a designed or modified target genome sequence is instead put together gradually from 
smaller subgenomic fragments that are linked together by various DNA assembly methods. Depending on the size of the 
genome or chromosome. 
Why it could be important? Are we examining the consequences? 
Date: 18 October 2017; Source URL: http://www.pnas.org/content/114/42/11006.short; doi: 10.1073/pnas.1715365114  
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Quantum computing 
Significant quantum and neuromorphic computing advancements 
Summary: At the 2018 Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas, Intel announced two major milestones: a 49-qubit 
superconducting quantum test chip and neuromorphic computing. The 49-qubit superconducting quantum test chip code-
named “Tangle Lake,” will “allow researchers to assess and improve error correction techniques and simulate 
computational problems.” The announcement came just two months after the delivery of a 17-qubit superconducting test 
chip. The neuromorphic research chip code-named “Loihi” is designed to mimic the way neurons communicate in the brain. 
Loihi is meant to make machine learning more efficient.  
Why it could be important? The neuromorphic chips will help accelerate real-world data processing in evolving real-time 
environments, e.g. enable smarter security cameras and smart-city infrastructure designed for real-time communication 
with autonomous vehicles. 
Date: 8 January 2018; Source: https://newsroom.intel.com/news/intel-advances-quantum-neuromorphic-computing-
research/ 
China’s quantum satellite - quantum teleportation and transmitting encryption keys 
Summary: In June, Chinese researchers demonstrated that the satellite Micius could send entangled quantum particles to 
far-flung locations on Earth, their properties remaining intertwined despite being separated by more than 1 200 
kilometres. Now researchers have used the satellite to teleport particles’ properties and transmit quantum encryption 
keys. In quantum teleportation, the properties of one particle are transferred to another. The scientists first sent particles 
of light, or photons, from the ground to the satellite — a distance of up to 1 400 kilometres. When the researchers made 
particular measurements of other photons on the ground, the spacefaring particles took on the properties of the 
landlubbers, thanks to quantum entanglement between the earthbound and satellite-based particles – an important 
ingredient of quantum communication. Quantum key distribution is a method of creating a secret string of random 
numbers that can be used to encrypt communications. The researchers beamed photons from the satellite to Earth over 
distances of up to 1 200 kilometres, using the photons’ polarization, the orientation of their electromagnetic waves, to 
transmit a string of random numbers with utmost security. Quantum communication via satellite can reach greater 
distances than land-based transmission, because in space, particles don’t get absorbed by the atmosphere. 
Why it could be important? The new results pave the way for a global quantum internet that would provide for ultra-
secure communications and allow quantum computers to work together. 
Date: 7 July 2017; Source: https://www.sciencenews.org/article/china-quantum-satellite-adds-two-new-tricks-repertoire 
Control society – surveillance profiling 
China piloting nation-wide "social credit rating system" 
Summary: China introduces a pilot “social credit system” – an ambitious social-engineering experiment that the 
Communist Party plans to undertake over the next five years. The system would evaluate the behaviour of individuals and 
businesses by tapping on vast troves of personal digital data accumulated from its citizens’ online activity, such as 
purchases and other forms of digital presence, as well as data related to food-safety or pollution incidents for firms. 
Why it could be important? First attempts to mine personal data and control behaviour based on it. 
Date 29 November 2016; Source URL: http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/11/06/china-wants-to-tap-big-data-to-
build-a-bigger-brother/ 
Neo-Lombrosians decide that you are gay by looking at your face 
Summary: Lombroso is not dead, in the minds of some... In the study, which involved the examination of more than 
35 000 images, it was found that the computer algorithm could correctly distinguish between gay and straight men in 
81% of the instances. For women, this number was 74%. When the software reviewed five images per person, this 
accuracy rocketed up to 91%. The researchers, Dr. Kosinski and Mr. Wang, have also offered an explanation for this 
outcome. According to them, as a foetus grows in mother’s womb, it’s exposed to different hormones–including 
testosterone–that play a part in the development of facial structures. The AI model is able to pick the subtle signals of a 
person’s sexuality from a man’s nose, eyes, eyebrows, cheeks, hairline, and chin. For women, the most important parts are 
nose, mouth corners, hair, and neckline. 
Why is it important? In contrast to the algorithms, the human judges performed much poorly. They accurately identified 
the sexual orientation correctly 54% of the time for women and 61% for men. 
Date: 8 September 2017; Source: https://fossbytes.com/ai-tells-gay-or-straight-from-pictures/    
Would YOU let your boss implant you with a microchip? 
Summary: NewFusion is offering to implant the identification chips in employees’ hands. Chips contain personal 
information and provide access to the company systems 10 000 people worldwide are believed to already have microchip 
implants. 
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Why it could be important?  Controversial devices raise questions about personal security and safety.  
Date: 8 February 2017; Source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4203148/Company-offers-RFID-microchip-
implants-replace-ID-cards.html 
Autonomous weapons 
Open letter to stop lethal autonomous weapons becoming the third revolution in warfare 
Summary: Lethal autonomous weapons threaten to become the third revolution in warfare. Once developed, they will 
permit armed conflict to be fought at a scale greater than ever, and at timescales faster than humans can comprehend. 
These can be weapons of terror, weapons that despots and terrorists use against innocent populations, and weapons 
hacked to behave in undesirable ways. We do not have long to act. Once this Pandora’s box is opened, it will be hard to 
close. We therefore implore the High Contracting Parties to find a way to protect us all from these dangers. This is the call 
of AN OPEN LETTER TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS signed by an 
excellence group of developers and entrepreneurs in AI and robotics. 
Why is it important? “As companies building the technologies in Artificial Intelligence and Robotics that may be repurposed 
to develop autonomous weapons, we feel especially responsible in raising this alarm. We warmly welcome the decision of 
the UN’s Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) to establish a Group of Governmental 
Experts (GGE) on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems. Many of our researchers and engineers are eager to offer 
technical advice to your deliberations. Nevertheless, as a Guardian article explains, We can’t ban killer robots – it’s already 
too late”.  
Date: 20 August 2017; Sources: AN OPEN LETTER TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL 
WEAPONS https://futureoflife.org/autonomous-weapons-open-letter-2017/; We can’t ban killer robots – it’s already too 
late: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/aug/22/killer-robots-international-arms-traders 
The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence 
Summary: A 100-page report released today (February 21, 2018) is sounding the alarm about the risks of malicious use 
of artificial intelligence by “rogue states, criminals, terrorists”. “As AI capabilities become more powerful and widespread, 
we expect the growing use of AI systems to lead to the following changes in the landscape of threats: (1) Expansion of 
existing threats. The costs of attacks may be lowered by the scalable use of AI systems to complete tasks that would 
ordinarily require human labour, intelligence and expertise. A natural effect would be to expand the set of actors who can 
carry out particular attacks, the rate at which they can carry out these attacks, and the set of potential targets. (2) 
Introduction of new threats. New attacks may arise through the use of AI systems to complete tasks that would be 
otherwise impractical for humans. In addition, malicious actors may exploit the vulnerabilities of AI systems deployed by 
defenders. (3) Change to the typical character of threats. We believe there is reason to expect attacks enabled by the 
growing use of AI to be especially effective, finely targeted, difficult to attribute, and likely to exploit vulnerabilities in AI 
systems”. (4) Why is it important? This report surveys the landscape of potential security threats from malicious uses of 
artificial intelligence technologies, and proposes ways to better forecast, prevent, and mitigate these threats. The focus is 
“on what sorts of attacks we are likely to see soon if adequate defences are not developed.” 
Date: 21 February 2018; Source: https://maliciousaireport.com/ ;  
See also: https://connected.cnect.cec.eu.int/community/jrc/directorate-e/e7/blog/2017/11/30/security-and-defense-
artificial-intelligence-and-potentially-catastrophic-consequences-of-allowing-lethal-autonomous-weapons-to-be-
developped; Fake video on mini-drone killers for real questions: http://www.lemonde.fr/videos/#v50lf0; - Future of Life 
Institute: https://futureoflife.org/; Artificial Intelligence and Safety Research: https://futureoflife.org/ai-safety-research/; Call 
for autonomous weapons ban at the UN: http://autonomousweapons.org/ 
Brain manipulation 
Brainwave technologies to read thoughts 
Brainwave technologies will be used in various products in the years to come, they have already started: Actually a 
number of companies already sell basic brain wave reading devices; some companies offer headsets that allow you to 
play a video game on your iPhone using only thoughts. NeuroSky’s MindWave (http://neurosky.com/) can attach to Google 
Glass and allow you to take a picture and post it to Facebook and Twitter just by thinking about it. Even the army has (not 
very well) flown a helicopter using only thoughts and a brain wave headset.  
Why is important? Human computer interaction with a brain reader allows gathering conscious and unconscious brain 
activities. This could be a way for better understanding the intentions and wishes of people but comes with a dystopian 
scenario of Big Brother surveillance. Practical use for touchless human machine interaction (e.g. brain computer interface) 
is another field of application.  
Date: July 2010, April 2017; Source: https://www.ted.com/talks/tan_le_a_headset_that_reads_your_brainwaves and 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/19/facebook-brain-interface/    
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How electrical brain stimulation can change the way we think 
Summary: US military researchers have had great success using “transcranial direct current stimulation” (tDCS) — in which 
they hook you up to what's essentially a 9-volt battery and let the current flow through your brain. After a few years of 
lab testing, they have found that tDCS can more than double the rate at which people learn a wide range of tasks, such as 
object recognition, math skills, and marksmanship. After trying it myself, I have different questions. To make you 
understand, I am going to tell you how it felt. The experience wasn't simply about the easy pleasure of undeserved 
expertise. For me, it was a near-spiritual experience. When a nice neuroscientist named Michael Weisend put the 
electrodes on me, what defined the experience was not feeling smarter or learning faster: The thing that made the earth 
drop out from under my feet was that for the first time in my life, everything in my head finally shut up. There was 
suddenly this incredible silence in my head; I have experienced something close to it during two-hour Iyengar yoga 
classes, or at the end of a 10k, but the fragile peace in my head would be shattered almost the second I set foot outs ide 
the calm of the studio.  
Why it could be important? And then, finally, the main question: What role do doubt and fear play in our lives if their 
eradication actually causes so many improvements? Do we make more ethical decisions when we listen to our inner 
voices of self-doubt or when we're freed from them? If we all wore these caps, would the world be a better place? 
Date: 30 March 2012; Source: http://theweek.com/articles/476866/how-electrical-brain-stimulation-change-way-think 
Nightmare weekend? Don’t worry, removing bad memories is a step closer 
Summary: New research shows that weakening the connections between specific groups of brain cells can prevent the 
recall of fear memories in mice. The study, published earlier this week in the journal Neuron, has led some – including the 
study authors themselves – to speculate that this will eventually lead to treatments for conditions such as post-traumatic 
stress disorder and, inevitably, to news stories mentioning the 2004 film Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, in which 
an estranged couple undergo a procedure to erase memories of each other from their brains. Woong Bin and Jun-Hyeong 
Cho of the University of California, Riverside used a combination of sophisticated techniques to identify those brain cells in 
mice that encode a specific type of fearful memory, and then to suppress them, so that the memory could not 
subsequently be “reactivated”. Contrary to some of the news stories, however, this is not “a new approach to wiping 
memories from the brain”. Over the past five years, there has been a whole series of studies using optogenetics to 
manipulate memories in various ways, most notably from Susumu Tonegawa’s lab at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (https://tonegawalab.mit.edu/). The novelty of this new study is the identification of the neuronal circuitry that 
encodes this particular type of fear memory – it has determined exactly which cells in the mouse brain do so and, equally 
importantly, the precise pattern of the connections they form with neurons in other parts of the brain. This trial involves 
injecting a virus carrying the Channelrhodopsin gene into patients’ eyes, in the hope that it w ill be taken up by cells in the 
retina, so that natural light entering the eyes will stimulate them to send signals along the optic nerve to the brain. The 
effectiveness of such a treatment remains to be seen, and optogenetic treatments for manipulating memories in the 
human brain face far bigger challenges. (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3868662/).    
Why it could be important? Research like this should continue to advance our understanding of how the brain works, by 
revealing more of the finer details about how its cells function together to encode, store and retrieve different kinds of 
memories. 
Date: 21 August 2017; Source: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/aug/21/nightmare-weekend-remove-
bad-memories-step-closer   
Mind-reading algorithm uses EEG data to reconstruct images based on what we perceive 
Summary: A new technique developed by neuroscientists at the University of Toronto Scarborough can, for the first time, 
reconstruct images of what people perceive based on their brain activity gathered by EEG. The technique developed by 
Dan Nemrodov, a postdoctoral fellow in Assistant Professor Adrian Nestor’s lab at U of T Scarborough, is able to digitally 
reconstruct images seen by test subjects based on electroencephalography (EEG) data. “When we see something, our brain 
creates a mental percept, which is essentially a mental impression of that thing. We were able to capture this percept 
using EEG to get a direct illustration of what's happening in the brain during this process,” says Nemrodov. For the study, 
test subjects hooked up to EEG equipment were shown images of faces. Their brain activity was recorded and then used 
to digitally recreate the image in the subject's mind using a technique based on machine learning algorithms. It is not the 
first time researchers have been able to reconstruct images based on visual stimuli using neuroimaging techniques. The 
current method was pioneered by Nestor who successfully reconstructed facial images from functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) data in the past, but this is the first time EEG has been used. 
Why it could be important? The fact we can reconstruct what someone experiences visually based on their brain activity 
opens up a lot of possibilities. It unveils the subjective content of our mind and it provides a way to access, explore and 
share the content of our perception, memory and imagination. 
Date: 22 February 2018; Source: https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2018-02/uot-mau022218.php 
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Misuse of robotisation 
The Day Humans Taught Robots to Fight Back 
Summary:  An amazing video of a robot dog fighting off a human as it tries to open a door is not only creepy, but it also 
has raised the question: Why are we teaching a robot to fight back against humans? The “dog” in question is the SpotMini, 
a 66-lb. (30 kilograms) robot designed to fit comfortably in a home or an office. In the video, the dog is shown attempting 
to open a door—when a human comes with a hockey stick and shoves the robot's grasping arm away from the door knob. 
The robot manages to open the door anyway, and even continues standing when a human tries to pull “him” away from 
the door using a huge leash. It turns out, any successful robot assistant for the home needs to be good at dealing with 
“disturbances”, according to the company — and that may sometimes include pesky humans. 
Why it could be important? Needs for regulation 
Date: 22 February 2018; Source: https://www.livescience.com/61840-robot-dog-fights-off-human.html   
Airbus’ Self-Flying Taxi Drone Takes First Flight 
Summary: Airbus first announced its plans to create a self-flying taxi service in 2016. On Jan. 31, after two years of 
planning and building, it proved it isn’t just a pipedream — the Vahana successfully completed its first flight test. Only one 
person can fit in the electric VTOL (vertical takeoff and landing) drone. It measures about 20 feet wide, 19 feet long, 9 
feet high and weighs more than 1 600 pounds. Discover has reported that Uber is looking to add self-flying aircraft like 
these to their services. 
Why is it important? If successful, it would democratize personal flight giving a strong boost to technologies such as 
electric propulsion, energy storage, and machine vision. 
Date: 2 February 2018; Source: http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/drone360/2018/02/02/airbus-drone-flying/ 
Overreliance on AI 
Nudged by machines 
Summary: Digital assistants have much to offer, but the next technological frontier may not be entirely rosy. As our digital 
butler increasingly controls our mundane tasks, it will be harder to turn off. It will be tempting to increasingly rely on the 
butler for the news we receive, the shows we watch, and the things we buy and even say. We may feel that we roam the 
fields of free ideas. And yet, we are increasingly ushered by the super-platform’s digitalized hand, not recognizing its toll 
on our well-being. 
Why it could be important? Many of our decisions will be done by the digital assistants in the future. 
Date: 8 December 2016; Source: https://www.wired.com/2016/11/subtle-ways-digital-assistant-might-manipulate/   
Machine bias: urgent need to understand algorithmic bias 
Summary: Algorithmic bias is shaping up to be a major societal issue at a critical moment in the evolution of machine 
learning and Artificial Intelligence. Algorithms that may conceal hidden biases are already routinely used to make vital 
financial and legal decisions. Society will start to trust the mathematical (data-driven) models only if there are agreed 
procedures for the identification, monitoring and correction of the algorithmic biases. 
Why is this important? Policy making: regulation of the algorithms use; Data-driven modelling: accept responsibility. 
Date: July 2017 Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fMym_BKWQzk&t=6s and 
https://weaponsofmathdestructionbook.com/   
Subversion of government – new governance 
Backfeed: an operating system for decentralised organisations 
Summary: A new operating system for organisations, called Backfeed, aims to enable “large-scale, free and systematic 
cooperation between thousands of people without the coordination of any central authority”. It is founded upon a peer-to-
peer evaluation system, based on tokens that are recorded on blockchains. The tokens represent the perceived value of 
individual contributions to a community and enable the organisation to compensate accordingly. 
Why is it important? This is part of a growing wave of ‘platform co-operativism’, in which businesses are owned and 
controlled by the services users themselves. It is evidence of the Sharing Economy coming to maturity, and the 
regeneration of co-operatives. It may change the way people live and travel, and the way urbanisation will develop, 
countering the current trend to develop mega-cities. 
Date: 8 November 2016; Sources: https://www.forumforthefuture.org/blog/signal-change-backfeed-operating-system-
decentralised-organisations and http://backfeed.cc/explore-in-depth 
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Individualistic practices and values increasing around the world 
Summary: Individualism is thought to be on the rise in Western countries, but new research suggests that increasing 
individualism may actually be a global phenomenon. The findings, published in Psychological Science, a journal of the 
Association for Psychological Science, show that increasing socioeconomic development is an especially strong predictor 
of increasing individualistic practices and values in a country over time. “Much of the research on the manifestation of 
rising individualism – showing, for example, increasing narcissism and higher divorce rates – has focused on the United 
States. Our findings show that this pattern also applies to other countries that are not Western or industrialized,” says 
psychology researcher Henri C. Santos of the University of Waterloo. “Although there are still cross-national differences in 
individualism-collectivism, the data indicate that, overall, most countries are moving towards greater individualism”. 
Overall, the results showed a clear pattern: Both individualistic practices and values increased across the globe over time. 
Specifically, statistical models indicated that individualism has increased by about 12% worldwide since 1960. 
Why it could be important? Santos and Grossmann are hoping to continue this line of research, studying other predictors 
of cultural change, including migration and shifts in ethnic diversity, and also the potential consequences that rising 
individualism may have on a global scale. “I hope that these findings encourage psychologists in a variety of countries to 
take a more in-depth look at the rise of individualism within their respective countries,” says Santos. 
Date: 18 July 2017; Source: https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2017-07/afps-ipa071717.php and 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0956797617700622 
Asgardia: first nation state in space 
Summary: A team of scientists and legal experts is welcoming people to join the first space nation, Asgardia 
(https://asgardia.space/en/), coined as “a global, unifying and humanitarian project”. According to Head of Nation Dr. Igor 
Ashurbeyli (https://asgardia.space/en/page/concept), the aim is for Asgardia to become a full-fledged independent nation, 
and a member of the United Nations. As a conflict-free no-man’s land, Asgardia will mirror humanity in space, minus the 
divisiveness of states, religions and nations. With false divides collapsed, everyone will be equal regardless of the 
prosperity of the country they happened to be born in. 
Why it could be important? With today’s commercialisation of space through activities such as asteroid mining, we risk 
seeing companies and nations at the forefront setting anti-competitive rules and monopolies. On the legal front, Asgardia 
seeks to create a ‘Universal space law’ and ‘astropolitics’ to protect the interests of developing nations as well as open up 
access to space technology. Using protective shields Asgardia also wants to defend Earth against cosmic threats such as 
asteroids and space junk. 
Date: 24 Mar 2017; Source: https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/oct/12/will-you-become-a-citizen-of-asgardia-the-
first-nation-state-in-space 
Media changing the society 
Post-truth and self-administered justice 
Summary: Pizzagate, the conspiracy theory that claims (with no evidence) that high-ranking Democratic officials and allies 
operate an international pedophilia ring centered around Washington, DC's Comet Pizza  
(http://dcist.com/2016/12/what_on_earth_is_pizzagate_why_did.php), made a cameo in New York City this month when 
employees of Roberta's received threatening phone calls related to the internet fixation. Pizzagate hopped off the virtual 
pages of some of the internet’s most notorious sewers and into real life this weekend, when an armed man walked into 
Comet Pizza and fired a gun, while claiming he was there 
(http://dcist.com/2016/12/alleged_comet_ping_pong_gunman_says.php) to self-investigate the claims of the conspiracy 
theory. 
Why it could be important? Interconnectedness made conspiracy theories more potent, but with the weakening of 
perception of government, people are more willing to act on them. 
Date: 8 December 2016; Source: http://gothamist.com/2016/12/07/robertas_gets_threatening_pizzagate.php   
Both the aggressor and the victim: alarming number of teens cyberbully themselves 
Summary: Adolescents harming themselves with cuts, scratches or burns has gained a lot of attention over the years not 
just because of the physical damage and internal turmoil, but also because it has been linked to suicide. More recently, a 
new form of self-harm in youth has emerged and is cause for concern, warns a researcher and bullying expert from 
Florida Atlantic University. The behaviour: “digital self-harm,” “self-trolling,” or “self-cyberbullying,” where adolescents post, 
send or share mean things about themselves anonymously online. The concern: it is happening at alarming rates and 
could be a cry for help. A new FAU study is the first to examine the extent of this behaviour and is the most 
comprehensive investigation of this understudied problem. “The idea that someone would cyberbully themselves first 
gained public attention with the tragic suicide of 14-year-old Hannah Smith in 2013 after she anonymously sent herself 
hurtful messages on a social media platform just weeks before she took her own life,” said Sameer Hinduja, Ph.D., study 
author, a professor in FAU’s School of Criminology and Criminal Justice in the College for Design and Social Inquiry, and 
co-director of the Cyberbullying Research Center. “We knew we had to study this empirically, and I was stunned to 
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discover that about 1 in 20 middle- and high-school-age students have bullied themselves online. This finding was totally 
unexpected, even though I've been studying cyberbullying for almost 15 years”.  
Why it could be important? “Prior research has shown that self-harm and depression are linked to increased risk for 
suicide and so, like physical self-harm and depression, we need to closely look at the possibility that digital self-harm 
behaviours might precede suicide attempts,” said Hinduja. “We need to refrain from demonizing those who bully, and 
come to terms with the troubling fact that in certain cases the aggressor and target may be one and the same. What is 
more, their self-cyberbullying behaviour may indicate a deep need for social and clinical support.” 
Date: 30 October 2017; Source: https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2017-10/fau-bta103017.php    
Why you should be sceptical that any video is real 
Summary: Researchers have shown how a video of a person talking can be altered in real time to change what a speaker 
appears to be saying. In a new video, the scientists show how they edited YouTube clips to change mouth movements. The 
system uses a webcam to track one person’s facial expressions, and then applies them to the face of the person in the 
target video. The software creates a 3D representation of a subject’s face, which can then be swapped with the 3D 
representation of another face. The process works even if one subject has facial hair or a different skin tone. But it won’t 
work if a person’s long hair blocks his or her mouth. 
Why it could be important? Matthias Niessner, a Stanford University professor who contributed to the collaboration 
between the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg and the Max Planck Institute, warned that because of such technology we 
should be more careful about believing what we see in videos. 
Date: March 2016; Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/03/23/why-you-should-be-
skeptical-that-any-video-is-real/  http://niessnerlab.org/projects/thies2016face.html   
High-tech crime 
New governance forms of organised crime 
Summary: An increasing number of individual criminal entrepreneurs offer Crime-as-a-Service (CaaS). The online trade in 
illicit goods and services enables individual criminals to operate their own criminal business without the need for the 
infrastructures maintained by ‘traditional’ organised crime groups (OGCs). OCGs exploit various legal business structures 
and professional experts to maintain a facade of legitimacy, obscure criminal activities and profits, and to perpetrate 
lucrative and complex crimes. Legal business structures allow OCGs to operate in the legal economy and enable them to 
merge legal and illegal profits. 
Why it could be important? Organised crime is not necessarily hierarchical structure. 
Source: EUROPEAN UNION SERIOUS AND ORGANISED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT Crime in the age of technology 
"SOCTA2017", Europol https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-serious-and-
organised-crime-threat-assessment-2017 
Audio speakers hacked and transformed in spy bugs 
Summary: Research by MWR InfoSecurity (https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/alexa-are-you-listening) found it is 
possible to turn an Amazon Echo into a covert listening device without affecting its overall functionality. One big limiting 
factor: the process does involve the attacker being able to gain access to the physical unit, but it is possible to tamper 
with the Echo without leaving any evidence. 
Why is it important? Hacking and spying will grow and merge, with hackers more and more connected to commercial and 
international spying cybersecurity issues will become more and more relevant. Customers need to be informed of side 
effects of technology. 
Date: 1 August 2017; Sources: http://www.zdnet.com/article/this-amazon-echo-hack-can-make-your-speaker-spy-on-you-
say-security-researchers/  https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/alexa-are-you-listening   
Crowdsourcing police work 
Summary: Police departments are often overloaded with cases, making it difficult to devote 40-plus hours a week to a 
20-year-old case. That’s where podcasters can be a big help. The best recent example of that is the well-known podcast 
Serial (https://serialpodcast.org/). The podcast, which won a Peabody Award, also helped lead to a new trial 
(http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/02/us/adnan-syed-serial-new-trial-appeal/) for Syed, based largely on the very 
inconsistencies Koenig pointed out in her series. The number of true crime podcasts almost immediately began 
multiplying, capitalizing on the many true crime fans who were seeking similar podcasts as Serial came to an end. Serial 
inspired an offshoot podcast called Undisclosed (http://undisclosed-podcast.com/), which took a more in-depth look into 
Syed’s case. In the process, the show’s co-host discovered the cell phone tower evidence that was eventually used to 
overturn the original conviction. “As a community in general, we are very cognizant of the impact podcasts like Serial and 
Undisclosed have had in the legal community,” Lopez says. “People thought Adnan's conviction being overturned was 
impossible, and Undisclosed proved that it wasn't. That is huge.” 
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Why it could be important? A combination of new media and citizen engagement can be used in less obvious domains like 
security. 
Date: 14 February 2017; Source: https://psmag.com/in-an-internet-era-can-armchair-detectives-actually-solve-a-case-
be0a90aa9db5#.npr0fmuqh    
Blurring between security and defence 
Smartphone App detects military bases 
Summary: Sensitive information about the location and staffing of military bases and spy outposts around the world has 
been revealed by a fitness tracking company. The details were released by Strava (https://www.strava.com/) in a data 
visualisation map that shows all the activity tracked by users of its app, which allows people to record their exercise and 
share it with others. The map, released in November 2017, shows every single activity ever uploaded to Strava – more 
than 3 trillion individual GPS data points, according to the company. The app can be used on various devices including 
smartphones and fitness trackers like Fitbit to see popular running routes in major cities, or spot individuals in more 
remote areas who have unusual exercise patterns. However, over the weekend military analysts noticed that the map is 
also detailed enough that it potentially gives away extremely sensitive information about a subset of Strava users: 
military personnel on active service. Following the revelations, militaries around the world are contemplating bans on 
fitness trackers to prevent future breaches. As well as the location of military bases, the identities of individual service 
members can also be uncovered, if they are using the service with the default privacy settings.  
Why it could be important?  The US Marines have had clear policies on the use of “personal wearable fitness devices” on 
base since 2016. Such devices are prohibited “if they contain cellular or wifi, photographic, video capture/recording, 
microphone, or audio recording capabilities.” The policy notes that “merely disabling the cellular, camera, or video 
capability is not sufficient”. But it does allow such devices if they don’t contain those features, and explicitly mentions that 
devices with bluetooth connectivity and a GPS tracking function may be used on base, and it contains no specific ban on 
uploading that information. Those features are what allow apps like Strava to create personalised maps of historic 
activity. 
Date: 28 January 2018; Source: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/fitness-tracking-app-gives-away-
location-of-secret-us-army-bases 
World’s 1st Laser Weapon Is Ready to Blast Rogue Drones 
Summary:  The world’s first laser weapon — one that can “kill” threatening, airborne drones — is ready for action, 
according to news sources. The laser, known as the Laser Weapons System (LaWS), may seem as though it were pulled 
straight from a James Bond movie, but it is entirely functional and can shoot with stunning accuracy, the US Navy told 
CNN. The LaWS is currently deployed aboard the USS Ponce, an amphibious transport ship, in the Persian Gulf. The LaWS 
laser beam is completely silent and invisible. It is also fast: The laser travels at the speed of light (186 000 miles per 
second, or about 300 000 kilometres per second), meaning it is about 50 000 times the speed of an incoming 
intercontinental ballistic missile, such as the one North Korea is testing, the Navy told CNN. The $40 million system 
requires a team of three to operate it and a small generator to power its electricity supply, according to the Navy. 
However, each blast is relatively cheap. 
Why it could be important? Under Geneva Convention rules, armed forces are not allowed to use laser weapons directly 
against people, reported Optics.org, a site that tracks the photonics industry. The US will abide by that protocol, Rear Adm. 
Matthew Klunder, chief of naval research, said in 2014 at a news conference in Washington, D.C., according to Optics.org. 
The US Navy is already developing second-generation systems that might be able to target threats other than drones and 
water vessels. 
Date: 18 July 2017; Source: https://www.livescience.com/59846-navy-laser-weapon-blasts-drones.html    
Concrete as top weapon on the battlefield 
Summary: Concrete is as symbolic to their deployments as the weapons they carried. No other weapon or technology has 
done more to contribute to achieving strategic goals (http://www.cbsnews.com/news/full-transcript-of-bushs-iraq-speech/) 
of providing security, protecting populations, establishing stability, and eliminating terrorist threats. This was most evident 
in the complex urban terrain of Baghdad, Iraq. Increasing urbanization and its consequent influence on global patterns of 
conflict mean that the US military is almost certain to be fighting in cities again in our future wars. Military planners 
would be derelict in their duty if they allowed the hard-won lessons about concrete learned on Baghdad’s streets to be 
forgotten. 
Why could it be important? Should the military incorporate concrete into its plans for contingencies in urban terrain? 
Should it equip Army combat formations with better cranes among its organic equipment? Should the Army pre-position 
concrete? Should research and development be conducted on advanced hydraulic systems or technology that lifts six-ton 
barriers so that a soldier can push them into place by hand? These are questions that military planners should be asking. 
Concrete might not be sexy, but it is the most effective weapon on the modern battlefield. 
Date: 22 December 2016 Source: http://mwi.usma.edu/effective-weapon-modern-battlefield-concrete/     
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Decrease of privacy 
Human rights and automated border controls 
Summary: In 2013, the European Union proposed expanding and harmonizing automated border crossings across the 
region. This Smart Borders initiative could soon be approved. The automated gates (e-gates) in place in many EU airports 
are the first phase. The European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-scale IT Systems in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA) is testing how to link them to databases and processes region-wide. Entries and 
exits will be stored in a database, replacing passport stamps. This information will be made available to border-control 
and immigration authorities, and will be linked to fingerprint records and watch lists held by police, customs and 
immigration agencies. 
Why it could be important? A piece on technological developments in creation of ‘big data borders’ and how they endanger 
human rights (privacy, data security, non-discrimination, right to avoid suspicion) and produce inequalities. Of relevance to 
transport and security policies, justice and fundamental rights. When our personal data are collected and shared before 
we board an aeroplane, a border ceases to be a line that separates countries or administrative areas. It becomes a 
process of monitoring, control and automated decisions. The physical border is increasingly irrelevant because our rights, 
privileges, relations, characteristics and risk levels are checked all the time. 
Date: 9 March 2017; Source: http://www.nature.com/news/protect-rights-at-automated-borders-1.21543   
Digital Health/Public Health Informatics 
Summary: The digital revolution is ongoing and nearly everything is affected by it. The opportunities for interdisciplinary 
digital health research bringing together computer science to improve public health, global health and wellbeing of 
individuals, populations and ecosystems globally are numerous.  
Why it could be important? The questions that need to be raised however are concerning the risks of these trends. Who 
owns the data? How is the security organized/regulated? Avoidance is digital dictatorship should be prioritized.  
Source: http://www.acm-digitalhealth.org/    
New law enforcement techniques 
Big brother: sunglasses equipped with facial recognition technology 
Summary: Police in China have begun using sunglasses equipped with facial recognition technology to identify suspected 
criminals. The glasses are connected to an internal database of suspects, meaning officers can quickly scan crowds while 
looking for fugitives.  China is a world leader in facial recognition technology and regularly reminds its citizens that such 
equipment will make it almost impossible to evade the authorities. The country has been building what it calls “the world's 
biggest camera surveillance network”. 
Why it is important? Fight criminality but also track political dissidents or profile ethnic minorities. 
Date: 7 February 2018; Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-42973456   
The next generation of cameras might see behind walls 
Summary: The latest camera research is shifting away from increasing the number of mega-pixels towards fusing camera 
data with computational processing. The single pixel camera captures information from many light sources with a single 
pixel – for example a simple data projector that illuminates the scene one spot at a time or with a series of different 
patterns. This form of imaging would allow you to create cameras that work at wavelengths of light beyond the visible 
spectrum, where good detectors cannot be made into cameras. It is even possible to capture images from light particles 
that have never even interacted with the object we want to photograph, taking advantage of the idea of “quantum 
entanglement”. This has intriguing possibilities for looking at objects whose properties might change when lit up, such as 
the eye. For example, does a retina look the same when in darkness as in light? The Lytro camera that collects information 
about light intensity and direction on the same sensor, to produce images that can be refocused after the image has been 
taken. The Light L16 camera, with more than ten different sensors, combines all the data to provide a 50 Mb, re-focusable 
and re-zoomable, professional-quality image. Researchers are also working hard on the problem of seeing through fog, 
seeing behind walls (https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms1747), and even imaging deep inside the human body and 
brain (https://www.nature.com/articles/nphoton.2014.107). All of these techniques rely on combining images with models 
that explain how light travels through or around different substances. Another interesting approach that is gaining ground 
relies on artificial intelligence to “learn” to recognise objects from the data 
(https://www.osapublishing.org/optica/abstract.cfm?uri=optica-4-9-1117). Single photon and quantum imaging 
technologies are also maturing to the point that they can take pictures with incredibly low light levels and videos with 
incredibly fast speeds reaching a trillion frames per second. 
Why it could be important? One day we may not even need cameras in the conventional sense any more. Instead we will 
use light detectors that only a few years ago we would never have considered any use for imaging. And they will be able 
to do incredible things, like see through fog, inside the human body and even behind walls. 
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Date: 22 January 2018; Source: https://theconversation.com/the-next-generation-of-cameras-might-see-behind-walls-
90258 
Cellphone tracking for outbreaks 
Summary: The idea is to find out very quickly the origin of a new infection (accidental or criminal). Usually when there is a 
new epidemics people are doing an outbreak investigation through a survey among the affected people and relatives in 
order to discover what they can have had in common (food, water, specific common places, etc.). In this paper the idea is 
to use the history of recent locations of affected people through their cell phones (ethically not possible right now, but this 
is an exercise done in Israel). Then you compare the tracking of people obtained through their cell phone and try to find 
where they have been together…  
Why is it important? Apparently it reduces the time from 24 hours (usually required when using surveys), to 4 hours and it 
could even be quicker if the tracking was more accurate (here the information is obtained through cell phone companies 
and signal from antenna). Of course it can only be done once people are showing symptoms… so the attack/event may 
have occurred several days before depending on the incubation period. But once it starts then you can define the exact 
location and also people who may have also been exposed. 
Date: February 2018; Source: https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/hs.2017.0012    
Robotisation – impact on society 
Post-work: the radical idea of a world without jobs 
Summary: As a source of subsistence, let alone prosperity, work is now insufficient for whole social classes. In the UK, 
almost two-thirds of those in poverty – around 8 million people – are in working households. In 2017, half of recent UK 
graduates were officially classified as “working in a non-graduate role”. In the US, “belief in work is crumbling among 
people in their 20s and 30s”, says Benjamin Hunnicutt, a leading historian of work. “They are not looking to their job for 
satisfaction or social advancement”. Hester would like the post-work movement to think more radically about the nuclear 
home and family. Both have been so shaped by work, she argues, that a post-work society will redraw them. The 
disappearance of the paid job could finally bring about one of the oldest goals of feminism: that housework and raising 
children are no longer accorded a lower status. With people having more time, and probably less money, private life could 
also become more communal, she suggests, with families sharing kitchens, domestic appliances, and larger facilities. 
Why is it important? “A post-work society is meant to resolve conflicts between different economic interest groups – that’s 
part of its appeal,” he told me. Tired of the never-ending task of making work better, some socialists have latched on to 
post-work, he argues, in the hope that exploitation can finally be ended by getting rid of work altogether. 
Date: 19 January 2018 Source: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jan/19/post-work-the-radical-idea-of-a-world-
without-jobs 
Increasing support for a universal basic income 
Summary: Support for a Basic Income Guarantee (BI) is increasing around the world. It is largely accepted that a BI could 
unleash creativity and encourage new work forms that could reduce unemployment, underemployment, encourage 
entrepreneurship, encourage consumption at least at replacement levels, avoid eventual social unrest and reduce work-
related health risks. Some 68% of EU-28 supports the principle of a BI. Previous pilot programs showed clear benefits and 
more pilots are being currently conducted and planned. The idea is also supported by tech moguls, some already funding 
pilot projects. In New Zealand, which will hold national elections this month, a BI is being actively debated. The new TOP 
party has it as one of their main platform items (No 7) and the Labour Party is also discussing it and considering a “local 
version”.  
Why is it important? Basic income would be a major departure from current active social and employment policy. Would it 
lend itself to integration, could it be a common policy? 
Date: July-August 2017; Sources:  https://futurism.com/richard-branson-just-endorsed-basic-income-here-are-10-other-
tech-moguls-who-support-the-radical-idea/ http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/Basic-Income-Policy-Option-2017.pdf 
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New use of resources 
Mining Minerals in space: a reality in 20 years? 
Summary: Scientists believe there is an abundance of valuable resources in asteroids and comets that circle around the 
Sun at about the same speed and distance as the Earth orbits the Sun. An Australian study investigated the potential 
economic benefits of an off-Earth operation for asteroids. This study examined the metallic asteroid 1986 DA, which is 
2.3 km diameter and contains 88% iron, 10% nickel and 0.5% cobalt. Asteroid 1986DA is also estimated to contain more 
than 10,000 tonnes of gold and 100 000 tonnes of platinum. It is located approximately 75 million km from the Earth – a 
similar distance between the Earth and Mars – at the closest point of its orbit. The study concluded that extracting 
minerals from this asteroid and bringing back to Earth is not economically viable, but if the asteroid is halfway closer to 
the Earth then the operation starts becoming viable. Considering that there are about two million Near Earth Asteroids, it’s 
not hard to see that commercial launch systems and advanced robotics technologies will soon make space-based mining 
financially viable. Previous research has found that asteroids have several commodities of interest: water and volatiles, 
precious metals, rare earth minerals, refractory materials, iron and nickel. Comets, on the other hand, have been viewed by 
the naked eye from the Earth and contain a mixture of gas, dust and water vapour. However, water must be considered 
the most important commodity in the development of a space economy. Hydrolysis of water produces hydrogen and 
oxygen, which can be used as a rocket fuel to resupply satellites and spacecraft. Hence there is a common belief that 
water will be the currency of space. The Moon will most probably be the first off-Earth body that humans colonise. The 
colonisation purpose most likely will be for tourism or as a staging post for missions to Mars or beyond. According to most 
researchers and futurists, the Moon regolith would be an ideal material that can be used to construct facilities required by 
humans. Furthermore, yttrium, lanthanum, and samarium are increasingly critical in the manufacturing of high-tech 
products such as tablet computers, electric vehicles and wind turbines, and helium-3 is a non-radioactive nuclear fusion 
fuel that is considered the safest energy source of the future. All of these are abundant on the Moon. Many researchers 
agree that Mars is the most logical destination for the next manned visit to interplanetary space.  
Why is it important? “Off-Earth mining has the potential to trigger great expansion in the global economy (…). We also 
need to make sure we have trained manpower to take advantage of this great adventure” says Michael Dello-Iacovo, a 
former geophysicist and researcher in the area. 
References: Text mainly based on: Mining Minerals in Space. Australian Science, October 2016. 
Mars Colony in situ resource utilization: An integrated architecture and economics model. Robert Shishko, Rene Fradet, 
Sydney Do, Serkan Saydam, Carlos Tapia-Cortez, Andrew G. Dempster,  Jeff Coulton. Acta Astronautica, 138 (2017) 53–
67. 
Finnish Cities To Explore Small Modular Reactors For District Heating 
Summary: The Finnish cities of Helsinki, Espoo and Kirkkonummi have begun studies to find out if it would be feasible to 
replace coal and natural gas in district heating with small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs), the environmental group 
Ecomodernist Society of Finland said. The society said a feasibility study will be carried out into the potential for SMRs to 
replace fossil fuel-burning in cities around the Helsinki metropolitan area. Several advanced SMRs are in development and 
coming to market by 2030 that could meet the specifications, the society said.  
Why it could be important? Most of the district heating in Finland is produced by burning coal, natural gas, wood fuels and 
peat. While many Finnish cities have progressive climate policies and goals, they have struggled to decarbonise heating 
and liquid fuels, the society said. Rauli Partanen, vice-chair of the society and an independent energy analyst and author, 
said there are “significant economic possibilities” in producing combined heat and power (CHP) with nuclear reactors. He 
said: “With CHP, the reactor could produce roughly twice the value per installed capacity compared with just electricity 
production, while at the same time decarbonising heat production.” He said nuclear is great for baseload needs, but with 
advanced technologies such as high temperature reactors and high temperature electrolysis, nuclear can also be used to 
decarbonise not just electricity, heat but also transportation fuels and many industries”. 
Date: 15 December 2017; Source: NucNet 
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Death from pollution dwarfs any other causes 
Summary: Pollution kills at least nine million people and costs trillions of dollars every year, according to the most 
comprehensive global analysis to date, which warns the crisis “threatens the continuing survival of human societies”. 
“Pollution is one of the great existential challenges of the [human-dominated] Anthropocene era,” concluded the authors 
of the Commission on Pollution and Health, published in the Lancet on Friday. “Pollution endangers the stability of the 
Earth’s support systems and threatens the continuing survival of human societies. Pollution kills at least nine million 
people a year, and welfare losses from pollution amount are estimated at USD 4.6 trillion a year, equivalent to more than 
6% of global GDP. The commission report combined data from the World Health Organisation (WHO) and elsewhere and 
found air pollution was the biggest killer, leading to heart disease, stroke, lung cancer and other illnesses. Outdoor air 
pollution, largely from vehicles and industry, caused 4.5 million deaths a year and indoor air pollution, from wood and 
dung stoves, caused 2.9 million. The next biggest killer was pollution of water, often with sewage, which is linked to 1.8 
million deaths as a result of gastrointestinal diseases and parasitic infections. Workplace pollution, including exposure to 
toxins, carcinogens and second hand tobacco smoke, resulted in 800 000 deaths from diseases including pneumoconiosis 
in coal workers and bladder cancer in dye workers. Lead pollution, the one metal for which some data is available, was 
linked to 500 000 deaths a year. 
Why it could be important? The editor-in-chief of the Lancet, Dr Richard Horton, and the executive editor, Dr Pamela Das, 
said: “No country is unaffected by pollution. Human activities, including industrialisation, urbanisation, and globalisation, 
are all drivers of pollution. We hope the commission findings will persuade leaders at the national, state, provincial and 
city levels to make pollution a priority. Current and future generations deserve a pollution-free world.” 
Date: 20 October 2017; Source: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/oct/19/global-pollution-kills-millions-
threatens-survival-human-societies  
The world is running out of sand 
Summary: Pascal Peduzzi, a Swiss scientist and the director of one of the U.N.’s environmental groups, told the BBC last 
May that China’s swift development had consumed more sand in the previous four years than the United States used in 
the past century. In India, commercially useful sand is now so scarce that markets for it are dominated by “sand mafias”—
criminal enterprises that sells material taken illegally from rivers and other sources, sometimes killing to safeguard their 
deposits. In the United States, the fastest-growing uses include the fortification of shorelines eroded by rising sea levels 
and more and more powerful ocean storms—efforts that, like many attempts to address environmental challenges, create 
environmental challenges of their own. 
Why it could be important? In the industrial world, sand is “aggregate,” a category that includes gravel, crushed stone, and 
various recycled materials. Aggregate is the main constituent of concrete (eighty per cent) and asphalt (ninety-four per 
cent), and it’s also the primary base material that concrete and asphalt are placed on during the building of roads, 
buildings, parking lots, runways, and many other structures. A report published in 2004 by the American Geological 
Institute said that a typical American house requires more than a hundred tons of sand, gravel, and crushed stone for the 
foundation, basement, garage, and driveway, and more than two hundred tons if you include its share of the street that 
runs in front of it. A mile-long section of a single lane of an American interstate highway requires thirty-eight thousand 
tons. The most dramatic global increase in aggregate consumption is occurring in parts of the world where people who 
build roads are trying to keep pace with people who buy cars. 
Date: 29 May 2017; Source: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/29/the-world-is-running-out-of-sand   
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the address of the centre 
nearest you at: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa website at: 
https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publications. 
Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see 
https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en). 
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